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### LA TURQUIE RECONNAIT L'ÉVACUATION DE 3185 VILLAGES KURDES DEPUIS 1990



L'ISSUE d'une visite d'information dans les provinces kurdes, une mission de la Commission d'enquête parlementaire sur les migrations a révélé ces chiffres au cours d'une conférence de presse donnée le 28 juillet à Diyarbakir au siège de l'Association des journalistes du Sud-Est. Le président de cette

Commission, Seyit Hasim Hasimi, député de Diyarbakir, a indiqué que ces données officielles ont été communiquées à la mission par la préfecture de la région d'état d'urgence (OHAL). Selon ces données 853 villages et 2332 hameaux ont été complètement évacués de leurs 364742 habitants dans le cadre de «la lutte contre le terrorisme». Sur cette population

déplacée, 11032 paysans ont par la suite été autorisés à regagner 63 villages et 27 hameaux. 87% des paysans déplacés vivent en dessous du seuil de pauvreté. «Ils ont été dépossédés et n'ont plus aucun lien avec leurs champs, leurs vergers et leurs autres biens restés à l'abandon dans les villages évacués quand ils n'ont pas été détruits et incendiés» a encore ajouté M. Hasimi. «Les gens ont besoin du pain pour survivre; des épidémies comme la fièvre typhoïde et la jaunisse ont atteint des dimensions effroyables au sein de cette population» a poursuivi le député qui décrit Diyarbakir comme «la capitale de la misère où on compte 311.000 adultes au chômage contre 127.000 qui ont un emploi plus ou moins stable».

Les destructions de villages se sont poursuivies en juin et juillet dans les provinces de Mardin et de Batman. Dans la province de Dersim (Tunceli) la population accuse l'armée d'incendier les forêts de chênes. Un élu de cette province, le député Orhan Veli Yildirim a accusé, le 5 août 1997, l'armée pour l'attaque aux mortiers contre le village de Karsilâr, à l'est de la ville de Tunceli, tuant une femme âgée de 55 ans et blessant trois autres personnes. *«L'armée était responsable de l'attaque. Deux officiers sont même allés s'excuser... Dix jours plus tôt le village avait été la cible d'une attaque aux mortiers pour intimider les villageois»* a-t-il déclaré à la presse. Depuis 1994, la province de Tunceli est sous embargo alimentaire imposé par l'armée sous prétexte de *«couper l'aide logistique aux séparatistes»*. M. Yildirim a affirmé que *«80% des routes (dans la province de Tunceli) sont bloquées à partir de 15h. Toutes nos écoles sont fermées... Notre population persécutée, dans la nuit par les terroristes et dans la journée par l'État»*. Les autorités locales nient l'existence d'un tel embargo. Le gouverneur militaire de Tunceli déclare, néanmoins: *«Il n'y a pas d'embargo à Tunceli. Mais nous envoyons les produits alimentaires aux villages d'une façon contrôlée»*. Les habitants de Tunceli pour se procurer des produits alimentaires doivent d'abord passer par un poste de commissariat pour déclarer le nombre exact des membres de leurs familles afin d'obtenir un document leur permettant de faire leurs courses. *«Les militaires disent aux habitants: partez, peu importe la destination, mais partez d'ici, et maintenant ils les bombardent»* a déclaré Huseyin Ayrimaz président de l'Association de culture et de solidarité de Tunceli, basée à Istanbul.

Selon le quotidien *Hürriyet* du 28 juillet on compte actuellement 3 millions d'enfants déplacés en

Turquie. Ce qui donne une indication sur l'ampleur des déplacements des populations dus à la guerre du Kurdistan. Pour la première fois depuis le début de la politique de la terre brûlée conduite par l'armée turque dans le Kurdistan, une recherche universitaire vient d'être réalisée sur la population dont les villages ont été évacués, axée sur les enfants. Cette recherche a été conduite par le chercheur Ahmet Bilgili, directeur du département de sociologie de l'université Yüzüncü Yil, à Van. Le chercheur a analysé, durant l'année universitaire 1996, les mouvements démographiques en relation avec la guerre du Kurdistan, dans l'Est de l'Anatolie. A l'issue de cette recherche, il a écrit un rapport intitulé: *«Rapport sur les enfants issus de la migration dans l'Est de l'Anatolie»*.

De larges extraits de ce rapport ont été publiés dans l'édition du 28 juillet du *Hürriyet*. En ce qui concerne la province de Van, M. Bilgili a mené des enquêtes et des entretiens dans les quatre camps et les trois centres d'habitations en bordure de la ville où sont regroupés les familles déplacées. Il s'est également entretenu avec des élèves, des chefs de familles et des instituteurs. Afin de mieux communiquer avec les enfants, il s'est servi d'interprètes kurdes. La ville de Van, selon le dernier recensement de 1990, comptait 153.000 habitants. Sa population a triplé depuis, passant à 457000 habitants, selon les statistiques de la préfecture. Les subventions attribuées à la maire se font toujours en fonction du dernier recensement. *«Nous avons fixé à 6,6 le nombre d'enfants par famille déplacée. Les familles vivent avec leurs enfants dans des endroits exigus. Si l'on prend en compte leurs parents proches, on se retrouve alors avec une population de 20 à 25 personnes vivant dans le même endroit.»* relève le chercheur. L'unique

moyen de subsistance traditionnelle était l'élevage; ce moyen n'existant plus en raison de la guerre, les familles se trouvent en situation de détresse. *«Les enfants, tout comme leurs familles, sont obligés de faire des petits boulots comme étalagistes, cirqueurs, balayeurs et contribuent ainsi au budget de leurs familles. Néanmoins, il n'y a qu'une partie infime d'entre eux qui parvient à trouver ou à faire ce genre de petits boulots»* indique encore le rapport.

Diyarbakir, dont la population était de 381 000 il y a encore sept ans, est en tête des villes affectées par la politique de déplacements forcés. Sa population est estimée aujourd'hui à 1,5 millions. La recherche de M. Bilgili conduit à la conclusion que ce sont les enfants qui font les frais de ces déplacements forcés car *«Il n'est pas possible que les enfants se sentent en sûreté au cours de ce processus qui affecte de manière très considérable les enfants vivant sous le régime de l'état d'urgence. Déjà, ils ne comprennent pas le sens des déplacements forcés de l'état d'urgence. Les enfants victimes des déplacements forcés grandissent dans un état d'anxiété et dans un état d'esprit détruisant leur sentiment de confiance»*. Le chercheur se plaint qu'aucun service d'assistance n'est assuré par les autorités et explique que *«l'enfant s'habitue à l'endroit où il naît et où il grandit. Dans un endroit qui lui est familier, il se sent en sûreté. S'il est détaché de son environnement social et naturel où il a grandi, il éprouve le besoin d'être aidé pour s'habituer à son nouvel environnement. Mais malheureusement il n'existe aucun moyen d'assistance dans notre pays pour venir en aide aux enfants victimes à ce genre de fléau.»* Étant donné la situation désastreuse dans laquelle se trouvent les familles déplacées, le chercheur explique comment celles-ci en arrivent à considérer leurs enfants comme des moyens de subsistance *«A la question*

(voulez-vous que vos enfants travaillent pour rapporter de l'argent?), 64% des sondés répondent par l'affirmative. A la question (De quoi vivez-vous actuellement?) 15% des sondés répondent (grâce à l'argent gagné par leurs enfants) comme ils ne peuvent trouver de travail eux-mêmes. Il s'avère que la contribution de l'enfant à la famille par sa force du travail devient une nécessité en raison des déplacements forcés». La pauvreté détruit ainsi toutes les structures socio-économiques de la famille.

A l'issue de ses études du terrain le chercheur fait les propositions suivantes pour atténuer l'impact néfaste des déplacements forcés sur les enfants: Les enfants doivent être tenus

à l'écart de la sphère politique. *«Il ne faut jamais tolérer la mort et la souffrance des enfants quelle que soit l'ampleur des conflits armés. C'est pourquoi les enfants devraient être tenus à l'écart de toute considération politique. Il faudrait agir d'urgence afin de créer une éthique publique pour la protection des droits des enfants(..) «Des enseignants de langue maternelle, le kurde, doivent être désignés» . M. Bilgili affirme que le choix d'enseignants kurdophones faciliterait les contacts avec les enfants. Pour ce faire «ces enseignants devraient absolument passer par une formation spéciale (...)».* Enfin le chercheur estime qu'il faut encourager la population à adopter les enfants déplacés.

manifestations de cette nature susceptibles de troubler l'ordre public» a déclaré sans ambages ce préfet. Selon le vice-Premier ministre turc, Bulent Ecevit, «ce genre de manifestations tend à redonner du souffle et de la légitimité aux organisations séparatistes au moment même où notre armée est en train de les éradiquer définitivement. Le gouvernement ne peut tolérer de tels troubles». M. Ecevit prône par ailleurs la mise en oeuvre rapide de son plan de création de «village-villes» (Köy-Kent) version turque des hameaux stratégiques édifiés dans les années 1980 par Saddam Hussein pour interner les paysans kurdes dont les villages venaient d'être détruits par l'armée. Selon la chaîne d'informations turque NTV, la ville de Diyarbakir se trouvait sous état de siège le 1er septembre: des blindés ont pris position dans les points importants de la ville et un poste de gendarmerie a été installé dans l'aéroport de la ville pour refouler les pacifistes dès leur arrivée. Les responsables du parti pro-kurde HADEP à Diyarbakir ainsi 450 personnes ont été arrêtés par la police.

Après une garde à vue de 24 heures, ils ont été libérés à l'exception de 14 d'entre eux considérés comme des «meneurs» qui ont été déferés à la Cour de Sûreté de l'État. Les autocars transportant les pacifistes ont également été interdits d'accès à Ankara, sur ordre du préfet. Ceux-ci ont organisé sur place un sit-in. Des diplomates occidentaux se sont alors rendus auprès de leurs ressortissants pour les convaincre de poursuivre leur voyage vers Istanbul. A leur arrivée dans cette ville, les pacifistes ont été accueillis par un impressionnant dispositif policier. La police turque est également intervenue brutalement pour empêcher la tenue, le 3 septembre, à l'hôtel Péra Palas, d'une conférence de presse par des pacifistes européens. Elle a interpellé, à coups

## DES PACIFISTES EUROPÉENS INDÉSIRABLES EN TURQUIE



L'INITIATIVE de «l'Appel de Hanover», une organisation de droits de l'homme basée en Allemagne, un «train de la paix» devait partir le 26 août de Bruxelles à destination de la capitale kurde Diyarbakir au bord duquel plusieurs membres d'ONG, des représentants d'églises ainsi que des parlementaires européens devaient prendre place. Ce train devait traverser l'Allemagne et arriver à Diyarbakir le 1er septembre, pour la Journée mondiale de la paix. Le ministre allemand de l'Intérieur a interdit la traversée du train en Allemagne car, selon Bonn, cette initiative est soutenue par le PKK, organisation interdite en Allemagne. Ce même motif avait auparavant été avancé par les autorités turques. Le 31 août, une partie des délégués est

arrivée par avion à Ankara et a été accueillie par 3000 personnes. Des dizaines de cars sont partis de différentes villes de Turquie pour arriver en même que les délégués européens le lundi 1er septembre à Diyarbakir. Néanmoins les sept cars qui transportaient les délégués ont été stoppés par les militaires turcs sur la route de Diyarbakir dont l'accès leur a été interdit. Ceux qui avaient pris l'avion, ont, dès leur arrivée, été interpellés et refoulés vers Ankara. De même, environ 70 autocars transportant des participants locaux à la manifestation pacifique de Diyarbakir ont été arrêtés sur ordre du préfet de la Région d'état d'exception (OHAL) dans la ville de Birecik, sur l'Euphrate, située à plus de 150 km de Diyarbakir. «La Turquie est une démocratie, mais les étrangers doivent respecter nos lois qui interdisent des

de matraques, 18 Européens ainsi qu'un diplomate britannique et cinq journalistes turcs. Pour Jon Benjamin, porte-parole de l'ambassade de Grande-Bretagne, l'arrestation du vice-consul à Istanbul, Neil Frappe, est une «grossière violation du statut diplomatique». Onze Allemands, un Danois, un Suisse, deux Espagnols et un Britannique ont été placés en

garde à vue ainsi que Dicle Anter, fils du poète kurde Musa Anter, et Mme. Tomris Ozden, veuve d'un colonel turc tué au Kurdistan.

Depuis le début de la guerre du Kurdistan, toute initiative pour la recherche d'une solution politique et pacifique de la question kurde est systématiquement interdite par les

autorités turques. Au mois de mai dernier «Une conférence internationale pour un règlement pacifique de la question kurde» qui devait se tenir à Ankara à l'initiative d'une trentaine d'organisations internationales les plus représentatives du monde occidental, peu suspectes de sympathies pour le PKK, a également été interdite par les militaires turcs.

## LA NOUVELLE COALITION DE MESUT YILMAZ OBTIENT LA CONFIANCE DU PARLEMENT



A coalition dirigée par Mesut Yilmaz a obtenu le 12 juillet la confiance du parlement, par 281 voix contre 256 avec 2 abstentions sur un ensemble de 550 voix.

Cette cession de vote a, à plusieurs reprises, été reportée en raison des échauffourées à coups de poings entre les députés déclenchées lorsqu'un député de la majorité a traité son collègue islamiste de «maquereau»; un certain nombre de députés ont tiré leurs pistolets sans toutefois faire feu. D'entrée de jeu, le Premier ministre s'est attelé à l'application des mesures exigées par l'armée, qui avait forcé à la démission l'ancien Premier ministre Erbakan et a permis à M. Yilmaz de prendre les rênes du pouvoir. Parmi les toutes premières mesures à prendre: une épuration dans l'administration envers les islamistes accusés de noyautage. La deuxième mesure concerne l'éducation dans les écoles religieuses «Imam Hatip» et exigée elle aussi par l'armée a été approuvée, le 22 juillet, par les différents partis de la coalition; celle-ci permettra la fermeture de centaines

d'écoles religieuses. Cette mesure a été qualifiée par l'ancien Premier ministre Erbakan d'«*exemple de fascisme pro-laïc*». Selon lui, le nouveau gouvernement conduit le pays vers «*le chaos et la confusion*».

Par ailleurs, un tribunal militaire turc a ouvert une enquête sur les allégations d'une éventuelle collaboration de l'ancien vice-Premier ministre et ministre des Affaires étrangères Mme. Çiller avec la CIA. Cette enquête a été ordonnée après des allégations faites par le dirigeant du petit parti ouvrier turc,

Dogu Perincek, connu pour ses liens étroits avec l'armée. Celui-ci a affirmé être en possession de documents démontrant que Mme. Çiller travaillait comme un agent de la CIA sous le nom de code «la rose d'Istanbul» contre un salaire annuel de \$100 000. Mme. Çiller avait dans le passé fait l'objet de plusieurs enquêtes parlementaires pour des affaires de corruption. En formant une coalition gouvernementale avec les islamistes, elle avait pu échapper à la justice. L'actuel Premier ministre et rival de toujours de Mme. Çiller semble décidé à la faire condamner. De son côté, l'armée très mécontente d'une tentative d'espionnage de l'état-major organisée par l'ancien ministre de l'Intérieur, une proche de Mme. Çiller, apparaît désireuse de faire payer celle dont elle s'est pendant longtemps servie comme «mannequin politique».

## DES CONGRESSMEN AMÉRICAINS LANCENT UNE CAMPAGNE POUR LA LIBÉRATION DE LA DÉPUTÉE KURDE LEYLA ZANA



L'INITIATIVE de 4 représentants à la Chambre, Elizabeth Furse, John Porter, Esteban Torres et Frank Wolf, une campagne de sensibilisation sur le sort de Mme. Zana et ses trois collègues parlementaires, en prison depuis mars 1994 et condamnés à 15

ans, a été lancée. Une des accusations retenues par la Cour de Sûreté de l'État d'Ankara qui les avait condamnés à cette peine de prison, était notamment une intervention de Mme. Zana devant la Commission Helsinki de la Chambre des Représentants. Lors de cette audition, Mme. Zana avait lancé aux Congressmen: «*Soutenez les forces*

démocratiques (en Turquie) et aidez-les à mener des actions non violentes». Cette campagne a été lancée sous forme d'une lettre qui sera adressée fin septembre au Président Clinton. A ce jour elle a été signée par 102 Congressmen. Cette lettre est libellée comme suit: «Monsieur le Président, Nous vous écrivons pour attirer votre attention sur la situation dramatique de Leyla Zana. Première femme kurde élue au Parlement turc. Mme. Zana, mère de deux enfants, a été élue pour représenter la ville kurde de Diyarbakir par une écrasante majorité en octobre 1991. Elle a été arrêtée par les autorités turques en mars 1994 dans l'enceinte du Parlement et a été condamnée, selon l'accusation retenue par les autorités turques, pour «discours séparatistes» qui ne sont fait que dans l'exercice de son droit à la liberté d'expression pour défendre les droits du peuple kurde. Elle a été condamnée à 15 de prison en décembre 1994. Elle est toujours en prison, à Ankara.

Une des pièces à charge retenue contre Mme. Zana était son audition en 1993, ici à Washington, devant Helsinki Commission et le Congrès américain. Nous trouvons scandaleux que bien qu'elle ait été invitée par des membres du Congrès, son audition ait été une des activités qui l'ont conduite en prison.

La recherche de Mme. Zana d'un changement démocratique par des moyens non violents a été honorée par le Parlement européen qui lui a accordé le Prix Sakharov de la liberté de l'esprit en 1995. En outre, Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch se sont montrés concernés par son cas.

Monsieur le Président, la Turquie est un partenaire important des États-Unis, un membre de l'OTAN et un principal récipiendaire de notre aide étrangère mais son mauvais traitement de ses

citoyens kurdes et leurs parlementaires démocratiquement élus est inacceptable. La majorité des électeurs de la conscription où Mme. Zana a été élue, lui a donné le mandat de les représenter, mais le gouvernement turc a fait tout son effort pour l'empêcher de le faire. Sa voix ne doit pas être réduite au silence. C'est un moyen parmi d'autres que le gouvernement turc a mis à profit pour

poursuivre les gens pour leurs opinions politiques.

Nous demandons que vous et l'Administration souleviez le cas de Mme. Zana avec les autorités turques au plus haut niveau et demandiez son immédiate et inconditionnelle libération, de façon à ce qu'elle puisse de nouveau être accueillie chez-nous.»

## AINSI QUE....

— L'ANCIEN MAIRE DE DIYARBAKIR MEHDI ZANA CONDAMNÉ À 10 MOIS DE PRISON. La Cour de Sûreté de l'État d'Istanbul a condamné, le lundi 14 juillet, M. Mehdi Zana à 10 mois de prison et à une amende de \$ 540. L'ancien maire de Diyarbakir et époux de Mme. Zana, a déjà passé plus de 15 ans de prison dans les geôles turques (ces années de prison sont relatées dans son livre préfacé par Elie Weisel :La prison N° 5. édition Arléa). La Cour de Sûreté motive sa sentence par le caractère «séparatiste» d'un livre de poésie écrit par M. Zana, publié par la maison d'édition Belge. L'éditrice du livre, Mme. Aysenur Zarakoglu, a elle aussi été a condamnée à une amende de \$ 270. Depuis sa libération en décembre 1995, Mehdi Zana a déjà été condamné à 4,5 ans de prison pour ses écrits. Il vit actuellement en exil en Suède.

— UNE DÉLÉGATION DE PLUSIEURS ORGANISATIONS DE DÉFENSE DE LA LIBERTÉ DE LA PRESSE REÇUE PAR LES DIRIGEANTS TURCS. Dirigée par le vice président du Comité pour la

protection des journalistes, Terry Anderson, cette délégation comprenait Peter Arnet représentant du CNN, Robert Ménard, du Reporters sans frontières et Johann Fitz président de l'Institut international de la Presse, basé à Vienne. Elle a d'abord tenu à mettre en mains propres le Prix international de liberté de la presse à l'éditeur Isik Yurtçu, du journal pro-kurde *Özgür Gündem*, aujourd'hui interdit, dans sa prison à l'ouest du pays où il purge une peine de prison de 15 ans pour «propagande séparatiste». Ce Prix a été remis au journaliste turc en présence de nombreux journalistes et du romancier Yachar Kemal qui a déclaré que «les démocrates de Turquie ne se sentent pas seuls. On devient nombreux et nos actions deviennent agissantes». «Vous ne luttez pas seulement pour vous mais pour vos collègues persécutés ici aussi» a déclaré T. Anderson lors de la remise du Prix. La délégation a rencontré au cours de sa visite de cinq jours le président S. Demirel, le Premier ministre, le vice Premier ministre et le ministre des Affaires étrangères. Lors de sa rencontre avec M. Yilmaz, M. Anderson lui a indiqué qu'«il y a plus de journalistes emprisonnés en Turquie

(au nombre 78) que le total des journalistes emprisonnés en Éthiopie, en Chine, au Koweït et en Birmanie». L'ensemble des dirigeants turcs ont promis d'améliorer la situation dans le domaine de la liberté d'expression.

A la veille de cette visite, la presse américaine avait publié des éditoriaux critiques vis-à-vis du régime turc dont celui, percutant, du *New York Times* qui commence ainsi : «*La Turquie a la distinction honteuse d'emprisonner plus de journalistes que n'importe quel autre pays du monde*». Finalement, le 15 août les autorités turques ont libéré M. Yurtçu, sans doute, afin d'éviter de devenir une cible fréquente des critiques de la presse américaine.

— SEPT MORTS À LA SUITE DES MUTINERIES DANS DEUX PRISONS TURQUES. Protestant contre les mauvaises conditions de détention et les mauvais traitements, des prisonniers ont déclenché une mutinerie, le lundi 7 juillet 1997, dans la prison de Metris, prison de haute sécurité située dans la partie européenne d'Istanbul. Ancienne prison militaire et construite à l'origine pour accueillir 720 prisonniers, 1274 personnes, pour la plupart des Kurdes et des militants de gauche, sont aujourd'hui entassées dans des cellules surchargées. Après avoir demandé depuis des mois l'amélioration de leurs conditions et devant le refus de l'administration, les prisonniers ont, dans la nuit du 8 au 9 juillet, mis le feu dans leurs matelas en signe de protestation. La police est intervenue avec une extrême brutalité. Bilan: 5 morts et 5 blessés parmi les prisonniers. Pour sa défense, l'administration pénitentiaire affirme qu'elle a demandé l'intervention des équipes spéciales de la police afin d'arrêter les auteurs de l'exécution d'un prisonnier achevé la veille à

coups de broche dans une cellule. La deuxième mutinerie est survenue dans la ville d'Alasehir, à l'ouest de la Turquie, et elle s'est soldée par la mort de deux prisonniers. S'exprimant au nom de la plus importante centrale syndicale de Turquie, M. Ridvan Budak a déclaré que «*ceux qui sont responsables de cette brutalité pour mater la mutinerie doivent être traduits en justice*». Quant au porte-parole de l'Union des gardiens de prison, Ali Yazici, il a déclaré que «*cela montre à quel point le système est pourri... Ce n'est pas la première fois qu'un tel événement se produit et ce ne sera pas la dernière*».

Par ailleurs, six des quarante-huit policiers impliqués dans le meurtre du journaliste Metin Göktepe, du quotidien Evrensel, se sont présentés le 28 juillet au parquet de la ville d'Afyon, en Anatolie de l'Ouest. Il s'agit d'un directeur de la police et de cinq policiers contre lesquels la justice avait lancé des mandats d'arrêt. M. Göktepe avait été arrêté le 8 janvier 1996 par la police alors qu'il couvrait pour son journal les obsèques de deux détenus tués lors de la répression d'une mutinerie dans une prison d'Istanbul. Il avait été battu à mort par les policiers devant de nombreux témoins. Son procès, suivi de près par des ONG occidentales, notamment Reporters sans frontières, a été, à plusieurs reprises, déplacé dans des juridictions de province «*pour des raisons de sécurité*». Les policiers impliqués ont jusqu'ici systématiquement refusé de se rendre aux convocations des tribunaux. Lors de la dernière audience de ce procès, tenu le 24 juillet à Afyon, malgré les assurances et les ordres du Premier ministre Mesut Yilmaz les policiers prévenus ne s'étaient toujours pas présentés à la Cour. Après enquête, le nouveau ministre de la Justice a établi que les mandats d'arrêt les visant

n'avaient, deux mois après leur lancement, toujours pas été transmis à la Direction de la Sûreté d'Istanbul. Cette affaire devenant très médiatisée à l'étranger, donc gênante pour l'image du gouvernement, celui-ci a ordonné la reddition des policiers les plus lourdement impliqués dans le meurtre de Göktepe.

La police n'a finalement obéi qu'à contre coeur. Dès le lendemain de l'incarcération de ces six policiers, lors d'une manifestation des islamistes sous les murs de l'état-major des armées elle est intervenue avec hargne et brutalité contre des journalistes présents sur les lieux et en a blessé une dizaine, dont 3 grièvement.

Les manifestants islamistes ont brocardé «*l'armée ennemie du peuple*», «*son porte-parole Demirel*» et «*la marionnette Yilmaz*». 55 d'entre eux ont été arrêtés. Les islamistes dénoncent «*la mise en fiches systématique des citoyens par la Sûreté militaire*».

Au même moment, le général Karadayi, chef d'état-major des armées donnait un briefing sur «*la réaction islamiste et la terreur*» au Premier ministre Yilmaz, au vice-Premier ministre Ecevit et à leurs principaux ministres convoqués à l'état-major par les chefs militaires. D'après le *Hürriyet* du 30 juillet, ces derniers étaient furieux d'entendre sous leurs fenêtres «*les slogans injurieux des islamistes*» et reprochaient à la police de ne pas avoir pu disperser la manifestation. Ces briefings organisés à l'état-major militaire constituent dans le système turc une sorte de cérémonie d'adoubement pour le gouvernement civil auquel les généraux indiquent les tâches prioritaires qu'il aura à accomplir. Le briefing du 29 juillet est intervenu quelques jours après la



réunion mensuelle du Conseil de sécurité nationale du 25 juillet au cours de laquelle avait demandé aux nouvelles autorités civiles de mettre en oeuvre avec diligence et intégralement toutes les «mesures anti-islamistes» qu'ils avaient édictées le 28 février et qui ont conduit à la chute du cabinet Erbakan.

— LA PROLONGATION DE 4 MOIS DE L'ÉTAT D'URGENCE DANS LES PROVINCES KURDES a été votée le 9 juillet par le Parlement turc «conformément aux recommandations du Conseil de sécurité nationale». Seuls certains députés du CHP (parti républicain du peuple) et du Refah ont voté contre cette mesure. La plupart des provinces kurdes se trouvent depuis 1979 sous le régime d'état d'urgence. Depuis la création de la République turque en 1924, le Kurdistan turc aura ainsi été placé pendant 51 ans sous des régimes d'exception, d'état de siège, de loi martiale ou d'état d'urgence!

— LE GOUVERNEMENT SUD-AFRICAIN INTERDIT UNE LA VENTE D'ARMES À DESTINATION DE LA TURQUIE. Le journal sud-africain *The Sunday Independent* a révélé, le 10 août, que le gouvernement a émis son veto sur la vente de 12 hélicoptères Rooivalk d'un montant 1.2 milliards rands (\$257 millions) à destination de la Turquie. Cette décision avait été prise lors de la réunion de la Commission nationale de contrôle de vente d'armes, le 17 juillet. Laurie Nathan, du Centre pour la résolution des conflits, a déclaré à la presse que «la Turquie est coupable de commettre des violations des droits de l'homme à l'encontre des réfugiés kurdes et se livre à des bombardements des camps de

réfugiés kurdes». Et d'ajouter que «les Rooivalk pouvaient être utilisés à cette fin». Le gouvernement sud-africain avait levé son embargo sur la vente d'armes à la Turquie en dernier, décrété au printemps 1996 à la suite de l'incursion militaire turque dans le Kurdistan irakien, il vient de le rétablir. Confirmant le rétablissement de l'embargo sud-africain, le président de la Commission susmentionnée, Kader Asmal, a motivé la décision par «la poursuite des violations des droits de l'homme par la Turquie et son occupation illégale de Chypre». «Parce qu'il s'agissait d'hélicoptères d'attaque, nous avions à considérer la possibilité de

leur utilisation à Chypre et au Nord de l'Irak» a encore ajouté le responsable sud-africain. Cependant, à Washington après l'aval de la vente controversée de trois frégates à la marine turque, en raison de la campagne menée par les organisations de droits de l'homme et qui était en suspens, le Congrès a finalement approuvé la vente de 4 hélicoptères Hawk. Le pré-contrat de cette vente avait été signé en février dernier portant sur un montant de \$ 120 millions. Accusés de la mise en place d'un «embargo non-déclaré» par Ankara, les Américains ont voulu envoyer un message d'apaisement.

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# Revue de Presse



# TURQUIE

## La spirale infernale

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La Lettre

de la Fondation

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FONDATION DANIELLE MITTERRAND



**L**es années passent en Turquie et la situation ne cesse de s'aggraver, toujours plus dramatique, toujours plus insupportable. Les témoignages se multiplient : la Turquie moderne vit les heures les plus sombres de son histoire, sous le joug d'une dictature militaire qui prétend s'offrir des allures de démocratie. Et les vraies démocraties ne s'insurgent pas !

**A**u cours des dernières années, la situation s'est dégradée de manière spectaculaire. L'armée turque a accentué la répression et les destructions massives de villages. Et le gouvernement quant à lui a refusé toute idée de négociation, tout appel à la paix, y compris celui inspiré par des ONG en 1994, et qu'avaient signé tous les prix Nobel de la Paix - du moins ceux qui avaient les mains libres pour le faire.

Le PKK, force armée d'opposition kurde, avait pourtant à cette occasion proclamé et respecté un cessez-le-feu unilatéral, renoncé à ses revendications séparatistes pour ouvrir le champ des négociations.

Aujourd'hui, rien ne semble plus pouvoir arrêter la spirale de la violence. L'armée y trouve des intérêts financiers et politiques. En désignant les Kurdes comme les seuls auteurs de troubles dans un pays déboussolé, elle dresse contre eux la population turque qui, de ce fait, accepte comme un mal nécessaire l'omniprésence des militaires et la rigueur économique.

Et la spirale de la violence s'intensifie : la population civile kurde est contrainte à rejoindre les rangs du PKK pour y être protégée, et résister à l'anéantissement ou à s'exiler.

Simultanément, en Turquie, des voix s'élèvent. Les démocrates refusent d'être pris en otage entre les belligérants, ils demandent un retour à la paix, l'ouverture de négociations entre les parties. **Mais que les voix humaines sont faibles dans le fracas des armes dont le commerce est si juteux !**

A Ankara, la conférence pour la Paix, le 8 mai dernier, a été interdite par les militaires et pourtant des rencontres ont eu lieu.

C'est à nous, Européens, que revient le devoir de les relayer, à nous de rappeler que la Turquie est membre fondateur du Conseil de l'Europe dont la charte est la Convention des droits de l'homme.

C'est à nous d'obliger nos gouvernements à

faire pression sur la Turquie pour qu'elle respecte ses signatures. Par exemple, elle a ratifié la résolution 688 des Nations unies qui appelle les états membres à faciliter sur son territoire le passage des ONG qui portent assistance aux populations des pays voisins. Or depuis 1996, aucune ONG n'a pu se rendre en Irak en passant par la Turquie.

Plus grave encore, dans le pays même, qu'une voix s'élève pour dénoncer les atrocités commises, elle est aussitôt bâillonnée.

Cette situation est pourtant connue de tous. Les rapports s'empilent sur les bureaux et plus aucun ministre, aucun parlementaire dans nos démocraties exemplaires n'ignore que les droits de l'homme sont bafoués en Turquie. Mais qui s'en indigne ? Le commerce est roi ! La France ne vient-elle pas de vendre à crédit des hélicoptères à l'armée turque ?

La solidarité entre Etats reste le maître mot. Dans les années 80, pour préserver l'intégrité de l'Irak et contenir l'islamisme venu d'Iran, on cachait le génocide des populations kurdes perpétré par Saddam Hussein. Aujourd'hui, on laisse l'armée turque imposer sa terreur et faire le jeu de l'intégrisme - les dernières élections législatives l'ont amplement montré.

Finalement, la Turquie ne nous révèle-t-elle pas à nous-mêmes ? N'est-elle pas le miroir du laxisme de nos démocraties mercantiles ?

**T**ous les soirs à Istanbul et dans les grandes villes de Turquie, on éteint les lumières pendant une minute pour réclamer la paix. Qui, au-delà des frontières, entend l'appel désespéré des démocrates plongés dans l'obscurité ?

Un million et demi de personnes ont déjà signé la pétition pour la paix. L'objectif des deux millions sera sûrement atteint avant la fin du mois.

Même le patron des patrons vient de mettre en garde le gouvernement contre les conséquences de cette économie de guerre. Il doit rappeler aux sourds qui mènent le pays à la ruine que le PIB par habitant, dans la région Kurde (un tiers de la Turquie !), est équivalent à celui de la Somalie.

**I**l n'y a pas trente-six solutions, mais une : il faut imposer aux gouvernements d'Europe de l'Ouest qu'ils posent comme condition préalable aux relations entre Etats le respect des droits de l'homme. Si nous y parvenons, nous serons fiers d'être Européens.



# Turk Assumes Power With Secular Cabinet

By Stephen Kinzer  
New York Times Service

ISTANBUL — Mesut Yilmaz was named prime minister on Monday after forming a government that he said would put a definitive end to the country's yearlong experiment with Islamic rule.

Mr. Yilmaz presented a list of cabinet ministers to President Suleyman Demirel, who approved it, and later moved into the prime minister's office to begin his first day of work.

"Our government will meticulously guard the basic principles of the republic," Mr. Yilmaz said after taking over. "It will be a government that raises the profile of civilian, democratic and freedom-loving values."

The new government must be confirmed by Parliament, but that appeared to be little more than a formality since Mr. Yilmaz has won the support of a broad range of party leaders. Parliament is expected to vote within two weeks.

His government will probably enjoy the support of Turkey's powerful military commanders, who applied heavy pressure to force the Islamic leader Necmettin Erbakan from the prime minister's job in June. The military charged that Mr. Erbakan was undermining secular democracy and leading the country toward Islamic fundamentalism.

In the 10 days of consultations that led to Monday's announcement, Mr. Yilmaz met with leaders of all the major political parties except Mr. Erbakan. He described the pro-Islamic policies that Mr. Erbakan and his Welfare Party followed over the last year as divisive and undemocratic.

"Welfare is responsible for the tension that has spread across this country," Mr. Yilmaz said. "It is time for this party to move into opposition."

The departing government had stirred domestic conflict and raised international concern by making overtures to Libya and Iran, advocating greater emphasis on Islamic education and naming religious conservatives to government posts.

Although Mr. Yilmaz's ascendance means that Turkey will now have a fully secular government, it does not put a permanent end to Islamic prospects here. Leaders of the Welfare Party said they were continuing to gain strength, and predicted that in the next election the party would win far more than the 21 percent of the vote it took in 1995.

It is not clear when the election will take place. Some leading members of the incoming coalition want it soon, while others want to wait a year or more.

In secular political circles Monday, there was widespread relief that a new government had finally been formed without the participation of Islamic lead-

ers or their supporters. The enthusiasm, however, was tempered by doubts about Mr. Yilmaz, who is not considered to be the dynamic figure some believe is necessary to confront the rise of Islamic political power. He has a reputation as phlegmatic and cautious rather than imaginative or inspirational.

Mr. Yilmaz, 50, began his rise to power in the 1980s under the patronage of Turgut Ozal, then the prime minister. He held several posts under Mr. Ozal, and during the late 1980s was the youngest foreign minister in Europe. In that post he took strongly pro-Western stands.

He served as prime minister in 1991 and again in 1995, but both of his governments collapsed after just a few months.

The government he unveiled Monday is a coalition among his center-right Motherland Party and two smaller parties. A leader of each of those parties became deputy prime minister.

One is another former prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, a veteran of three decades in Turkish politics who heads the Democratic Left Party and is best known abroad for having ordered Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus. The other is Ismet Sezgin, another veteran who represents the centrist Democratic Turkey Party. He will also serve as defense minister.

This three-party coalition will be supported, but not joined in the cabinet, by the Republican People's Party, Mr. Ecevit's rival on the left.

When Mr. Erbakan submitted his resignation June 18, he said he expected his coalition partner, Tansu Ciller, to be named prime minister in his place. That would have allowed the pro-Islamic government to remain in power with only a reshuffle at the top.

President Demirel, however, refused to name Mrs. Ciller. She may turn out to be the biggest loser in the current transition, in part because Mr. Yilmaz has in the past supported efforts to strip her of her parliamentary immunity so the Supreme Court can investigate corruption charges against her.

Mrs. Ciller reacted angrily to the president's refusal to name her, calling it "disgraceful to democracy" and "a great blow to future generations."

Although Mr. Yilmaz's success in forming a government means that Turkey has overcome its immediate crisis, many commentators and politicians here said the country still faces serious political problems. They believe that if these problems are not addressed, pro-Islamic sentiment may continue to grow.

"One of Turkey's greatest problems is our lack of statesmen," Kamran Inan, a member of Parliament from the Motherland Party said. "In the past we were able to produce them, but not any more.

We don't have decisive or inspirational leaders to whom we can turn at difficult times."

Asked if he thought Mr. Yilmaz might now rise to fill that role, Mr. Inan replied: "He is the leader of my party, so it would not be appropriate for me to comment on that."

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, TUESDAY, JULY 1, 1997

# Yılmaz forms 'reconciliation government'



ALL SMILES-  
Prime Minister Mesut  
Yılmaz (C) flanked by  
his coalition partners,  
Democratic Left Party  
leader Bülent Ecevit  
(L) and Democrat  
Turkey Party leader  
Hüsamettin Cindoruk.  
TDN Caner Goren

Ankara - TDN Parliament Bureau

■ Mesut Yılmaz announced on Monday that Turkey's 55th government, which he leads, will be a government of reconciliation that will solve pressing problems and stage an election. He said that as soon as he became prime minister designate the "system and state crisis" in the country had started to ease, and that society had felt this. It will be a task for the government to bolster that easing process.

The new government has been formed by the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Democratic Turkey Party (DTP), with the outside support of the Republican People's Party (CHP). After President Süleyman Demirel approved the new Cabinet list, Yılmaz told a press conference they wanted to take the country out of the crisis it had been pushed into by the 54th government.

Flanked by his coalition partners DSP leader Bülent Ecevit and DTP leader Hüsamettin Cindoruk, Yılmaz said: "We have assumed office at a very difficult time. Our motto will be overcoming the

difficulties. I believe that we will overcome all the difficulties. We are a government rising on civilian, democratic and libertarian values. Our government will meticulously protect the values on which the republican system has been rising." He said it had been demonstrated that it is possible to solve all problems, all crises, within the democratic system under Parliament's roof. He promised that they would give priority to national interests, implementing the measures required without worrying about getting votes.

Yılmaz said they would strive to integrate Turkey with the "contemporary world." The government protocol has been drafted toward this aim. The new government will seek a vote of confidence from Parliament on July 12, he said. Prior to this Cabinet will meet and begin to function.

Yılmaz refused to reply to the barbs Welfare Party (RP) and True

Path Party (DYP) leaders Necmettin Erbakan and Tansu Çiller had directed at him. He said they would refrain from polemics since they wanted reconciliation.

In reply to a question, DTP leader Cindoruk said he had refused a ministerial position because of preparations needed for his party's congress. Yılmaz said they had very much wanted Cindoruk to be a deputy prime minister.

Yılmaz said all the issues at hand would be tackled, including the plan to introduce eight-year "continuous" basic education. He said the "Susurluk state gangs" file had not been closed, that the new government would be prepared to help the judiciary in any way on this issue. He also said he had no doubt that his government would win a vote of confidence.

# Protocol objective: Restoration of the republic

ANAP, DSP and DTP's coalition protocol emphasizes that the fundamental principles of the republic will be safeguarded

Ankara - TDN Parliamentary Bureau

■ The protocol of the Motherland (ANAP), Democratic Left (DSP) and Democrat Turkey (DTP) minority coalition forged under the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz emphasized that the fundamental principles of the republic, which were targeted by the preceding Islamist-led coalition government, will be revived and adhered to in full.

The four-page protocol, disclosed by Prime Minister Yılmaz at a news conference in Parliament immediately after President Süleyman Demirel approved the new Cabinet list, included all issues that were at the heart of tensions between the military and the Islamist-led former coalition. The protocol specifically stressed that the coalition government will aim

to pull the country from the "state and system crisis" it was plunged into by the Necmettin Erbakan-led Islamist Welfare Party (RP)-conservative True Path Party (DYP) coalition government.

Yılmaz's protocol stated that the coalition partners' aim was to stop society's moral decay, to bring about the revival of a "clean society," and to rebuild the people's confidence in the state by re-establishing the state establishment's respectability.

The fundamental principles of the coalition were listed in the protocol as follows:

■ The foremost target of the coalition is to achieve harmony between the fundamental values of the nation and the irreplaceable and unchangeable fundamentals of the state.

Within this framework, secular, democratic and legal characteristics of the republic will be safeguarded and freedom of thought, conscience and enterprise will be promoted.

■ The culture of reconciliation will be strengthened. The government will have regular meetings with the opposition and inform them about the affairs of the state.

■ Legal measures will be implemented to ensure the independence of the judiciary.

■ Immunity of parliamentarians will be restricted and obstacles preventing the effective combating of corruption will be lifted.

■ An effective struggle against organized crime (gangs) will be staged with determination and, to this end, all necessary legal arrangements will be implemented.

■ The fight against terrorism and separatism will be continued with determination. In this struggle, the legal norms of a democratic state will be adhered to and every measure will be taken to prevent any harm to citizens.

■ In the field of human rights, the level of other countries will be attained with speed.

■ Eight-year uninterrupted primary education will commence. Religious education will be under the protection and supervision of the state and will be conducted in accordance with the wishes of parents. At all levels of education, the principles of Atatürk and national and moral values will be raised.

■ A foreign policy centered on Turkey's region, which was successfully implemented during the Atatürk era, will be revived and Turkey will reestablish its place and weight in its region within this framework. Region-centered foreign policy and the economic advances achieved will accelerate Turkey's full membership in the European Union.

■ Relations with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Turkic republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which were neglected during the previous government, will be improved.

■ Every measure will be taken to sustain the defense power of Turkey.

■ Every measure will be taken to provide a healthy structure for social security institutions that have been brought to the verge of bankruptcy.

■ Besides the necessary amendments to the Constitution, legislation to provide the opportunity to update electoral lists will be implemented.

■ Sustainable growth and economic stability is an objective. Policies will be developed to increase productivity, to generate new jobs and to reestablish economic balances.

■ Unregistered economic activity will be registered, tax losses and evasion will be minimized. Tax rates will be reduced in certain areas, the tax base will be widened. A tax reform will be initiated that will

safeguard against the erosion of tax revenue by inflation.

■ In the shape-up of social and economic policies the Economic and Social Council will be effectively used.

■ While conducting the struggle against separatist terrorism in the Southeast with determination and by every effective means, respect will be given to the norms of democratic state law. The serious security problem in the region will be considered and handled in conjunction with social and economic solutions and in tandem with international relations, and all required policies will be developed.

■ The government is pledging to employ in full the constitutional democratic system with full respect to supremacy of law and with all institutions of democracy. This pledge is also valid for all issues that are not included in this coalition protocol.

*Turkish Daily News*

TUESDAY, JULY 1, 1997

# France and Turkey enhance military cooperation

Prime ministerial delegations search for ways to establish military cooperation and technology exchange

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Çevik Bir received President of France's General Directorate for Armament Jean-Yves Helmer in Ankara on Monday. Consultations between the two will center on the issue of arms modernization, the Anatolia news agency reported.

Speaking at the Helmer's reception, Gen. Bir said that studies for the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) planned for the next 15-20 years, included helicopter and front-line battle tank projects. Bir also added that he and Helmer agreed that other projects and joint studies with France should be considered.

Helmer said France and Turkey already have cooperated both militarily and industrially and hoped that joint projects and cooperation between the two nations continue.

## Tank cooperation between France and Turkey

Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister, Sedat Çelikdoğan, announced that French Leclerc tanks

will be produced in Turkey as a result of joint cooperation, as foreseen in official talks between Turkish and French officials in Paris last week.

Çelikdoğan said a Turkish delegation visited France last week and studied opportunities for cooperation while touring several defense industry institutions, including the enormous French defense company "GIAT."

Çelikdoğan said that they had a chance to closely observe third generation Leclerc tanks while discussing French-Turkish joint tank production. But he added that, "we Turks have to produce the tanks ourselves."

Çelikdoğan said that besides joint tank projects, they have also discussed the possibilities of joint satellite production. "Most of the biggest media companies in the world are converting to satellite communication as we speak.

If we buy from other nations, costs soar, but there are both technological and production aspects to manufacturing these satellites. We believe that we can manufacture satellites once we find the proper technological partner.

We have already considered the French company Alstom to produce satellites," Çelikdoğan said.

Çelikdoğan concluded that "we believe that Turkey can grow more powerful if it directs its agenda toward advancing its technology."

# Turkey says Greece supports PKK

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Ömer Akbel on Monday said that Greece was backing the outlawed separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and that documents, video tapes and photographs demonstrating this fact had been given to international organizations.

Answering a question regarding whether Turkey planned to take any action against Greece in this regard, Akbel said that they had already several times supplied such evidence to international authorities. He also recalled that Greek deputies had invited PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to Greece and noted that

the deputy speaker of the Greek Parliament had visited Öcalan.

Akbel, responding to a question concerning jabs from the Greek government over recent comments by Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Onur Öymen, underlined that Turkey was always in favor of better relations with Greece.

The volley of criticism between Greece and Turkey had started when Undersecretary Öymen claimed, in an interview with the Turkish Daily News last Wednesday, that Greece was reluctant to establish dialogue with Turkey and pointed out the lack of trust between the two nations.

Greek government spokesman Dimitri Reppas

replied to Öymen's remarks the day after the interview, calling the undersecretary's comments aimless, careless and comic, and saying that they were contrary to the building of good relations between the two countries.

In response to Reppas' statement, Akbel charged that the criticism from the Greek side was both surprising and unjustified. Stressing the attitude of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Akbel said: "Turkey never acts with a purpose of augmenting tension between the two states but with the aim to find resolutions to the existing problems."

Turkish Daily News

TUESDAY, JULY 1, 1997

TUESDAY, JULY 1, 1997

Turkish Daily News



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### ● M. Yilmaz souhaite négocier, si nécessaire, les mesures imposées par l'armée

ANKARA, 1er juil (AFP) - Le nouveau Premier ministre turc Mesut Yilmaz a indiqué son souhait de négocier, si nécessaire, une série de mesures imposées par les militaires fin février à l'ancienne coalition gouvernementale à dominante islamiste, destinées à stopper la montée du fondamentalisme religieux.

"Je n'ai pas signé personnellement ces mesures parce que je ne faisais pas partie de l'équipe civile qui les avait négociées avec l'aile militaire" du Conseil national de sécurité (MGK), a déclaré M. Yilmaz, lors d'une émission télévisée lundi soir.

Il répondait à la question de savoir si ces mesures seraient appliquées à la lettre.

"Le président de la république m'a livré les procès-verbaux des réunions du MGK (...) j'examinerai toutes les décisions prises lors des précédentes réunions, et s'il y a quelque chose qui ne nous convient pas, nous pouvons demander, en tant que nouveau gouvernement, une nouvelle évaluation", a-t-il ajouté, sans autre précision.

Le MGK, organe à travers lequel les militaires exercent leur influence politique, avait imposé, le 28 février, 18 mesures au gouvernement de coalition islamo-conservateur de l'ancien Premier ministre islamiste Necmettin Erbakan pour qu'il lutte contre la montée de l'extrémisme religieux en Turquie.

Il avait notamment demandé une réforme de l'éducation prévoyant le passage de cinq à huit ans de la durée de l'enseignement obligatoire, ce qui entraînerait la fermeture automatique des sections secondaires des écoles "imam-hatip", destinées à former les imams et considérées comme source de futurs cadres du Parti de la Prospérité (Refah) de M. Erbakan.

Ce dernier était opposé à la fermeture de ces écoles et a résisté à l'application de cette mesure, ce qui a accéléré le processus de départ de l'ancienne coalition sous la pression accrue des militaires, hostiles au maintien de la présence des islamistes au pouvoir.

Le protocole de coalition du nouveau gouvernement prévoit la mise en vigueur de cette mesure sur laquelle les militaires insistent. Le ministère de l'Education est détenu dans la nouvelle coalition par le Parti de la Gauche Démocratique (DSP, gauche nationale) qui affirme avoir déjà préparé un programme à ce sujet.

CE/hc/bds eaf

# Les ambiguïtés d'une presse à scandale

Par  
NUR  
DOLAY \*

« **C**OMMENT aurions-nous pu savoir que nous soutenions la personnalité qui avait le plus de défauts de notre histoire politique, et que nous allions lui permettre de se transformer en monstre ? Comment aurait-on pu savoir qu'elle mettrait ses ambitions et ses intérêts personnels au-dessus du régime laïque et démocratique ? Comment aurions-nous pu savoir ? (1) »

Ce *mea culpa* tardif d'Ertugrul Ozkok aurait pu être louable s'il était l'expression d'un regret sincère. On se souvient que c'est lui, éditorialiste du puissant quotidien populaire *Hurriyet*, qui avait « lancé » M<sup>me</sup> Tansu Ciller en assumant sa promotion médiatique. Une fois le but atteint, il n'avait pas hésité, comme beaucoup d'autres dans son entourage, à se couper la moustache, symbole à la fois du traditionalisme et de la virilité, pour s'adapter à la période nouvelle qu'annonçait la nomination au poste de premier ministre, en octobre 1995, d'une femme – un fait sans précédent dans l'histoire du pays – qui était, de plus, belle, blonde et moderne.

Pourtant quelques observateurs, comme İlhan Selçuk, décelaient déjà, derrière la façade élégante, « le produit de l'hégémonie médiatique sur la société » (2). L'éditorialiste du quotidien *Cumhuriyet* s'interrogeait sur l'origine de la fortune colossale de M<sup>me</sup> Ciller, richesse qu'elle prétendait avoir acquise avec son salaire d'universitaire. Mais personne ne s'étonna de cette voix détonante, venant du seul quotidien indépendant du pays, abonné au rôle d'opposant, qualifié de « dinosaure » pour n'avoir pas su s'adapter au nouvel ordre médiatique.

Les autres journaux, dépendant de grandes banques, s'étaient déjà constitués en importants groupes aux publications diversifiées, ayant chacun sa propre chaîne de télévision, ainsi qu'une large palette de journalistes exprimant des idées très disparates, allant de la gauche apprivoisée à la droite civilisée, au nom du pluralisme.

Chacun connaissait toutefois, dans cette « démocratie » aux allures de supermarché, les limites à ne pas dépasser et le respect dû aux bailleurs de fonds. Les énormes subventions gouvernementales, sous leurs formes diverses, ou des prêts à des taux très avantageux – et remboursables seulement en cas de « bêtises » – ont été investis dans des affaires juteuses sans rapport avec le journalisme.

La puissance et la collusion de ces empires de presse avec le pouvoir politique étaient telles qu'on a évoqué la participation du groupe Sabah à l'une des nombreuses coalitions gouvernementales formées par M<sup>me</sup> Tansu Ciller, comme si un journal pouvait être un partenaire politique des élus ! D'autre

part, Milliyet et Hurriyet, deux autres grands groupes, avaient fusionné sous le nom de Dogan Medya, pour mieux combattre leur concurrent Sabah.

Totalisant 79 % des ventes de journaux, les deux empires ont dévoilé leur conception de la liberté quand un intrus, *Aksam*, a tenté de s'imposer. Le 16 septembre 1996, les groupes Sabah et Dogan Medya, qui ont le monopole de la distribution, ont tout simplement « laissé sur le carreau » les ballots d'*Aksam*, devenu un concurrent trop dangereux. Les kiosques se sont vu interdire la vente de ce quotidien sous peine d'être totalement exclus du circuit de la distribution. En outre, en faisant du dumping sur le prix de vente de quelques-uns de leurs titres, dumping compensé par leurs autres activités, le cartel réduisit sérieusement les possibilités d'existence d'autres publications, et par là même l'expression d'autres opinions.

Lés sombres affaires de M<sup>me</sup> Tansu Ciller et de son mari, accusés de collaborer avec des *maffiosi* introduits au sein de l'appareil d'Etat, avaient déjà été décrites en détail par l'hebdomadaire de gauche *Aydinlik*, sans que personne daigne y prêter attention. Il fallut le fameux accident de la route de Susurluk (3), le 3 novembre 1996, pour apporter les preuves irréfutables de cette collusion. Ces révélations tombèrent au moment même où les empires de presse s'apprétaient à déclarer la guerre à la coalition dirigée par M. Necmettin Erbakan, dirigeant du parti islamiste Refah et qui comprenait la formation de M<sup>me</sup> Tansu Ciller.

## L'armée, ultime espoir

DÈS la formation de son gouvernement, en juin 1996, le premier ministre islamiste avait, de manière malhabile, déclaré son intention de mettre la presse au pas en lui coupant les subventions. Les grands quotidiens et leurs chaînes de télévision « redécouvrirent » alors le célèbre journaliste Ugur Mumcu, assassiné en 1993. Celui-ci n'avait cessé de dénoncer, dans les colonnes de *Cumhuriyet*, et de révéler, dix ans plus tôt, l'identité de criminels encore « recherchés » et liés aux forces politiques.

Tout cela a été largement utilisé dans la guerre contre M<sup>me</sup> Tansu Ciller. Dans le même temps, les grandes plumes des quotidiens entreprenaient une tournée dans les capitales européennes pour dénoncer « les atteintes à la liberté de presse en Turquie » ! Mais leur vrai espoir était... l'armée, et avec elle le spectre d'un coup d'Etat frénétiquement brandi. Cette dernière était effectivement mécontente de voir le gouvernement dirigé par un islamiste. Mais de là à annoncer aux lecteurs, chaque matin, des bruits de bottes, et à transformer chaque réunion mensuelle du Conseil de la sécurité nationale en une ultime

mise en demeure de militaires à la veille de passer à l'action...

Au début, l'armée s'accommoda de cette pression exercée en son nom par la presse, en espérant qu'elle suffirait à maintenir M. Necmettin Erbakan dans le cadre institutionnel. Mais l'intéressé y répondit par la surenchère. Au lieu de s'appliquer à réaliser quelques-unes de ses promesses électorales, il choisit de multiplier les actes de provocation. La presse joua les pompiers pyromanes. Surtout quand elle trouva un acteur médiatique dans le général Cevik Bir, l'adjoint du chef de l'état-major, ex-commandant des forces internationales en Somalie. Celui-ci tranchait par son franc-parler avec la prudence de son supérieur, qui se bornait à rappeler, chaque fois qu'il en avait l'occasion, la responsabilité des civils dans les choix politiques. Les commandants trop bavards finirent par recevoir des consignes de discrétion. Mais les spectateurs avaient déjà pris place dans l'arène, prêts à applaudir chaque coup que l'armée infligerait à son adversaire.

La presse publia des sondages désignant l'armée comme l'institution à laquelle la société accordait le plus sa confiance. Pendant la récente intervention dans le nord de l'Irak, elle publia des déclarations anonymes de généraux affirmant que l'état-major n'avait pas informé le gouvernement, par peur de fuites. En soulignant ce manque de confiance, elle identifiait le gouvernement avec le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), l'ennemi numéro un. Le démenti publié par l'état-major ne trouva pas un grand écho. En revanche, les journaux mirent à la « une » la réaction épidermique du bras droit de M. Erbakan, M. Abdullah Gul, qui bravait le général « anonyme » : « *Qu'il se montre, s'il est un homme !* »

M. Erbakan avait cru pouvoir ajourner les manœuvres militaires conjointes avec Israël. Les militaires rappelèrent alors qu'il s'agissait d'une décision prise en concertation avec plusieurs organismes d'Etat, et que le premier ministre n'avait pas compétence pour décider seul de son annulation. La presse se félicita encore une fois de la victoire de l'armée, qui passait par-dessus le pouvoir civil, ce qui aurait dû plutôt l'inquiéter. Finalement *Hurriyet* jubila après la décision du parquet d'ouvrir un procès contre le coupable, entre autres, d'« insultes à l'armée » (4).

Finalement, la presse a obtenu la chute du gouvernement de M. Erbakan. Pourtant, cette victoire est entachée de trop d'aspects inquiétants pour que les citoyens et les journalistes puissent s'en réjouir.

(1) *Hurriyet*, 15 mai 1997.

(2) *Cumhuriyet*, mai 1993.

(3) Lire Martin Lee, « Les liaisons dangereuses de la police turque », *Le Monde diplomatique*, mars 1997.

(4) *Hurriyet*, 22 mai 1997.

## The New York Times

July 2, 1997

### Turkish Ex-Premier's Comeback Hits a Snag

By STEPHEN KINZER

■ STANBUL, *Turkey* -- Last month Tansu Ciller, who was then *Turkey's* foreign minister, displayed her characteristic determination by asserting, "I will be prime minister soon."

But Monday, Mrs. Ciller was forced to watch as her bitter rival, Mesut Yilmaz, became prime minister instead. She also faces the possibility that the Turkish Parliament may lift her immunity from prosecution and send corruption charges against her to the Supreme Court for investigation.

In a televised interview Monday night, his first since taking office, Yilmaz pledged that his government "will not remain a spectator in the face of corruption."

Asked if believed that the end had come for Mrs. Ciller, he replied: "This is a process, and it is accelerating. What she has done is clear, and it cannot be ignored. It is now a matter for Parliament and the courts."

Yilmaz was able to form his government only because he won the support of more than two dozen members of Parliament from Mrs. Ciller's True Path Party who have turned against her and now want to help bring her down. Some of them have predicted that the party will either continue losing members or be torn by an internal rebellion against her leadership.

Mrs. Ciller, who was not available for comment Tuesday, has steadfastly denied charges of corruption against her and her husband, Ozer, an Istanbul businessman. Many of the charges have to do with illicit enrichment through the manipulation of government agencies and contracts.

Leading Turkish newspapers reported Tuesday that prosecutors plan to summon Mr. Ciller for questioning about stock manipulation, smuggling and ties to organized crime.

Some papers also reported that the military has ordered immigration officers to prevent Mr. and Mrs. Ciller from leaving the country. The reports could not be independently verified.

This complex of problems marks a sharp turn in fortune for a couple that

once seemed to have all *Turkey* at their feet.

When Mrs. Ciller became *Turkey's* first woman prime minister in 1993, she was acclaimed at home and abroad. Since then, however, her reputation has plunged.

Many European leaders are still angry with her because before the 1995 election, she toured Europe appealing for foreign support on the ground that she was the only figure who could prevent the Islamic-oriented Welfare Party from coming to power in *Turkey*.

But after the election, she joined a coalition government with the Welfare Party and helped propel its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, to the post of prime minister.

Erbakan made her foreign minister and helped her defeat several motions in Parliament aimed at sending charges against her to the Supreme Court for investigation. But the votes were very close, and she has reason to fear that the results may be different if similar votes are taken again.

Several times in the past, however, Mr. and Mrs. Ciller have managed to emerge from seemingly crushing reverses. Despite their latest troubles, not everyone here discounts their prospects for another resurrection.

The Cillers have built a fortune estimated by some in the tens of millions of dollars and by others in the hundreds of millions. Mrs. Ciller has said her husband is in charge of the family finances and that their fortune was built in part from investment of a \$1 million inheritance from her mother. But neighbors say that the mother died in poverty.

As the Cillers' fortune has grown, so has the number of their enemies. They include politicians who consider them corrupt, human rights advocates who believe that they encouraged death squads, and gangsters who say that Ciller operatives have moved in on their rackets.

In May one of the country's most-wanted fugitives, Alaattin Cakici, telephoned an Istanbul television station from a hideout to complain that the Cillers and their "waterfront mansion gang" were trying to extort \$20 million from him in exchange for allowing him to buy a government-owned bank.

Cakici issued several threats against Mr. Ciller, and vowed to "destroy the waterfront mansion gang or die trying."

The day after Cakici's interview, gunmen shouting "You will pay for this!" shot up the Istanbul studio of the station that broadcast it.

The police have not solved the case, but Mrs. Ciller wrote a letter to the station owner saying, "I strongly condemn and deplore this dastardly attack."



## Die türkische Regierung auf Konfrontationskurs Islamisten und PKK im Visier – Ermittlungen gegen Ciller

Das Arbeitsprogramm der neuen türkischen Koalitionsregierung enthält scharfe Positionen sowohl in der Islamisierungs- als auch in der Kurdenfrage. Am Dienstag wurden Ermittlungen gegen die bisherige Aussenministerin, Tansu Ciller, eingeleitet.

it. Istanbul, 1. Juli

Die neue türkische Koalition hat der Lösung von drei drängenden Problemen Priorität eingeräumt. Primäres Ziel der neuen Regierung sei es, dem Land aus seiner gegenwärtigen System- und Staatskrise herauszuhelfen, erklärte Ministerpräsident Mesut Yilmaz. Die Debatte über den laizistischen Charakter der Republik, die in den letzten Monaten zu Spannungen geführt hatte, müsse deshalb eingestellt werden. Die Türkei sei, getreu den Grundsätzen des Republikgründers Kemal Atatürk, laizistisch. Ferner soll die obligatorische

geschlossen worden, sagte Yilmaz am Montag. Einen Tag später hat der oberste Staatsanwalt, Savas, Ermittlungen gegen Frau Ciller eingeleitet. Laut der halboffiziellen Agentur Anatolien wird sie beschuldigt, «Geld von Ausländern» angenommen und damit gegen die nationalen Interessen der Türkei gehandelt zu haben.

### Wünsche der Generäle erfüllt?

Die türkischen Islamisten betrachten die Ermittlungen gegen Ciller als ein schlechtes Omen. Im vierseitigen, am Montag verteilten Arbeitsprogramm unterstreicht die neue Koalition ihren Willen, den Laizismus – die Trennung zwischen Staat und Religion – zu bewahren. Viele Islamisten deuten dies als Ankündigung einer Verfolgungswelle. Sie sehen die Ermittlungen gegen Ciller auch als politische Verfolgung. Eine Verhärtung der Standpunkte ist auch in der Kurdenfrage festzustellen. Gemäss dem neuen Arbeitsprogramm soll der Kampf gegen Terrorismus und Separatismus mit Entschlossenheit fortgesetzt werden. Das «Südostanatolienproblem» sei nicht ein ethnisches Problem, sondern habe rein geographische, soziale und wirtschaftliche Ursachen. Es sei ferner auf die feudale Struktur der Region sowie auf Pläne und Provokationen aus dem Ausland zurückzuführen. Wahlen soll es erst nach einer neuen Volkszählung, also erst nach längerer Zeit, geben. Das Arbeitsprogramm der neuen Koalition listet faktisch die im letzten Februar von den Generälen diktierten Massnahmen auf.

### Zweifelnde Stimmen

Diese Regierung werde ständig im Schatten der Generäle stehen, schrieb am Dienstag die liberale Zeitung «Yeni Yüzyil». Zweifel am Erfolg der dritten Regierung Yilmaz hat auch die englischsprachige «Turkish Daily News» geäußert. Einige Generäle würden von Yilmaz erwarten, dass er sofort ihre Forderungen, etwa die Einführung der achtjährigen Grundausbildung, erfülle. Dafür fehlten dem Staat allerdings die nötigen Finanzmittel wie auch die Infrastruktur. Die auflagestarke «Sabah» warnte vor einem allzu grossen Eifer bei der Bekämpfung der «islamistischen Gefahr», da dies die Radikalisierung der Islamisten zur Folge haben würde. Die Vertrauensabstimmung über die neue Regierung wird am 12. Juli stattfinden. Dann soll das Parlament, so hofft zumindest der Islamistenführer Erbakan, eine «historische Aufgabe» erfüllen und gegen Yilmaz sowie die «antidemokratischen Kräfte» stimmen.

### Die neue türkische Regierung

Ankara, 30. Juni. (ap) Dem Kabinett des neuen türkischen Ministerpräsidenten Yilmaz gehören Mitglieder von dessen Mutterlandspartei (Anap), der Demokratischen Linkspartei (DSP) und der Partei der Demokratischen Türkei (DTP) an.

Ministerpräsident: *Mesut Yilmaz* (Anap)

1. Vizepremier: *Bülent Ecevit* (DSP)

2. Vizepremier und Verteidigung:

*Ismet Sezgin* (DTP)

Ausseres: *Ismail Cem* (DSP)

Inneres: *Murat Baseskioglu* (Anap)

Finanz: *Zekeriya Temizel* (DSP)

Justiz: *Oltan Sungürlü* (Anap)

Erziehung: *Hikmet Ulugbay* (DSP)

Kultur: *Istemihan Talay* (DSP)

Öffentliche Arbeiten, Wohnungsbau:

*Yasar Topcu* (Anap)

Gesundheit: *Ibrahim Özsoy* (Anap)

Landwirtschaft: *Mustafa Tasar* (Anap)

Arbeit und Soziales: *Nami Cagan* (DSP)

Energie und Bodenschätze:

*Cumhur Erstümer* (Anap)

Fremdenverkehr: *Ibrahim Gurdal* (Anap)

Forsten: *Ersin Taranoglu* (Anap)

Umwelt: *Imren Aykut* (Anap)

Verkehr: *Necdet Menzir* (DTP)

Grundausbildung von fünf auf acht Jahre verlängert werden. Das dritte und nicht weniger wichtige Ziel seiner Regierung sei der Kampf für eine «saubere Gesellschaft» und gegen die Verfilzung zwischen organisiertem Verbrechen und hohen Staatsbeamten. Die Akten über den Susurluk-Skandal – in den die ehemalige Aussenministerin Ciller offensichtlich verwickelt ist – seien nicht ge-

LE MONDE / MERCREDI 2 JUILLET 1997

# Mesut Yilmaz, de retour aux affaires, présente le nouveau gouvernement turc

## La coalition tripartite veut barrer la route aux islamistes

Le président de la République turque, Suleyman Demirel, a approuvé, lundi 30 juin, le gouvernement de coalition formé par Mesut Yilmaz. Le

dirigeant du Parti de la Mère patrie (ANAP) qui, à l'âge de cinquante ans, devient premier ministre pour la troisième fois, est à la tête d'une

nouvelle équipe formée de trois partis, de gauche et de droite, rassemblés pour barrer la route aux islamistes du Parti de la prospérité.

### ISTANBUL

de notre correspondante

Il y a un an, Mesut Yilmaz avait été forcé, après l'effondrement de l'alliance qu'il avait brièvement formée avec Tansu Ciller et le Parti de la juste voie, de passer la main à Necmettin Erbakan, le vainqueur des élections générales de décembre 1995, qui lui avait succédé au poste de premier ministre. Lundi 30 juin, au cours d'une brève cérémonie, c'est M. Erbakan qui lui a remis le pouvoir. La nouvelle coalition est composée de trois partis, de gauche et de droite, dont le seul véritable point commun semble être un désir de barrer la route du pouvoir aux islamistes du Refah (Parti de la prospérité). Ce gouvernement « de conciliation », développera « les valeurs civiles, démocratiques, en faveur de la liberté », selon les termes du nouveau premier ministre. Il pourra compter sur le soutien d'une quatrième formation politique, le Parti populaire républicain (social-démocrate) de Deniz Baykal.

Dans l'immédiat, la formation du 55<sup>e</sup> gouvernement de la République turque permet au pays de sortir de l'impasse née de la dispute entre l'armée et le premier ministre islamiste, Necmettin Erbakan. Les marchés financiers ont salué l'événement avec une hausse record de la Bourse. Mais les expériences passées en témoignent, une telle alliance de partis aux vues souvent divergentes a peu de chance d'ap-

porter à la Turquie la stabilité politique durable dont elle a bien besoin.

Le premier objectif de Mesut Yilmaz sera d'obtenir le vote de confiance de l'Assemblée nationale, prévu pour le 12 juillet, après avoir présenté son programme. Cette étape devrait être franchie facilement compte tenu du nombre de défections au sein de la formation conservatrice rivale, le Parti de la juste voie (DYP) de Tansu Ciller qui a perdu douze députés au cours de la semaine écoulée. Le Parti de la prospérité, le DYP et le Parti de la grande unité (BBP) se trouvent désormais minoritaires au Parlement.

Parmi les objectifs prioritaires, figurent des mesures demandées par les militaires, telle l'introduction de l'enseignement obligatoire de huit ans. Si le document reflète les

préoccupations des généraux et des défenseurs de la laïcité, avec des références aux principes fondateurs introduits par Atatürk, Mesut Yilmaz a cependant clairement voulu se démarquer de l'armée, qui, en maintenant la pression sur le gouvernement précédent, avait finalement obligé Necmettin Erbakan au départ. La formation du gouvernement, a rappelé M. Yilmaz, « prouve que la solution se trouve dans la démocratie » et « sous le toit de l'Assemblée nationale ».

Le nouveau cabinet envisage également de s'attaquer à la corruption - Tansu Ciller devrait être une des principales cibles - ainsi qu'au crime organisé. Il veut assurer l'indépendance des tribunaux et limiter l'immunité parlementaire des députés. Le fameux dossier de Susurluk - l'accident de voiture qui

avait révélé les liens entre des policiers du DYP, la police et des criminels - pourrait ressortir des tiroirs où il avait été consigné par la coalition précédente.

Necmettin Erbakan et Tansu Ciller, qui a échoué dans sa tentative de devenir premier ministre, avaient d'autre part proposé des élections anticipées à l'automne. Lorsqu'il a été pressenti par le président Suleyman Demirel pour former le cabinet, Mesut Yilmaz avait de son côté parlé d'un scrutin au printemps 1998.

Aujourd'hui, le nouveau chef du gouvernement semble moins empressé. M. Yilmaz a certes déclaré, lundi, que des élections anticipées auront lieu mais il est resté très vague sur la date du scrutin, ajoutant que celle-ci ne pourrait être décidée qu'après des négociations entre les partis politiques et les partenaires de la coalition. Cela ne fait pas l'affaire du Parti populaire républicain (CHP) de Deniz Baykal, qui a posé comme condition à son soutien au gouvernement la tenue rapide d'élections. Un responsable de cette formation a déjà rappelé le nouveau premier ministre à l'ordre. Pour l'heure, Mesut Yilmaz porte les espoirs de ceux qui sont opposés à toute participation des islamistes au gouvernement, et une majorité de Turcs semble prête à lui accorder sa confiance. Du moins pour quelque temps.

### Les principaux membres du cabinet

Bulent Ecevit, dirigeant du DSP (Parti démocratique de gauche), qui était premier ministre au moment de l'intervention turque à Chypre en 1974, revient au gouvernement en tant que vice-premier ministre. Ismet Sezgin sera également vice-premier ministre pour le DTP (Parti de la Turquie démocratique), une fonction qu'il comblera avec le poste de ministre de la défense. Gunes Taner (ANAP), un des ministres qui avait mis en place les réformes économiques importantes du gouvernement Ozal, fait son retour en tant que ministre d'Etat, responsable de l'économie. La diplomatie sera prise en charge par un social-démocrate, Ismail Cem (DSP). Murat Basoglu (ANAP) prend la relève de la très controversée Meral Ak-sener, au ministère de l'Intérieur, alors que Oltan Sungur prend la tête du ministère de la Justice qu'il avait déjà dirigé à l'époque de Turgut Ozal.

Nicole Pope

# Çiller wanted to counter the Armed Forces...

The former prime minister tried to create a police force loyal to her which could counter the military...

**F**ormer prime minister Tansu Çiller, the leader of the True Path Party (DYP), apparently played with fire when she tried to create an alternative armed force to counter the Armed Forces. This did not only bring about deep resentment in the Armed Forces, but it also triggered a defense mechanism and even created animosity among the military towards the police force. It seems someone had advised Çiller that she should bolster the police force, which would be loyal to her and thus have an armed force to counter any military moves.

We were told last week by a very high-level state official about this Çiller scheme and that the former lady prime minister had even planted spies in the Navy...

It seems Çiller never realized that the Armed Forces are very particular about remaining the only force in this country and thus would not tolerate such actions.



## Editorial

İlinur Çevik

great loyalty.

When Ağar ended his career in the police force, he was given a colorful grand farewell ceremony, which showed off the strength of the police force and which clearly irked the military. At the time, some commanders who watched this ceremony at the general staff headquarters just across the road from the police department, felt this ceremony was a direct challenge to the military.

Later, the same Ağar became governor and then deputy and even a minister. He was always regarded as a challenge to the military and thus a danger because he served Çiller. His name was implicated in the Susurluk scandal as the man who set up death squads. All this seems to fit into place as it is revealed that Çiller used police spies to infiltrate into the military and monitor their activities...

This is a country where the military has to give permission for arms imports even for the police force. This is how particular the military is in trying to avoid an armed force that could counter it.

Çiller has disregarded this fact and has tried to play with fire. She has tried to pit the police against the military... Now we will see how all this backfires...

The scheme of creating an alternative to the military seems to have been created long before the DYP formed a coalition government with the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (Refah). It is said Çiller, when she was prime minister, decided she could set up gangs to counter "the enemies of the state" through people like former police chief Mehmet Ağar, who later became governor and then a deputy from the DYP. When Ağar was police chief he had formed his own mini-empire in the police force, which served Çiller with

WEDNESDAY, JULY 2, 1997

Turkish Daily News

# RSF calls for regaining the lost dream of press freedom

*Istanbul - Turkish Daily News*

■ European parliamentarians have asked for the freedom of journalist Işık Yurtçu who was sentenced to 10 years and 10 months while he was the editor-in-chief of the pro-Kurdish daily Özgür Gündem.

In order to support "Işık Yurtçu Campaign" being carried out by the Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), 101 members of the European Parliament put their signatures to a joint declaration calling on the responsible Turkish officials to release Yurtçu. The RSF which is based in Paris has no governmental association. In tandem with this, the Journalists' Association of Turkey (TGC) has applied to the office of the Speaker of Parliament requesting a complete pardon for Yurtçu and all other editors in chief who are in prison.

"This action of the TGC occupies a meaningful place in the struggle for freedom of the press in Turkey. And we repeatedly make it clear that the RSF fully supports TGC's draft bill which has been delivered to the office of the speaker of parliament, parliamentarians and political party officials," RSF declared in the introduc-

tion to its last report on Turkey, titled "Turkey: Lost Dreams".

The RSF issued the abovementioned report, which was sponsored by the European Commission, during the fifth hearing in the trial of the men accused in the murder of journalist Metin Göktepe which was held at 26 June in Afyon.

Sending a delegation to the trial, the RSF particularly focused its view in three basic topics in the report which evaluates conditions related to the freedom of press between January 1 and May 31 of this year.

The three basic topics were legal regulations which opened the way to prisons for journalists; censorship of news in the Southeast by both sides of the confrontation — the Turkish army and the illegal, pro-Kurdish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK); and violence by the security forces against journalists. According to the report, nothing changed during the time period on which the report focussed, January and May, while 150 journalists were arrested and at least 13 of them were tortured. Furthermore eight journalists are still in prison because of "press crimes".

## Turkish journalists HRW awards 12

*Washington - Turkish Daily News*

■ Human Rights Watch (HRW), the international human rights advocacy group, awarded twelve Turkish journalists with Hellman/Hammett grants "because of state persecution."

The journalists, who represent "Islamist, Kurdish, leftist and mainstream" perspectives, have been "(persecuted) for writing about a number of issues, including the Kurdish question, the role of Islam in society, and the nature of the Turkish state," HRW claimed.

HRW awarded the following journalists: Ahmet Altan, Ragip Duran, Ali Erol, Atilla Halis, Mustafa İslamoğlu, Sefa Kaplan, Ertuğrul Kürkçü, Mehmet Oğuz, Ahmet Şık, Işık Yurtçu, Ayşenur Zarakolu.

In addition, writers from 15 other countries, a total of 45 writers, received Hellman/Hammett grants this year.

HRW also noted that "a high degree of free expression" exists "on almost all other topics, creating a national dichotomy that permeates public debate."

"With these awards we hope to stir public debate about the scope of free expression in Turkey and what needs to be done to improve it," said Peter Osnos, chair of the grant selection committee. "While free expression is permitted in many areas, it is frequently suppressed in the discussion of some of Turkey's most pressing problems."

### TGC takes action for editors in chief

■ The Turkish Journalists' Association (TGC) has submitted to the new government a draft law to prevent the punishment levied against a journalist from being forced on the publication's editor in chief as well, the Anatolia news agency reported.

TGC Chairman Nail Güreli said in a written statement that the draft law had been given to Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, his Deputies Bülent Ecevit and İsmet Sezgin, Justice Minister Oltan Sungurlu and Democrat Turkey Party Chairman Hüsamettin Cindoruk. The association is calling for an article to be added to the Press Law. *Ankara - Turkish Daily News*

THURSDAY, JULY 3, 1997

Turkish Daily News

# By Turkish Shift Ciller Weakened

## *As Rival Takes Over, Pressure Mounts for Corruption Probe*

By Stephen Kinzer  
*New York Times Service*

ISTANBUL — Last month, Tansu Ciller, who was then Turkey's foreign minister, displayed her characteristic determination by asserting, "I will be prime minister soon."

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In May, one of the country's most wanted fugitives; Alaattin Cakici, telephoned an Istanbul television station from a hideout to complain that the Cillers and their "waterfront mansion gang" were trying to extort \$20 million from him in exchange for allowing him to buy a government-owned bank.

Mr. Cakici issued several threats against Mr. Ciller, and vowed to "destroy the waterfront mansion gang or die trying."

The day after Mr. Cakici's interview, gunmen shouting "You will pay for this!" shot up the Istanbul studio of the station that broadcast it.

The police have not solved the case. In a letter to the station's owner, Mrs. Ciller said, "I strongly condemn and deplore this dastardly attack."

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,

THURSDAY, JULY 3, 1997

# Human Rights Watch speaks out against closing down Refah

FRIDAY, JULY 4, 1997

Turkish Daily News

## HRW: 'Headscarf is a right of free expression'

Washington- Turkish Daily News

■ Human Rights Watch (HRW)/Helsinki, an international human rights organization, came out against the possible closing of the Islamist Refah Party (Welfare Party or RP) on the grounds that this violated the secular nature of the republic. A press statement released by HRW on July 3 said it viewed with "deep concern" the May 21, 1997 decision by chief prosecutor Vural Savas to close the RP, the senior partner in RP-DYP coalition until RP leader Necmettin Erbakan resigned on June 18, 1997.

"While we understand that the issue of the role of religion in public life is under intense dispute and debate in Turkey at the moment, we defend the right of the Welfare Party to make policy proposals as a basic element of the right of free expression and public debate," HRW said.

## Political motivation

HRW said there was "political motivation" behind trying to close down the RP.

"We believe that the final judgment on these ideas should be left to the electorate and people of Turkey, not a court. The appearance of the indict-

ment on the heels of a failed vote of confidence targeted at toppling the Erbakan government, combined with the fact that there have been no efforts since the 1980 coup to close the Welfare Party despite the fact that its ideology has changed little over the past decade, point towards a political motivation for the case," HRW argued.

## Defending religious dress

HRW defended the freedom to wear religious dress in public, as defended by the RP, as a "right of free expression." In a Feb. 28 ultimatum by the National Security Council (MGK), the RP was told to implement, among others, measures to eliminate the spreading practice of wearing headscarves and other religious attire in public offices.

"Issues such as whether an individual may wear religious dress in various situations may implicate both freedom of expression and the right to hold religious or other opinions without government interference.

The right of freedom of religion encompasses the right to express one's religious beliefs through acts such as religious dress, as long as that does not infringe the rights of others.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki also believes that the exercise of that right includes the right not to wear religious dress if one so desires.

Advocacy on behalf of those who wish to wear headscarves is a protected act of free expression, even if it is contrary to settled government policies," HRW said.

## Advocacy of hatred

But, addressing another charge leveled at the RP by the state prosecutor, HRW said: "advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination or violence is not protected expression."

Specifically referring to certain statements uttered in the past by some militant RP former-deputies, HRW said: "Acts charged in the indictment, such as calls by former party deputies Ibrahim Halil Çelik for 'blood to flow' and Şevki Yılmaz's statement that 'our task is not to talk, but, as a soldier in the army, to apply the plan in the war' may not be protected speech if under the circumstances they amount to incitement of physical attack, actual imposition of discriminatory penalties or criminal harassment or intimidation," HRW argued.

But HRW still questioned whether closing down a party was the right response to such actions by some of its individual members.

"In any event, it is open to question whether the Welfare Party as a whole should be held responsible for selected inflammatory statements by certain of its members," HRW concluded.

# Genuine progress in N. Iraq: KDP, PUK and Turkmens held extensive talks

Western diplomat: We are still waiting for Turkish troops' complete withdrawal

SAADET ORUC

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ The High Level Coordination Committee, set to consult on northern Iraq, according to the Ankara Process, held its first meeting on June 30 in northern Iraq. Dr. Fouad Masoum of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Sami Abdurrahman of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Sinan Celebi from the Turkmen Front were among the participants.

Confidence-building measures including revenue-sharing and the release of prisoners were the main agenda items. Pointing out that the

US-British-Turkish sponsored Ankara Process is being carried out successfully, Turkish diplomatic sources stated that after the implementation of the co-chairmen's statement of the fourth round of multilateral Ankara talks, the new round of broad talks can now probably come to the agenda.

In addition to the June 30 meeting in northern Iraq near the Degala

province, six subcommittees are holding meetings on technical issues such as electricity, health, exchange of prisoners and education. Three of these committees meet in Arbil, and the remainder in Suleymaniye. Whereas no result has been achieved concerning the sharing of the border revenue, the reports about the continuation of the cease-fire are customarily positive. A Western diplomat briefing the TDN

Turkish Daily News

FRIDAY, JULY 4, 1997

referred to the current situation as "genuine progress."

## Complete withdrawal

Meanwhile, diplomatic sources talking to the Turkish Daily News stated that they are still waiting for the complete withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Iraq. "We don't want Turkish soldiers to stay there. We were told that the operation would be a limited one, therefore we are still waiting to see what transpires," he said.

The Turkish army began the cross-border operation in May reportedly with 50,000 soldiers backed by armored vehicles and Super Cobras. According to Office of the General Staff statements, more than 3,000 separatists were killed during the armed clashes. Most of the troops reportedly withdrew from the area last week.

# ...And the military shows signs of uneasiness

Foreign policy statements by Ecevit and remarks by Yılmaz that the government wants to renegotiate its position regarding the military's demands for anti-fundamentalist measures seems to have irked the military

**T**he Mesut Yılmaz coalition government composed of the Motherland Party (ANAP), Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Democrat Turkey Party (DTP) came to office with a mandate to "mend the broken down state system" and then lead the way for elections. But let no one forget that there was also another mandate given to it by the secularist forces in Turkey led by the military that it was charged with taking a series of measures approved by the National Security Council (MGK) to combat fundamentalist activities.

The pro-Islamic Welfare Party (Refah) led coalition was unseated because it failed to take these measures and because the military felt Refah had actively encouraged such activities. It was clear from the very start what the expectations of the military were. They wanted Yılmaz to do the job efficiently and without any delay.

So when Yılmaz started telling his interview-



**Editorial**  
İlhan Çevik

ers on TV that his government will not be able to close down the religious schools by increasing compulsory primary education from five years to eight in the near future, that he could only start such an application in a limited area and that there were financial constraints, it was obvious that the military would be extremely unhappy...

The Motherland Party, and its leader Yılmaz, has to consider the fact that their own voters are composed of the conservative masses who are very sensitive on religious issues. Thus Yılmaz knows he has to exercise caution and thus cannot antagonize those who support his party.

Here Yılmaz is forced to reassess his position on what he can do and what he can't. It is clear he cannot deliver some of the military demands regarding Islamists.

Thus we have a dilemma. The military will press Yılmaz to deliver, but at one point will we need arbitration and compromise. The arbitration can be done by President Süleyman Demirel and the compromise could be between Yılmaz and Chief of Staff General İsmail Hakkı Karadayı...

The military wanted a government without Refah and Çiller and now they have it. They will also get some anti-fundamentalist measures and the cleaning of the state offices of Islamists. As the social democrat ministers in charge of education and the religious affairs department start their work in earnest, we will also see a more secularist approach in these vital state offices. But there will be a limit to how far this government can go and this is where the military will be required to make some concessions.

We are aware there are already some civilian persons who are trying to tell the military that Yılmaz will never deliver what they want and thus a military intervention is needed. We feel the military, which has acted with great responsibility and maturity, should not listen to these people who know they cannot ever earn a ministerial seat through democratic means and want to stir up trouble...



# US State Dept.: 'We know Mesut Yılmaz well'

**Burns:** 'We look forward to working with Mr. Yılmaz'

**Burns:** 'We have no dialogue with the PKK'

**UĞUR AKINCI**

*Washington- Turkish Daily News*

■ The Clinton Administration on Wednesday reiterated its satisfaction with the government of Mesut Yılmaz when State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said, "We look forward to working with Mr. Yılmaz. We know him well."

"He has been, as you know, prime minister before. He has been a senior official in many governments. We are looking forward to working with the government that emerges from the current round of consultations," Burns added. Previously, acting spokesman John Dinger had told journalists that the Yılmaz government was a sign that Turkish democracy was functioning well. After the resignation of former Prime Minister and Refah Party leader Necmettin Erbakan, President Demirel gave the task of forming a new government to main opposition leader and Motherland Party (ANAP) chairman Mesut Yılmaz. Yılmaz formed a cabinet with the participation of Bülent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Democratic Turkey Party (DTP) of Hüsamettin Cindoruk — longtime allies of President Demirel.

## Level of contacts

Replying to another question concerning the level of contacts Washington maintained with the previous Refah-True Path Party (RP-DYP) coalition government, Burns insisted that, "We have high-level contact with the Turkish Government every day," primarily through the United States ambassador in Ankara. The previous ambassador, Marc Grossman, is currently in Washington, waiting for his Senate confirmation hearing to become the new chief of the State Department's European Affairs Office. The new ambassador-to-be, Mark Parris, (of the National Security Council) has not been announced officially by the White House as the incoming U.S. ambassador to Ankara.

"The ambassador, Marc Grossman, who was our ambassador

— he has now departed — was the President's personal representative. We have had high-level contact," Burns continued. "Strobe Talbott visited Ankara just a couple of weeks ago. He is a high-level official; he is our deputy secretary of state. Letters, phone calls, meetings by Secretary Albright, NATO meetings with Mrs. Çiller and others — we have had the highest possible contacts with President Demirel, with Deputy Prime Minister Çiller. We will have contacts with Prime Minister Yılmaz. We respect him. We look forward to working with him and his government as it is formed. We have an excellent relationship with Turkey, and that is going to be carried on." Alexander Vershbow of the White House National Security Council told a group of journalists on Wednesday that Secretary of State Albright would be meeting with both the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers during the NATO summit in Madrid.

## Sidestepping

Burns, sidestepping a question concerning whether or not the Clinton Administration has officially invited any senior members of the RP-DYP coalition to Washington in the last 12 months, reminded his audience about the senior level American officials who visited Turkey in the past year.

"But then-Ambassador Madeleine Albright, in July 1996, when she was Ambassador to the U.N., visited Ankara. Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff was in Ankara. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. We have had Defense Department officials. Jan Lodal has been there. There has been no lack of contact between the United States and Turkey," Burns said.

## On Cyprus

Burns commented as well on the upcoming Cyprus talks in New York. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus President Rauf Denktaş said he may not be travelling to New York for the U.N.-sponsored talks between the leaders of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, if he is going to be presented with a U.N. package proposal about which he was not consulted in advance. "We very much support and applaud the efforts of Kofi Annan to convene talks on Cyprus in Armenia, New

York, and we encourage both of the parties to be represented at the highest possible level," Burns said. "That would be President Clerides and Mr. Denktaş. We think that it is very important that they be there. Peace is not going to be made if you stay away from the conference table. Peace will not be made if you are not there." Concerning whether there is a U.N. package prepared to be presented to the parties in question, Burns declined to confirm. "I do not wish to speak for the United Nations, but we, the United States, support the United Nations and the role the United Nations is playing. We give all support possible to it. We wish it success."

But did the U.S. contribute to the preparation of such a document by the U.N. High Commission, Burns was asked. "We have consulted quite intensively with the United Nations," Burns admitted. "But this is a United Nations conference, a set of discussions that is being undertaken. We hope it is very successful. We have our own special negotiator in the person of Dick Holbrooke. We will be carrying on separate discussions, but always in conjunction with the efforts of the United Nations and the United Kingdom with Sir David Hannay, and in the spirit of cooperation that all of us together might make a small contribution to move the process forward, knowing that the people who really need to make the basic effort here are the parties themselves, President Clerides and Mr. Denktaş." Although Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, President Clinton's special coordinator for Cyprus, will not be participating in the talks, a lower-level U.S. official, Carey Cavanaugh of the Southern European Office, would nevertheless be in Armenia during the talks, Burns admitted.

## On the PKK

Replying to a question about whether or not Abdullah Öcalan, leader of Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), is correct in alleging that Washington had established a dialogue with the PKK, Burns said that it was not true. "The PKK does not have any dialogue with us. They are a vicious terrorist organization," Burns said, as he has frequently stated in the past. "It is not possible for us to have a dialogue with the PKK." "We have nothing to discuss with PKK. We reject discussions because of their perfidious actions in southeastern Turkey," Burns added.





## • Massacre de Sivas: peine capitale requise contre 38 accusés

11:49  
GMT, 04  
Juillet  
1997

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1997

ANKARA, 4 juil (AFP) - Le procureur de la Cour de sûreté d'Ankara (DGM) a requis vendredi la peine capitale contre 38 accusés du massacre de Sivas, où 37 personnes avaient été brûlées vives en 1993, a annoncé l'agence Anatolie.

Il s'agit du réquisitoire final du procureur qui, le 30 avril, dans son acte d'accusation, avait déjà requis la peine de mort, mais cette fois contre 42 des accusés, pour "tentative de changer par la force l'ordre constitutionnel de l'Etat".

L'agence n'a pas précisé pourquoi le procureur a changé entre temps son réquisitoire contre quatre de ces accusés.

Le procureur a en outre requis un maximum de 15 ans de prison pour 40 autres accusés, pour "participation à une tentative de changer par la force l'ordre constitutionnel de l'Etat", et confirmé une demande d'acquittement pour 14 autres accusés.

Le massacre de Sivas est le plus grave crime fondamentaliste commis en Turquie à l'époque moderne. Le 2 juillet 1993, 37 personnes, en majorité des intellectuels, avaient péri brûlées vives dans l'hôtel Madimak à Sivas (centre). Le feu avait été allumé par la foule, menée par des intégristes, en réaction aux propos de l'écrivain satirique turc Aziz Nesin, qui avait mis en doute l'originalité du Coran lors d'un débat.

En demandant un nombre élevé de peines capitales, le procureur de la DGM s'est conformé aux attendus de l'annulation d'un premier jugement contre les accusés du massacre par la Cour de cassation, qui avait demandé des sentences plus sévères en octobre 1996.

La Cour de cassation avait qualifié, le 3 octobre dernier, de "soulèvement intégriste" les incidents de Sivas, cassant les sentences prononcées en 1994 qu'elle jugeait trop légères.

Elle avait estimé que 42 des accusés devaient être rejugés aux termes de l'article 146-1 du code pénal, qui sanctionne la "tentative de changer par la force l'ordre constitutionnel de l'Etat", et que la peine capitale devait être requise contre eux.

A la suite du premier procès devant la DGM, parfois très agité, qui avait duré du 21 octobre 1993 au 26 décembre 1994, 27 accusés du massacre de Sivas avaient été condamnés à 15 ans de prison pour homicide, dont un par contumace, 60 autres à trois ans de prison et les 37 restants avaient été acquittés.

Ces verdicts de 1994 avaient suscité la réaction des familles de victimes et d'une partie de l'opinion publique turque qui les avait estimés insuffisants.

La DGM avait alors basé son accusation sur les articles du code pénal sur les homicides ordinaires, sans prendre en considération l'article 146 qui sanctionne les "crimes contre l'Etat".

HC/ob t.f

# Reform via scandal



Opinion  
Doğu  
Ergil

We are discovering our political system through scandals. Susurluk was an eye opener

**T**he latest (not the last of course) scandal concerning eaves dropping among security forces is indicative of two things: The deep rift in the society and the extent of attrition in ethical values and transparent government. Any government which does not address these core issues will not even leave a scratch in Turkish history books.

It is evident that the first priority of the new government will be trying to ease the tensions caused by the Pseudo-Agenda of the Refahiyol coalition. But would it gradually improve the unpopular and unresponsive nature of our political system?

The greatest criticism levelled against the Refahiyol coalition was that it was in conflict with the basic principles and institutions of the system. This may be a legitimate criticism, but it is based on the static assumption that the system (which is defined as "Republicanism") does not change. I believe this is the source of many systemic problems.

The construction of an unchanging or unchangeable political system — with the exalted excuse that the republic was built on them — negates popular will as the foundation of legitimacy. Devoid of a popular legitimacy base, the "system" remains to rest on mere ideology (Republicanism). We know how ideologies are constructed. They start out as the word of God (or Deus ex machina - machina in this case is the state machinery), and end up as God! Today republi-

canism or basic principles of the republic (crystallized in 1920) or Kemalism for some, is the basis of legitimacy.

If this is true, freedom of election, representation, expression even jurisdiction becomes ephemeral to system (the republic's) maintenance. If the system cannot be maintained by virtue of its capacity to satisfy its citizens, then an unpopular or extra-political force may "legitimately" want to keep peace and order in ways other than conventional.

What is the place of political parties in this black-and-white picture? They will carry on with business as usual: since they represent the "basis principles of the Republic" (not necessarily more). They cannot help being an appendix of the state. Only Refah was an exception, however, this party looked at the society as "we" and "they." "They" were not only different but bad or "deviant." The party's conflicting attitude prevented it from being an agent of compromise and progress. Refah was forced out of office

when its disagreement with certain qualities of the system began to be perceived as opposing the "basic principles of the Republic." This meant all out war.

It is a pity that Refah really missed a historic opportunity of bringing new groups and expectations to the system. Not only did it not comply with the high moral principles it advocated at the outset. But it had no realistic or coherent program to satisfy its supporters. Yet this party will go on playing the role of representing the dispossessed, because they believe that there is no other political organization that is sensitive to their particularities and exigencies. Hence, Refah is here to stay. The problem is to tolerate it and to keep it in the system by way of remaining and persuading it to remain loyal to the basic principles of democracy. Indeed that is what is missing in Turkey. We have a somewhat clear idea of what the basic principles of the republic are; national sovereignty (not necessarily popular participation); nationalism; statism; unitary state, social and cultural uniformity of the nation. But our notion of what the basic principles of democracy are is not that clear. We confuse freedoms with democracy. We are freedom loving people, but we want those freedoms for individual use, not necessarily for others. That is why we do not have full-fledged democracy, although we have all the relevant institutions. Secondly, we have not yet overcome the main obstacle against full democracy: the belief and practice that the state is the shaper, provider and supervisor over the

society. Consequently, in democracies administrations are transparent and administrators/politicians are accountable.

Any country may have a democratic regime without these preconditions, we have a century-old democracy because we have adopted the parliamentary system as early as 1908. But if the majority of the people in this country are complaining about the sterility of the system to deliver and the insensitivity of the government to heed them, that means the contract between the people and the government(s) is now working. Considering that the latest three political contracts (Constitutions) have been prepared on the order of the military (1961, 1971, 1981), their degree of realism and popularity is questionable.

Now Turkey needs a new political contract, not between state and society, but between social cohorts. These cohorts through their representative organs/organizations must draw up the basic principles of democracy as the prerequisites of good, (efficient and accountable) governance, tolerance of revered cultural differences (preserving the right to be assimilated into a majority culture) and equality of representation.

At no time has the Turkish political parties took on the mission of structuring the regime along these ideals. That is why a democratic common ground, (basic rules and mores) which political agents cannot back down from could be established.

Is the new government aware what is expected of it or do they see their role merely as ousting the Welfare Party (RP) and easing the political tension? We do not know yet. What if they adopt a minimalist attitude and limit their role to taking Turkey to the next elections without addressing these systemic problems? Well, then, we will lie back, close our eyes and think of Turkey, our eternal love, while ... as usual.

*Turkish Daily News*

MONDAY, JULY 7, 1997

## Egyptian Ambassador:

# 'We can take Turkey in Arab and Africa market' Turkey is welcome in the Damascus Declaration

Egyptian Turkish business council meeting is held on July 7-8. The main topic will be the cooperation in the area of construction  
**AYŞE KARABAT**

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Egyptian Ambassador Muhammad Al-Mahdi Fathalla said that Turkey and Egypt could cooperate for the third markets and Egypt could include Turkey within the framework of the Damascus Declaration, in a Turkish Daily News interview just prior to the July 7-8

Turkish-Egyptian joint business council meeting.

The present Damascus Declaration states, six Gulf Arab countries in addition to Syria and Egypt, agreed to set up a common market on at their ministerial meeting on June 26. As a further result of this meeting, the ministers issued a

statement that said the Turkish-Israeli military and security cooperation could constitute a threat to the security of Arab countries and the stability of the Middle East, calling on Turkey to reconsider its cooperation with Israel.

Ambassador Fathalla said that the Damascus group's new concerns remain within the limits of an agreement of economic cooperation and are not targeted against Turkey. He added that it was never in their mind to push Turkey away from the Middle East; it was just the opposite and they were continuing to look at Turkish-Middle East relations from a very comprehensive view point. He stressed that beside bilateral cooperation, Egypt and Turkey can cooperate in other country's markets.

"At this point, it looks very promising. We are offering African and Arab markets. You have Central Asia and the Balkans. Look toward Egypt as another big market," Fathalla said.

Fathalla said that the upcoming Istanbul convention will be the Fourth

Egyptian-Turkish business council meeting since its creation in 1992. He added that about 20 prominent Egyptian businessmen were members of the council and though they came from many different fields, tourism and construction was heavily represented. Fathalla pointed out that the legal base for joint investments was already prepared during former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan's last October visit to Cairo.

He said that Turkey and Egypt had quite a bit to offer the tourism industry and their proximity to each other — one-and-a-half hours by air, or one day by sea — added to the likelihood that the two countries could prepare common package tours.

The ambassador also spoke about Egypt's ongoing reconstruction projects in southeastern Egypt and their need for investment. "We look forward to cooperating with Turkey in this area of construction, an area that Turkey is doing very well in," he said.

MONDAY, JULY 7, 1997

Turkish Daily News

## Kurdish group rejects cease-fire proposed by rival

Damascus- German Press Agency

■ A Kurdish group on Saturday rejected as "an impossible project a peace initiative proposed by its Kurdish rival to end fighting in northern Iraq.

The Kurdistan Democratic Alliance, a coalition of Kurdish parties in northern Iraq led by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, has recently proposed an agreement to share control of northern Iraq as a way of ending years of conflict with the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

"The PUK wants to cancel, once and forever, what has happened on the ground by submitting an unattainable project which cannot be considered as a peace initiative," the KDP spokesman in Damascus said in a statement distributed here on Saturday.

"The project inspires that the PUK wants to impose its own conditions and harbours suspicious and sinister targets and intentions," it added.

Under the proposed agreement, the two factions would turn over control to a committee of representatives from all Kurdish parties.

The committee would then appoint a group to scrutinize revenue from customs levied at the border - a

point of contention between the two factions- and oversee other finances.

The agreement also calls for forming a temporary parliament representing the PUK, KDP and other ethnic groups in northern Iraq. The parliament would then elect a "unity government" whose main mission would be to organize elections in less than a year.

The KDP, led by Massoud Barzani, said the current parliament should be preserved as it is despite all the "complications of the current crisis."

It reasserted its keenness about achieving peace and signaled its readiness to cooperate with all peaceful efforts to alleviate tension and to reach a final cease-fire.

"The current crisis could be totally solved by creating appropriate climates to conduct democratic parliamentary elections with an international guarantee to honor the outcome," it said.

The Iran-backed PUK, which is led by Jalal Talabani, and the KDP have controlled northern Iraq since shortly after the 1991 Gulf War with backing of the United States, Britain and France. But the two have fought bitterly, and Iran and Iraq have both supported their own faction in the struggle.

SUNDAY, JULY 6, 1997

Turkish Daily News



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GMT, 07  
Juillet  
1997

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## ● La Turquie lève l'interdiction du commerce frontalier avec l'Irak

ANKARA, 7 juil (AFP) - La Turquie a levé l'interdiction du commerce frontalier avec l'Irak, qui a avait été imposé après l'invasion du Koweït par ce pays il y a sept ans, a annoncé lundi le vice-Premier ministre turc Bulent Ecevit.

"L'interdiction du commerce frontalier dans le sud-est a été levé", a dit M. Ecevit lors d'une réunion de son Parti de la Gauche démocratique (DSP, gauche nationale). "C'est notre première décision", a-t-il ajouté, sans autre précision.

Il faisait manifestement référence au commerce avec l'Irak, voisin de la Turquie au sud-est. La Turquie n'a imposé aucune limitation sur son commerce avec ses deux autres voisins du sud-est, la Syrie et l'Iran.

M. Ecevit n'a pas indiqué si la décision de son gouvernement signifiait une violation de l'embargo imposé par les Nations unies sur le commerce avec l'Irak depuis août 1990.

La Turquie se plaint d'avoir perdu, du fait de cet embargo, pour 30 milliards de dollars en échanges avec l'Irak, qui était son deuxième partenaire commercial avant la crise du Golfe, et a demandé la levée des sanctions de l'ONU à l'égard de Bagdad.

L'an dernier, Ankara avait demandé aux Nations unies de lui accorder un statut spécial, similaire à celui de la Jordanie, pour lui permettre d'acheter des quantités limitées de pétrole irakien en échange de ventes de nourriture, mais n'a pas encore reçu de réponse.

L'ONU tolère depuis quelques années que des camionneurs turcs livrent de la nourriture en Irak et reviennent avec des cargaisons limitées de mazout, en passant par le poste frontalier de Habur, le seul point de passage routier entre les deux pays.

L'Irak a repris en décembre des ventes limitées de pétrole, dans le cadre d'un accord "pétrole contre nourriture" avec les Nations unies, vendant pour deux milliards de dollars de brut afin d'acheter des vivres et des médicaments.

La plupart du pétrole ainsi vendu a été acheminé vers la Méditerranée par un oléoduc passant en territoire turc.

M. Ecevit, un faucon dans les relations avec les Etat-Unis et les autres alliés occidentaux concernant les politiques vis-à-vis de l'Irak et la question de Chypre, est devenu vice-Premier ministre le 30 juin dans le cabinet de coalition pro-laïc du nouveau Premier ministre Mesut Yilmaz.

ue/hc/mm t



## Attempt to give 'Islamic orientation' to Turkish foreign policy far from successful

Erbakan in his last days as prime minister met with other D-8 summit participants, all of whom had the same question on their minds: What will be the future of the organization?

*The establishment of the D-8 is the main highlight of the former government's achievements, which otherwise failed to make new inroads in trying to give Turkey's foreign policy a more 'Islamic flavour'*

AYŞE KARABAT & SAADET ORUÇ

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

**I**n this second and final part of our analysis of Turkey's foreign policy under the Islamist-led Welfare Party (RP) and True Path Party (DYP) coalition we look at this government's approach to the "Islamic east." A brief glimpse is also provided as to what awaits the new "secularist" government led by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz.

**Despite Erbakan's moves,**

**Middle East business as usual**

From the very beginning, the Welfare Party (RP)-True Path Party (DYP) coalition caused controversy, especially concerning policies on the Middle East and, more specifically, regarding relations with Muslim countries. Erbakan's aim was that Turkey act as a bridge, as he stated in his first prime ministerial trip abroad to Iran in August 1996. He had said: "There are countries which fundamentally oppose the West, and Western countries that do not understand the Muslim world. We have to be a bridge between them and promote dialogue and understanding."

But instead of forming this bridge, Erbakan was accused of trying to turn Turkey away from the West. His first overseas visit was viewed by opponents as an indication of the former government's predominantly

Islamic and anti-Western orientation.

This view is compounded for the opposition by the fact that of all the countries Erbakan visited, namely Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, only Singapore was not predominantly Islamic. During his Iranian visit, the Islamist leader reportedly criticized his own security forces who had claimed that Iran was supporting the outlawed separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). But the RP leader's real defeat occurred during his second trip in which he visited Egypt, Libya and Nigeria. While there was no problem with his visit to Egypt, the concern was that his visiting Libya and Nigeria would be construed as acts of defiance by the West, which has blacklisted these two.

Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi declared that he wished to see a Kurdish state in the Middle East, while criticizing Turkey for being a NATO member. He also stated that Erbakan was his "deputy at the council of commanders of the Islamic public." This claim was never openly denied by Erbakan but it created problems for him right up to his last day in office, and he was reportedly questioned about these allegations at a meeting of the National Security Council.

Another result of these two visits was the establishment of Developing Eight (D-8), which was intended to improve economic cooperation between Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia,

and Malaysia. During the D-8 conference held in June during the final days of the coalition, then Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller at a press conference announced the end of the government. At this summit, the main question on everyone's mind was the future of the fledgling organization, since it was founded at the initiative of Erbakan himself. At the same time, the Turkish operation in northern Iraq was going on, and a Turkish helicopter crashed after being hit by a PKK missile which allegedly came into the separatists' possession via Iran. After this incident, Mesut Yılmaz said that because of the D-8, Erbakan's government had not taken necessary measures against Iran.

Another fact concerning the former government's Middle East policy was the changing structure of Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), a United States-led force involving Turkey, Britain, and France, which was patrolling northern Iraq. Its goal was to protect Iraqi Kurds from Saddam Hussein's attacks. But in an August 1995 Baghdad-backed operation, Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), captured most of the region. This was the spark which led to the Ankara Process, a peace effort aimed at a cease-fire between Barzani's group and the forces led by Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani. In these negotiations, Turkey also insisted on the participation of the Turkmens as mediator and third power apart from the Kurdish factions. Following these developments, the structure of OPC, which had always been opposed by the RP, changed. The operation's military coordination center in Zakho was closed, resulting in the coordination of all flights being under Turkey's control. This had not been the case previously, and France, at its own instigation, withdrew from OPC, which is now known as Northern Watch.

During his first days as prime minister, Erbakan reportedly talked with the Kurdistan Islamic Movement and convinced them to take action against the PKK. However, the movement had inadequate forces to have any real impact. Thus, another "Islamic solidarity project" failed.

The main problem for the RP-led coalition was stepped-up relations with Israel. When Erbakan was in opposition he openly declared that after coming to power they would abolish the Turco-Israeli military training agreement, but this never happened. According to this agreement, Turkish pilots would be trained in Israel and vice versa. The accord sparked overreaction from Iran and other Arab countries.

In Turkey, whatever the government, the foreign policy does not seem to change dramatically, and this was true in the case with Israel. Relations with Israel continued to develop. One of the RP ministers, Fehmi Adak, did his best to delay the ratification of the Turco-Israeli trade accord by Parliament but Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy made a trip to Turkey and met with Erbakan. According to Israeli sources, this meeting was excellent and a "special chemistry" pre-

vailed. Turkey has condemned the new settlement policy of Israel, and the opening the tunnel near Islam's third-holiest site, Mescid ul Aqsa, but these issues can be

considered a reflection of Turkish policy on the Middle East and the peace process.

Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller did not pay much attention to relations with the Middle East, except for her one visit to Jordan, which was postponed several times due to domestic policy problems.

Under the new government, dramatic changes in Turkish foreign policy are not really expected. Democratic Left Party (DSP) leader Bülent Ecevit has always supported a regional policy in the Middle East. And in the new government protocol it is written that "regionally focused foreign policy will be pursued."

During Ecevit's Prime Ministry in 1979, the first Palestine Liberation Organization office opened in Turkey. Last year in March he visited Palestine and Israel, and even conveyed a message from Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to Yasser Arafat during this trip. He also outlined his views on the Middle East at a conference at the International Press Institute (IPI). There he said that the region, including Iran, Syria and Iraq, must be urged to cooperate against terrorism. Ecevit said Iraq must be reunited through an internationally guaranteed arrangement that would ensure security and human rights for people of all ethnic origins, and the economic embargo on Iraq must be lifted under effective scrutiny.

The DSP leader also said that substantial international aid must be extended to all the settlements under Palestinian rule in order to ensure greater and sustained support for the peace process. Arrangements for the fair utilization of water resources should be supplemented by coordinated agricultural policies among the Middle Eastern countries to ensure optimal productivity. It is very regrettable that the United States and several European countries have been contributing to the perpetuation of some of the most anachronistic and despotic regimes of the world in the Middle East, Ecevit has claimed. He believes that the holy city of Jerusalem must be turned into a permanent center of cultural exchange between the three main religions which were born in the Middle East.

Ecevit's ideas of course will not necessarily become government policy but may be the basic principles for Turkey's foreign policy in the Middle East if the Motherland Party raises no objection. Turkey's strategy in the Middle East could include some attempts to improve relations with Iraq, at least in the field of economy; a more suspicious approach to Iran; and more involvement in the Middle East peace process. Still, it is certain that these moves will not bring any drastic changes.

### **Energy driven foreign policy**

As the main question in most local conflicts

appears to be, "How will the borders of the world's energy map be drawn?" Turkey's Caucasus policy revolves around the aim of becoming the energy bridge or terminal of the 21st century.

The Caucasus is one of the regions that Turkey particularly focuses on. Although the Caucasus frequently appeared in the Turkish press with reports about the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and rich oil reserves, the Caucasus has additional importance because of its ethnic ties with Turkey. While the Caucasus was in need of Turkey as a big brother, Turkey was dreaming about benefiting from these oil-wealthy relatives.

These dreams began to turn into reality: Efforts on mega projects such as the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline had already started under previous governments. However, during the period of the Welfare Party (RP)-True Path Party (DYP) government, instead of extensive discussions on Baku-Ceyhan, as would have been expected, there was talk of another strategic mega project: the Turkish-Iranian natural gas deal.

The RP placed great importance on that \$21 billion project and perhaps lost a considerable amount of its already diminished credibility among "big guns," because of that deal. Some circles within the state which were against having good ties with Iran voiced, behind closed doors, their concerns regarding this project. They were of the opinion that the plan would have to be cancelled in order to prevent Iran, which is alleged to permit terrorist infiltration into Turkey through its frontiers, despite warnings, "find room to breathe."

As RP's flirtation with Iran became serious due that project, Turkey's big brother started to get worried about that friendship with a "naughty" partner.

Moreover, Turkey was about to violate the United States' controversial D'Amato Law which strictly limits investment in both Iran and Libya. Turkey's answer was explicit: "We are energy-poor... We have to find reliable energy resources in order to avoid welcoming in the 21st century freezing in the darkness. Turkey will do its best to find energy supplies." As these discussions were going on, Turkey quietly persuaded the United States to accept that agreement by giving the specifics about the deal. They explained that the natural gas sold by Iran was, in fact, Turkmen gas, thus facilitating U.S. acceptance of the agreement.

Regardless of all the discussions, the tender process for the construction of the natural gas pipeline is being successfully carried out. This is perhaps a surprising example of the relations that can be forged between antagonistic brothers on the occasion of such a large energy deal. According to senior bureaucrats, one of the world's largest oil companies, U.S.-based UNOCAL is rolling up its sleeves for Turkish gas pipeline projects. Who knows? Time will tell...

Another point concerning Turkey's energy politics which appeared during the Welfare Party term in office relates to the absence of a Turkish Foreign Ministry. Experienced diplomats did their best, but most of the time they were not able to make the politicians listen.

The most recent episode involves the natural gas discussions with Iraq. Turkish Foreign Ministry officials were forced to insist that a remark about the United Nations embargo, which has been in place since the Gulf War, on Iraq be added to the declaration of the energy minister. But Minister Recai Kutan was always shown to be the one issuing "brave" statements against the U.N.



Former Prime Minister Erbakan's first official overseas visit to Iran was much criticized.

embargo.

While Kutan was sending signals of breaking the embargo if it were not lifted, in an interview with the Turkish Daily News Turkey's most senior diplomat, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Onur Oymen again officially denied Turkey held any such position.

Energy politics was linked to the preferences of Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) and Turkish Pipeline Company (BOTAS) officials. Diplomats in the Foreign Ministry did not have full opportunity to guide Turkey's main foreign policy principles during the discussions on energy. A senior Foreign Ministry official stressed this point by saying that the "energy bureaucracy" was not aware of foreign policy facts. "We generally have to remind them of these facts," he said.

### The Caucasus

Concerning Turkish politics regarding the Caucasus, the coldest shower came with the statements of Azerbaijan's President Haydar Aliyev during his visit to the Turkish Parliament. He displayed anger that attempts at a coup d'etat in his country had been backed by certain circles in Turkey.

Despite these negative remarks, it was obvious that Azerbaijan needed Turkey strategically. There were wide-ranging talks during Aliyev's visit about possible strategic cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan insisted on such collaboration, particularly regarding the illegal missile transfers to Armenia.



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## ● L'armée préparait un coup contre le gouvernement Erbakan, selon un ancien ministre

ANKARA, 8 juil (AFP) - L'armée turque préparait un coup d'Etat contre le gouvernement à dominante islamiste de Necmettin Erbakan, a laissé entendre mardi Meral Aksener, ministre de l'Intérieur dans l'ancien cabinet.

"Nous avons appris qu'un groupe sans aucune base légale a été formé au sein des forces armées", a déclaré Mme Aksener lors d'une conférence de presse.

"Selon des informations recueillies, ce groupe était impliqué dans des activités allant bien plus loin que la simple lutte contre le fondamentalisme" islamique, a ajouté Mme Aksener, qui est proche de l'ancien vice-Premier ministre Tansu Ciller, la partenaire de M. Erbakan dans ce gouvernement qui a démissionné le 18 juin.

"Allait-il y avoir un coup d'Etat? Cela doit être débattu publiquement", a-t-elle ajouté.

Ses déclarations font suite à un scandale dans lequel, selon la presse, le département des renseignements de la police avait placé sur écoute les téléphones de l'état-major des armées.

Mme Aksener a confirmé que la police avait écouté les téléphones de l'état-major, ajoutant: "le service des renseignements de la Sécurité a fait son devoir en recueillant des informations et en les communiquant au gouvernement".

"Le Premier ministre (Erbakan) a alors parlé de la situation au président (Suleyman Demirel), qui à son tour a informé l'état-major", a dit Mme Aksener.

Elle a déclaré que les trois coups d'Etat, en 1960, 1971 et 1980, avaient fait grand tort à la Turquie, ajoutant: "Malheureusement, ces coups, on les a regardés se dérouler, on n'a pas pu les prévenir".

L'ancien ministre a indiqué avoir récompensé le chef du département des renseignements de la police, Bulent Orakoglu, qui avait recueilli les informations en question, en l'envoyant en mission aux Etats-Unis.



Mais selon l'agence Anatolie, il a été limogé mardi par le successeur de Mme Aksener comme ministre de l'Intérieur, Murat Basesgioglu.

M. Erbakan a démissionné le 18 juin, sous une forte pression de l'armée, qui était hostile à son gouvernement à dominante islamiste depuis son entrée en fonctions en juin 1996.

Depuis février, l'armée tentait de forcer M. Erbakan à prendre des mesures contre le fondamentalisme islamique, ce à quoi M. Erbakan se refusait.

Il a été remplacé comme Premier ministre par le leader conservateur Mesut Yilmaz, dont le gouvernement de coalition pro-laïc minoritaire, formé le 30 juin, devrait obtenir samedi la confiance du parlement.

Quelques semaines avant la démission de M. Erbakan, un porte-parole militaire avait accusé le gouvernement d'encourager le fondamentalisme islamique et promis que l'armée combattrait les extrémistes religieux par tous les moyens, "y compris par la force".

La tension entre le gouvernement Erbakan-Ciller et l'armée avait suscité la crainte d'un coup d'Etat, bien que de hauts responsables militaires eurent écarté cette possibilité.

Un porte-parole militaire avait indiqué le 10 juin que l'armée avait mis sur pieds un "Groupe d'étude occidental" pour lutter contre le fondamentalisme islamique, qualifié de plus grave menace pour la république turque.

C'est ce groupe qui, selon Mme Aksener, est allé "plus loin que le combat contre le fondamentalisme".

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### ● Huit morts, 11 blessés dans une mutinerie dans une prison d'Istanbul

ANKARA, 9 juil (AFP) - Huit détenus ont été tués et 11 autres blessés dans une mutinerie déclenchée dans la nuit de mardi à mercredi dans la prison de Metris, dans la partie européenne d'Istanbul, pour protester contre leurs conditions de détention, a annoncé mercredi matin la chaîne privée d'information en continu NTV.

On ne savait pas dans l'immédiat si les victimes avaient péri lors de la mutinerie ou dans la répression de celle-ci, une opération ayant été déclenchée dans la prison par les forces de l'ordre vers 08h00 (05h00 GMT) mercredi.

Toutefois selon NTV, qui citait des équipes de secours envoyées sur les lieux, la plupart des victimes sont mortes asphyxiées par la fumée dégagée par un incendie allumé par les mutins et qui a été éteint dans la matinée par les sapeurs-pompiers.

CE/hc/dfg eaf

## POINT SUR LA SITUATION EN TURQUIE

### FORMATION D'UNE COALITION FRAGILE

Le nouveau cabinet turc formé par Mesut Yilmaz et approuvé, le 30 juin, par le président Demirel comporte 38 membres, dont 7 transfuges du Parti de la Juste voie (DYP) de Mme. Çiller. Grâce à des transferts de députés réalisés au cours des deux dernières semaines il dispose, sur le papier, d'une majorité de 3 voix et pourrait obtenir le 12 juillet prochain l'investiture du Parlement. Cependant, cette majorité théorique est des plus fragiles. Les trois partis formant la coalition, l'ANAP (parti de la Mère-patrie, 132 sièges) de M. Yilmaz, le DTP (parti de la Turquie démocratique, 12 sièges) de H. Cindoruk et le DSP (parti de la Gauche démocratique, 67 siège) de B. Ecevit, ne dispose ensemble que de 248 sièges sur 550. Outre les 49 voix du Parti républicain du peuple (CHP) de Deniz Baykal qui a promis de soutenir le gouvernement "jusqu'aux élections anticipées", celui-ci doit s'assurer les voix de 17 députés indépendants et celles des 2 députés du Parti de l'Action nationaliste (MHP), extrême droite. S'il parvenait à passer l'épreuve du vote d'investiture, il aura du mal à maintenir cette coalition hétéroclite formée à coup de promesses de portefeuilles ministériels et de millions de dollars. L'ex-Premier ministre Erbakan et Mme. Çiller dénoncent publiquement "le gouvernement des militaires et des salles des jeux (Kumarhane)", affirmant qu'il a été formé à la demande de l'armée et grâce à des millions de dollars provenant des salles de jeux pour financer le débauchage et les transferts des députés. Le Refah qui dispose de nombreux sympathisants au sein de l'ANAP de M. Yilmaz se dit prêt à débaucher à son tour quelques députés de ce parti.

Autre fragilité de la coalition: le soutien conditionnel du CHP. Celui-ci ne soutiendra "le gouvernement laïc



que le temps d'organiser dans de bonnes conditions de nouvelles élections anticipées". Son chef, M. Baykal, accorde un délai de 6 mois, ce qui fait dès maintenant grincer les dents de son rival, l'ultra-nationaliste Bulent Ecevit, "le conquérant de Chypre", qui l'âge de 72 ans devient vice-premier ministre.

Le protocole signé entre les partenaires de la coalition prévoit la mise en oeuvre rapide des mesures demandées depuis fin février par l'armée. L'organisation d'un recensement de la population, la mise à jour des registres électoraux, la limitation du champ de l'immunité parlementaire et "la lutte contre la corruption". Le problème kurde n'est même pas mentionné dans ce protocole qui, en revanche, souligne "la nécessité de poursuivre avec détermination la lutte contre le terrorisme".

### "L'ACCESSION DE LA TURQUIE À L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EST IMPOSSIBLE" DÉCLARE K.KINKEL

Prenant la parole devant une assemblée réunissant des parlementaires allemands, anglais et américains, tenue à Berlin le samedi 28 juin, le ministre allemand des

Affaires étrangères Klaus Kinkel n'a pas caché son irritation face aux pressions exercées par les États-Unis sur les Européens pour accepter l'adhésion de la Turquie dans l'Union européenne. En prenant ses distances par rapport à Washington, le ministre allemand a déclaré qu' "il est impossible pour nous de nous

souscrire dans la vision américaine qui met en avant la place stratégique de la Turquie, et d'accepter cela comme critère pour faire entrer la Turquie dans l'UE". Tout en mettant l'accent sur le fait que la Turquie était un "allié indispensable que nous ne pouvons nous permettre de perdre", il a rappelé avec la même force qu'il y a des problèmes à résoudre dans ce pays et qu' "ils savent eux-mêmes que ces problèmes doivent trouver une solution". Au premier plan de ces problèmes figurent "la question des droits de l'homme, la question kurde et l'assainissement de l'économie" a martelé le ministre allemand.

### QUELQUES CHIFFRES SUR LE GOULAG TURC

La Fédération internationale des Commissions de Helsinki, un consortium d'ONG de défense de droits de l'homme ayant des sections à travers le monde, a dressé, dans un rapport rendu public le 19. 06. 97,

un tableau en quelques chiffres sur le monde pénitentiaire turc. A la fin de 1995 il y avait 49 705 prisonniers en Turquie dont 8751 prisonniers politiques. Seulement 124 des 650 prisons turques disposent d'une infirmerie et d'un façon générale d'un médecin par prison. Les prisons sont toutefois dépourvues de service d'urgence et d'un service médical à plein temps dans un monde pénitentiaire, ou on assiste à des grèves de la faim à répétition (en 1996 douze prisonniers politiques ont décédé à la suite d'une grève de la faim). Selon les chiffres donnés par le ministère de la justice en 1995, le gouvernement dépense 22500 livres par prisonnier et par jour, ce qui représente en Turquie le prix d'un pain! Lors des transferts des prisonniers vers les hôpitaux, les tribunaux ou vers d'autres prisons, les prisonniers sont enchaînés. Les restrictions des visites des familles et des avocats des prisonniers sont fréquentes. Dans ce rapport on également relever quelques chiffres concernant la destruction et l'évacuation par l'armée des villages dans les provinces kurdes. Le rapport cite le Super-gou-

verneur de la région soumise aux lois d'urgence, Necati Bilican, celui-ci dans un briefing donné, le 26. 05. 1996, a déclaré que "706 villages ont complètement été évacués (détruits, corrige le rapport); 212 partiellement détruits; 1592 hameaux ont complètement été évacués et 175 partiellement". Un total de 2685 villages et hameaux ont complètement ou partiellement été évacués et détruits, selon ces chiffres officiels.

## COOPÉRATION MILITAIRE RENFORCÉE ENTRE LA FRANCE ET LA TURQUIE

La Turquie vise de plus en plus à se rendre sinon "autonome" en matière d'industrie d'armement du moins à fabriquer chez elle ce dont elle a besoin avec l'aide des compagnies américaines et européennes. C'est dans ce cadre que le vice-chef d'état-major des armées turques, le général Cevik Bir, a invité le président de la Direction générale de l'industrie militaire française, Jean-Yves

Helmer, le lundi 30 juin. Le général turc a indiqué que des projets sont à l'étude pour la modernisation des forces armées turques pour les 15 à 20 années prochaines. Français et Trucs se sont mis d'accord sur les projets concernant les hélicoptères et les chars et d'autres projets pourraient encore aboutir. Le premier conseiller du Premier ministre, Sedat Celikdogan, a déclaré que "les chars français Leclerc seront produits en Turquie" que c'était le fruit d'un voyage effectué la semaine dernière en France d'une délégation militaire turque. Notons qu'une importante part du marché de l'industrie lourde en Turquie est également contrôlée par les militaires que des projets portant sur la vente de satellites de communication par la compagnie française Alstom à des sociétés proches des militaires ont également été conclus.



LUNDI-MARDI, 7-8 JUILLET 1997

# Akşener: We have foiled military coup

Turkish Daily News

WEDNESDAY, JULY 9, 1997

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Interior Minister Meral Akşener has confirmed the secret intelligence-gathering from the military by the police, but has denied that she gave the orders.

After two instances of postponement, Akşener spoke at a press conference at the True Path Party (DYP) headquarters in Ankara on Tuesday, saying the ministry had received reports that the West Working Group — a military body established by the General Staff in order to monitor illegal Islamic fundamentalist activities at home and abroad — was carrying out activities outside of its assigned responsibilities.

The "mole scandal" broke out after several releases of press reports last week that Bulent Orakoğlu, the acting chief of the intelligence branch of the Security Department, had allegedly spied on military documents with the help of a former police officer serving his army duty in the intelligence section of Naval Forces Headquarters. The reports said the police department was motivated by the rumors that the military would organize a coup. After gathering the secret documents, Orakoğlu submitted to former Minister Akşener a report that followed a hierarchical path which ended at the hands of President Süleyman Demirel. He later gave the documents to the General Staff.

When the spying was uncovered a month ago, the military asked Akşener to dismiss Orakoğlu, but she sent him into the background to duties in the United States, where he spent the last few weeks with his family. Finally, Orakoğlu returned to Turkey on Monday after the controversy was publicized.

"When the documents reached our hands, we were informed about the establishment of some non-hierarchical organizations against legal procedures," Akşener said referring to the West Working Group. "There are some suspicions that the West Working Group does have no legal base. We have also learned about the existence of that organization with the help of these documents," she added. She also tried to assure that the

investigation by the police department into whether the military would organize a coup or not, did not actually target the Turkish Armed Forces.

Akşener denied that she had given the orders to Orakoğlu to carry on with the espionage and said she did not need to give these instructions. She said the law already authorized the police officers to gather information on suspicious activities carried out against the state, in order that the president and the heads of government be informed. But she also confirmed that if she was authorized to give the orders for such an act, she would do so.

The former interior minister also blasted press organizations for deliberately publishing "political speculation" against police organizations.

#### **Military reacts**

After Akşener's controversial press conference which exposed the alleged illegal actions taken by the West Working

Group, military sources criticized the former minister, saying that the new government should shed light on Susurluk Scandal as well as implementing the eight-year compulsory education system.

They added that "certain" individuals, referring to Akşener, would be seen to be involved in illegal activities such as setting up a gang within the state. Military officials said that such remarks aim to bring the Turkish Armed Forces and other groups, including police forces, face-to-face. They said the Turkish military took its power from the Constitution and laws to protect the secular and democratic Turkish Republic.

#### **Interior Minister sacks Orakoğlu**

Meanwhile, Interior Minister Murat Başesgioğlu has announced that he has removed Orakoğlu and his deputy, Hanefi Avci, from office.

Başesgioğlu said he had ordered an investigation into the actions of Orakoğlu, adding that he was soon to be retired. Başesgioğlu also said Orakoğlu's deputy, Avci, will be appointed to another office.

The minister addressed reporters at Parliament on Tuesday, saying the two intelligence officers who allegedly collected information on the possibility that the armed forces might organize a coup, had been relieved of their duty. Başesgioğlu said he did not believe the claims that the military was preparing for a coup.

He also said he had not seen any "report" that was allegedly prepared by these two bureaucrats and submitted to former Interior Minister Meral Akşener. He added that the armed forces were authorized by the Constitution to safeguard the basic principles of the republic and that the enigma would be clarified after the investigation was completed.

*Turkish Daily News*

WEDNESDAY, JULY 9, 1997



## ***TOBB report: Tunceli has the highest rate of migration***

*Ankara - Turkish Daily News*

■ A recent Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) report stated that one out of every four people have migrated from their hometown to another city.

According to official census based TOBB research results, the highest rate of migration from urban areas comes from the southeastern town of Tunceli.

Although 253,271 people list Tunceli as their place of birth on identity cards, only 118,356 of them live there.

Tunceli's migration rate, first among all other cities in Turkey, amounts to 53.57 per-

cent with 134,915 people migrating since the last census.

Bayburt's migration rate also achieved a mark of distinction.

While 97,605 people who were born in the Bayburt area continue to live in their hometowns, 101,776 of them have moved to other cities giving Bayburt a 51.05 percent migration rate.

The research noted that Sivas and Kars also had high migration rates. While 350,711 of the 3,074,506 people born in Istanbul migrated to other cities, 317,000 of those migrating from Sivas choose to go to Istanbul.

# Intelligence scandal shakes Turkey

Turkish Daily News  
THURSDAY, JULY 10, 1997

**Intelligence chief meets PM Yılmaz over "intelligence scandal," who later has talks with second in command of the armed forces**

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ As the ongoing intelligence scandal shakes the nation, Turkey prepares to overhaul its intelligence and security institutions and their role in state structure.

As a reflection of the gravity of the situation, Sönmez Koksall the head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) visited Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, as well as top-ranking military officials, on Wednesday. Prime Minister Yılmaz also had a meeting with the deputy chief of the General Staff Gen. Çevik Bir to discuss the developments surrounding the "intelligence scandal." The capital, which has been shaken by the "mole scandal" controversy over alleged intelligence-gathering by the police from the military, witnessed a tough new set of orders on Wednesday. MIT Undersecretary Sönmez Koksall reported to the office of Yılmaz early in the day. Deputy Premiers Bülent Ecevit and İsmet Sezgin also took part in the meeting which lasted more than an hour. It was said that Yılmaz also received Gen. İlhan Kılıç, the secretary-general of the General Staff. Kılıç told the reporters that he informed Yılmaz about the agenda of the next National Security Council (MGK) meeting which will take place on July 25 in Istanbul.

Military sources told the Turkish Daily News that following the talks with Yılmaz, Koksall and the generals of the General Staff, including the head of the General Staff's intelligence department, reportedly discussed the current status of the intelligence and security institutions. They also talked about the organizations' responsibilities and duties throughout the country.

Sources said Wednesday's meeting was focused on the role of the intelligence institutions, adding that there were seven of these institutions in Turkey. Responsibility for each of these institutions must be completely defined in an effort to prevent any further chaos among the intelligence organizations. Further talks, including other intelligence bodies, reportedly will be made in coming days, said sources.

Meanwhile, the participants who attended the talks with Yılmaz, responded neither positively nor negatively to the questions reporters posed to them about whether the meeting concerned "the mole affair." Only Sezgin and the defense minister spoke after the meeting, saying that they had merely evaluated the current situation. They declined to comment about former Interior Minister Meral Akşener's remarks that there were certain trends in the army that tended toward "junta rule."

At a controversial press conference on Tuesday, Akşener accused the West Working Group, a military body set up by the General Staff in order to monitor illegal Islamic fundamentalist activities at home and abroad, of being an illegal organization assisting the military plan in a possible coup. She also said the Security Department was responsible under Turkish law to gather intelligence on suspicious activities:

The greatest reaction to Akşener's accusations came from the commander of the Gendarmerie Forces, Teoman Koman. He stated publicly that intelligence gathered by the police was illegal since it was not reported to the MIT. Koman said the right to gather intelligence for the state belonged to the MIT, and that police can only collect intelligence against individual criminals.

Koman, the former undersecretary of MIT, said the recent practice by the Security Department, a branch of the Interior Ministry, would take place only in countries strictly controlled by the police. He also said Akşener would have made a serious procedural error if she found out that a separate group within the armed forces was trying to launch a coup and failed to notify the appropriate authorities. Koman said that if this turned out to be what had actually occurred, she would have to directly inform the General Staff.

The Gendarmerie Commander also denied another remark made by Akşener, who said that the West Working Group's activity was revealed after the police spied on the General Staff documents. Koman said the group was publicized much earlier than that and that it was first disclosed during earlier MGK meetings which were also attended by former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan.

The General Staff found Akşener to have made serious breaches of security on Tuesday, saying she demonstrated how badly state tradition and cohesion among

state establishments were hampered and how widely nonconfidence among state agencies had developed. The General Staff also underscored her remarks which were "aimed against the Turkish Armed Forces," saying Akşener was apparently being guided by certain circles. Although it did not disclose who were Akşener's guides were, the former interior minister is known to be a close associate of the family of former prime minister and True Path Party (DYP) leader Tansu Çiller.

The statement also said her claims that there was an illegal organization within the armed forces were unfounded.

The "mole scandal" broke out after several press reports last week which revealed that Bülent Orakoğlu, acting chief of the intelligence branch of the Security Department, had allegedly spied on military documents with the help of a former police officer serving his army duty in the intelligence section of Naval Forces Headquarters. The reports said the police department was motivated by the rumors that the military would organize a coup. After gathering the secret documents, Orakoğlu submitted to former Minister Akşener a report that followed a hierarchical path which ended at the hands of President Süleyman Demirel. He later gave the documents to the General Staff.

When the spying was uncovered a month ago, the military asked Akşener to dismiss Orakoğlu, but she sent him to the United States to perform obscure and unknown duties. He spent the last few weeks with his family. Finally, Orakoğlu returned to Turkey on Monday after the controversy was publicized.

## **ANAP's Dedelek: 'Welfare path in panic'**

The Motherland Party (ANAP) Deputy Chairman Yaşar Dedelek criticized the former coalition government of Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party (RP) and Tansu Çiller's DYP for its involvement in the "mole scandal," the controversy over the alleged intelligence gathering by the police from the military. He said that members of the former government had gone into a panic as their alleged wrongdoings were disclosed, and started accusing each other.

"Those who worry about their security, although they might have done admirable things in the past, will tap in on others' conversations. Such an act is against democratic norms and only seen in dicta-

torships," Dedelek said, referring to the former government's involvement in the scandal.

Dedelek spoke at a press conference on Wednesday, saying Prime Minister Yılmaz's government was aimed at bringing tranquility and peace and he believed that it would win the vote of confidence in Parliament on Saturday by a large majority. He said the people, who had encountered many problems for a year, were now in favor of the new government. He said the former government had failed to solve their problems and only exploited religious beliefs. He added that RP had also tried to cover up the corruption allegations against its coalition partner, the DYP.

Dedelek said the method implemented by the former government of playing off the military and the police was only seen

in fascist and Nazi periods, adding that spies had penetrated the state's institutions and tapped the telephones of a number of leaders — including President Demirel's.

The ANAP deputy chairman also promised that the new government would relax controls on the judiciary. "Everyone will explain their corrupt acts before the judges, and our government will help the judiciary to work efficiently," he added.

#### **RP's Indirect support to Akşener**

Meanwhile, the RP has given indirect support to former Interior Minister Meral Akşener's accusations that the West Working Group was an illegal organization.

Akşener on Tuesday said that the group was carrying out the activities of its

assigned responsibilities.

At a press conference on Wednesday at Parliament, the RP's Deputy Chairman Ahmet Tekdal said every state institution should deal with its own responsibilities. He was replying to questions by reporters on how he assessed the recent tensions between Akşener and the General Staff.

"The important thing is the implementation of laws and the compliance with the democratic rules. In a place where the laws are supreme there is no possibility for any government official or institution to carry out illegal activities," Tekdal said. He added that all responsibilities were specified in the Constitution and that no one, nor any institution, had the right to sit in the position of single ruler of the country.



17:29  
GMT, 10  
Juillet  
1997

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### • Au moins dix Irakiens morts, 25 autres disparus dans un naufrage en mer Egée

ANKARA, 10 juil (AFP) - Dix personnes sont mortes et vingt-cinq autres sont portées disparues dans le naufrage jeudi en mer Egée d'un navire transportant illégalement des réfugiés irakiens de Turquie en Grèce, selon un bilan provisoire annoncé par l'Agence Anatolia.

Six Irakiens, tous des hommes, ont été sauvés par les gardes-côtes turcs, qui ont récupéré également les corps de dix autres, huit femmes et deux enfants, après que le navire transportant près de 40 personnes eut fait naufrage pour une raison inconnue entre la côte turque et l'île grecque de Chios, selon la même source.

Le bateau, qui transportait surtout des femmes et des enfants, a fait naufrage mercredi soir peu après son départ du port turc de Karaburun (300 km au sud-ouest d'Istanbul).

Un hélicoptère de sauvetage turc, des navires des gardes-côtes et des bateaux de pêche partis du port turc de Cesme continuaient jeudi leurs recherches, mais l'espoir de retrouver des survivants s'amenuisait rapidement, selon les autorités.

"C'est horrible, ces survivants ont passé plus de quinze heures en mer. Ils sont maintenant à l'hôpital", a déclaré un garde-côte.

Un accident similaire avait fait 15 victimes en mai dernier. Une personne avait survécu.

Plus d'une centaine d'Irakiens sont passés illégalement de Turquie en Grèce depuis le début de l'année. Les autorités grecques se plaignent de ce trafic, devenu une activité professionnelle pour beaucoup de propriétaires de bateau dans plusieurs ports turcs.

ue/hc/ial/fa



## ● L'armée poursuit ses efforts en vue de la dissolution du Refah

15:45  
GMT, 10  
Juillet  
1997

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ANKARA, 10 juil (AFP) - L'armée turque a soumis jeudi des documents à la Cour constitutionnelle, dans le cadre de ses efforts pour obtenir la dissolution du Parti islamiste de la Prospérité (Refah) de l'ancien Premier ministre Necmettin Erbakan, a annoncé l'agence Anatolie.

Les documents, fournis par l'état-major, contiennent des informations "qui établissent un lien entre le Refah et des activités fondamentalistes illégales", a précisé l'agence.

La Cour constitutionnelle, plus haute instance judiciaire de Turquie, a ouvert en juin une procédure légale contre le Refah, qui a été accusé par des procureurs de "mener le pays vers la guerre civile et de mettre en danger le régime laïc".

L'armée turque, qui se considère comme la gardienne des institutions laïques de la république, a usé de sa grande influence dans le pays pour provoquer en juin la démission de M. Erbakan, ouvrant la voie à la désignation comme Premier ministre du leader conservateur pro-laïc Mesut Yilmaz.



## ● L'UKP menace de boycotter la commission de coordination de la force de surveillance

17:31  
GMT, 10  
Juillet  
1997

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LONDRES, 10 juil (AFP) - L'Union Patriotique du Kurdistan (UPK) a menacé de ne plus siéger à la commission conjointe de coordination de la force alliée de surveillance du nord de l'Irak en raison de la "partialité" du président turc de la commission, a indiqué le parti dans un communiqué diffusé jeudi par le service de presse du Conseil national irakien (CNI, opposition).

Selon le communiqué, les représentants de l'UKP ont abandonné une réunion de la commission le 7 juillet à Erbil, dans le nord de l'Irak "en raison de l'attitude antagoniste du président de la commission M. Kaplan".

L'organisation accuse M. Kaplan d'avoir lancé "des accusations infondées contre l'UKP, provenant du PDK de Massoud Barzani".

Le secrétaire général de l'UKP a écrit au président de la commission pour lui demander "des excuses officielles", précise le communiqué.

"L'UKP estime que la position de la délégation turque n'est pas impartiale et que cela constitue un obstacle à la participation de représentants de l'UKP à ses réunions à l'avenir", indique le communiqué.

L'UKP ajoute que l'attitude déséquilibrée du gouvernement turc et son soutien à M. Barzani est "un facteur important" dans le retard pour la ratification de l'accord interkurde conclu en octobre dernier à Ankara sous l'égide des Etats-Unis.

hb/mad t

# Washington Quietly Tries to Mend Ties With Iran



Agence France-Press

**Ukrainian-built tanks rolling through the central Iranian town of Doroud. Russia has agreed to rearm Tehran if it leaves former Soviet republics be.**

By Robin Wright  
*Los Angeles Times*

WASHINGTON — In its most serious attempt in a decade to engage Iran in dialogue, the U.S. government has quietly signaled through diplomatic channels that it seeks to improve the volatile relationship between Tehran and Washington.

"We would like to end the estrangement," a senior White House official said. "And we are now looking for ways to accomplish that goal."

The United States wants to take advantage of a political shift inside Iran, symbolized by a presidential election upset in May in which a relative moderate won office, and to do so soon enough to prevent a potential confrontation if the Islamic republic is eventually tied to last year's bombing of a military complex in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. Air Force members.

Paradoxically, Saudi Arabia — which made the strongest case about Iran's role in the bombing — has been a central intermediary in relaying the U.S. message to Iran, the official said. A senior member of the Saudi Council of Ministers, Abdul Aziz Abdallah Khweater, outlined U.S. terms for eventual rapprochement during a visit to Tehran last week.

The U.S. official declined to elaborate on those terms.

U.S. officials are looking to Iran for a major step away from its sponsorship of international terrorism, the official said. As an early signal of Iranian intent, Washington will watch President-elect Mohammed Khatami's cabinet appointments, which are expected before he takes office Aug. 3.

The United States is particularly interested in the ministries of intelligence and interior, the two posts that have been linked with promoting extremism.

Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian has been linked in a German court to Iranian-backed plots to assassinate dissidents abroad. His departure is considered essential to improved relations.

"Iran has proven in recent years that it is capable of changing its behavior in ways we could deal with it," the official said.

For example, the official said, Iran "has a working relationship with the Russians despite strong ideological differences." Iran and Russia have worked out a deal in which Iran does not meddle in the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, while Moscow helps restock Iran's arsenal, depleted by 40 percent in its 1980-88 war with Iraq.

If relations with the United States improved enough that the administration ended its policy of economic isolation, Iran could, among other things, gain access to badly needed Western technology and equipment for its out-

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**'We would like to end the estrangement. And we are now looking for ways to accomplish that goal.'**

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dated oil industry.

But senior administration officials fear that before the new Iranian government has a chance to respond to U.S. overtures, the Saudi bombing investigation could develop conclusive evidence pointing to Iranian involvement.

Mr. Khatami will need time to consolidate his hold on power in a faction-riddled political environment before he can take any bold steps to improve relations with the United States.

"We would love to see Iran take action that shows response to our con-

cerns" the senior official said, adding that it should do something before momentum takes over on Capitol Hill "or among other quarters that would make it difficult to argue the case for dealing with Iran again any time soon."

A possible source of such evidence is a Saudi dissident being held in the United States: Hani Abdel Rahim Sayegh, who may have been a driver and lookout in the attack, according to information provided the United States primarily by Saudi officials.

Mr. Sayegh was deported last month from Canada to Washington and is scheduled to appear in court Thursday. It is uncertain whether he will stick to his original agreement with U.S. investigators, in which he would provide information about the Saudi attack in exchange for being allowed to plead guilty to a lesser charge.

The U.S. government first signaled its decision to push the issue of rapprochement with Iran shortly after Mr. Khatami's surprise landslide victory May 23, which Mr. Clinton called a "very interesting" development and "a reaffirmation of the democratic process there."

Mr. Khweater's visit to Iran last week was intended to bolster relations between the Saudi Arabia and Iran, which have been tense since Iran's monarchy was ousted in 1979. Ties were severed by 1991.

Mr. Khweater's talks with senior Iranian officials included the current president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and were followed by the signing of several economic accords that effectively re-establish trade ties.

Both Saudi Arabia and Israel, two countries usually at opposite poles on regional tensions, have urged Washington not to retaliate against Tehran if evidence proves that Iran had a direct hand in the attack at Khobar Towers, Americans familiar with the issue say. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has made the case personally with the administration, they add.

Although Israel considers Iran a major threat to instability in the region, Israeli officials oppose a U.S. military response at least partly out of fear that their country could be the target of Iranian retaliation.



# Herald INTERNATIONAL Tribune

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FRIDAY, JULY 11, 1997

## The CIA Proved No Match for Iraq and Its Kurdish Allies

By Flora Lewis

PARIS — Only dribbles have emerged of the massive fiasco inflicted on the United States by Iraq's Saddam Hussein and his now-and-then Kurdish collaborators last year. It ranks with spectacular CIA failures like the Bay of Pigs and is an example of how far America is from the capacity for domination that friends and enemies alike charge it with exercising.

Thousands of people were involved. The United States did manage to extricate most of them and then sent them as far away as possible — to Guam, presumably because on the isolated, militarized Pacific island their chances of spilling the story would be reduced. Still, a few Iraqis and at least one former CIA official are beginning to talk.

This is certainly a case that needs congressional and more vigorous repertorial investigation. It shows that for all the pledges of reform, the CIA still hasn't learned much and indeed seems incapable of learning much about the Middle East.

From the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Washington has been trying to overthrow or arrange the assassination of Mr. Saddam by proxy. When Iraqi forces moved north to take advantage of fighting that had

broken out between rival Kurdish factions, it became clear that despite U.S. support for opposition to Baghdad and the "no-fly" zone established from a base in Turkey, Mr. Saddam could still work his will. He withdrew the army under threat of aerial attack but left his shadowy network of agents.

Turkey, which keeps renewing the six-month agreement for use of its Incirlik air base but with increasing reluctance and cost in concessions, undoubtedly knew about what was brewing. But the United States was taken by surprise and lost all it had tried to establish on the ground.

There has been no explanation of why Turkish intelligence did not supply more serious warning and why those who did warn were not heeded. But Turkey has its own complicated web of relations with Iraqi Kurds in its attempt to suppress the insurrection of Kurds in eastern Turkey and destroy their bases in Iraq.

A remarkable new book by the Washington Post correspondent Jonathan C. Randal illuminates the jungle of conflicting interests and ambitions, repeated betrayals and collusions in Kurdistan that continue to defeat simplistic American attempts to line up friends and

overwhelm foes.

Mr. Randal developed an obsession with the hapless Kurds. At great personal risk and even greater discomfort, he managed to keep visiting their beleaguered strongholds over a number of years. He is deeply sympathetic to their cause of community and identity if not to actual statehood, given the fierce resistance of the various countries that hold sovereignty over their tribal lands.

The Kurds are the largest nation in the ethnic sense that have never achieved a state. They were promised one in the post-World War I distribution of the Ottoman empire, but the promise was not kept.

The book is titled "After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness?" and subtitled "My Encounters with Kurdistan." It documents the feuds, the treacheries, the atrocities, the ardent patriotism of the Kurds and the endless tragedies they have suffered from almost blind dedication to the old strategic illusion that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."

But it doesn't do much to explain the essential mystery of their survival and their impotence. They are an old tribal mountain people, and while they are Muslim they always insist

that they are not Turkish, nor Arab, nor Persian but distinct from all around them. The culture has vigorous roots and a warrior tradition. Some assimilate in the countries where they live — Turkey, Iraq, Iran primarily — but they do not lose their adamant sense of Kurdishness.

And yet, fairly geographically concentrated unlike the

Jews in the millennia of dispersion, they have never managed to form a political union. For all the American airpower protecting them from Mr. Saddam's planes and poison gas, they are no closer to it today.

Massoud Barzani, the Kurdish leader who made the deal with Mr. Saddam, holds control along the Turkish border and therefore monopolizes the smuggling trade that became so lucrative with the embargo against Iraq. His one-time ally and rival, Jalal Talabani, wanted a cut of the loot and a share of power. So they fought and Mr. Saddam tipped the scales. The United States held its nose in frustration and embarrassment.

The United States is still in the neighborhood, achieving nothing at considerable cost, and the players have lost none of their appetite for intrigue and brutality. There are things superpowers can't settle in this world, but neither can the clumsy attempts be hidden indefinitely. This chapter of how it's tried is a nasty one.

© Flora Lewis

## Cem meets with French and Armenian counterparts

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

Foreign Minister Ismail Cem met with the French and Armenian foreign ministers during the NATO summit in Madrid late Wednesday.

French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine said that they were aware of the strategic importance of Turkey and they were doing their best to improve their relations with Turkey.

Armenian Foreign Minister Aleksandr

Arzumanyan stressed his country's concerns about reports that the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) used missiles from Armenia. He said that of course his government was not involved and that they were ready to cooperate. He said they condemned PKK terrorism.

Arzumanyan also stated that Armenia wanted to improve its economic ties with Turkey, but Cem told him that Turkey was waiting for a resolution to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

Turkish Daily News

FRIDAY, JULY 11, 1997

*Turkish Daily News* Sunday, July 13, 1997

# Parliament gives Yılmaz the go ahead

Fist fights mar voting when CHP deputy holds up placard insulting Islamist MP

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ The minority coalition government led by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz won a resounding victory in Parliament when it received a vote of confidence with a comfortable majority of 281 against 256.

The anti-Islamist alliance set up between the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Democrat Turkey Party (DTP) and supported by a handful of independent deputies and the left-wing Republican People's Party (CHP) was already set for an easy win after several True Path Party (DYP) deputies defected from their party to back the new government. The latest defection came hours before the voting when deputy Yaman Toruner, a former head of the central bank, resigned from the conservative DYP and joined Yılmaz's ANAP.

Seven DYP deputies Osman Berberoğlu, Mustafa Zeydan, Sedat Aloğlu, Ufuk Söylemez, Doğan Güreş, Hasan Karakaya and Mahmut Yılmaz did not attend the voting thus helping the government and further eroding the DYP's party discipline...

ANAP's Cemil Çiçek who had been punished by the party disciplinary board recently was another absentee.

The voting was marred when a left-wing deputy from the CHP held up a placard reading "get out, greatest pander" insulting another Islamist deputy who has just entered the hall. Deputies in the assembly had cast just 30 votes when angry Islamist deputies rushed the podium and a fist fight broke out. "I am calling a recess," speaker Mustafa Kalemli told the MPs amid shouts of anger. The vote was suspended for 15 minutes before deputies returned to their seats.

The fighting began when CHP deputy Sabri Ergül held up the placard in a reference to Islamist maverick Şevki Yılmaz who angered deputies with derogatory remarks broadcast on Turkish television last month.

During the recess pro-Islamic deputies tried

to get hold of Ergül to beat him up and there were reports that guns were drawn. Later the anger subsided and the voting continued. Şevki Yılmaz was forced to resign from the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (Refah) after public furor. Later the party also decided to expel him for life preventing ever from returning to Refah. However, observers said, Refah deputies showed their support for Şevki when they rallied around him after the Ergül incident.

Parliament Speaker Kalemli punished Ergül with a parliamentary warning and suspended him from voting. However, later Ergül slipped into the hall and was allowed to vote in favor of the government... Kalemli denied Ergül had voted but parliamentary records later proved him wrong.

After the vote Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, no relative to Şevki Yılmaz, thanked the Parliament for its support and said his government will follow the path of Atatürk, the founder of the modern secularist republic.

Former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and his coalition between the pro-Islamic Refah and the DYP was forced out of office under intense pressure from the military because the Armed Forces felt the Islamists had failed to heed army warnings to curb Moslem activism. The brass also turned on the secularist DYP for cooperating with Erbakan.

Former Prime Minister Erbakan hit the government as the product of an anti-democratic plot. Erbakan speaking at a press conference after the vote said the way the government was set up was anti-democratic. "People were forced to defect from their parties and anti-democratic steps were taken during the formation of the government the president (Süleyman Demirel) also took wrong steps. This government is abnormal and lacks the support of the people. It is a minority government with no public backing."

# Alevi question their ancient 'Dedelik' institution



The principal criticism of the institution of *dedelik* is that it passes from father to son. Those who oppose this tradition cite the necessity of establishing a dervish convent. They also favor choosing the *dede* from among those who aspire to the position and who have received permission from the convent in the traditional manner dating from the 14th century period of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli

of the Turkish Republic. The difficulty of finding footing in the newly established socio-political-legal structure proved to be a handicap not so easily overcome. In spite of this, today's Alevi have begun renewing the basic institution of the *dedelik* and bringing the 1,000-year-old profession to a point where it suits modern necessities. In fact, according to some of the leading Alevi, such renewal is a necessity.

The principal criticism toward the institution of *edelik* is that it passes from father to son. Those who oppose this tradition cite the necessity of establishing a dervish convent. They also favor choosing the *dede* from among those who aspire to the position and who have received permission from the convent in the traditional manner dating from the 14th century period of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli. Among those who support this view are the Alevi descendants of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli. Their

**NESLIHAN ÖZTÜRK**  
Istanbul - TDN Guest Writer

**W**ith their itinerate wandering, the *dedeler* or elder fathers continue to function as an integral part of

Alevi communities over the centuries by keeping alive religious beliefs and Alevi customs. For a time the sect lost respect and was perceived inferior to the Sunnis, the predominant religious group during the reign of Ottoman Empire.

Conditions for the Alevi worsened after the establishment

argument has gained strength and seriousness due to the importance attached to Alevi bloodline. On the other hand, there are those who are opposed to the establishment of such a dervish convent and seek to give credence to the view that there should be a different institutional structure for the *dedelik*. They support renovating the institution to bring it more into conformity with the necessities of modern times. The Alevi Bektaşî Representative Assembly, centered in Germany, has been motioning for this for some time.

#### 'A return to old times'

"Dede" Veliyettin Ulusoy, supposedly a descendant of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli and one of the most influential leaders among the Alevi community today, is among the defenders of the establishment of a dervish convent. Ulusoy says, "There is continual coordination between the *dedes* and those aspiring to the position who are bound to us. We may give them permission." The matter is considered upon request and whatever complaints there are concerning a *dede*, would be examined by them and decided upon. However, the community continues to lead the *dedes* in terms of cultural development.

"We don't have any institution for educating the *dedes*," he continues. "The *dedes* only pass knowledge on to those aspiring to the position by word of mouth. Actually one has to leave these questions aside and ask about the *dedelik* institution itself. The Alevi community is also asking for this, of course. The institute which Hünkar Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli began has again reached the situation where it has become an essential part of the community from the point of view of unity and togetherness. However, I have just one thing to say about the insufficiency of the *dedelik* institution in our days and that is that it's necessary to return to the past."

#### The source of Dede knowledge'

Alevi writer Lütfü Kaleli wholeheartedly supports the *dedelik*

institution being renewed. Kaleli stressed how respect for the *dedelik* institution had eroded since the 1980s and said, "it would be a mistake to tie the Alevi organization to the dervish convent. We have decided that the convent — an institution under the spiritual leadership of the descendants of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli should not be a model to be emulated. A structure which could not secure unity within itself could not be considered a structure which could include the *dedes* in Turkey. It would be more correct to set up a structure which would hold Alevis and Bektaşîs together. That is, to set up a joint dervish convent or establish a joint association. When decisions are taken in the Representative Assembly in Germany, the *dedes* must form an association in order to follow the necessary guidelines. *Dedelik* for us means showing the way. The *dedelik* institution in Europe has been in operation for three years. Meetings are held periodically. These meetings have been good and continue to bring the point home that unity is necessary. The strife among the *dedes* has been eliminated by this means."

Kaleli noted that it was impossible for an uninformed *dede* to make any contribution to a student examining atoms in a university setting. According to Kaleli, either the *dedes* should scientifically train themselves with as much rigor as university students, or only skilled persons should become *dedes*.

"For this reason the question must be solved by elections. If the Alevi community thinks anyone is worthy of becoming a *dede*, and he is not coming from a *dede*'s direct line, he should be required to be elected as a *dede*. For example, a community with a population of 30,000 has accepted Mehmet Baba as *dede*, even though he was originally not even an Alevi," said Kaleli.

#### Symbolic Cem rituals

Followers of British resi-

dent Rıza Yörükoğlu initiated the idea of forming a *dergah* (dervish convent) at Hacı Bektaş. Kervan magazine, published by Yörükoğlu in Turkey, is implementing the plan for all *dedes* to graduate from this *dergah* and attend further instruction under the spiritual leadership of Velayettin Ulusoy.

According to Yörükoğlu, the Alevi community is a union of faith, a way of life, and a philosophy as well. This is why, he says, an Alevi who isn't able to renew his knowledge of the Alevi brotherhood in accordance with modern conditions cannot become the leader of an Alevi community.

Kervan magazine focussed on the Cem rituals and *dergah* institution as key issues for

exploring the *dedelik* institution. According to the magazine, the best place for *dedes* to question themselves are through Cem rituals. But these rituals, which mostly are being performed as plays, restrict the opportunities afforded to the *dedes*. Instead, "if the Alevi community can save its roots" says the article, "the *dedelik* institution should be renewed and be concentrated around *dergahs*. *Dergahs* consist of a consultation council under the post of *dede* who represents 12 *ocaks*, and Alevi academics, intellectuals and artists" and exist to

allow this for introspection.

Nowadays most of the leaders and members of the Alevi community share these ideas. They are seriously questioning the Alevilik institution which has retained control for the last 200 years.

Also, their willingness to renew the *dedelik*'s role in respect to changing conditions in order to save unity shows the devotion required of a religious sect aiming to cement a place for itself in today's world.

## Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli (d. 669/1271)

was from Khorasan. He migrated to Anatolia and settled in today's Hacıbektaş. Little is known about him. He is the author of the Arabic book called "Makalat."

His *tarikat* or sect only appeared well after his death and its principles do not follow Hacı Bektaş's ideas. It has been established that he was a Sünni sheikh. However, Bektaşîye came to follow the mystic line in which Batiniye, Hurufiye, Alevilik and even Christianity and Shamanism were mixed.

The sect was widespread throughout Anatolia and Rumelia achieving a wide following within the janissaries. When the Ottoman Empire finally disbanded the janissaries in 1826, the sect was outlawed as well. Even though outlawed, it continued underground.

Throughout history, traces of its teachings can be uncovered in rural folklore. It is also one of the greatest of influences on Turkish literature.

## Anatolian Alevilik and Bektaşilik

**B**ektaşilik, which is identical to the Anatolian Alevilik, is originally a Turkish order developed in Anatolia. The basic philosophy and traditions of this order were much influenced by Islamic mysticism (sufism), which has qualities and characteristics of the Turkish culture.

According to some, the source of Bektaşilik is a mixture of old Turkish religions such as shamanism and Islam. It expresses this mixture in sufi motives and for this reason, is communicated in a publicized language.

Although the Anatolian Alevi and Bektaşîs historically belong to the Caferi order which appears as a branch of Shiite Islam, they do not know much about principles of this order. The Anatolian Alevi especially refute the cultural and political applications of the Iranian Shiite.

For example, the Iranian Shiite's praying rituals differ greatly from the Sünni Muslim practice. However, you cannot find that difference between Anatolian Alevi and Sunnis.

That being so, the Turkish Alevilik is basically a separate and distinct sect from both Arabic Alevilik and Iranian Shiite. In addition, the rituals of Anatolian Alevi have been inspired by Turkish tradition and culture throughout history.



Alevi women take an active role in Cem rituals

# Newly-established migration commission to visits S.east



**SAADET ORUÇ**

*Ankara-Turkish Daily News*

**Hasimi: 'Both the state and the PKK evacuated villages in southeastern Anatolia'**

■ While the Turkish Parliament engaged in both verbal and physical sparring during Saturday's vote of confidence, a newly-established parliamentary commission held its second meeting to investigate one of the biggest social problems afflicting Turkey.

The new commission was set up by the Parliament to clarify the reasons for domestic migration and will soon visit southeastern cities, including Hakkari, Van, Diyarbakır and Şırnak.

## **Southeastern agenda**

Welfare Party's Seyyit Hasim Hasimi, who chairs the commission pointed out that they were going to ask all of the governors of the southeastern cities, including the governor of the emergency rule region, Necati Bilican, to provide the exact figures of migration.

Briefing the Turkish Daily News about the commission, Hasimi said that the data prepared by different bodies, such as the Office of the General Staff and the Office of the Governor of the Emergency Rule Region were contradictory.

"Our first task will be to calculate the figures of migration to western cities of Turkey and to Europe from southeastern cities," he said.

It was also stated that one of the chief aims of the commission was to provide financial aid and to develop better conditions for the migrants. The members of the commission are getting in contact with a number of foreign and domestic bodies to find financial and political support for the commission, the TDN learned. The commission was established after a proposal by Algan Hacaloğlu of the Republican People's Party (CHP) was submitted to the Parliament requesting an investigation of the reasons for migration. Apart from Hacaloğlu, who is a deputy from Istanbul, the other eight members of the commission are from southeastern cities.

Hasimi, the head of the commission, was the mayor of Cizre a town in Diyarbakır, between 1989-1995.

## **Migration, as a direct result of 'Kurdish Issue'**

Hasim Hasimi, the chair of the commission, said that the migration was caused by the ongoing Kurdish conflict in southeastern Anatolia.

"Both the state and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) evacuated villages in the southeastern provinces.

These two led to migration towards western cities.

And there is an additional third reason; some of the villagers leave their homelands to save their souls.

According to the data of the Office of the General Staff, based on compilations through 1996, 2,614 villages were evacuated. Among the main countries that the evacuees have gone to are Germany, Sweden, Belgium and Netherlands. We asked Germany to give the exact data of immigration to that country (from the Southeast).

In Turkey, the Mediterranean cities, Mersin, Adana and the big cities, Istanbul, and Ankara are the most densely settled with migrants from the Southeast.

Since there is contradictory data from the Office of the Governor of the Emergency Rule Region and the General Staff, clarification of the causes of migration is our first goal," Hasimi said.

Algan Hacaloğlu, another member of the commission, stated that nearly 400.000 inhabitants from 3,000 evacuated villages had to migrate. Additionally, according to Hasimi, last year 350.000 migrants came to Diyarbakır and 14 villages of Şırnak were evacuated. Those who left their villages are living in poverty, in Kumçatı, a district between Şırnak-Cizre.

## **Welfarepath's policy on Southeast**

Asked about the policy of his party relating to the Kurdish population, Hasimi confessed that no achievements were made during the Welfarepath government. "First, Necmettin Erbakan had consultations with army officials about the voluntary return of migrants to their villages, which was a common subject in all of the National Security Council (MGK) meetings. Because we were in government, but not governing, nothing could be done regarding that social pain," he commented.

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, MONDAY, JULY 14, 1997

National Split Personality / **Democracy and Torture**

# Turkey's Troubled Human Rights Record

By Stephen Kinzer  
New York Times Service

**I**STANBUL — Every Saturday at noon, as they have done for more than two years, about 100 Turks converge on a bustling plaza in central Istanbul and quietly sit on the pavement.

There are usually no speeches and no placards. The protesters, mostly women, make their point by silently displaying photographs of their missing loved ones, although their emotion sometimes boils over into a chant, like "Mothers' anger will strangle the murderers." After half an hour they rise and go their separate ways.

"Three men in civilian clothes grabbed my husband as he left the house one night in 1995," one of the protesters, Hanim Tosun, 32, said on a recent Saturday. "They were carrying pistols and walkie-talkies. We checked the license number of their car and found it was registered to the police. That was almost two years ago. We have tried everything to find him, but the police tell us nothing."

Mrs. Tosun's husband was a street vendor who had served three years in prison on charges of collaborating with Kurdish guerrillas in southeastern Turkey and had come to Istanbul to start a new life. He is now a statistic, one of an unknown number of Turks believed to have disappeared while in police custody.

As Mrs. Tosun and the other "Saturday mothers" carried out their weekly protest, people around them went about their business. At nearby kiosks, newspapers carried bold headlines accusing politicians of various abuses. Organizers of rightist and leftist parties huddled in offices, making plans for the coming election campaign.

"This is in many ways a very free country, so free that people can go to the polls and change their government whenever they want," Orhan Pamuk, a prominent young novelist, said in an interview. "But it is also a country with a horrible human rights record. Probably there is no country in the world where this contradiction is so sharp and clear."

Turkey's human rights record is the subject of endless debate, not only here but also in the Western world. Turkish officials say the problem is exaggerated, but it is one of the main reasons why the European Union insists on holding Turkey at arm's length and why some Westerners consider Turkey to be a difficult partner.

Many strategists in Washington and in European capitals agree that because of Turkey's membership in NATO, its geographical position, its history and its role as a defender of secular democracy in the Muslim world, Turkey could become even more important than it has been.

But they also say that before Turkey can become a full partner of the West or a desirable model for the new nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia, it

must resolve nagging questions about the way it treats prisoners and dissenters.

"Human rights and freedom of expression are very important issues for the image of Turkey, and they condition many people's reflex reaction to questions about Turkey's role in Europe," said Michael Lake, the European Union envoy in Ankara.

"This reflex is so strong that it outweighs important perceptions of Turkey, such as its strategic importance, its place in the foreign and security architecture of Europe, and even its growing importance as an economic partner."

Hanging over the human rights debate is the war being waged by Kurdish nationalists in southeastern Turkey. Most charges of human rights abuses in Turkey stem from incidents in that region. As many as 80 percent of the charges arising in other parts of the country, according to several human rights advocates, are somehow related to that conflict.

"Tens of thousands of people have been killed out there," said Sabri Ergul, a member of the human rights committee in Parliament. The remains of Turkish soldiers and civilians slain in the fighting "have come back to nearly every town and village in Turkey," he added. "Naturally people are very angry about this. They develop the feeling that whatever has to be done to stop terrorism is justified."

"Terrorism is the problem of our age, but our age is also the age of human rights," Mr. Ergul said.


"The great mistake that is made here is the belief that when you combat terrorism, you don't have to respect democracy and law."

Mr. Ergul is involved in one of Turkey's most important torture-related cases. He is a lawyer for the families of 16 teenagers who were arrested last year for scrawling leftist graffiti on walls and who are accused of belonging to subversive organizations in the western town of Manisa.

Although the police have admitted that the teenagers confessed to their crimes under torture, they were found guilty and sentenced to terms of up to 12 years in prison. A public prosecutor in Manisa has filed suit against 10 police officers accused of having carried out the torture, but the government is drawing out the case and seems to hope that it will somehow fade away.

It is doing the same in another important case, the investigation of officers charged in the 1996 beating death of a journalist, Metin Goktepe.

"The government, especially the Interior Ministry, protects the police who torture," Mr. Ergul said. "They encourage it. They are the ones telling the police forces to behave this way, so naturally they are not in a position to prosecute officers who follow their instructions."



**H**UMAN RIGHTS advocates say that besides torture in detention centers and the "mystery killings" of perceived Kurdish nationalists, the other principal human-rights problem in Turkey is the ban on statements deemed to threaten national unity. Laws that forbid these statements are applied most often against those who question government policy in the Kurdish region.

It is generally considered criminal to suggest that the army shares responsibility for the carnage there, to advocate peace talks or to assert that the government should treat the Kurds as a distinct ethnic group that deserves autonomy.

These laws are often used in cases that devastate Turkey's image. Last year, for example, one of the country's most beloved cultural figures, the novelist Yasar Kemal, was sentenced to a 20-month prison term for making pro-Kurdish statements that were interpreted as separatist propaganda.

Mr. Kemal's sentence was suspended, as often happens in such cases. Nonetheless, human-rights advocates say that more than 70 journalists and writers are in jail for statements they have made.

Turkish officials concede that torture is sometimes used in detention centers, but they insist that it is not systematic and not approved by the authorities. They also assert that laws against separatist propaganda must be judged in the context of a civil conflict in

which terrorism has been a principal weapon.

At a news conference in London last year, Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller said that Turkey "has decided to take a series of measures in order to totally eliminate in practice the crime of torture, which as a matter of fact is forbidden by our laws." After she spoke, Parliament passed a law cutting the maximum time defendants may be held incommunicado to 10 days from 30.

Perhaps the most illuminating human rights case in Turkey is the complex scandal that emerged after a spectacular car crash near the western town of Susurluk in November that killed a top police official and an escaped heroin smuggler. A pro-government Kurdish clan leader, who is also a member of Parliament, survived.

Questions about what the three men were doing in a car together led to accusations of government involvement in smuggling, death squads, illegal repression in the southeast and other crimes.

But a parliamentary investigation of the scandal fizzled out after senior military and civilian leaders signaled that they would not cooperate. Many Turks believe responsibility for the crimes reaches so high that a full investigation is impossible.

"I'm glad we had Susurluk," said Taciser Belge, coordinator of the Istanbul-based human rights group Helsinki Citizens Assembly.

"Now when we speak about these things, people realize that we're not making up stories. Since Susurluk, people understand that when things like mystery killings happen, the army and the state are involved. This is very new in Turkey."



Stanton R. Winter/The New York Times

*The weekly gathering of 'Saturday mothers' in central Istanbul is a sign of how Turkey's human rights abuses contrast with the nation's democratic traditions. Every Saturday women and some men assemble with photos of missing loved ones.*



# Turkey gets some MEDA funds

Turkish Daily News

MONDAY, JULY 14, 1997

**ELIF SEMİHA KÜFLÜ**  
*Ankara- Turkish Daily News*

■ The European Union will give Turkey some of the long-awaited MEDA funds which were put on hold last year, due to a decision made by a member of the European Parliament as a result of Turkey's human rights report.

The portion originally predicted to be granted to Turkey was about 375 million ecu of the total MEDA funds, designed in 1997 for the bloc's Mediterranean neighbors. The funds were put on hold partially because of Turkey's human rights situation, its democratization, and its Southeastern conflict, and partially due to a Greek veto which was later lifted by Athens.

The MEDA funds, worth 33.1 million ecu (approximately \$40 million), will be used for five different projects. The EU officials said that the funds will be transferred as soon as the paperwork, currently at the Treasury, between the donor and the receiving parties is completed.

EU officials, however, who trying to finance other projects, noted that other small and medium-scale programs will follow eventually. The first project is the longstanding Jean Monet scholarship for Turkish postgraduate students; the second is a Ministry of Agriculture project for the upgrading and opening of food control laboratories; the third one is a plan from the

Ministry of Education for the modernization of vocational training; the fourth program is a network between business innovation centers; and the fifth is an International Union of Local Authorities project for decentralization cooperation in local capacity and institutional building.

Turkey slammed the European Parliament decision to put the funds designed to strengthen free trade between the EU and its the Mediterranean neighbors on hold for human rights purposes, and condemned the freezing of the funds, saying it was a double standard on EU's part. Diplomatic circles in Ankara said the sum that will soon be released to Turkey had been approved long before the MEDA funds were put on hold, and was due to arrive anyway. Ankara was angered by the freezing of the funds earlier last year.

Turkey's funds, however, are also a victim of the EU's domestic budget problems, and the talks concerning the funds have not concluded with favorable results for Turkey, Brussels-based sources told the TDN. The funds for Turkey have to go through an inspection council, comprising European Commission and Parliament members, who look into all projects and judge using the criterion of human rights. Turkey will be able to receive MEDA funds via municipalities, universities and nongovernmental organizations.

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## Turkey and the Press

Turkey has the shameful distinction of imprisoning more journalists than any country in the world. The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists has compiled a list of 78 reporters, writers and editors now in jail, and the Turkish Press Council reckons the total may be twice as high. Now that a new government has assumed power, it has a timely opportunity to open those prison doors. Doing so would lessen a stain on Turkey's reputation and enhance the democratic credentials of Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz's secularist center-right coalition.

Most of the journalists in prison are charged with disseminating "separatist propaganda" or with being members of proscribed pro-Kurdish political groups. In fact, under Turkey's broad anti-terrorism law, journalism itself is criminalized and reporters face prison for doing their job. An emblematic case is that of Ocak Isik Yurt-

cu, a prominent writer and former newspaper editor who has served 3 years of a 15-year sentence. Mr. Yurtcu's offense was to publish articles about the Turkish Army's scorched-earth campaign against Kurdish insurgents in southeastern Turkey.

Mr. Yurtcu's plight, along with scores of other cases, will be taken up this summer by a visiting delegation of journalists, among them Terry Anderson and Peter Arnett, at the request of Turkish press organizations. By responding favorably, Mr. Yılmaz would signal a halt to Turkey's descent into repression. He would begin to answer critics, especially in the European Union, of Turkey's dismal human rights record, and would set a different example from his immediate secular and Islamic predecessors.

This is more than a press issue. For nearly a decade Turkey has relied primarily on force to counter Kurdish terrorists, without opening a parallel political track for a huge, aggrieved ethnic minority. Press freedom is among the casualties of a failed strategy, imposed by the military, which Mr. Yılmaz cannot change overnight. Yet it is within his power to release jailed journalists and decriminalize free speech, an essential precondition for an end to Turkey's domestic turmoil. Turkey's friends hope he will not let this moment pass.

—THE NEW YORK TIMES.

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**INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,**

**MONDAY, JULY 14, 1997**

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# The comedy of feeling sorry for jailed journalists

As long as the ultraconservative mentality that freedom of expression is a major threat to the Turkish state does not change we will continue feeling sorry for imprisoned press people...

A delegation of international journalists is visiting Turkey and has already met with high-level state officials to call attention to the fact that our country has one of the worst track records in the world regarding its treatment of press people...

What is sad is that everyone who meets these prominent foreign journalists laments the fact that Turkey has jailed press people and comments on how sorry they feel about this... Even President Süleyman Demirel told these visitors how "deeply sorry" he is for jailed press people. Most of the leading Turkish officials who met the visitors have been in influential positions that would have allowed them to do something about freedom of expression in Turkey and, of course, about jailed journalists. Yet, none of them could admit this to our visitors...

Today Turkish state officials are stage acting. They have done nothing substantial to promote press freedom and, beyond that, freedom of expression. That is why many journalists and writers have landed in jail and are serving lengthy prison sentences...



## Editorial

İlhan Çevik

Whenever you raise this issue you are confronted with a long story about the terrorism threat in Turkey and thus the need to impose restrictions.

Today there are taboo subjects in Turkey which can put you in jail. One is Atatürk; the other two are the Kurdish issue and religion.

The state fears that if people are allowed to express their views, the Kurdish separatists will have a major say in convincing the masses to set up a separate Kurdish state. There is also the fear that the Islamists may get the masses to set up an Islamic state and thus do away with secularism and the system set up by Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey.

Many leading personalities in Turkey, as well as those who run the country, agree with all this and thus help maintain the curbs and restrictions which have resulted in the jailing of these journalists... Thus, we have a conservative establishment that stalls legislation to introduce democratic reforms which will bring us on a par with Western democracies.

What is sad is that some prominent journalists also belong to this conservative establishment which opposes a true democratic system. You only have to look into the back issues of mass circulation dailies to realize how they and their columnists are steered by the state... This is only to be expected when the major media groups have received soft loans, subsidies and incentives from the state.

Some of our colleagues in the press agree with the official state position that some press people now in jail are actually "terrorists" and, thus, should never see the light of day.

So the international Committee to Protect Journalists has to realize that as long as the ultra-conservative mentality that freedom of expression is a major threat to the Turkish state does not change, and the so-called intellectuals of Turkey stop supporting repression, they may launch several new trips to Turkey but will not achieve much...

They will see some minor changes in the laws that will allow limited pardon for some jailed journalists, but the bulk will remain behind bars...

Dienstag, 15. Juli 1997 ■ die tageszeitung

# Soli-Netzwerk für Kurdinnen gegründet

## ■ Kurdische Aktivistinnen und Frauenforscherinnen kooperieren

**Berlin (taz)** – Die Mutter verstand nur Kurdisch, und diese Sprache war im türkischen Gefängnis verboten. Mühsam lernte sie den einzigen türkischen Satz, mit dem sie ihren Jungen dann ein halbes Jahr lang stereotyp ansprechen mußte: „Wie geht es dir, mein Sohn?“

Unter solch subtiler Psychofolter leiden Kurdinnen. Es sei nahezu unmöglich, die Situation in den türkischen Gefängnissen zu beschreiben, erklärte eine Teilnehmerin einer Veranstaltung zur kurdischen Frauenforschung am Wochenende in Berlin. Bei dem Treffen gründeten Wissenschaftlerinnen und Aktivistinnen ein internationales Netzwerk. Für die Forscherinnen und die politisch aktiven Kurdinnen, so zeigte die begleitende Tagung an der Freien Universität Berlin (FU), ist die Ausgangslage denkbar schlecht.

Weltweit steht die Kurdologie ganz am Anfang, wissenschaftliche Literatur oder gar universitäre Stellen sind rar gesät – wie etwa die Gastprofessur von Martin van Bruinessen am ethnologischen Institut der FU. Den Aktivistinnen in den kurdischen Gebieten drohen Repressionen von verschiedenen Seiten. Um ihre Rechte als Frauen, betonten einige Teilnehmerinnen, sei es momentan so schlecht bestellt wie nie. „Über Feminismus in der jetzigen Situation des Krieges in Kurdistan auch nur zu sprechen, ist eine Phantasie“, erklärte Fatma Kayhan aus Istanbul.

Mit ihren Beiträgen vermittelten im Exil lebende Kurdinnen während der Tagung eine Ahnung von der Gewalt, die kurdische Frauen täglich erfahren. Hatice Yaşar, die heute in Wien lebt, berichtete von der selbst erlittenen Folter im türkischen Gefängnis. „Es ist schwierig, sich nicht von den Gefühlen überwältigen zu lassen, die solche Erfahrungen hervorru-



Frauensolidarität aus dem fernen Berlin: Bewohnerin der Region Kurdistan im Irak

Foto: Birgit Betzelt

fen“, sagte die Berliner Turkologin Heidi Wedel, eine der Initiatorinnen des Netzwerks mit dem Titel: „Kurdish women's studies and activism“. Frauenforschung und politisches Aktivsein sollen nach dem Willen der Konferenz verbunden werden.

Angedacht ist ein Treffen mit in Frauenzentren arbeitenden Kurdinnen. Die sollen ihre Erwartungen an die Wissenschaftsseite äußern. Umgekehrt erhoffen sich Forscherinnen neue Kontakte zu Kurdinnen. Studien in den kurdischen Gebieten selbst, bestätigte Heidi Wedel, seien problematisch. „Auch wenn die Wissenschaftlerinnen selbst nicht gefährdet sind, so müssen sie doch damit rechnen, daß ihren Gesprächspartnerinnen

Repressionen drohen“, erläuterte sie die besonderen Schwierigkeiten der Forschungsarbeit. Um zumindest eine symbolische Schutzwirkung zu erreichen, solle im Netzwerk auch darüber nachgedacht werden, so Wedel weiter, eine Folgekonferenz vor Ort zu organisieren.

Irma Leisle von Hînbûn, einem Beratungszentrum und Treffpunkt für kurdische Frauen in Berlin, regte beispielsweise eine Studie dazu an, was es für junge Frauen hier und in anderen Ländern wie der Türkei, Syrien oder dem Iran heißt, „sich kurdisch zu nennen oder nicht“. **Monika Honner**

# Struggling to save colleagues behind bars in Turkey

WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 1997

Turkish Daily News

'Far more journalists are in jail in Turkey than in any other country in the world, including China, Burma and Libya. That's not acceptable for a democratic country,' veteran journalist Terry Anderson says

**ALPARSLAN ESMER**  
*Ankara-Turkish Daily News*

■ A delegation representing international press institutions arrived in Turkey on the weekend to raise awareness of freedom of the press issues and to primarily meet with government leaders to secure the release of imprisoned journalists. The delegation appears to be impressed with the response of the newly formed conservative-led government. Terry Anderson, the leader of the delegation said, "When we came here, we expected to work with the Turkish Press Council to try to convince the government, and what we found was that the government was already convinced," said Anderson, a former foreign correspondent of the Associated Press, who had been held hostage for seven years by the Shiite Muslim militia in Lebanon. "Den of Lions," is Anderson's best-selling account of this experience.

Anderson now is the vice chairman of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), a New York-based institution. Other organizations represented by the delegation are the International Press Institute and Paris-based Reporters Without Borders.

"Everybody we met with — the president, the foreign minister, the justice minister, the two deputy prime ministers, and now the prime minister — has welcomed us, agreed with us, and they have even made very concrete specific promises to change things," Anderson said, emphasizing the point that although it was a small step by the Turkish leaders, it was the first at least.

He said Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz had promised work on the anti-terrorism law and the penal laws in order to provide the release of imprisoned journalists, writers and publishers. The CPJ has compiled a list of 78 reporters, writers and editors currently in Turkish prisons, though the Turkish Press Council suggests that the figure could be twice that. Anderson said that he believed Yılmaz's government would try its best to ensure that more journalists are not arrested "for doing their job, for trying



Terry Anderson

to be journalists, for writing their opinion."

A primary objective of the delegation is to secure, among others, the immediate release of Işık Yurtçu, editor-in-chief of the now defunct pro-Kurdish daily "Özgür Gündem", who is serving a 16-year jail sentence in the northwestern province of Tekirdağ.

"The Turkish Press Council asked us to come to support them in their demands. Far more journalists are in jail in Turkey than in any other country in the world, including China, Burma and Libya," the veteran journalist said. He said he was aware of the reports of beatings and murders of journalists.

"That's not acceptable in a democratic country, even with the excuse of terrorism and separatism, it's still not acceptable," he added.

### **'Strong and direct' PM**

Assessing the newly appointed prime minister, Mesut Yılmaz, Anderson said he was very "strong and direct" in his promises for improvements to freedom of expression. He said he was outlining the "concrete steps" he was going to take, and promised to meet with the interior minister "as soon as possible" to ask him to forward instructions to the security forces to "stop beating journalists."

Prime Minister Yılmaz, who had recently received the delegation in Ankara, said he actually told its members that his newly formed minority government would give priority to the freedom of press issues, despite the fact that it faced constitutional and legal difficulties.

He promised to present a proposal to Parliament next week on the legal regulations pertaining to the "published writings of the responsible editors which constituted crime." He said he would work hard on the release of journalists in prison who were considered to have committed criminal acts with their writing.

But he added that there was a constitutional barrier on that matter and the government would try to solve this problem within a "reasonable time."

Speaking on the subject of Işık Yurtçu's release, Yılmaz said President Süleyman Demirel would use his own powers to that end when the necessary documents could be arranged.

Assessing the ongoing case of the murdered journalist, Metin Göktepe in which the suspected police officers who allegedly had beaten him to death refused to appear in court, Yılmaz said that situation was intolerable, and accused the former administration of failing to fulfill its obligations to assist the judiciary. He said his government would also work to cooperate with the judiciary.

Yılmaz also pledged to work for the regulation of the press law which took its latest shape in 1992. He said the law was already out of date, and would have the law debated in Parliament.

Addressing the most sensitive issue, the beating of journalists, Yılmaz said he would soon instruct Interior Minister Murat Başesgioğlu to issue a decree for the security personnel to treat journalists "well" in order for press members to carry out their "public duty" without hindrance.

"The government is aware that Turkey does not have a reputation in the international arena of which it can be proud, as far as press freedom is concerned. We will try to repair the damage inflicted by the state's

institutions and laws due to the lack of sufficient accumulation of experience in fighting against terrorism," Yılmaz said.

### **'Promises, not deeds'**

In spite of Anderson's optimism, he said the statements made by government leaders were 'still just promises' and time would tell if these promises would be kept. He said people could be skeptical of statements and promises made before by the other governments, but adds: "My sense after meeting with all these people over the past two days is that they mean it. They're really going to try."

The prime minister said, directly to us, that he is willing to see his government fall over this question."

Anderson said that they would closely monitor whether promises would be kept or not. He said the institutions would stay in touch with the Turkish Press Council on a regular basis. But, he also said, he was already convinced that the government would try its best and Yılmaz appeared very determined about that. He said he was also assured that the minority government would be backed by the parties and deputies that were not part of the coalition.

### **'No guarantees'**

Anderson said that they wanted to secure the release of as many journalists as possible. "I'm talking about a lot. I'm not talking about six. But that's an immediate step. It's not sufficient. The prime minister knows that, and he said that. There needed to be other things done to get the rest of them out," he added, referring to the positive developments to have Yurtçu and several others freed. "All of these things, of course depend on him (Yılmaz) staying in power."

If the government falls, what can you do? Look, there is no guarantee here. We did not come and get an absolute guarantee after two days. All we could do was, with the Turkish Press Council, push them as hard as we could, and they responded, in very positive terms. Now, we have to see what happens."

The delegation of foreign press institutions will visit Işık Yurtçu in prison on Wednesday to present him with the CPJ's Press Freedom Award he won last year. After leaving the meeting with the prime minister, Anderson talked with Yurtçu over the telephone to offer him encouragement and to report on the delegation's support and the positive developments that will pave the way for his release.

# Army to boost fleet with 10 cargo choppers

The current plan envisages the modification, including the addition of night-vision systems, of 10 CH-53 cargo helicopters, to be made either in Israel or in Turkey, with the assistance of an Israeli firm

## METEHAN DEMİR

Ankara- Turkish Daily News

■ Turkey is planning to buy ten Sikorsky-made CH-53 cargo helicopters under the U.S. Surplus Arms Program, in an effort to boost the capability of its special forces, while the country is still evaluating proposals for another bid to procure four large transport choppers for its land forces.

The current plan envisages the modification, including the addition of night-vision systems, of ten cargo helicopters — updating them according to Turkey's specifications — to be carried out either in Israel or in Turkey, with the assistance of Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI), high-ranking military sources told the TDN.

Negotiations have been going on for months, and during Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Çevik Bir's recent visits to Washington and Israel, the countries involved have agreed on preliminary plans for ten cargo helicopters and their modification by Israeli experts, the military sources said.

Since the beginning of this year, Gen. Bir has reportedly been insisting on buying such helicopters from the United States, sources stated. Turkey is among the first three of countries which buy American surplus arms, according to an earlier defense report.

## TAI and Israel

Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and the Turkish military electronics firm, Aselsan, would play key roles in Turkey with the assistance of Israeli technicians, if the modifications are to be performed in Turkey.

Under the U.S. Surplus Arms Program, ten cargo helicopters would be provided from among helicopters that are still being used by the American special forces.

In another request for tenders, Turkey accepted bids in March on a contract for four cargo helicopters, in a direct pro-



Under the U.S. Surplus Arms Program, 10 cargo helicopters would be provided from among helicopters that are still being used by the American special forces.

urement deal worth \$120 to \$150 million.

Among the technical and tactical specifications of CH-53 helicopters are: crashworthy fuel tanks, air refuelling capability, three engines, 315 km/hour maximum speed, 33,880 pounds operating weight, carrying capacity for between 37 and 55 passengers, and 500 nautical miles maximum range.

The final choice for the cargo helicopters is to be made from three competing firms' products — the Sikorsky CH-53 Super Stallion, the Boeing CH-47 Chinook, and the Russian Mi-26 Halo. Turkey is planning to increase the number of such helicopters to 20, spending a total of more than \$500 million over the long term. Sources say that after the direct procurement of the ten Sikorsky-made CH-53 helicopters, the competition will be more active among the competitors for Turkey's business.

The Sikorsky Black Hawks and Eurocopter Cougars, which the Turkish Army currently uses, are both designed for light lifting and personnel transport and cannot handle heavy loads of artillery, jeeps and fuel.

The Turkish Armed Forces' special forces unit has been suffering from the lack of well-equipped and

heavy-lifting-capable helicopters in its inventory. There are also other plans to modernize the unit's three Black Hawk helicopters. By means of these initiatives, Turkey hopes to overcome some of its difficulties.

Turkey also needs the heavy-load helicopters to transport brigade-sized units along with logistical support to respond on short notice. The Turkish Land Forces have long been emphasizing the urgent need for such helicopters, asking that they be used in operations in the Southeast, especially for crossing mountainous border areas to deploy troops and units in northern Iraq, while working against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

Earlier, former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan held up Turkey's previous plan to purchase four Boeing CH-47 cargo helicopters from the U.S.-based Boeing, saying that the country should open a new round of bidding for the direct procurement of such helicopters.

The earlier scheme envisaged buying cargo helicopters directly from abroad in a noncompetitive way, by asking the relevant parties from the foreign firm Boeing to submit proposals.

# Intellectuals at odds with the state

**Eşber Yağmurdereli:**  
*'It is not good for Turkey if I have to go into the prison from which Işık Yurtçu has just left. The new government must take the necessary measures for freedom of expression'*

**Oral Çalışlar:**  
*'Turkey's giant of literature, Yaşar Kemal was saying that he did not want to stay in a Turkey, where Eşber is imprisoned. And probably he will talk with PM Mesut Yılmaz about that'*

**Çalışlar:**  
*'Eşber was the leading figure in bringing about the ending of the hunger strike in prisons'*

SAADET ORUÇ  
Ankara - Turkish Daily News

**T**uesday turned out to be "a day from hell" with the news of the unexpected death of a young journalist, Murat Koç of Anatolia news agency. This time the "traffic monster" chose one of our colleagues, leaving many unanswered questions, "Why did this happen to him?" or "Why is it such a common fate to end one's life so tragically, so needlessly on our roads?" "Why did he die so young?"....

These "whys" multiplied as I walked towards the garden of the Mülkiyeliler Birliği, the place where I was to interview Eşber Yağmurdereli, a leading human rights figure...

Yağmurdereli, who first became well-known through his efforts to end the prisoners' hunger strike in 1996, is now awaiting the yet-to-be-determined time of his arrest and imprisonment. Yağmurdereli was sentenced to 23 years imprisonment because of a speech he made at a meeting of the Human Rights Association (IHD), which is to celebrate its 11th anniversary Thursday.

The bearded, blind, elderly man sat in front of me, smoking a cigarette that appeared likely to fall from his lips, talking about politics, human rights and

optimism. I watched his smile, framed in a white, black, yellow and brown-coloured beard. He began speaking, reflecting on the similarly hot July days of the previous year, the time of the hunger strike...

Referring to those days as "one of the historical turning points" of the country, he said that the power of civilians in society was only then understood. It was the first time that the ability of intellectuals to solve social conflicts was proven, Yağmurdereli said. He continued, "Turkey decided on early elections in 1995. The main goal was to bring an end to the political crisis in the country. Without taking a serious stand against 'the war' that had lasted for 13 years, however, it was impossible to prevent the crisis in the country ... The decisions of the then-governments were not democratic in their approach, but were intended to terrorize the public with the continuation of the Kurdish conflict. There are some circles within the state that want the conflict in the Southeast to continue, especially the ones who profit from the war and take a considerable share from drug trafficking via Turkey. As \$25 billion worth of drugs are traded via Turkey, reportedly 25 percent is taken by some individuals connected to the state. So it is easy to say that these circles will not readily give up that amount of a money.

The government that was established after the December 1995 election, was keen on the idea of a military approach for the Kurdish conflict.

The appointment of former police chief Mehmet Ağar, which we understood better especially after the Susurluk accident, as minister of justice without a law background, confirmed the position of that government.

Those were the first days after my release from prison. The bloody results of May Day demonstrations and prison incidents terrorized society. Turkey, as the country having the most political prisoners, was to experience more tragic events. The day we went to Bayrampaşa prison was also the time when the National Security Council (MGK) decided to end the strikes by force. If we had

not taken action, hundreds of prisoners would have died. Prosecutors and politicians then asked us to act as mediator.

Yaşar Kemal, the symbol of Turkish literature, Zülfü Livaneli, composer, Oral Çalışlar, Cumhuriyet Daily's columnist and I started to mediate for a bloodless ending to the hunger strike. And it was the first that the intellectuals were active in seeking a solution to Turkey's problems...

Oral Çalışlar, Cumhuriyet columnist, talking about those days to the Turkish Daily News pointed out that Eşber Yağmurdereli, was the leading figure in bringing about the ending of the hunger strike ... Çalışlar describes the rest of the story: "Eşber had the key role, then. It was a Friday when we met with Yaşar Kemal and Zülfü Livaneli, arriving from a meeting with Ferzan Çitici, Istanbul's prosecutor.

There was a fear among us because of the possibility of an attack against the prisoners.

Yaşar Kemal made the statement that Turkey could not get over the shame of an attack upon the prisoners. By phone, Welfare's Istanbul deputy, Bahri Zengin, acting with special authority from the prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, we were given an undertaking that there would be no interference from the prison. Then we accelerated our efforts. At that moment, I called Eşber, to his cellular phone while he was on the ferry between Kadıköy and Karaköy ... He got into the Bayrampaşa prison to act as a mediator, and succeeded. We, together with Ercan Karakaş, Halil Ergün and Orhan Pamuk, acted after Eşber talked with the prisoners."

Çalışlar, disturbed by the forthcoming imprisonment of Yağmurdereli, says that it is a shame for Turkey to put Yağmurdereli, a man who always promotes peace, in prison. According to Çalışlar, Yaşar Kemal is very much at odds with the state. "Yaşar Kemal, nowadays is saying that he will not stay in a Turkey, where Eşber is imprisoned. He said that he would say that to Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz," Çalışlar said.

### Still hopeful

Now, returning to our two-hour talk with Yağmurdereli ... He is still optimistic about the new government. "If the Turkish people have not reacted to the 33 percent increase in oil prices yet, it means that it is just an open cheque for the new cabinet. But, if I have to go into the prison from where Işık Ocak Yurtçu is released, it is not good for Turkey. Instead of finding short-term

solutions, the government must find radical solutions to bring about freedom of expression, which is the basic of human rights," he says.

This last remark appears to be similar to Akın Birdal's recent proposal: "As we did during the hunger strike, we can act as a mediator for seeking a solution to the Kurdish issue. The state does not have to sit with the PKK for negotiations. But free discussion of the problem will bring the solution."

Birdal, speaking to the TDN about the 11th anniversary of the İHD, had also proposed to act as a mediator between the state and Kurdish circles in seeking to resolve the conflict.

"It is necessary to find the solution to the Kurdish conflict, which has caused 70 percent migration from eastern city Tunceli, and the evacuation of 2759 villages," Birdal says. "The İHD will surely pay attention to that issue, which is at the same time a problem not only for Turkey, but for the world. We are ready to act as mediators, just as we did to save the imprisoned soldiers from the PKK," Birdal continued.

Last year, a mission of activists traveled to PKK camps in northern Iraq, to save a group of imprisoned Turkish soldiers. They faced harsh criticisms because they sat under the PKK flag in a cave, a command post of PKK. The İHD, which is currently actively working to support Yağmurdereli, is celebrating its 11th anniversary. Birdal says that they will continue to defend human rights.

At a time when the Motherleft government is making positive statements with regard to human rights, the often-criticised Human Rights Association (İHD) reaches its eleventh year.

The organization which was on honeymoon until 1992, began to be the target of security officials and was accused of "being the tool of terrorist organizations". The year 1992 was the year, when the İHD took a stand for a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem, Birdal says.

The İHD was established just after the Sept. 12, 1980 coup d'etat, to defend the rights of oppressed people. Birdal defines their aim as "to improve rights, to protect rights". The abolition of the law that prevented intellectuals from practicing their professions, the 1402nd article of the Constitution, was one of their greatest successes, Birdal said.





## ● Les Etats-Unis démentent que Mme Ciller ait travaillé pour la CIA

09:52  
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Juillet  
1997

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ANKARA, 17 juil (AFP) - L'ambassade des Etats-Unis à Ankara a démenti jeudi que l'ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères turc Tansu Ciller ait été un agent de la CIA, contrairement à des accusations dont elle fait l'objet.

"Toute suggestion d'une relation clandestine entre le gouvernement américain et Mme Ciller est complètement fausse", a déclaré Margarete Schmidt, porte-parole du service d'information des Etats-Unis (USIS) à Ankara.

Le parquet militaire turc a lancé mercredi une enquête contre Mme Ciller sur des faits "d'espionnage pour la CIA" américaine, selon des informations de la presse turque qui n'ont pas été démenties par l'armée.

Si l'enquête permet de découvrir des éléments à charge, une procédure judiciaire débouchant sur un procès sera entamée.

L'enquête du parquet militaire fait suite à des accusations lancées le mois dernier par le leader du Parti travailliste turc (gauche), Dogu Perincek, qui avait affirmé avoir en sa possession des documents prouvant que Mme Ciller, qui fut Premier ministre de 1993 à 1996, avait travaillé pour la centrale de renseignements américaine.

Mme Ciller, chef du Parti de la juste Voie (DYP, droite, opposition), est en butte à l'hostilité de l'armée pour s'être alliée de juin 1996 à juin 1997 avec les islamistes du Parti de la Prospérité (Refah), permettant à leur leader Necmettin Erbakan d'accéder au poste de Premier ministre.

La coalition Refah-DYP, qui a démissionné le 18 juin, avait provoqué une forte tension avec l'armée qui accusait les islamistes de favoriser une dérive vers le fondamentalisme islamique et qui a obtenu leur départ du pouvoir.

hc/od



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## ● Les dirigeants kurdes ont promis de respecter le cessez-le-feu: Washington

WASHINGTON, 17 juil (AFP) - Les dirigeants kurdes rivaux du nord de l'Irak ont assuré les Etats-Unis qu'ils respecteraient un cessez-le-feu intervenu en octobre malgré de récents heurts, a affirmé jeudi le département d'Etat.

Les responsables officiels américains ont été en contact avec Massoud Barzani du Parti Démocratique du Kurdistan (PDK) et Jalal Talabani de l'Union Patriotique du Kurdistan (UPK), a indiqué le porte-parole du département d'Etat Nicholas Burns.

"Les deux dirigeants, MM. Barzani et Talabani, nous ont assuré qu'ils souhaitent continuer à appliquer le cessez-le-feu établi en octobre", a déclaré M. Burns.

Le Parti Démocratique du Kurdistan a accusé mercredi son rival dans le nord de l'Irak, l'Union Patriotique du Kurdistan (UPK), d'avoir tué deux de ses combattants dans une attaque contre ses positions.

Le PDK de Massoud Barzani avait accusé lundi son rival d'avoir attaqué, de concert avec les séparatistes kurdes de Turquie, une de ses positions, faisant cinq blessés.

"Les deux parties nous ont fait part de leur préoccupation face à certains de ces incidents", a déclaré M. Burns. "Mais elles se disent toutes deux prêtes à rester en contact l'une avec l'autre pour trouver des moyens de les résoudre et c'est ce qu'il convient de faire", a-t-il conclu.

cml-uh/et/mb eaf

## Free Turkey's Press

It is an irony and an embarrassment that even as NATO imposes high democratic standards on new members, it has given an errant old member, Turkey, a bye. On the litmus issue of imprisoning journalists for what they write, for instance, Turkey is the recognized world champion. The Committee to Protect Journalists, an American defense group, counted 78 jailed Turkish journalists at the beginning of the year. All the more satisfying, then, that the group has now elicited from the new Turkish government of Mesut Yilmaz a commitment to do something about a record that, if a current NATO applicant had it, would exclude it from the West's premier democratic club.

The trouble lies, of course, in Turkey's continuing conflict with a Kurdish minority that has its pacific assimilationist element but its armed separatist element as well. An official policy giving a long leash to an assertive Turkish military has not only failed to curb Kurdish terrorism but has also cost past governments political support. Journalists who write about Kurdish nationalism from an independent perspective have been at risk of being locked up and

censored, harassed and beaten. Article 312 of the penal code permits reporting and commentary on other than the government line to be punished as "incitement to racial hatred."

The Kurdish problem is as tough as any ethnic conflict anywhere. No one has a good solution in the inflamed circumstances in which it is unfolding now. What is certain, however, is that the problem must be addressed in a context in which the Turkish people are fully and fairly informed about the options before them. This is the prospect now opened up by the Yilmaz government. It speaks for a minority coalition and faces parliamentary resistance to its new free-press commitments. But it also has the opportunity to bring Turkey the appreciation rather than the opprobrium of the democratic West. Up to this point, the army has plainly been calling most of the shots on policy toward the Kurds. The army is manifestly unfit for this role and plays it poorly. Opening up the press is no glib civics textbook prescription. It is a practical way for Turkey to build support for a consensus approach.

—THE WASHINGTON POST.

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,

THURSDAY, JULY 17, 1997

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, THURSDAY, JULY 17, 1997

# U.S. Arms Sales in Gulf Risk Being Eroded by China and Others

By John Lancaster  
*Washington Post Service*

**KUWAIT** — After U.S.-led forces drove Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1991, this country and other Gulf allies showed their gratitude by spending billions of dollars on American weapons. But U.S. arms merchants no longer can take their wealthy customers for granted: Kuwait is considering the purchase of long-range howitzers from China.

Kuwait's potential purchase of 72 Chinese-made self-propelled howitzers instead of what are widely considered to be superior American, British and South African versions has raised eyebrows among U.S. defense contractors and prompted a personal appeal to Kuwaiti leaders from Vice President Al Gore.

Kuwaiti officials assert publicly that they have not made a final decision and will do so only after each model has been thoroughly evaluated on the basis of cost and performance. In private, however,

they say they may end up buying the Chinese weapons for reasons that have nothing to do with range, price or accuracy and everything to do with politics.

Eager to gain a foothold in one of the world's richest arms markets, China has hinted that it will withhold its support at the United Nations for extending trade sanctions against Iraq if Kuwait does not agree to the estimated \$300 million purchase, according to Western diplomats and a senior Kuwaiti official who spoke on condition of anonymity. China is one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council — along with the United States, Britain, France and Russia — which votes on the renewal of the sanctions in October.

"Sometimes you get to a state when you feel you're being blackmailed," the senior Kuwaiti official said. "We lean toward the U.S. equipment, but we have to find a way to please the Chinese and not upset them in the Security Council."

The United States is not the only weapons supplier in the Gulf. France and Britain have long been major competitors here. Kuwait has bought armored military vehicles from Russia, tanks from the former Yugoslavia and patrol boats from France.

The Gulf War, however, gave the United States a competitive edge. Arab nations in the U.S.-led coalition that drove Iraqi invasion forces from Kuwait

were impressed by high-tech American weapons and grateful for U.S. leadership during the crisis.

American officials also have been successful in persuading Gulf allies to buy weapons compatible with those that would be used by American troops in the event of another conflict in the region.

The partnership has been a profitable one for the United States, the largest weapons exporter in the world. Since 1990, the six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab

Emirates and Oman — have signed contracts for \$36 billion worth of American arms — 32 percent of the \$110.8 billion in U.S. arms exports over the same period, according to an analysis of Defense Department figures by the Washington-based Arms Control Association.

But as memories of the Gulf War fade, U.S. defense contractors have begun to face growing competition from abroad, especially in the realm of such less sophisticated weapons as howitzers and armored vehicles, as Arab allies diversify their suppliers for political and economic reasons.

The U.S.-based Lockheed Martin Corp., for example, is competing fiercely to sell as many as 80 long-range strike planes to the United Arab Emirates in a deal worth about \$6 billion. Despite a personal appeal in 1995 by President Bill Clinton to President Zayed ibn Sultan al Nahayan, officials of the emirates said in March that they were seriously considering two European offers.

Kuwait is on excellent terms with the United States; their forces conduct regular maneuvers together. So American officials were surprised to learn recently that Kuwait's Higher Defense Council was leaning toward China's North Industries Corp. to supply it with self-propelled howitzers — tracking vehicles that function as long-range artillery pieces.

The United States has been pushing its M109A6 Paladin model, some of which are deployed in the desert north of Kuwait City to defend it against any invasion from Iraq.

U.S. Army warrant officers who recently examined the Chinese howitzer in Kuwait said they found faulty welds and antiquated radio equipment that would not permit communication with American-made M1A2 tanks used by Kuwaiti

and U.S. forces, according to diplomatic sources.

"For sure, those who will use the new artillery pieces, would like to see American technology, but we find we have to please other friends," Deputy Foreign Minister Suleiman Shaheen of Kuwait said in an interview here this week. "China is a power to be reckoned with, so it is in our interest to have a relationship with them."

An official at the office of the Chinese defense attaché office in Washington, who would not give his name, refused to comment on the proposed howitzer sale. But he said: "In Chinese policy, we will not impose any political conditions on any country. We want to have normal trade relations with everyone."

News of the proposed purchase set off alarm bells in Washington.

In April, according to Defense News, Mr. Gore wrote a letter to the leadership in Kuwait, saying: "I would like to reiterate my strongest support on behalf of United Defense L.P., a U.S. company which has proposed to provide the 155mm M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzer."



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## ● Le PDK accuse de nouveau l'UPK de l'avoir attaqué

ANKARA, 18 juil (AFP) - Le Parti Démocratique du Kurdistan (PDK, de Massoud Barzani) a affirmé vendredi avoir repoussé la veille une attaque conjointe de son rival dans le nord de l'Irak, l'Union Patriotique du Kurdistan (UPK, de Jalal Talabani), et des rebelles kurdes de Turquie (PKK), et avoir capturé à cette occasion un responsable de l'UPK.

"Le 17 juillet, une force conjointe UPK-PKK comprenant environ 150 hommes a attaqué le bureau du PDK dans le village de Semaylan, dans la vallée de Roost", indique un communiqué du PDK, reçu par l'AFP à Ankara.

"Nos forces ont repoussé l'attaque, faisant un mort et six blessés de leur côté. L'un des blessés, Kadir Waso Kadir, alias Hajar Sharoosh, membre du comité d'organisation de l'UPK à Sangasar, a été capturé. Le directeur du bureau du PDK dans la vallée de Roost a été également blessé dans l'attaque", poursuit le texte.

La vallée de Roost se trouve au nord-est de Rawanduz, non loin de la frontière iranienne.

"Bien que l'UPK ait publiquement démenti sa participation à ces attaques contre le PDK, la capture d'un de ses peshmergas illustre la coopération étroite et la coordination entre l'UPK et le PKK dans leur offensive militaire contre le PDK", conclut le communiqué.

Le PDK avait déjà accusé l'UPK d'avoir rompu le cessez-le-feu à deux reprises depuis le début de la semaine.

Il l'avait notamment accusé d'avoir attaqué ses positions, conjointement avec le PKK, dans la nuit de mardi à mercredi, tuant deux de ses hommes et en blessant 14.

"Il y a eu environ 25 attaques de ce genre depuis six semaines", a déclaré à l'AFP Safeen Dizai, porte-parole du PDK à Ankara selon lequel "il semble que cela devienne régulier. Même si elles étaient menées principalement par le PKK, elles venaient du territoire de l'UPK. Les accords d'Ankara (consécutifs au cessez-le-feu) stipulent que le territoire de chaque camp ne doit pas être utilisé pour des attaques contre l'autre camp", a ajouté le porte-parole.

La représentation de l'UPK à Ankara n'était pas joignable vendredi matin.

HC/amc t.

# Judicial vise tightens on DYP leader Çiller

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Trying to survive strong political tides ever since she left the government, True Path Party (DYP) leader Tansu Çiller is trapped in a legal vise which is tightening around her.

While Tansu Çiller is accused of being an agent of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), her husband, Özer Çiller, is accused of taking part in a "Mafia style" gang involved in crime and murder as well as in providing shelter to criminals at the controversial farm house at Kuşadası.

While Çiller has declared that she would not be frightened at such accusations, the fact that the charges are being examined by a military court demonstrates the dangers the former prime minister and foreign minister is facing.

"I have nothing to say about the indictment prepared by Dogu Perincek. But shame on anyone who takes this claim in hand and does not reject it," Çiller said.

Over the past year, Workers' Party (IP) leader Doğu Perinçek has been charging that Tansu Çiller was an agent of the CIA. In a recent letter he sent to parliamentarians, including DYP deputies, Perinçek renewed his claim that, since 1967, Tansu Çiller was working for the CIA.

In his letter, Perinçek charged that the CIA did not recruit Tansu Çiller, but rather, the former prime minister herself applied to become an American intelligence agent. He said such applications were described by the CIA as "walk-ins."

According to Perinçek's letter, Çiller obtained a permanent residence permit in Hartford, Connecticut on Aug. 10, 1970, and her green card number was A 149 33 25 N 95, while her social security number was 043-50-0720.

Perinçek asserted that between 1970 and 1971, Çiller underwent training at the CIA's Camp Peary in Virginia, before she was recruited as "personnel-on-call" on the Near East and North Africa desk of the U.S. State Department.

According to Perinçek, Çiller travelled in 1973 to Libya as a member of the U.S. State Department, and applied for U.S. citizenship on her return to the U.S. on April 23, 1973. The IP chairman also said that Çiller had been active on behalf of the CIA in the former Soviet Union.

The former premier and her husband face mounting charges ranging from being a CIA agent to establishing a gang.

*Turkish Daily News*

FRIDAY, JULY 18, 1997



DYP leader Tansu Çiller

According to claims made by Perinçek, Çiller returned Turkey in 1974 and started to earn \$100,000 a year for reporting on anti-American developments in the Turkish Armed Forces to the CIA station chief in Ankara.

The Workers' Party leader further claimed that Çiller became an American citizen on July 1, 1979, and that the number on her acceptance document for citizenship was Ph 195 000 318.

The second spying charge was made by two former CIA agents in their notarized testimonies and memoirs.

After news that a "mole" had been planted in the Navy command to gather information on the anti-Islamist "West Work Group", the charges concerning Çiller became important for the army as well.

The Turkish general staff decided this week to initiate an investigation on Çiller over the claims that she has been working for the CIA.

If military prosecutors find Çiller guilty of espionage, she will be tried in the supreme court under Article 133 of the Turkish penal code. The article referred to stipulates a minimum prison

term of 15 years for those who pass on vital state information to other states, defining it as political or military espionage.

Besides Tansu Çiller, her husband Özer Çiller is also facing some serious charges. Republican People's Party deputy Fikri Sağlar applied to the court last week and demanded an investigation be opened into alleged links of Özer Çiller to a "Mafia style" crime gang, his role in the murder of some key underground gambling barons, and charges that he provided murderers with shelter at the controversial farm house at Kuşadası.

Sağlar charged that Özer Çiller had a telephone conversation with Sami Hostan, the criminal believed to be the killer of gambling baron, Omer Lutfu Topal. The CHP deputy claimed that there were strong suspicions that it was Özer Çiller who encouraged the criminals to murder Topal.

In connection with this investigation, Özer Çiller went to the Office of the Ankara Prosecutor last week and testified.

## Turkish Daily News

FRIDAY, JULY 18, 1997



# IHD celebrates its eleventh anniversary with demonstration

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ The Human Rights Association (IHD) celebrated its eleventh anniversary in Ankara with a street demonstration where most of its founders were present.

Aydın Erdoğan from the Contemporary Jurists Organization (CHD) addressed a crowd of approximately 400 activists that gathered at the "human rights statue" in Yüksel

Caddesi.

Other organizations represented included the People's Democracy Party, trade unions, and Yavuz Önen from the Turkish Human Rights Foundation (TIHV). Also a German MP, Amke Drekert-Scheuer was present. Eşber Yağmurdereli, the human rights activist who is expected to be imprisoned soon, was also one of the faces at the celebrations.

The crowd marched toward

the IHD office in Tunalihilmi Street, distributing the IHD monthly bulletin to pedestrians and onlookers.

The crowd had also visited the stand opened in memory of Metin Göktepe, a journalist who died, reportedly, as a result of a police beating. Göktepe stand was covered in photos and articles that had been published in various papers about him. The police followed the activists without any interference.

# Hussein urges Turkey to change its ways

**Hussein at the national day of his country:** 'Turkish authorities are complaining from the thorns bleeding [sic] their hands; thorns planted and nurtured by their own doing and those of the Americans and Zionists'

*Ankara - Turkish Daily News*

■ Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein devoted most of his speech marking the occasion of the 29th anniversary of Iraq's national day on Thursday to criticizing Turkey.

According to the full text of the speech supplied by the Iraqi news agency President Hussein said that northern Iraq was secure and peaceful towards the region, towards itself and towards its neighbors but Turkish authorities allowed subversive Kurdish elements the freedom to cross the Turkish-Iraqi border over the past years.

President Hussein said that Turkey has not been encouraging the return of the legitimate Iraqi authority to the north of Iraq to ensure Turkey's own security across the border. Instead, "The Turkish authorities appear to be fascinated by the West's ploy, providing and facilitating the political objectives of the armies of America, Britain and France in imposing the infamous no-fly zone at the 36th parallel," Hussein said.

He accused Turkey of providing bases and services to help the armies of those countries "in their task to keep the region beyond the control of the Iraqi state."

"Turkey also facilitated the mission of Western intelligence activities in line with U.S. wishes and direction and paved the way for Israeli spies to roam the area near and right across its borders. And this at a time when Turkish authorities are complaining from the thorns bleeding [sic] their hands, thorns planted and nurtured by their own doing and those of the Americans and Zionists," he said.

When he was talking about Iraqi-Turkey relations he said that both parties had been careful not to cause any harm to each other

and had started to develop good neighborly relations. He said that since the early seventies Iraq has taken the initiative in this respect, specifically on the economic side and for that they endured much criticism and discontent from Arabs.

He said that Turkey and Iraq completed many projects together prior to the Gulf War and they had signed a border security agreement.

"When the U.S. aggression against Iraq began, Turkish policy at certain known levels in the state hierarchy regrettably was aware of some of its provisions. But since

we are keen to endorse aspects of harmony and peace, and not those of disunity and malice, as our own religion Islam calls for in relations between Muslims and their neighbors we assumed for this irresponsible, unjustified stance a special interpretation, notwithstanding the pain we felt, an interpretation that placed the Turkish stance within the general mood which prevailed at the time when many norms of international and neighborly relations were shaken and upset," Hussein said.

He said to solve this problem was easy; it was created by the Americans and Zionists and would be ended "through the national efforts of the keen people of Iraq."

"First by cutting off the feeding source that keeps this abnormal state in the north and that is the departure of forces which come under the pretext of 'providing comfort' for the Kurds ... Second by coordinating among the neighboring states with the objective of achieving border security," the president of Iraq said.

He said that they believed that there was a conspiracy against Turkey and against Arabs with the aim to push Turkish policy into colliding with Arabs and Arab national security in order to isolate Turkey and weaken it then turning Turkey more and more against Arabs and against itself. "This as well as Turkey's new policy in building up ties of military cooperation with the Zionists, some of which include aerial activities near Iraq and Syria, cause apprehension and suspicion and may lead to hostility if the wise do not take heed," he said.

Hussein also urged Turkey to rectify its stands. He said that in all that they did not harbor any plans other than the wish that

Turks remedy their problems with the Arabs and Iraq with a spirit of sincere desire to build up firm ties of cooperation.

**Pangalos and Cem have reportedly agreed on six points:**

- 1) A mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuing development of good neighborly relations;
- 2) Respect for each other's sovereignty;
- 3) Respect for the principles of international law and international agreements;
- 4) Respect for each other's legitimate, vital interests and concerns in the Aegean, which are of great importance for their security and national sovereignty;
- 5) Commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstanding; and
- 6) Commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual consent and without use of force or threat of force.

*Turkish Daily News*

FRIDAY, JULY 18, 1997

# Mehdi Zana sentenced

*Turkish Daily News*

SATURDAY, JULY 19, 1997

**Ankara - Turkish Daily News**

■ An Istanbul court on Thursday sentenced the husband of imprisoned ethnic Kurdish former deputy Leyla Zana to prison for spreading "separatist propaganda."

The semi-official Anatolia News Agency (AA) said Istanbul state security court sentenced Mehdi Zana to 10 months in prison and an 83 million lira (\$ 540) fine for a book of poetry he had written. The charge is one often used to try pro-Kurdish or human rights activists. Zana's publisher, Ayşenur Zarakolu, was given a fine of 42 million lira (\$270).

Leyla Zana is one of four ethnic Kurdish ex-MPs who are currently serving a 15-year sentence for links with the outlawed separatist Kurdistan Workers Party. In 1995 the European parliament awarded Leyla Zana the Sakharov peace prize for freedom of thought. Mehdi Zana accepted the award on his wife's behalf in Strasbourg.

Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz pledged last week that he would ask Parliament soon to ease Turkey's strict freedom of expression laws, often criticised by Ankara's Western allies.



08:51  
GMT, 19  
Juillet  
1997

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## ● Retour en Irak de 220 réfugiés kurdes irakiens

TEHERAN, 19 juil (AFP) - Quelque 220 kurdes irakiens qui s'étaient réfugiés en Iran ont regagné samedi le Kurdistan d'Irak sous la supervision du Haut commissariat de l'ONU aux réfugiés (HCR), a rapporté l'agence officielle IRNA.

Les réfugiés sont rentrés en Irak depuis la frontière iranienne de Haj-Omran, dans la région de Piranchahr, dans le nord-ouest de l'Iran, a ajouté IRNA.

Il y a dix jours, M. Ahmad Hosseini, directeur du département des étrangers au ministère iranien de l'Intérieur, avait demandé à "tous les réfugiés kurdes de rentrer chez eux".

Selon lui, "1,3 million de réfugiés afghans, 490.000 Irakiens et 30.000 ressortissants de différents pays d'Asie" vivent actuellement en Iran.

Les kurdes d'Irak s'étaient réfugiés en Iran après la guerre du Golfe en 1991 puis en septembre 1996 pour fuir les combats entre factions rivales kurdes dans le nord de l'Irak.

kd/tp



# The Welfare dilemma

Refah is one of the 'questions' directed at the system. Therefore, closing down the party will not and cannot solve the system's crisis which has created problems of equal magnitude such as the 'Eastern (Kurdish) question'

**T**he Welfare Party (Refah) has finally come to realize that there are realities other than their own. For the Welfare hardliners this must be a breakthrough, living as they were in a world of virtual reality which was hardly virtuous.


They had excelled in promoting their image of tolerance and their own victimization but they showed no tolerance to "others" and were no different from "others" in victimizing those with cultural or intellectual differences. Although only verbally, party leaders mentioned the use of force as a means of imposing their way of life on the majority on more than one occasion.

Yet closure by the Constitutional Court is not a proper way of dealing with the political problems attributed to this or any party. Refah is a creature of crisis — it will survive, albeit under different names, as long as the economic, political and cultural crises continue. The combined effect of these crises surface in the social psyche as deprivation, anomy (instability due to the arbitrary use or lack of rules) and injustice.

If not solved within a reasonable time, the legitimacy of the system and administration start being questioned. That is what has happened in the case of Turkey. Refah is one of the "questions" directed at the system. Therefore, closing down the party will not and cannot solve the system's crisis which has created problems of equal magnitude like the "Eastern (Kurdish) question."

Being a child of crisis has also caused problems for Refah itself. While it wants to be a part of the "system" by practicing "normal" politics, it acts in contrary so as not to lose some (fundamentalist and anti-system) supporters.

Who are these staunch supporters that back up Refah come rain or shine? They are basically recent urban dwellers from the past few decades who have not yet shed their rural/traditional values and are disturbed by the lifestyle they must face in the cities. Not only do they find it hard to cope with the complex demands of urban life, they feel it is immoral. Immorality is



Opinion

Doğu  
Ergil

an underlying feeling in all Islamic rhetoric. It refers to both public and individual conduct. Why?

Refah and all other Islamist followers bitterly criticize the system/administration who have left them "outside." Remaining outside means left uneducated, poor, uprooted (due to migration or the threat of it) and devoid of professional skills (thus jobless). The psychological outcome of these disadvantages is hopelessness (expressed as mysticism) and "a lack of status." This last feeling is so corrosive that the traditionalists or Islamists feel that the republican system has betrayed them. That is why they attribute alien characteristics to it. Its Westernism is interpreted as infidelity. Its modernism is portrayed as decadence.

The result of women modernizing and joining the work force in a male dominated society, is that men severely suffer status ambiguity or low status through having to enter into competition with the women whom they had previously kept under control in a lower, dependent position. This poses a great threat to men's psyche and social standing which is why they (lower class men) want to keep their women either behind closed doors or covered up. Women's liberation further reinforces their (men's) perceived status deprivation. They feel they are simply not counted or respected by the system.

It is with this feeling that they have created an alternative social solidarity network along "tarikat" (religious order) lines. They have created an economic infrastructure by bringing together at first small amounts of money which have later turned into large volumes of investment capital. Some of the profits started to finance an Islamic-styled education and a support network composed of hostels,

tuition and pocket money, opening up new schools for poor but talented youngsters. The row about imam-hatip (preacher) schools rests exactly at this point. The dispossessed social strata send their kids to these schools, not because they are religious but because all the expenses of students are covered by generous funds, the sources of which are diverse. Thanks to "secular" politicians, the graduates of these supposedly professional high schools have also been granted entry into the general university system.

In synopsis, Refah supporters seem to have two difficulties with the system that they criticize as being alien, unjust and immoral. The first two attributions emanate from the feeling of being left out. The third attribution is born out of the fear of losing their grip on their women and children in urban settings which would further decrease their superiority over these dependent "creatures."

The perceived injustice and alienation to the system is not altogether unaccounted for. The republican elite always looked upon the traditional social strata with scorn and disdain as if their backwardness, traditionalism and obscurantism were of their own doing. The modern republican elite allocated the lowest social status to the traditional strata which had Islamic symbolism and value references an integral part of life.

Now "traditionalists," who are generally but wrongly called Islamists, are contesting the system. They are much better organized. They have economic funds to carry out a stretched-out fight. They have their intellectuals. This is indeed a novelty because the modern republic has never accepted an "Islamist" as an intellectual. Moreover, they feel that they have the moral superiority over the secularists; the latter failed to keep the promises given to the nation at the onset in return for the privilege to run the country, and now they are immersed in corruption as is the system. Having said all this, it is easy to deduce that Refah will survive, probably under other names because none of the societal problems that gave birth to this party have been addressed. Let's wait and see.

*Turkish Daily News*

MONDAY, JULY 21, 1997



13:32  
GMT, 21  
Juillet  
1997

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## ● La Turquie veut réviser son accord d'union douanière avec l'UE

Dans notre dernier envoi Turquie-UE daté d'Ankara, merci bien lire au 4ème para que le déficit commercial de la Turquie avec l'UE est en milliards de dollars et non en millions comme écrit par erreur.

REVOICI L'ENSEMBLE DE LA DEPECHE CORRIGEE:

ANKARA, 21 juil (AFP) - La Turquie, irritée par son exclusion des plans d'élargissement de l'Union européenne, va réviser son accord d'union douanière avec l'UE, a annoncé le vice-Premier ministre Bulent Ecevit, selon la presse turque de lundi.

"Nous allons réviser cet accord en conseil des ministres et prendre une décision appropriée", a déclaré M. Ecevit à un groupe de journalistes dimanche soir alors qu'il rentrait d'une visite dans la partie nord (turque) de Chypre, selon la presse.

"Les milieux d'affaires turcs expriment eux aussi leur malaise à propos de cet accord", a dit M. Ecevit, cité par le quotidien Hurriyet.

Le ministre des Affaires étrangères Ismail Cem, qui accompagnait M. Ecevit, a déclaré pour sa part: "Notre déficit commercial avec l'UE était de 5 milliards (bien milliards) de dollars en 1995. Après l'entrée en vigueur de l'union douanière en 1996, il a grimpé à 11 milliards de dollars cette année-là".

"Nous allons demander à l'UE de corriger certaines des provisions de notre partenariat que nous considérons comme mauvaises", a ajouté M. Cem.

M. Ecevit, qui est également connu pour ses positions dures sur la question de Chypre, s'était opposé à l'accord d'union douanière avec l'UE quand l'ancien Premier ministre Tansu Ciller l'avait conclu en 1995.

Aux termes de cet accord entré en vigueur le 1er janvier 1996, la Turquie et les pays de l'UE ont levé leurs barrières commerciales dans presque tous les domaines, à l'exception des produits agricoles.

Mais la Turquie se plaint de ce que l'UE n'ait pas débloqué une aide financière de plus de trois milliards de dollars prévue par l'accord et destinée à compenser les pertes pour l'industrie turque occasionnées par l'accord, en raison du veto de sa voisine et rivale la Grèce.

La Turquie est le seul pays non membre de l'UE à avoir un accord d'union douanière avec elle.

La Commission européenne a annoncé la semaine dernière qu'elle entamerait début 1998 des négociations d'adhésion avec cinq pays d'Europe de l'Est plus Chypre.

La Turquie, qui est également candidate à l'entrée dans l'UE, ne figure pas sur cette liste.

"Nous avons cru que l'union douanière serait un pas vers l'adhésion pleine et entière de la Turquie à l'UE mais cela ne s'est pas produit", a déclaré M. Cem.

MM. Ecevit et Cem n'ont pas indiqué si la Turquie avait la possibilité d'annuler unilatéralement l'accord.

En annonçant les grandes lignes de sa politique vendredi dernier, M. Cem avait laissé deviner une réduction de l'intérêt d'Ankara pour une adhésion totale à l'UE, déclarant que la Turquie chercherait de nouvelles coopérations dans d'autres régions du monde.

"La Turquie n'est pas condamnée à un processus d'attente (pour entrer dans l'UE) dont la durée et le résultat ne sont pas certains", avait-il dit, ajoutant: "Que l'autre côté (l'UE) réfléchisse un peu à ce qu'il perdra sans le dynamisme de la Turquie".

M. Cem avait indiqué que son gouvernement chercherait en particulier à développer ses relations économiques avec de grands pays comme la Russie, l'Inde et la Chine.

La décision de la Commission européenne a également amené la Turquie à durcir sa position sur la question de Chypre, dix jours après les premiers pourparlers intercommunautaires depuis trois ans afin de trouver une solution pacifique au problème de l'île divisée.

Dimanche à Nicosie, M. Ecevit a annoncé un plan visant à "intégrer" graduellement à la Turquie le nord de Chypre, qu'elle occupe depuis 23 ans, parallèlement aux préparatifs éventuels de la partie chypriote-grecque de joindre l'UE.

La République turque de Chypre du Nord (RTCN), reconnue uniquement par Ankara, a signé dimanche un accord en ce sens avec la Turquie.

M. Ecevit visitait la RTNC pour marquer le 23ème anniversaire de l'intervention de l'armée turque dans le nord de l'île en 1974, suite à un coup d'Etat nationaliste à Nicosie qui visait à rattacher l'île à la Grèce. M. Ecevit, à l'époque Premier ministre, avait ordonné cette intervention.

ue/hc/bm e.f

*Turkish Daily News*

MONDAY, JULY 21, 1997

## Çiller rebuffs 'CIA agent' accusations

**A DYP statement lashed out at the accusations of ANAP deputy Namoglu who claimed that Çiller was protected by the US government. It said Namoglu was not assigned by Parliament to file suits in the US courts**

**Ankara - Turkish Daily News**

■ True Path Party (DYP) leader Tansu Çiller on Sunday, reacted to the accusations that she was once allegedly hired by U.S. Intelligence to work against her country. A statement made by the DYP said, it was unreasonable and illogical to attempt to diminish the stature of a political leader who once served as the country's prime minister with treacherous campaigns that only served to promote personal interests.

Çiller was initially accused by Workers' Party

Chairman Doğu Perinçek of having been paid by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the General Staff launched a probe against her last week.

The statement accused various media organizations of violating its principles and taking revenge against Çiller.

The DYP statement was actually targeting a newspaper's Sunday edition for reporting an accusation made by a Motherland Party (ANAP) deputy who filed two different suits against Çiller in the United States to clarify her U.S. citizenship and her assets in that country. When the U.S. court refused his appeals, he claimed that Çiller was "protected" by Washington.

The statement said that ANAP Deputy Yusuf Namoglu was not assigned by Parliament to file these suits. It added that the newspaper story did not include the earlier reports that the U.S. State Department's spokesperson down-played the allegations as "ridiculous," and the German police's denial that Çiller protected drug-smugglers.

Generals  
and Politics

# The increasing loneliness of being Turkey

Turkish Daily News

TUESDAY, JULY 22, 1997

A country that could be the meeting place of democracy and Islam is in danger of becoming a no-man's land between them. This can be prevented

## The Economist

*The following is the full text of a special feature in this week's edition of the London based Economist magazine dealing with Turkey's growing "secularist-Islamist" dichotomy:*

**T**urkey, say the geopoliticians, is the most important member of the new, expanded Atlantic alliance; and they may well be right. This is a huge place, with the biggest land area and the second biggest population of any NATO country east of the Atlantic. It has the biggest army of them all, including America's and though its soldiers do not have the most modern weapons they are dogged and uncomplaining fighters; there are gentlemen in England still abed who remember Gallipoli and Kutal-Amara. Above all, Turkey stands where Germany did in the previous period of NATO's existence on the front line, face to face with the big problem. Now that the Soviet army no longer looms over Germany, NATO's eyes have turned southward, to the bubbling mixture of oil and Islamism and decrepit authoritarian regimes called the Middle East: a bubbling which will not be kept from boiling over by diplomacy alone.

The trouble is that the alliance of the democracies needs Turkey for two different reasons, and both have been put at risk by what is now happening in Turkish politics.

The military value of Turkey is that it sits next door to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, to the mullah's Iran and to the unpredictable dictatorship of Syria's Hafez Assad. Its own armed forces, the bases it provides for allied aircraft and warships and — not least — its quiet ability to control the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers into Iraq and Syria are all weighty pieces in the regional balance of power. But Turkey has been of even greater value for a different, political reason. Until recently, it had looked like the one fairly solid example of a Muslim country that was also a working democracy. It looks less solid now.

On February 28th, Turkey's generals stuck their hand into politics again (they had three full-scale coups between 1960 and 1980) by issuing a list of instructions to the mildly Islamist government. This has made it harder to argue that Turkey was at last settling down to be a real democracy, a place where the people take the decisions. And if the generals have miscalculated — if the Koran-toting Welfare Party,

which they have now pushed out of power, comes back into office at the next election on a wave of Muslim resentment — they will either have to live with a new government that will among other things be much more suspicious of their pro-western foreign policy, or do an Algeria and squash the election.

A little time was bought when Mesut Yılmaz, the beneficiary of the generals' intervention, got a rather wobbly vote of confidence last Saturday (a majority of 25 in the 550-member parliament) for a three-party coalition he has stitched together out of his own conservative Motherland Party, its old adversary the Democratic Left, and a small splinter group. The generals would have had an immediate crisis on their hands if Welfare and its ally in government since last July, the True Path Party, had beaten Mr. Yılmaz. Only two weeks earlier a majority of parliament's members had signed a plea that Welfare and True Path Party should stay in office. The necessary votes were, in the end, cajoled or bought. But the crisis is far from over.

Even if Mr. Yılmaz's majority survives the year, which is by no means certain, some hard questions have to be answered. All those involved — the generals, Mr. Yılmaz and Welfare Party's leader Necmettin Erbakan — have to try to work out what sort of country they want Turkey to be.

## They went over the to

The generals' answer is that they want Turkey to remain the secular state created 70 years ago by their hero Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, "Father of the Turks." They went into action last February armed with Article 118 of the constitution, under which the National Security Council — five civilian ministers under the chairmanship of the country's president — can say what it wants done to preserve "the independence of the state" and "the peace and security of society." They gave the prime minister a list of 18 things they wanted done to reduce Islam's influence on the workings of government.

Further demands were made on the government, including its approval for the dismissal of military officers considered too pro-Welfare. A handful of big firms that had shown sympathy for Welfare got a dressing-down. The lady in charge of True Path Party, Tansu Çiller, who had used her coalition with Welfare as an umbrella against the charges of corruption raining down on her, came under renewed attack. Towards the end, the newspapers suddenly revealed that a

government ministry had been tapping the soldiers' telephones. Most curiously of all, the country's chief prosecutor, shortly after saying he did not think such a thing could be successfully done, brought a suit before the Constitutional Court calling for the Welfare Party to be banned.

Not all these things were organized from military headquarters, though many of them undoubtedly were. Nor have the generals had unanimous support among secular Turks who enjoy a western-style way of life: the main businessmen's association, in a list of proposals to improve Turkish democracy, suggested abolishing the National Security Council. But eventually the pressure worked. Mr. Erbakan said he would go; a vain attempt was made to get the prime ministership transferred to Mrs. Çiller; President Demirel said he preferred Mr. Yılmaz; Mr. Yılmaz won some more defectors, and only July 12th he got his majority, and the generals got their way.

The problem with all this is not just that their victory could be short-lived. A sizeable chunk of Mr. Yılmaz's majority last weekend consisted of the Republican People's Party, but this party has refused to join the government and would like a new election in 1997, whereas Mr. Yılmaz wants to wait until next year. Motherland and Democratic Left, the two chief parts of the new coalition, will not find it easy to run a joint government program (the Democratic Left is keen on bigger pensions for public-sector workers, Motherland wants to cut the budget deficit and do some more privatisation.)

Turkish parties are anyway much given to fragmentation; pieces regularly drop off and join other parties, and it is only half-jokingly said that the average parliamentarian's price is between \$2m and \$5m. Mr. Yılmaz is a clever enough politician, but not the only one with the technique of making converts. He is also rather a dull dog, with little taste for big ideas and no known ability to capture people's imagination. He could have trouble holding on to that 25 majority.

But there is a bigger reason for worrying about what has happened over the past five months. When you inspect the list of accusations that are said to justify the Welfare Party's removal from government, they turn out to be remarkably vague.

### Not proven

The chief prosecutor's reasons for saying that Welfare should be banned include only a couple of things actually done by Welfare during its past year in government — its attempt to insist that women should be allowed to wear head-scarves in public buildings, despite a ban dating from Atatürk's time, and Mr. Erbakan's invitation to dinner at the prime minister's house of some controversial people who, good gracious, "attended in attires in violation of revolutionary laws." It is perfectly true that the Welfare-led government did encourage the wearing of scarves in schools and other buildings. But that is hardly

reason enough to ban a party. It even seems a rather liberal idea, when you reflect that peasant mothers whose soldier sons have been wounded in the civil war against Kurdish rebels are made to remove their daily headgear if they want to visit their boys in a military hospital.

Probe a little deeper than the public prosecutor does, and you dig up two further charges. One is that Welfare has allowed money to be brought into the country, and has perhaps itself provided money, for Masonic-like secret societies dedicated to spreading the Islamist word. This may or may not be true. It is hard to tell, because apart from one or two clear-cut episodes — such as the arrest at Istanbul airport of a man trying to smuggle in money from Islamists in Germany — most of the evidence offered is distinctly murky. "Our control system is very good." "The information is to be found in Welfare's computer system." This is less than wholly convincing.

The other chief complaint of the defenders of secularism concerns religious education. Turkey has about 500 Imam Hatip ("Parson-Preacher") secondary and high schools — a small fraction for the total number of schools for children of that age — which offer a modest dose of Muslim education to 11-to-14-year olds on top of the regular state curriculum but a much larger dose, up to a third of the total week's work, to those above 14. The secularists' fear is that these schools will pour out a flood of fanatical young graduates like the Taliban students of Afghanistan.

Unfortunately for the secularists, however, the Imam Hatip schools are a product of the secular regime. They were

started, with the generals' blessing, back in the 1950s, and most of the existing ones were founded in the 1970s and 1980s; not one was added during Welfare's just-ended year in government. They are run, and inspected, by the state. They are also popular with parents, since they tend to be more orderly than the other schools, and to get better results. The generals want to cut the ground from under them by

building more non-religious secondary schools. But that would seem to clash with many parents' wishes, as well as adding to the government's overspending. If Imam Hatip graduates subsequently do illegal things, they should be arrested. But unless a disproportionate number of them do, the case against these schools does not seem to stand up.

After this, the charge-list grows even mistier. Mr. Erbakan has supported the idea of building a mosque in Istanbul's Taksim Square, which is a bit like proposing a Christian revivalist centre in Piccadilly Circus. The Welfare mayor of a small town earlier this year invited the Iranian ambassador to a Muslim revivalist rally, which was provocative but no dafter than a communist mayor in cold-war Western Europe inviting the Soviet ambassador to his country to a joint denunciation of capitalism. Various Welfare people said heated things at



public meetings. A few of these are worrying (Istanbul's mayor is quoted as saying that democracy is like a tram: you take it where you want to go, and then you get off). But most were just politicians saying in the rough accent of Anatolian politics that, if they get elected, the other side had better not try keeping them out of office.

### **The flavour of the 1930s**

To be sure, all Islamic revivalists need to be examined through narrowed eyes. Some of them are ignorantly and brutally dictatorial: look at the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the wilder specimens in Algeria, Egypt and Pakistan. But not all are like this.

The mainline revivalist parties in Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan have said that they wish to operate within a democratic system — multi-party free elections, alternation of government and all. Malaysia's Islamists, in that country's admittedly creaky semi-democracy, are obeying the rules. The heartening discovery of the past few years is that the Muslim world's revivalist movement is not a uniform entity; it is a spectrum, ranging from incurable authoritarian to devout searchers after God's will who are nevertheless prepared to accept the people's judgement. With any luck, Turkey's plump if occasionally excitable Mr. Erbakan, and most of his party, are at the moderate end of the spectrum.

The fact that the leaders of the anti-Welfare campaign will have none of this says much about the psychology of Atatürk's Turkey. No, they insist, you can never trust a politician with the Koran in his hand; these people are trained to say one thing and do another; we secular Turks know in our bones that they are plotting to force a fundamentalist dictatorship on us. There is a neurotic edge to the way many secularists talk about the awkward, rather earnest, just-up-from-the-country sort of people who make up most of Mr. Erbakan's following.

This may be because, when you look at it, the Atatürk definition of secularism is not quite what most other westerners mean by the word. There is still a flavour of the 1930s about today's Turkey. It is not just the self-consciously heroic statuary, the assurances that "the army knows what the people want," the still far too big state sector of industry. The Turkey that Atatürk built two-thirds of a century ago was constructed out of a now rather old-fashioned mixture of nationalism and rationalism.

The nationalism was not too bad: the Turks treat their Kurdish minority very badly, and they are stubborn about their interests in Cyprus, but Atatürkian Turkey has never been a serious threat to its neighbors. The rationalism part, alas, now feels like something out of a dusty past.

For most Europeans and Americans, a secular state is a state in which the church cannot dictate to the government and, in America at least, the symbols and ceremonies of the two are kept firmly separate. But this does not mean that for most people in the West of the 1990s the business of government can be conducted without reference to some kind of moral order.

The rational pursuit of self-interest is the necessary basis of human activity but, if a country is to be worth living in, all those competing individual self-interests have to operate within an agreed set of rules. The rules may be derived from a belief in God, or they may be constructed by a consensus of non-believers; but in either case they will draw upon the instinctive part of the mind — the tug of compassion, the intuitive sense of right and wrong — as well as the purely rational part. Christian Democrats and Christian socialists in Europe, Christian revivalists in America and communitarians on both sides of the Atlantic would all nowadays agree on that much.

For Atatürk, though, rationalism was king. To be useful, he said religion "has to conform ... to science and knowledge, to logic." The phrase "a moral order" would probably have struck Atatürk, with his belief in the absolute supremacy of reason, as something murky dug out of the medieval recesses of the Islamic mind.

This is why his sort of secularism has less in common with the secularism of most of today's Europeans and Americans than it has with that of France's 19th-century rationalists. It is not merely an insistence that religious believers should keep the propagation of their ideas within the rules of the democratic system. It is a preference of excluding their ideas from the public arena altogether. It is not impartiality towards religion so much as a turning of the back upon it. And this is why in 1997 Turks who have inherited Atatürk's secularism and Turks in search of an Islamic revival find themselves gazing at each other across a gulf of incomprehension.

### **If they don't try**

If the gulf is to be bridged, both Mr. Erbakan and the generals have to stretch out a hand. Mr. Erbakan can reasonably argue that in his year in the prime ministership he did not visibly break any of democracy's rules. He might add that his foreign policy, apart from a smirk towards Iran and a humiliating visit to Colonel Qaddafi's Libya, was just the sort of thing the generals wanted: his government stayed a loyal member of NATO, kept knocking on the European Union's door, and even let the Turkish army get on with its cosy new program of military co-operation with Israel.

But Mr. Erbakan could go further. He could formally commit himself to the democratic credo already voiced by open-minded Islamists in other countries.

What people believe or do not believe says this credo, is their own private business; the state should keep its nose out. But both believers and non-believers should be free to put their ideas about the government of the country, wherever in heaven or earth those ideas are said to come from, to the country's voters. If they and their allies get the support of a majority of the voters, they can put their proposals into law, provided these laws do not clash with the country's constitution (which must itself have the voters' approval). If at the next election a different lot of people with different ideas win a majority of votes, the first lot will stand down and accept the changes the second lot make, subject to the same proviso. Full stop. That is democracy.

In reply, the generals could say that their only concern is to preserve the rules of democracy. They do not support or oppose any particular body of ideas; they merely want to make sure that the voters can make the choice next time they wish.

Given Mr. Erbakan's commitment to the same principle, the generals will go back to their military business and watch the next election with impartial interest. They might add, sotto voce, that if anybody really does break the rules they will know what to do about it.

If something like this happens, the Turks can resume normal politics. If it does not, they face an increasingly isolated future. A continuation of the army's campaign against the Welfare Party — maybe even a court order disbanding the party — will give new ammunition to the people in the European Union who say that Turkey will never be democratic enough to be a full member of the EU (even though its economic qualifications for membership are in some ways those of most of the EU's other current applicants). It would also make it harder for the United States to insist on Turkey's military importance to the NATO alliance, since the countries now seeking to join NATO are being told that

they first have to prove they are good democrats. And Iran's mullahs will be even more anti-Turkey than they are now.

If the generals have got it wrong, on the other hand, and their harassment of Welfare wins indignant Islamists more votes in Turkey's next election, the next Turkish government is likely to be colder to NATO, less interested in Europe, and on even pricklier terms than its predecessors with the hard-nosed and ungodly men who run Iraq and Syria.

Either way, a country that could have been a demonstration of the compatibility of Islam and democracy would be drifting off into a lonely limbo between the two. That is not what the democracies need, and it is not what most Turks want.

*Turkish Daily News*

TUESDAY, JULY 22, 1997

## What any intelligent foreigner sees...

SEMIH D. IDIZ

Ankara - *Turkish Daily News*

■ It is always pleasing to read an article on Turkey written by a Western journalist who has bothered to get down into the finer points of the subject matter at hand.

More often than not the practice by Western journalists is to simply take the easier course and do little but build on superficial information and existing prejudices.

This is then colored by sweeping pronouncements in order to hide the ignorance involved and "hey presto!" yet another expert on Turkey is born.

The article in this week's *Economist* called, "Generals and Politics: The increasing loneliness of being Turkey" has, however, earned its writer the privilege to make the "pronouncements" that he does.

As an incisive article the writer analyzes the crisis between the Turkish military and the Islamist camp which culminated in the forced resignation of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan.

Before moving into the details of this crisis the writer cites geopoliticians who now characterize Turkey as "the most important member of the new, expanded Atlantic alliance."

It is clear that the secularist-Islamist struggle has implications, not only for this country, but also for other countries, or blocs such as NATO or the EU, made up of specific countries.

Having kicked off with this notion the writer very correctly points to the irregular nature of what has been taking place in this country, particularly over the past five months.

He suggests the military, as the bastion of "secularist Kemalism," has overreacted to the Welfare Party in power and has effectively staged a "soft coup" to get rid of this party, even though many of the accusations brought against Welfare are unsustainable.

He then indicates that this has ill-served Turkey which could otherwise have provided an excellent example of a predominantly Islamic country which retains this aspect of its identity while developing its Western-style democracy at the same time.

He suggests in so many words that Turkey's democracy is not on par with Western democracies, and goes on to say openly that the Kemalist notion of "secularism" is not the same as what is understood about this concept in the West either.

Given the way matters in this country have turned

out, the *Economist's* writer fears that rather than being "a demonstration of the compatibility of Islam and democracy" Turkey will now be "drifting into a lonely limbo between the two."

The only way out of this situation, the writer correctly says, is for "all those involved — the generals, Mr. Yilmaz and Welfare's leader, Necmettin Erbakan ... to try and work out what sort of country they want Turkey to be."

The message here is that even a foreigner who has delved into the intricacies of Turkey can see the way out, while Turks insist on maintaining debilitating political wars of attrition and thus squandering the God-given advantages this country has.

One criticism may be brought against the writer on his criticism of the secular and military establishment for overreacting to the Welfare Party.

While it is correct that many of the things this party has been accused of would be hard to prove in an objective court of law, he does not analyze sufficiently why the establishment reacted the way it did.

One reason is of course the bellicose approach that Welfare had during its election campaign, with its open attacks on secularism, and its unmistakable suggestions that it would be ditching NATO and the EU, toning down Turkey's ties with the West and opening to the Islamic world in a manner that has not been done to date. When Welfare, once in power, started taking some steps that appeared to be in line with these "promises," it was inevitable that the bastions of "a la Turca secularism" would immediately conclude this was the time to act according to the Turkish saying and "kill the snake while its head is still small."

In this respect, the Welfare Party cannot be said to be totally innocent about the way things have turned out.

It could have been far more "attuned" to the sensitive environment, and could have acted in line with the overall experimental project aimed at demonstrating that Islam and democracy are not incompatible.

Instead it chose at times to step on the secularist "central nervous system" with openly defiant remarks, some of which are also referred to by the *Economist*.

But on the whole the *Economist's* writer has captured the essence of the problem facing Turkey today.

It remains to be seen now whether people in responsible positions in Turkey will have enough insight and foresight to arrive at the obvious conclusions that any intelligent foreigner can apparently arrive at so easily.



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## ● La Turquie incitée à tourner le dos à l'UE par ses politiciens extrémistes

par Hervé COUTURIER

ANKARA, 21 juil (AFP) - Les "durs" de la politique turque, furieux de l'attitude de l'Union européenne à l'égard d'Ankara et à propos de Chypre, tentent d'inciter la Turquie à lui tourner le dos, mais un consensus est loin d'être acquis au sein du gouvernement, selon les analystes.

Bulent Ecevit, vice-Premier ministre du nouveau gouvernement de coalition droite-gauche de Mesut Yilmaz et connu pour ses positions intransigeantes en politique étrangère, a annoncé dimanche un processus d'"intégration partielle" à la Turquie de la partie nord (turque) de Chypre, ainsi qu'une "révision" de l'accord d'union douanière existant entre Ankara et l'UE.

"Nous allons réviser cet accord (d'union douanière) en conseil des ministres et prendre une décision appropriée", a déclaré M. Ecevit à des journalistes en rentrant d'une visite dans la partie nord (turque) de Chypre.

Le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Ismail Cem, qui accompagnait M. Ecevit, a déclaré: "Notre déficit commercial avec l'UE était de 5 milliards de dollars en 1995. Après l'entrée en vigueur de l'union douanière en 1996, il a grimpé à 11 milliards de dollars cette année-là".

"Nous allons demander à l'UE de corriger certaines des provisions de notre partenariat que nous considérons comme mauvaises", a ajouté M. Cem.

MM. Ecevit et Cem appartiennent au Parti de la Gauche démocratique (DSP), formation de tendance nationaliste membre de la coalition pro-laïque de M. Yilmaz, qui a remplacé fin juin une coalition à dominante islamiste.

Leur position représente une déviation de la ligne traditionnellement pro-européenne de la Turquie, mais selon des responsables de l'UE et des analystes, elle n'est pas partagée par le Parti de la Mère Patrie (Anap, droite) de M. Yilmaz.

"En ce qui concerne la Commission européenne, la situation n'a pas changé", a déclaré lundi à l'AFP le représentant de la Commission à Ankara, Michael Lake.

"Nos contacts officiels nous indiquent que la Turquie va continuer l'union douanière et même accélérer la mise en oeuvre de certaines législations qui y sont liées", a-t-il ajouté.

"Il y a un lobby pro-européen fort au sein de l'Anap qui ne laissera pas M. Ecevit endommager les relations de la Turquie avec l'UE", a déclaré à l'AFP un économiste turc, Burak Bekdil.

"L'union douanière va peut-être créer la première fissure dans le nouveau gouvernement. Une autre possibilité est que la déclaration de M. Ecevit ait été destinée au public turc", a-t-il ajouté.

M. Ecevit s'était opposé à l'accord d'union douanière avec l'UE lors de sa conclusion en 1995.

Aux termes de cet accord, la Turquie et les pays de l'UE ont levé leurs barrières



commerciales dans presque tous les domaines, à l'exception des produits agricoles.

Mais la Turquie se plaint de ce que l'UE n'ait pas débloqué une aide financière de plus de trois milliards de dollars prévue par l'accord et destinée à compenser les pertes pour l'industrie turque occasionnées par lui, en raison du veto de sa voisine et rivale la Grèce.

Les déclarations de M. Ecevit sont une réaction à l'annonce la semaine dernière par la Commission européenne que l'UE commencerait dès l'année prochaine des négociations d'adhésion avec cinq pays d'Europe de l'est et Chypre. La Turquie, également candidate à l'adhésion, ne fait pas partie de cette liste.

Après cette annonce, Ankara a également durci sa rhétorique sur Chypre, dix jours après les premiers pourparlers intercommunautaires depuis trois ans en vue d'une solution au problème de l'île divisée.

M. Ecevit a annoncé que la Turquie et la République turque de Chypre du nord (RTCN, autoproclamée en 1983) réaliseraient "par étapes" leur "intégration partielle", "parallèlement au processus d'adhésion de l'administration chypriote-grecque à l'UE".

Mais selon un diplomate européen qui a souhaité garder l'anonymat, cela "ne semble pas changer le statut de Chypre". "La RTCN est toujours une république non reconnue internationalement et soumise à embargos. Quant aux propositions pour une intégration économique, elles sont déjà en place puisque la RTCN utilise la Livre turque comme monnaie".

## **Ekinci: PKK seeks revenge on DYP**

Ankara- Turkish Daily News

■ True Path Party (DYP) Deputy Chairman Hasan Ekinci said on Monday that outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan had been attempting to take revenge on the DYP and its leader Tansu Çiller through Workers Party (IP) Chairman Doğu Perinçek.

In a press conference at DYP headquarters, Ekinci said Çiller, who has been accused of being an agent of the CIA since 1967, and her DYP had been targeted because of the determined struggle she had waged against the PKK. He said that the PKK had prepared fake documents purporting that the Turkish state dealt in heroin and that its prime minister had been protecting the heroin dealers. He pointed out that the allegations had been reported abroad and regrettably also discussed in Turkey.

However, Ekinci noted, the German state court had cleared the Turkish nation and the Turkish state from all such charges. He said it was regrettable that the state merely remained a spectator in the face of such developments.

Ekinci maintained that his party had never been as unified as it was now. He said his

## **via Perincek**

party was the central pillar and the backbone of Turkish democracy.

He also criticized the government for increasing the price of gasoline by 32 percent.

In modern democracies, Ekinci said, it was the nation which formed the government and appointed the prime minister.

He asserted that only five of the 55 governments in Turkey had not been founded by the people.

He claimed that those five governments had been led by Nihat Erim, Naim Talu, Ferit Melen, Bülent Ulus and Mesut Yılmaz.

*Turkish Daily News*

TUESDAY, JULY 22, 1997

## La Turquie en froid avec les «Quinze»

*Le nouveau gouvernement veut réviser le traité d'union douanière.*

La Turquie veut réviser son accord d'union douanière avec l'Union européenne. Annoncée hier par Bulent Ecevit, vice-Premier ministre et vieux leader charismatique de la gauche nationaliste turque, cette décision qui sera bientôt entérinée par le Conseil des ministres traduit le durcissement vis-à-vis des Quinze du nouveau gouvernement turc. Les autorités d'Ankara n'ont guère apprécié d'être exclues des plans d'élargissement de l'Union. L'irritation couvait en fait depuis plusieurs mois «Nous avons cru que l'Union douanière serait un pas vers une adhésion pleine et entière mais cela ne s'est pas produit», a affirmé le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Ismail Cem, précisant que le déficit commercial avec l'UE avait doublé entre 1995 et 1996 passant en un an de 5 milliards de dollars à 11 milliards de dollars. Aux termes de ce traité entré en vi-

gueur le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1996, la Turquie et les pays de l'UE levaient toutes les barrières commerciales sauf pour l'agriculture. Mais à cause du veto d'Athènes, les Européens n'ont toujours pas débloqué les quelque 3 milliards de dollars d'aides financières destinées à compenser le manque à gagner des industriels turcs.

Bulent Ecevit était à l'époque hostile à la signature de cet accord. Revenu au pouvoir pour la première fois depuis vingt ans à la faveur de la coalition laïque droite-gauche dirigée par Mesut Yilmaz, il compte bien infléchir la politique extérieure de son pays en cette phase de malaise croissant dans les relations avec Bruxelles. Fin lettré, social-démocrate et nationaliste, Ecevit, 72 ans, était le Premier ministre qui en 1974, à la tête d'un gouvernement de coali-

**La Turquie est venue d'être exclue des plans d'ouverture de l'UE et attend toujours des aides bloquées par Athènes.**

tion avec l'islamiste Necmettin Erbakan, décida de l'invasion de Chypre pour venir en aide à la communauté turque après un coup d'Etat des extrémistes grecs qui voulaient rattachier l'île à la Grèce. Quelque vingt-trois ans plus tard, les troupes turques sont toujours dans le tiers nord de l'île où fut proclamée en 1987 une république turque de Chypre

hostile à la signature de l'accord (RTCN) reconstruite seulement par Ankara. C'est à l'occasion d'une visite dans le nord de l'île qu'il annonçait avant-hier un plan visant à «l'intégration» progressive de la RTCN à la Turquie. Un défi à l'UE si celle-ci entamait réellement des négociations pour l'intégration de la république de Chypre qui couvre le reste de l'île et reste la seule autorité internationalement reconnue. La Turquie rejette catégoriquement une en-

trée de Chypre dans l'UE avant qu'une solution soit trouvée au problème de l'île, ou avant qu'elle soit elle-même admise au sein de l'Union. Dix jours plus tôt, les représentants des deux communautés avaient pour la première fois depuis trois ans commencé à négocier directement aux Etats-Unis sous la houlette de l'ONU. Ils devaient se revoir à la mi-août à Genève.

En durcissant le ton vis-à-vis des Européens sur ce dossier, les autorités turques savent pouvoir compter sur une certaine compréhension de Washington. L'envoyé spécial américain pour Chypre, Richard Holbrooke, avait mis en garde la semaine dernière l'UE contre des négociations sur l'intégration de Chypre qui «ne prendraient pas en compte» les efforts menés par l'ONU et les Etats-Unis pour régler cette question ●

M.S.

*Turkish Daily News*

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 1997

# Çatlı was walking about like a minister

A former administrator of the National Intelligence Organization Mehmet Eymür, a witness in the Susurluk case, said that Çatlı had gotten out of control at the end

*Istanbul - Turkish Daily News*

■ The case related to the Susurluk traffic accident is continuing in the Istanbul No.6 State Security Court. The former administrator of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Mehmet Eymür in testimony Tuesday related how what was said about Abdullah Çatlı was very attention-getting. Eymür continued, "At the end he got completely out of control and became so powerful that he could even have me removed from my job."

Abdullah Çatlı was one of the most important names in the criminal organization which had penetrated the government and which appeared following the Susurluk accident. He was wanted as a suspected murderer and had escaped from prison and before the traffic accident in which he died occurred he is reported to have travelled around Ankara like a minister.

Eymür added that Çatlı was to be found in a room in the king's suites in five-star hotels where many important statesmen stayed.

Eymür added to his words he had relayed this information to journalists Uğur Mumcu may have been killed for what he knew about Çatlı.

At the second stage of Tuesday's hearing of the Susurluk trial, evidence from police officers who had been arrested on charges related to the criminal organization in the government. Eleven defendants, ten of whom were under arrest, continued. Among these was Ibrahim Şahin who had been the deputy director of the Special Operations Department of the police. Korkut Eken who was a former high-ranking member of MIT also attended the trial.

Eken told the court that during the years that he had worked for MIT, Ibrahim Şahin had been an instructor for the special operations teams. Eken himself denied charges that he had received money with which he bought a house and car. He said that he knew Tank Ümit who had worked for MIT and who has disappeared and is presumed dead. However he denied that he had any knowledge of Ümit's disappearance.

Eken admitted under oath that he had known Abdullah Çatlı since 1988 and had also known him when he was using the false identity of Mehmet Özbay. The court trial was continuing at the time the newspaper went to press.

# La Turquie dénonce le sort que lui réserve l'Union européenne

Le vice-premier ministre, Bulent Ecevit appelle à une révision de l'accord d'union douanière signé avec les Quinze, qu'il juge défavorable à son pays. Il annonce, par ailleurs, une « intégration » de la partie turque de Chypre

ISTANBUL

de notre correspondante

La Turquie est-elle en train de tourner le dos à l'Europe ? La question s'était initialement posée en 1996 avec l'arrivée au pouvoir du premier ministre islamiste Necmettin Erbakan, mais c'est maintenant l'attitude du gouvernement fait formé pour lui succéder qui remet le sujet à l'ordre du jour.

En visite à Chypre pour célébrer le 23<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de l'intervention des forces armées turques sur l'île, le vice-premier ministre Bulent Ecevit a en effet annoncé que la Turquie pourrait revoir l'accord d'union douanière avec les Quinze entré en vigueur le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1996. « Cet accord a causé un tort important à la Turquie depuis son entrée en vigueur », a déclaré M. Ecevit au cours d'une conférence de presse commune avec le dirigeant turc chypriote, Rauf Denktas. Le ministre des affaires étrangères, Ismail Cem, membre lui aussi du Parti démocratique de gauche que dirige M. Ecevit, a ajouté que « le déficit commercial de la Turquie vis-à-vis de l'Europe est passé à 11 milliards de dollars après l'accord douanier, contre 5 milliards en 1995. »

Dans le même temps, alors que les Nations unies tentent de convaincre les deux communautés - turque et grecque - de Chypre de se réconcilier, la Turquie a annoncé qu'elle prévoyait « l'intégration partielle » de la partie turque de l'île. La République turque de Chypre du Nord (RTCN) - une entité fondée en 1983 et reconnue uniquement par la Turquie - continuera à exister indépendamment, mais une union financière et économique est prévue et un conseil d'association réunira des représentants des deux Parlements.

Plus important encore, la Turquie et la RTCN entendent développer un concept commun de défense et toute attaque contre la partie turque de l'île serait considérée comme étant dirigée contre la Turquie.


Ces démarches peuvent être comprises comme l'expression de la frustration des autorités

turques, qui non seulement ont dû avaler le fait que la Turquie n'ait pas été incluse dans les plans d'élargissement de l'Union européenne, annoncés les 16 et 17 juillet - ce qui n'aurait pas dû être une véritable surprise -, mais également le fait que les négociations en vue de l'accession de Chypre à l'Union débuteraient prochainement. Ismail Cem avait alors quali-

fié la décision européenne d'« injuste ». « Nous avons toujours dit que l'union douanière n'est pas une fin en soi. Nous devons désormais réévaluer les chances d'intégration de la Turquie à l'Union européenne et décider si la situation aura un impact sur l'union douanière », explique Oguz Ozge, sous-directeur pour l'Union européenne au ministère des affaires étrangères. S'il est vrai que les Européens n'ont pas toujours traité la Turquie avec tact, les autorités turques oublient fréquemment que l'union douanière avait été précédée par une longue période de transition et de préparation de vingt-deux ans, au cours de laquelle l'Europe, abaissant unilatéralement ses tarifs douaniers, avait ouvert ses marchés aux produits turcs. « La situation de la Turquie n'a pas changé. En fait, l'idée d'une conférence européenne, dans le cadre de laquelle des sujets qui concernent la Turquie de très près pourront être discutés, a été ajoutée », explique l'ambassadeur Michael Lake, le représentant de l'Union européenne à Ankara. Mais les arguments rationnels des diplomates européens, qui répètent que la porte de l'Europe demeure ouverte pour autant qu'Ankara améliore le niveau de sa démocratie, n'ont qu'un impact limité : la relation turco-européenne est avant tout émotionnelle. Pour de nombreux Turcs, l'Europe est une sorte de miroir : ils attendent qu'elle leur renvoie l'image à laquelle ils aspirent, celle d'un pays occidental et développé.

#### GESTE D'HUMEUR

Lorsqu'elle est sur la défensive, la Turquie a tendance à sortir les griffes. Les diplomates occidentaux s'empressent cependant d'ex-



pliquer que les intérêts d'Ankara ne peuvent que souffrir de cette attitude. Chypre est un fardeau diplomatique et économique important pour la Turquie. « Comme les lourdes entreprises étatiques, elle devrait être privatisée », affirme un diplomate européen. Un rejet de l'accord d'union douanière aurait de sérieuses conséquences. Dans un premier temps, les marchés financiers, toujours à la recherche de stabilité, seraient vraisemblablement affectés et l'Europe pourrait réintroduire des taxes douanières et imposer de nouveaux quotas sur les produits turcs, une situation qui paraît impensable compte tenu du fait que plus de la moitié des échanges commerciaux de la Turquie se font avec l'Europe.

Malgré les déclarations intempestives et les gestes d'humeur, la Turquie choisira vraisemblablement de rester sur les rails de l'Europe, d'autant plus que le programme du gouvernement donne la priorité à l'harmonisation des lois pour faciliter le rapprochement avec l'Union et mentionne la nécessité de mettre fin à la dispute avec la Grèce. La position de M. Ecevit, qui est bien connu pour son nationalisme et qui veut par ailleurs rétablir de bonnes relations avec Bagdad, risque donc avant tout de semer la confusion et de porter atteinte à la cohésion de la coalition.

Nicole Pope

## L'étoile ternie de Tansu Ciller, ancien espoir des Turcs et des Européens

« **VOUS** êtes jeune et ambitieuse, je vous ferai briller comme une étoile », aurait dit le président Süleyman Demirel à Tansu Ciller lorsqu'il la lança en politique en 1991.

### PORTRAIT

**Même en économie, la réputation de l'ex-premier ministre a rapidement faibli**

Jeune professeur d'économie à l'université du Bosphore, à Istanbul, celle-ci connut, dès lors, une carrière politique fulgurante qui allait culminer en juin 1993, lorsqu'à quarante-sept ans, elle devint premier ministre, une première dans l'histoire de la Turquie. « *Belle et blonde* » comme la décrivait le quotidien *Hürriyet*, affectionnant les tailleurs blancs de bonne coupe, cette sémillante Stambouliote, anglophone car éduquée aux Etats-Unis, représentait alors pour des millions de Turcs l'espoir du renouveau tandis qu'à l'étranger elle était perçue comme le « *visage européen* » de la Turquie. « *Avec sa BMW blanche et son tailleur blanc elle incarnait le succès des classes moyennes, un rêve que la Turquie aurait voulu partager avec elle* », expliqua un jour la sociologue Nilüfer Göle qui, comme M<sup>me</sup> Ciller, fut étudiante à l'université du Bosphore.

Cinq ans plus tard, l'« étoile » a singulièrement pâli : vouée aux gémonies par la presse pour son alliance avec les islamistes (elle était devenue ministre des affaires étrangères dans le précédent gouvernement, celui de l'islamiste Necmettin Erbakan), désavouée par l'élite laïque pour sa piètre gestion du pays, fortement contestée au sein de son propre parti dont les effectifs fondent comme neige au soleil, lâchée, enfin, par ses principaux alliés d'hier - les militaires et le président Süleyman Demirel, son « parrain » en politique -, Tansu Ciller se retrouve, pour la troisième fois en deux ans, sous les projecteurs de la justice. Le procureur général de Turquie, Vural Savas, a demandé, le 2 juillet, à la Cour de sûreté de l'Etat d'examiner les accusations de corruption qui pèsent sur elle. Selon la plainte déposée par Dogu Perincek, le chef d'un parti d'extrême-gauche, elle est soupçonnée d'avoir « *reçu des fonds*

et des avantages de la part de services étrangers », tandis que son mari, Ozer Ciller, un riche homme d'affaires, aurait, lui, falsifié des documents pour minimiser les nombreux biens que le couple possède aux Etats-Unis.

Ce n'est pas la première fois que semblables accusations sont portées contre l'ancien premier ministre turc, jadis adulé. Entre 1996 et 1997, pas moins de trois commissions d'enquête parlementaires se sont opposées à son renvoi devant la Cour suprême pour y répondre de malversations dans la vente des monopoles d'Etat Tofas (automobile) et Todas (électricité) ou éclaircir l'origine de sa fortune personnelle - selon les allégations, 50 millions de dollars (environ 300 millions de francs) dont beaucoup de biens immobiliers en Turquie comme aux Etats-Unis - accumulée principalement lors de son séjour à la tête du gouvernement entre juin 1993 et juillet 1996.

### ÉCHEC POLITIQUE

La comparution devant la plus haute juridiction de l'Etat a été évitée à M<sup>me</sup> Ciller grâce au vote des députés du Parti de la prospérité (Refah, islamiste). Ce parti islamiste, qui fut à l'origine de ces demandes d'enquête est devenu ensuite son partenaire dans la coalition gouvernementale. Mais aujourd'hui, la nouvelle coalition au pouvoir paraît déterminée à en finir avec les « affaires ». « *Le gouvernement ne restera pas simple spectateur face à la corruption* », a déclaré le nouveau premier ministre, Mesut Yilmaz, lors de sa première intervention télévisée. Les défections qu'a enregistrées ces dernières semaines le groupe parlementaire de M<sup>me</sup> Ciller, celui du Parti de la juste voie (DYP), pourraient en outre favoriser la levée de son immunité.

Plus généralement, l'hémorragie de députés frappant le DYP est révélateur de l'échec politique de M<sup>me</sup> Ciller. A son arrivée à la tête du vieux parti conservateur, en 1993, elle écarte la vieille garde, les anciens compagnons de Demirel, et s'appuie sur de nouveaux cadres, pour la plupart issus du Mouvement de l'action nationaliste (MHP, extrême-droite nationaliste) du colonel Turkes. Elle distribue les promotions aux préfets chargés de la sécurité dans les régions du Sud-Est peuplées de Kurdes et soumises à

l'Etat d'urgence, ce qui vaut bientôt à son parti le surnom de « *police academy* ». Ses détracteurs lui reprochent son inconstance. Tout au long de la campagne électorale pour les législatives anticipées, en décembre 1995, elle n'a de cesse de diaboliser les islamistes - « *plus dangereux pour le pays que le PKK* » (Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan, marxiste-léniniste, en lutte armée contre Ankara depuis 1984). En négociant l'accord d'union douanière avec l'Union européenne, elle se présente comme « *le meilleur rempart contre l'islamisme* » ; et puis, sept mois plus tard, elle fait alliance avec le chef des islamistes, Necmettin Erbakan.

Si à chacun de ses voyages à l'étranger, elle promet une amélioration de la situation en matière de droits de l'homme dans son pays, sa gestion de cette question est catastrophique. Le conflit qui, depuis 1984, oppose dans les provinces du Sud-Est les militaires aux militants kurdes armés du PKK s'est durci. En novembre 1996, l'accident de Susurluk, qui révèle à une population interloquée les liens existant entre la mafia, la police et les politiciens, ne laisse planer aucun doute sur les méthodes des « *équipes spéciales* », ces commandos antiguérilla mis sur pied par M<sup>me</sup> Ciller et son entourage et qui portent la responsabilité de centaines de disparitions et d'exécutions extrajudiciaires. Sur deux mille deux cents assassinats « *non élucidés* » répertoriés en Turquie depuis 1983, mille huit cents se sont produits pendant la période où Tansu Ciller était premier ministre selon des statistiques fournies par le ministère turc de l'intérieur.

Même dans son domaine de prédilection, l'économie, la réputation de cette diplômée de Yale a rapidement faibli. L'inflation atteint des sommets : de 71 % annuels en 1993 lors de son accession au pouvoir, elle passe à 150 % en 1995 pour plafonner à 80 % à l'heure actuelle. Enfin, malgré sa soumission au haut-commandement militaire, celui-ci a tôt fait de se détourner d'elle, une fois son alliance conclue avec les islamistes. Selon le quotidien *Hürriyet*, les militaires auraient donné des consignes aux services de l'émigration afin d'empêcher toute sortie du territoire de l'ancien premier ministre et de son mari.

Marie Jégo

**COMMENTAIRE**  
**CHANGEMENT**  
**DE CAP ?**

Après avoir fait peur aux Occidentaux en se donnant, pendant un an, un chef de gouvernement islamiste, Necmettin Erbakan, la Turquie serait-elle en passe de retomber dans une autre dérive qui, elle aussi, inquiète : celle du nationalisme ?

Les propos tenus ces derniers jours par M. Ecevit, vice-premier ministre dans le nouveau gouvernement, pourraient le laisser penser. En visite dans le nord de Chypre, occupée par l'armée turque depuis vingt-trois ans, Bulent Ecevit vient en effet d'annoncer coup sur coup que cette partie de l'île allait être progressivement « intégrée » à la Turquie et que l'accord d'union douanière qui lie Ankara à l'Europe devait être « révisé ».

M. Ecevit retrouve ses accents annexionnistes et anti-européens. Il joue avec la frustration que peuvent engendrer dans la population certaines prises de position de l'Europe : en l'occurrence, l'intention d'engager des négociations d'adhésion avec les autorités chypriotes internationalement reconnues (les grecques), et le fait que l'Europe ne mentionne pas la Turquie parmi les pays susceptibles de la rejoindre un jour.

M. Ecevit est fidèle à lui-même : il était aux commandes en 1974, lors de l'intervention à Chypre ; en 1995, il avait exprimé son hostilité au projet d'union douanière avec l'Europe. Mais qui gouverne à Ankara ? Le premier ministre, Mesut Yilmaz, n'est pas sur ces positions anti-européennes. Les milieux d'affaires non plus. On peut supposer que l'armée n'approuve pas la remise en cause par M. Ecevit d'une politique traditionnellement tournée vers l'Europe, pas plus qu'elle n'approuva, il y a quelques années, son soutien affiché à l'Irak. Il n'est donc pas dit qu'Ankara change de cap. On peut toutefois craindre que les méandres de la politique intérieure turque ne fassent manquer un moment particulièrement propice - la présence à Athènes d'un gouvernement ouvert au dialogue, les efforts redoublés de la communauté internationale pour régler le problème de Chypre - pour en finir avec les contentieux qui affectent la région.

Claire Tréan

## Une opinion déçue par les milieux politiques

ISTANBUL  
de notre correspondant

La coalition formée par le premier ministre Mesut Yilmaz a beau être entrée en fonctions dans des circonstances particulières - le gouvernement précédent ayant été forcé de démissionner sous la pression des militaires -, ses premiers jours au pouvoir suivent un scénario désormais bien familier : remplacement des hauts fonctionnaires, suspension des projets lancés par l'administration précédente et, dans un pays où l'inflation demeure constamment autour de la barre des 80 %, introduction des inévitables augmentations de prix.

Cette fois-ci, dès l'obtention du vote de confiance de l'Assemblée nationale, le gouvernement a frappé fort : l'essence a augmenté de 32 %, le sucre de 35 %, les prix des communications téléphoniques ont renchéri de 50 %. Pour transiter de l'Europe à l'Asie en voiture, les Stambouliotes devront désormais payer 250 000 livres turques alors qu'une semaine plus tôt 100 000 livres suffisaient. Ces mesures ne contribuent évidemment pas à la popularité de la nouvelle administration. Déçus par leurs politiciens, sans grand espoir de changement majeur, les Turcs s'intéressent avant tout à ce qui les touche de plus près : le coût de la vie.

Le gouvernement n'a cependant pas entièrement perdu de vue les élections anticipées qui devront vraisemblablement être organisées en 1998. Ainsi, les fonctionnaires ont reçu une augmentation de salaire de 35 % et le ministre d'Etat responsable de l'économie, Gunes Taner, a clairement signalé qu'un véritable plan d'austérité n'était pas prévu. La coalition a hérité d'une situation financière déplorable, mais elle espère la stabiliser, sinon la redresser, en augmentant ses rentrées, notamment par le biais de réformes fiscales limitées et par les privatisations qui, selon le gouvernement, devraient rapporter 4 milliards de dollars cette année. Le Parlement vient d'adopter une loi qui permettra désormais à des compagnies privées de bâtir les centrales électriques dont la Turquie a besoin pour satisfaire ses besoins en énergie.

Pour satisfaire les militaires qui veillent au grain et ses partenaires de gauche, le premier ministre Me-

sut Yilmaz a annoncé que l'Assemblée nationale n'aurait pas droit à ses vacances tant que la loi qui prévoit l'allongement de l'enseignement primaire obligatoire à huit années n'a pas été adoptée. Cette réforme très controversée était une des mesures préconisées par les généraux afin d'empêcher que les élèves ne se dirigent vers des écoles religieuses dès l'âge de onze ans, et auxquelles le gouvernement précédent s'était opposé. L'introduction de la loi, prévue pour cette semaine, promet des débats animés au Parlement : les islamistes s'y opposent violemment et, à l'intérieur même du Parti de la mère patrie (ANAP) de M. Yilmaz, des voix s'élèvent contre ce projet. Le programme gouvernemental prévoyait des améliorations dans le domaine des droits de l'homme mais le sujet, notamment un projet d'amnistie pour certains journalistes emprisonnés, n'a pas encore été abordé par le nouveau cabinet.

### CHASSE AUX SORCIÈRES ?

La coalition insiste également sur l'indépendance des tribunaux. La multiplication soudaine des procédures judiciaires contre les membres de l'ancien gouvernement - les demandes de levée d'immunité parlementaire contre les députés islamistes radicaux, la possible fermeture du Parti de la prospérité, les procès intentés contre M<sup>me</sup> Ciller pour corruption, l'ouverture d'une enquête par un procureur militaire sur la base d'une accusation selon laquelle l'ancien premier ministre aurait été un agent de la CIA - crée en fait l'impression, qu'un ou deux cas mieux documentés aurait pu dissiper, qu'une chasse aux sorcières est en cours.

Cette coalition de la dernière chance, formée pour bloquer le retour au pouvoir des islamistes, est tiraillée de tous côtés. Avec l'influence de Bulent Ecevit sur la politique étrangère, avec les exigences du Parti républicain du peuple (CHP) de Deniz Baykal, qui fait de la réforme de l'enseignement une condition *sine qua non* pour accorder son soutien au gouvernement, avec l'armée qui veille, avec les attentes de son propre parti, le premier ministre Mesut Yilmaz dispose d'une marge de manœuvre très limitée.

N. P.

Turkish Daily News

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 1997

# US defense giants ask support in breaking US shadow embargo

**METEHAN DEMİR**

*Ankara - Turkish Daily News*

■ Struggling to overcome the shadow embargo staged by anti-Turkish lobbies in the U.S. Congress blocking arms transfers to Turkey, American defense giants are enlisting the help of the pro-Israeli lobbies in Washington.

Following an agreement made by NATO allies Greece and Turkey on July 8-9 in Madrid on a set of principles designed to improve their troubled relationship, the U.S. administration started to send positive signals that it would accelerate efforts to deliver the arms to Turkey within a few weeks. Sources also said that, in addition to these developments, powerful pro-Israeli lobbies had raised the pressure on anti-Turkish lobbies and on certain Congressmen

to persuade them to break the shadow embargo against Turkey, especially concerning delivery of the frigates. "After massive, fruitless efforts to break the shadow embargo which blocked delivery of Turkey's frigates, Super Cobras and Sea Hawks for more than a year, we requested the lobbies' support to overcome these difficulties in the U.S. Congress," said a senior official from an American defense giant. Turkish and Israeli ties, especially in the defense field, have been strengthened following a series of military agreements. Recently, numerous pro-Israeli lobbyists in Washington visited important figures in Turkey and Turkish officials reportedly requested their support in Washington. The Israeli administration has also reportedly increased its support for Turkey in its difficulties

in Washington.

A group of Jewish-Americans from Jinsa, one of the most effective lobbies in Washington, visited Turkey last month. A senior Turkish official told the Turkish Daily News that Turkey requested the lobbyists' support in efforts to break the stoppage of arms transfers to Turkey. Another source said that Jinsa was playing a key role in organizing the pro-Israeli lobbies in Washington to help Turkey, a country which has, been paying tens of millions of dollars to other lobby companies in the United States to defend its interests.

The dispute over the transfer of arms to Turkey has become one of the main topics of discussion at every level between Washington and Ankara. The U.S. administration has been reluctant to send any proposals concerning arms sales to Turkey to Congress for a long time. The White House reportedly has been under strong pressure from anti-Turkish, Greek and Armenian lobbies in the U.S. capital.

Recently, Capitol Hill has been sending signals that it would transfer the arms to Turkey. Senior American diplomatic sources both in Washington and in Ankara also confirmed the reports, saying that Congress had given priority to the issue of Turkey's frigates and would approve the delivery of the ships soon.

Turkish Daily News

THURSDAY, JULY 24, 1997

## Workers' Party leader claims military info given to PKK

*Istanbul-Turkish Daily News*

■ Workers' Party (IP) leader Doğu Perinçek has claimed that the last military operation conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in Northern Iraq was communicated to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Greek secret service. At a press conference Wednesday at IP headquarters, Perinçek referred to former ambassador Sukru Elekdag who earlier wrote that the Northern Iraqi operation which started in last May was kept secret from the former Refahiyol coalition government by the General Staff, because, as a high-ranking general told Elekdag, the army feared the government would leak information

to the PKK.

Perinçek went on to say that, despite all efforts, the operation date was conveyed to CIA which in turn warned Greek secret service.

"Tratıyiki (Strategy) magazine which is known for its close connections with the Greek General Staff revealed the date of this secret operation in its 32nd issue which came out in May," said Perinçek, underlining the crisis in trust between the Turkish General Staff and the junior partner in the coalition, the True Path Party (DYP) which is led by Tansu Çiller who has been accused of being a CIA spy by Perinçek himself. Perinçek concluded by connecting many right-wing media groups to CIA; these groups have attacked Perinçek because of his controversial allegations.

# US religious freedom report positive on RP

UĞUR AKINCI

Washington- Turkish Daily News

■ A State Department report on religious freedom in 78 countries around the world, with special focus on the persecution of Christians, threw a rather positive light on the way religious minorities in Turkey were treated during the tenure of the coalition government led by the Islamist Welfare Party (RP).

According to the report prepared and presented to the press on Tuesday by Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck, director of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Affairs, "the Government formed in July 1996 has sought a more cooperative relationship with religious minorities, particularly in Istanbul, according to prominent members of these communities."

## Armenians: No delay

"The state ministry responsible for the religious minority communities gave the Armenian Patriarchate permission to rebuild a church in Anatolia and informed the Patriarchate that requests to restore some other properties would be approved immediately," the State Department report said. "These requests have all been approved without delay."

## 'Ecumenical Church'

The report was also positive in general but had a few reservations on the treatment received by the Greek Orthodox Church in Istanbul's Fener district, which is referred to by Christians as the "Ecumenical Church." Turks, pointing to the fact that the church is a Turkish institution, do not accept that the Greek Orthodox church is ecumenical in nature.

"The authorities monitor the activities of Eastern Orthodox churches and

their affiliated operations. The Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul has consistently expressed interest in reopening the seminary on the island of Halki in the Sea of Marmara. The seminary has been closed since the 1970's when the State nationalized most private institutions of higher learning."

## Red-tape

The bureaucratic red-tape that prevented maintenance of such sites was criticized.

"Bureaucratic procedures relating to historic preservation impede repairs to some religious facilities. Under the law, religious buildings that become "extinct" (because of prolonged absence of clergy or lay persons to staff local religious councils or for lack of adherents) revert to government possession. Some non-Muslim minorities, particularly the Greek Orthodox and, to a lesser extent, the shrinking Armenian Orthodox and Jewish communities, are faced with the danger of losing some of their houses of worship," the report said.

## Focus on Christians

The report, as promised, focused particularly on the problems and issues of Christians in Turkey.

"Most religious minorities are concentrated in Istanbul. The number of Christians in the south has been declining as the younger Syriac generation leaves for Europe and North America. Minority religions not recognized under the Lausanne Treaty may not acquire additional property for churches.

The Catholic Church in Ankara, for example, is confined to diplomatic property. The State must approve the operation of churches, monasteries, synagogues, schools, and charitable religious foundations, such as hospitals and orphanages," the report complained.

## US officials

The report noted that there have been no obstacles in the way of those U.S. officials who wanted to talk to the leadership of religious minorities in Turkey.

"U.S. Embassy officers — as well as other U.S. Government officials who visit Turkey — meet frequently with the Ecumenical Patriarch of the Orthodox faith, the Armenian Patriarch, and other religious leaders to discuss their concerns about religious liberty in Turkey.

U.S. officials also meet with Turkish government officials to discuss these matters. In March 1996, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, the U.S. Ambassador, and other U.S. officials convened an ecumenical meeting of religious leaders in Turkey to address specific concerns and promote greater tolerance among religious groups. The meeting was lauded by all participants as an historic event," the report said.

## Asylum policy

Finally, the report included a criticism of Turkey's asylum policy, specifically towards those Iranians and Iraqis seeking refuge in Turkey.

"The U.S. Government has protested Turkey's practice of turning back Iranian and Iraqi asylum seekers. On numerous occasions, U.S. officials have expressed serious concern to Turkish government officials about inadequate opportunities for asylum applicants to register with Turkish authorities.

The United States has urged the Government of Turkey to extend the registration period beyond the current 5-day limit, and to permit applicants to register at facilities staffed by professionally-trained officials in population centers. Turkish officials have agreed to meet with UNHCR officials to discuss the handling of applications in the future," the report concluded.

*Turkish Daily News*

THURSDAY, JULY 24, 1997

# ouest france

Saint-Brieuc

Jeudi 24 juillet 1997

Justice et Liberté

Un comité de soutien au peuple Kurde très actif

## Participation au train pour la paix

**Créé au moment de la guerre du Golfe en 1991, le comité de soutien au peuple Kurde mène un combat pour la reconnaissance de ce peuple opprimé. Pour lutter contre les exactions récentes de la Turquie, un train pour la paix va se rendre au Kurdistan, fin août, dans lequel se trouvera un représentant du comité briochin.**

Un train européen pour la paix, constitué de dix wagons, remplis pour l'essentiels de journalistes, d'écrivains et de personnalités, comme Mgr Gaillot, partira de Bruxelles, le 26 août pour se rendre à Diyarbakir, capitale du Kurdistan. « Ce train doit servir à alerter l'Europe sur la situation du peuple Kurde, explique Josette Hamon, représentante du comité de soutien au peuple Kurde. Une situation intolérable, qui fait que 15 millions de personnes sont clairement niées. Et notamment par la Turquie, qui suspecte tout Kurde de connivence avec le



*Josette Hamon, représentante du comité de soutien au peuple kurde, qui aura un émissaire dans le train pour la paix.*

**PKK, le parti pour l'autonomie du Kurdistan.**

### Participation de Yves Jouan

Récemment encore la Turquie a lancé une vaste offensive dans

les montagnes du Kurdistan. Dans laquelle elle a engagé 65 000 hommes. Motif invoqué, lutter contre le terrorisme du PKK. « Des villages sont rasés et des civils tués et l'Europe reste sans voix, prête même à accepter la Turquie au sein de l'Union »,

poursuit Josette Hamon.

C'est pour cela qu'est organisé ce train de la paix, par la ligue turque des droits de l'homme et diverses organisations allemandes, auquel le comité local de soutien au peuple Kurde va participer. En effet, l'écrivain Yves Jouan, actuellement en résidence à la maison Louis-Guilloux, va se rendre à Diyarbakir, en accord avec la fédération des œuvres laïques (FOL), qui l'emploie. Yves Jouan est l'auteur d'un recueil de poésies, « Azadi », écrites après un voyage au Kurdistan où il se rend pour témoigner de l'oppression du peuple Kurde, « qui ne demande que la reconnaissance dans une fédération et non plus l'autonomie. »

Pour financer ce voyage et soutenir le peuple Kurde, le comité a besoin de la bonne volonté de chacun et notamment des associations qui le composent.

Renseignements au centre social du Plateau, tél 02 96 33 61 80.



THE NEW YORK TIMES INTERNATIONAL SUNDAY, JULY 27, 1997

# Kurds Fashion Two Identities in a Fearful Turkey

By STEPHEN KINZER

VAN, Turkey — More than 1,000 miles separate a defiant peasant named Baran, who lives in a refugee's hovel outside Van, in eastern Turkey, from a polished and successful Istanbul jeweler named Cemal.

The gap in perception and experience between the two is even wider. All they have in common is that they are Kurdish citizens of Turkey.

"I am a Kurd, but what difference does that make?" asked Cemal as he sat behind a glass case full of gold bracelets and earrings. "I'm Turkish. I love Turkey. Never once have I had a problem because I happen to have Kurdish blood. Everyone is equal in this country."

To Baran, who fled his ancestral village rather than be pressed into the pro-Government village guards, things look very different.

"My identity as a Kurd is the most precious thing I have," he said as his son listened solemnly. "If I give up that identity, I can do anything in this country, even become president."

"But no matter what they do to me, I will never abandon a hundred generations of tradition in my family. I was born a Kurd, and nothing can ever make me a Turk."

These two men, both of whom asked to be identified only by their first names, represent the twin paradigms of Kurdish life in Turkey: Until their world views can somehow be reconciled, the Government will find it all but impossible to resolve one of the world's bitterest and most intractable ethnic conflicts.

"It is a conflict that has produced more than a dozen rebellions over the last 80 years, cost untold amounts of blood and treasure and polarized public opinion here and abroad. The current revolt, led for the last 13 years by the Kurdistan Workers Party, has taken more than 20,000 lives, mostly in fighting in eastern Turkey.

At a recent meeting here in Van, about 50 miles west of the Iranian border, senior Turkish military and intelligence officers agreed that the conflict cannot be resolved militarily. But like countless others who have pondered the problem, they failed to find a formula under which Turks and Kurds, the country's two principal ethnic groups, could live together without fighting.

The Kurdish issue is so divisive that there is even debate about how many Kurds live in Turkey. A leading demographer, Cem Behar, recently estimated that as many as 10 million people speak Kurdish in a country with a total population of 63 million. Several million more Kurds live in Iran, Iraq, Syria and other nearby countries, concentrated in a



Some Turkish officials in Van, where these Kurds live in a refugee settlement, recently agreed that the military could not solve the Kurdish conflict. Stanton R. Winter for The New York Times

region that has historically been known as Kurdistan.

The decades of revolts since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 have made Turkish authorities deeply suspicious of nearly all Kurdish political, social and cultural movements. In their view, the line separating guerrillas from peaceful intellectuals and politicians often blurs.

As recently as 1981, a member of Parliament was sentenced to three years in prison for asserting: "There are Kurds in Turkey. I am a Kurd." Since then — and especially after the late President Turgut Ozal broke a longstanding taboo by declaring that he was partly Kurdish — laws have been loosened. It is no longer illegal to speak Kurdish in public or to play Kurdish music.

Turkish officials often assert that Kurds enjoy the same rights as other citizens. Thousands of Kurds are highly successful in many fields, and by some estimates more than one-fourth of the members of Parliament are of Kurdish extraction. These facts make it difficult to argue that Kurds suffer systematic discrimination.


Kurdish leaders, however, say the path to success is open only to assimilated Kurds. The Government has strongly resisted Kurdish demands for cultural and political concessions. President Suleyman Demirel spoke for many Turks when he warned that such concessions would lead to "compromise after compromise with no end."

The Turkish Republic was founded after a rebellion against the terms of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, in France, under which most of what is now Turkey was to be divided among European powers. The trauma of that experience has bequeathed to Turks a "Sèvres syndrome," which Kemal Kirisci, author of a new study of the Kurdish problem, described as "the deep belief that the outside world is always trying to take the country away from you."

As a result, many Turks fear that giving autonomy to Kurds would lead to demands for independence, and that their country would split apart in the manner of Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union.

"This is not something unique to Turkey, but what is specific here is that Turkey has nurtured this fear and integrated it into the state apparatus so successfully that most people are only now beginning to question it," Mr. Kirisci said. "In many ways, the key question in Turkey is how to overcome that fear, the fear that minorities and minority rights represent a threat to the unity of the country."

Efforts to forge a political party to speak for the Kurds have failed several times. Opponents of Kurdish na-



Fighting has killed some 20,000 people in eastern Turkey.

ionalism, fearing such a party would serve as a wedge for separatists, have used various tactics to assure that none survive for long.

The People's Democracy Party, which is now a principal civilian voice of Kurdish nationalism, was subjected to fierce criticism after someone tore down the Turkish flag at its 1996 convention and replaced it with a guerrilla banner. Criminal charges were filed against party leaders, and 31 of them were convicted in June of subversive activities and sentenced to prison terms of up to six years.

The most famous Kurdish prisoner in Turkey is Leyla Zana, who was among eight members of Parliament convicted in 1994 on charges of "separatist speech" and supporting terrorism. She is now serving a 15-year prison term, and her supporters regard her as a martyr of democracy.

But many Turks consider the sympathy for Ms. Zana ludicrously naïve.

"Leyla Zana is a separatist and her party was a direct extension of the guerrilla insurrection," said a former Foreign Minister, Coskun Kirca. "Advocating separatism is illegal in Turkey, as it should be. We have a very strong desire to keep our country from splitting apart as she would like."

In 1991 a group of Kurds decided to set up a foundation to promote Kurdish culture, and last year it was finally given legal status as the Kurdish Cultural and Research Foundation. In May it began offering Kurdish language courses, but the courses were quickly shut down by the police. The chairman of the foundation, Yilmaz Camlibel, has been notified that criminal charges will be filed against him.

At the foundation's headquarters in Istanbul, the bathrooms are labeled Mer and Jin, the Kurdish words for men and women. But there are no students to use them, and Mr. Camlibel ruminates in his office under an allegorical painting that shows Kurds being sucked into a

whirlpool.

"If you speak Kurdish, you become Kurdish," he said. "Maybe that is what they are afraid of. They don't mind allowing courses in any other language, even Japanese, but when we want to learn our language, they see it as a threat."

Some prominent Turks have become convinced that the Kurdish question can be resolved only if Turkey becomes more democratic. A group of them recently formed an organization, the Foundation for the Research of Societal Problems. According to its manifesto, it aims at promoting "democratic pluralism" as an alternative to "authoritarian centralism."

It has begun a series of conferences at which figures on both sides of the Turkish-Kurdish divide seek a common platform.

"The challenge now is to reconstruct Turkish institutions to make this a truly democratic country which embraces multiculturalism, political democracy and the rule of law," said Dogu Ergil, an essayist and university professor who is the foundation's director. "Without those things, the war in the east will go on, people who benefit from the war will remain powerful and the Kurdish problem will never be solved."

# Jordan reveals prince had brought Syrian message to Demirel

**Ambassador Kabariti: 'We will do our best to mediate between Syria and Turkey'**

**SAADET ORUÇ**

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Saleh Kabariti, Jordanian ambassador to Ankara, said that his country would do its best for the normalization of ties between the two neighboring countries, Syria and Turkey.

Kabariti, brother of the former Jordanian prime minister, talking to the Turkish Daily News in an interview on Friday, said that Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan Bin Tallal, in his visit to Ankara on June 12, brought a message from Syrian President Hafiz Assad to his Turkish counterpart Süleyman Demirel.

Pointing out that both parts seemed to be adamantly in favor of this kind of dialogue, he said: "Prince Hassan brought a message from Assad which King Hussein had received during his talk with Assad the day before the prince's visit. Demirel and Hassan, in their closed meeting, widely discussed Syrian-Turkish relations. Although the visit was described in the press to be only concerned with the Turkish cross-border operation in northern Iraq, one of the main aims of the visit was to reduce Turkish-Syrian tensions."

"I came here to represent Jordan's King Hussein and to express his views. Jordan is concerned about the operation continuing in northern Iraq," the prince had told reporters.

He met President Demirel accompanied by Sönmez Köksal, the undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and

General Cevik Bir, deputy chief of staff.

Kabariti, speaking to the TDN before his departure for Amman, after ten years in his diplomatic post, the last two of which he was the dean of the diplomatic society in Ankara, also pointed out that King Hussein and all of his representatives abroad have always served to normalize international relations.

## Israeli-Turkish ties

Kabariti, also head of the regular monthly gatherings of the 17 Arab countries in Ankara (which take place in the Jordanian Embassy), commented that nothing changed in Turkey's attitude regarding Arab countries after it developed closer ties, especially in the fields of defense and military, with Israel.

Emphasizing that the establishment of a strategic cooperation between Turkey and Israel will be an odd one considering the relation between Arab states and Turkey and will do nothing for the region, Kabariti also commented that Turkey's strategic cooperation must be with the 17 Arab states which will serve Turkey's interests much more.

"Turkey is a part of the Middle East.

I sincerely hope that all Arab-Turkish ties will improve in the future. We cannot neglect Turkey," he said.

Discussing the Middle East Peace Process, the Jordanian diplomat pointed that the United States had not done what a superpower should do with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

"The Jewish lobby in the United States and all over the world advances the rights of the Israelis. Of course, one of the most important factors in worsening the situation is the Israeli government itself.

Israeli President Ezer Weizmann and the other moderate and logical personalities are trying to

do something positive for the solution of the problem. But, before the Netanyahu government leaves power, it is hard to say that positive steps could be taken.

Those who cannot see beyond their noses make dialogue impossible. But, until they go, much damages will be done," he said.

Kabariti, at the same time, expressed his expectation that Turkey will play a major role for peace in the Middle East. "It not only means having a semi-military relation with Israel, you have to put your own weight in Israeli policy regarding the Arab states," he said.

## Iraq and northern Iraq

Meanwhile, criticizing the ongoing United Nations (U.N.) embargo against Iraq.

Ambassador Kabariti stated that the region's people have been suffering from the embargo. Jordan is the only country which has a priority regarding the embargo and is able to conduct limited trade with Iraq for purposes of local consumption only.

Turkey has also applied to the U.N. for a similar exception, on the grounds that the Turkish economy is being affected badly by the embargo.

Talking about Turkey's cross-border operation in northern Iraq, Kabariti made the following remarks: "In principle, we are against the 'invasion' of the Turkish army into Iraqi territories, regardless of any factors.

We also consider that northern Iraq is an Iraqi matter and completely a local problem. When it comes to U.S.-British-Turkish sponsored peace efforts for northern Iraq, after so many meetings nothing has changed.

The Kurdish problem in general is a complex issue, so that the Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian Kurdish problems must be discussed in the spectrum of that complexity."

Turkish Daily News SATURDAY, JULY 26, 1997

# CIA's top Iraq man helped Tamraz into White House

Tamraz was once hired by the former prime minister of Turkey, Tansu Çiller. Reportedly, Çiller even paid up front an undisclosed sum to Tamraz so that he could argue the case for the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline to President Clinton, whom Tamraz claimed was a 'friend' of his

**UĞUR AKINCI**

*Washington - Turkish Daily News*

■ The fates of the rich and not-so-famous sometimes become intertwined in ways that would even the most imaginative Hollywood scriptwriter would envy.

Think of Roger Tamraz — the international oil-man, banker, CIA informer and INTERPOL fugitive, who was arrested and released last month in Georgia.

Tamraz was once hired by the former prime minister of Turkey, Tansu

Çiller. Reportedly, Çiller even paid up front an undisclosed sum to Tamraz so that he could argue the case for the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline to President Clinton, whom Tamraz claimed was a "friend" of his.

But Clinton did not even know Tamraz and thus Tamraz had to go through the hoop to gain access to the White House. On four occasions he managed to do so, only after contributing \$177,000 to the president's election campaign chest. All that is now a part of a more general Congressional investigation on campaign finance abuses.

To go back to our story — the National Security Council rang a loud alarm bell and cut off Tamraz's access.

They said Tamraz's plans were not realistic. At that point, Tamraz, through the Democratic National Committee, contacted his old pals at the CIA. Couldn't the "Company" perhaps prepare a new and improved report on him and send it to NSC to clear the shadow hanging over his name?

**Enter: 'Bob'**

The identity of Tamraz's CIA contact was a mystery up till now. Washington Post's veteran writer Jim Hoagland, who has been lambasting the CIA without mercy for its Iraq fiasco over the last couple of months, half-revealed who Tamraz's CIA buddy was — he was "Bob."

"Bob" was the nickname for "the agent in charge of the failed military campaign in northern Iraq, agency sources tell me," wrote the Pulitzer-prize winning Hoagland, whose sources are usually a cut above the rest.

"Having sailed through a perfunctory lie detector test on his role in Iraq and been put back to work, Bob finds his career at risk today not for his work on coup plots [against Saddam Hussein] but for his role in dialing for campaign dollars," Hoagland wrote on June 24. "Welcome to Clintonian Washington, Bob," he concluded.

Or he could have concluded the way traditional Turkish tales start: "Once there was, and once there wasn't."

Turkish Daily News SATURDAY, JULY 26, 1997

# PUK's busy schedule

**Talabani visits Washington next week**

Senior PUK official said to be visiting Abdullah Öcalan

*Ankara - Turkish Daily News*

■ Jalal Talabani, head of the northern Iraqi Kurdish group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), will visit the U.S. capital next week,

Shazad Saib, the PUK's representative in Ankara, told the Turkish Daily News on Friday.

Talabani is expected to discuss the Ankara process, the U.S.-Britain-Turkey sponsored peace efforts for N. Iraq, with U.S. officials.

The PUK has had concerns about the process for some time, claiming that Turkey was set to abandon its impartial position, especially after the recent cross-border operation of the Turkish army into northern Iraq.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry and the General Staff have said that the operation in northern Iraq

was launched at the request of Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani.

More than 50,000 Turkish soldiers participated in the operation in an area of northern Iraq controlled by the Barzani-led Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Most of the troops have reportedly been withdrawn from the region.

**PUK official said to be visiting Öcalan**

Meanwhile, reliable sources told TDN that a senior member of the PUK is currently paying a visit to the head of the outlawed Kurdistan

Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan. PUK official Saib, however, denied the reports. "We have no contacts with the PKK," he said.

In a related incident, Panayotis Sguridis, the deputy head of the Greek parliament reportedly met secretly with the PKK in Greek Cypriot territory, according to the Anatolia news agency on Friday.

The report said that approximately 40 separatists arrived in Greek Cyprus to continue on to Athens.

SUNDAY, JULY 27, 1997

*Turkish Daily News*

# US Congressmen plan to push for release of Zana

A letter to President Bill Clinton is signed by 100 House members

*Washington- Turkish Daily News*

■ One hundred members of the U.S. House of Representatives have agreed to sign a letter to President Bill Clinton urging him "to raise [Leyla] Zana's case with the Turkish authorities at the highest level and seek her immediate and unconditional release" from prison in Turkey, according to the American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN).



Leyla Zana

The U.S. House has 435 members. Zana, a former member of the Turkish Parliament, was tried at a Turkish court and found guilty of treason in 1994. She is currently serving a 15-year prison term.

Some of the House members that circulated the letter and urged their colleagues to sign on have spoken out frequently in the past against Turkey on a variety of issues, like John Porter (R) of Illinois, and Frank Wolf (R) of Virginia. Elizabeth Furse (D) of Oregon and Esteban Torres (D) of California are the other anti-Turkish members who sponsored the effort.

**The AKIN group**

AKIN is a Washington-based Kurdish advocacy group which is widely believed by Turkish observers to be just a front for the outlawed PKK.

The PKK is "a vicious terrorist organization," according to the U.S. State Department, which is since 1984 fighting the Turkish state for the long-term goal of an independent Kurdish state to be carved out of Turkish southeast.

PKK is banned as a terrorist organization in many European countries, including Germany and France.

AKIN denies any organic relationship between itself and the PKK although AKIN members do not attempt to hide their sympathies for the PKK's cause.

When AKIN's director Kani Xulam was arrested by U.S. federal officials last year on federal charges of passport fraud, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was quoted in a Kurdish publication published in Germany as saying that "with Xulam's arrest they pulled off just one strand of hair from our head."

# US to sell Turkey arms worth \$75 m to equip frigates

Pentagon sends notification to Congress; four Sea Hawks may also be transferred soon

**UĞUR AKINCI**  
*Washington- Turkish Daily News*

■ The complimentary gestures from Washington to Yılmaz government that started with the release of three frigates and removal of Turkey from scope of ILSA (Iran Libya



SUNDAY, JULY 27, 1997

*Turkish Daily News*

Sanctions Act) sanctions continued on Friday with another expected positive development in Turkish-U.S. military assistance program.

Pentagon on Thursday sent the necessary notification to the Congress to sell Turkey \$75 million worth of ammunition and related equipment package to equip the three decommissioned Perry class frigates that will be transferred to Turkey.

And that's not all: Sea Hawk helicopters seem to be on their way to Turkey as well. Last year's frustrating freeze on military transfers is thawing rapidly in the aftermath of Islamist Erbakan government's resignation and the Turkish-Greek "declaration of principles" in Madrid.

The frigates became an object of controversy for the last two years when House International and Senate Foreign Relations committees raised objections to the transfer of these frigates to Turkey, upon intense pressures exerted by anti-Turkish ethnic lobbies and some human rights advocacy organizations. One of the frigates will be given on a grant basis. The other two will be leased on a long-term basis.

The crucial members of the Congress, Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D) of Maryland and Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R) of New York have lifted their objections to the transfer last Thursday. Greece will now also be able to receive three Adams class destroyers which Sen. Jesse Helms, chairman of the Foreign Relations committee, linked to the delivery of the Turkish frigates.

#### The list

U.S. Department of Defense listed the contents of the \$75 million arms package as follows: 1) 300 rounds of 40 mm high explosives; 2) 24,000 rounds of 20 mm ammunition; 3) shipyard/port support services and post transfer activities relating to "hot ship" and "cold ship" turnover of three PERRY class frigates from the U.S. Navy; 4) U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel support services; 5) personnel training and training equipment, maintenance, repair and calibration services for shipboard equipment; 6) publications and technical data/drawings; 7) support equipment; 8) spare and repair parts, and 9) "other elements of logistics support necessary to prepare the three PERRY class frigates for transfer to Turkey in a "Safe

to Steam" condition with all combat systems in an operational status."

Turkey has already received eight Knox class frigates in 1993 and 1994.

"Turkey will have no difficulty absorbing these weapons and equipment into its naval forces," a Pentagon press statement said. "There are no offset agreements proposed in connection with this sale."

"The U.S. government and contractor technical and logistics in-country personnel requirements will be determined following consultations with representatives of the Turkish navy," Pentagon said.

#### Sea Hawks

A Pentagon official has also confirmed for TDN that the State Department also sent on Wednesday the required notification to the Congress for the transfer of four Sea Hawk navy helicopters to Turkey.

#### Why different notifications?

"Notification" is a statement of approval prepared by the relevant U.S. departments allowing the U.S. Congress to put their own stamp of approval on the arms transfers in question. Depending on the nature of the sales in question, the notification is sometimes prepared directly by Pentagon and sometimes by the State Department. A Pentagon official explained to TDN that if the arm sales in question is "commercial" in nature, then State Department's Export Licensing Bureau prepares the notification, with Pentagon's approval.

If, however, it is a "government-to-government" sale, then the notification is prepared by Pentagon, with the State Department's approval. The \$75 million arms package in question, for example, is classified as a "government-to-government" sale.

Since Sea Hawks, like the denied Super Cobras, count as a "commercial" sale, its notification was prepared by the State Department, with Pentagon's approval. There was no significant opposition to the Sea Hawks, the Pentagon official explained, because it did not draw the ire of human rights advocates.

"The main opposition to the Super Cobras stemmed from the claim that they could be used in the Southeast and northern Iraq against Kurdish civilians. That's what the opponents of the sale argued," the official said. "But the Sea Hawks are naval helicopters. And it is not financially practical to modify them for the southeast."

## Think tank: 'Turkey could help Israel launch strikes against Syria and Iran'

Turkish Daily News

MONDAY, JULY 28, 1997



UĞUR AKINCI  
Washington- Turkish Daily News

■A military strategic analysis issued by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy detailed the possible repercussions of the military cooperation agreement signed between Turkey and Israel in February and August 1996. The possibilities mentioned are not the kind that will gladden many hearts in Tehran and Damascus.

The Policy Watch paper on Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation penned by military analyst Michael Eisenstadt said Turkish cooperation may enable Israeli jets to launch strikes against Iranian nonconventional targets near Tehran, as well as create serious difficulties for Syria on land, sea and air in case of a war over the Golan Heights.

#### Dimensions of cooperation

Eisenstadt said the Turkish-Israeli military cooperation agreement, although its exact contents are still a secret, consisted of "protocols

regarding officer exchanges, visits by military delegations, naval port calls, access to training areas, joint air and naval training, cooperation in the areas of counter-terrorism and border security, and defense industrial cooperation. In addition, Israel and Turkey are believed to have strengthened longstanding intelligence ties."

### Striking Iran

After mentioning the frequently reported Israeli-Turkish cooperation on upgrading Turkish Phantom F-4s and Popeye missiles, etc., Eisenstadt explained the ways in which Turkey may be helping the Israeli Air Force get ready for deep strikes into Iran:

"The air force training exchange agreement calls for Israeli aircraft to train in Turkey four times a year. During the first visit, in April of last year, eight Israeli F-16 fighters spent a week at Akinci air base near Ankara. Such visits are mutually beneficial. They enable the Israelis to gain experience flying long-range missions over mountainous areas (a skill that would be necessary for missions over Iran), and provide greater opportunities for overland training than are available in a small country like Israel. This enables pilots to refine their competitive skills, since it is much harder for pilots to visually identify enemy aircraft over land than over water.

"Israel has reportedly established intelligence listening posts (along the Turkish-Iran border), and Turkish cooperation would greatly facilitate Israeli air strikes on Iran's nonconventional weapons infrastructure, much of which is located near Tehran. (Israeli aircraft could stage from and/or refuel over Turkey, greatly increasing their striking range)," Eisenstadt said.

### Intelligence links

Israel and Turkey were also previously reported to share intelligence data concerning their mutual adversaries, like Syria. "Israel is also reportedly helping Turkey to secure its border against Kurdish PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] terrorists operating from bases in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, drawing on its own experience in securing its border against terrorists in South Lebanon."

### Hitting Syria

The paper said Syria has much to consider now in case of a future war.

"Though neither agreement signed thus far is believed to contain provisions for joint contingency planning or war-fighting, the possibility that Turkey could assist Israel in wartime is a complicating factor Syria has to consider. In the future, President Assad will have to face the possibility of fighting Israel in the Bekaa and/or the Golan, while looking over his shoulder toward Turkey."

Turkey does not have to participate in a war to help Israel. The two or three divisions located near Homs and Aleppo that are earmarked to reinforce the Bekaa

and Golan in wartime, Eisenstadt said. Just by tying up those Syrian troops in north, like it did Iraqi troops during Gulf War, Turkey can again help Israel, Eisenstadt said.

### Air help

Turkey could also help the Israeli Air Force in war against Syria:

"In the air, Turkey could allow damaged Israeli aircraft to land at Turkish air bases and permit Israeli combat search-and-rescue crews trained to snatch downed pilots to operate from its soil. This would allow the Israeli Air Force to be more aggressive and take greater risks when attacking targets in northern Syria."

"It could likewise allow Israeli attack helicopters, aircraft, and commandos hunting Syrian Scud Missile launchers in northern and central Syria to operate from Turkish staging areas, and it could allow Israel to use the series of air bases that run parallel to its border with Syria for combat missions, raising the possibility of attacks against Syria by way of its 'weak underbelly.' This could compel Syria to reorganize its air defenses — oriented primarily to deal with Israeli threats from the southwest or west — to enhance coverage of the north of the country. Thickening air defense coverage in the north will mean thinning coverage of the center and southwest of the country."

"For its part, Turkey might exploit the opportunity offered by a war to launch air strikes on PKK targets in Syria," he added.

### Not realistic now

The Washington institute analysis concluded that such scenarios, although not realistic currently, still will have a psychological impact on the adversaries in the region. Turkey could still help Israel through passive support and intelligence sharing, and providing refuge for damaged Israeli aircraft and warships, for example.

"(Current) political realities rule out Israeli aircraft and warships operating from Turkish territory in wartime. Turkey would gain little by openly supporting the Israeli war effort, which would make Turkey a target for Syrian retribution (i.e. more terrorism) and Arab political censure. Turkey is, therefore, more likely to quietly render assistance to the Israeli war effort, providing intelligence, missile early-warning data, and refuge for damaged Israeli aircraft or warships. In this way, it will help Israel punish a troublesome neighbor and gain the good will of Israeli political and military leaders without incurring major risks."

"To the degree that this enhances Israeli (and Turkish) deterrence, it will have a tangible impact on the balance of forces in the region, even if current political and military realities preclude a formal alliance between the two countries," the analysis concluded.

# U.S. Won't Oppose Trans-Iran Pipeline

## \$1.6 Billion Gas Project Would Ease Tehran's Economic Isolation

By Dan Morgan  
and David B. Ottaway  
*Washington Post Service*

WASHINGTON — The Clinton administration has decided not to oppose a \$1.6 billion pipeline that would carry huge quantities of Central Asian natural gas across Iran, in the first significant easing of Washington's economic isolation of the Tehran government, according to U.S. officials and other sources.

The 3,200-kilometer (2,000-mile) pipeline project, now being undertaken with tacit U.S. acquiescence, would mark Iran's first participation in a major international energy project since its 1979 Islamic revolution. That upheaval and the seizure of American hostages led to U.S. sanctions and a long international campaign by Washington against Iran's fundamentalist government for allegedly supporting terrorism.

The pipeline would carry gas from Turkmenistan on the eastern side of the Caspian Sea across a 1,200-kilometer stretch of northern Iran to energy-needy Turkey and, eventually, to Europe.

One official said President Bill Clinton's administration had not endorsed the pipeline but had concluded that such a project did not technically violate America's 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. The law bars investments of more than \$40 million in the development of Iran's energy sector but does not address the issue of pipelines carrying another country's gas or oil across Iran, the official said.

Iran would receive transit fees for allowing the gas to flow across its territory, and sources indicate the pipeline eventually might also transport Iranian gas.

In part, the U.S. decision to acquiesce in the pipeline plan reflects the heightened priority that Washington now is giving to helping the independent former Soviet states of Central Asia assert their independence from Russia.

The Caspian Sea region holds the world's largest oil and gas reserves outside the Gulf, but Moscow historically has looked on these resources as a long-term reserve for its own needs.

Russia has been the traditional market for Turkmenistan's gas reserves, the world's third-largest. For that reason, a trans-Iranian pipeline would advance a major goal of U.S. policy, to provide multiple outlets for Caspian energy reserves that do not run across Russian territory, U.S. officials said. American officials made it clear they would prefer non-Iranian routes for Turkmen gas, such as a pipeline under the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and then west to Turkey. However, an official said, under the 1996 sanctions law, "we don't have the tools to do anything about a trans-Iranian line."

Some former and current U.S. foreign-policy officials also contend that acquiescence in the pipeline serves as a gesture of reconciliation toward Iran after its recent election of a relatively moderate president.

State Department officials testifying before Congress last week took a firm stance against Western investment in Iran's domestic oil and gas industry, citing their success in blocking foreign investment in 11 Iranian projects. Non-U.S. companies that violate the restriction can be blocked from doing business in the United States, a provision that has caused friction between the United States and its European allies.

Several European energy companies stand to benefit directly from construction of the pipeline. Three European companies — Italy's Snamprogetti, Gaz de France and Royal Dutch/Shell — hope to form a consortium to build it, except for the portion in Iran, Turkey's energy minister said this summer. Iran has agreed to finance and build the portion of the

pipeline passing through its territory.

Industry analysts also expect other companies such as Mobil Corp., which has a production-sharing contract in Turkmenistan, to profit from any opening of that landlocked country. But any perceived overtures to Iran risk stirring passions in Congress, with U.S. investigators now looking into a possible link between Iran and the bombing of a U.S. military compound in Saudi Arabia that caused the deaths of 19 American servicemen last year.

The administration's acceptance of the trans-Iranian pipeline "means there is some easing in our policy toward Iran," said Zalmay Khalilzad, director of strategic studies at Rand Corp. and a former Reagan administration foreign-policy official. "The question is, can you stop at this? Will it just lead to more pressure to allow Iranian gas to go to Turkey, too?"

Turkey signed an agreement in May to purchase Turkmen gas after the Clinton administration voiced strong objections to a proposed \$23 billion Turkish-Iranian gas deal. U.S. officials say Ankara's agreement with Turkmenistan will ensure Turkey's reliance on Turkmen rather than Iranian gas.

But Marc Grossman, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, said in a recent speech to an energy conference in Istanbul that Turkish officials had said that the pipeline would carry Turkmen gas "for the first few years." The phrasing suggested it may eventually transport Iranian gas, which is currently blocked from reaching Turkey or Western markets, partly because of U.S. sanctions.

An oil industry source said the deal involved "a swap of gas," an arrangement in which Turkmenistan would pump its supplies into the Iranian pipeline network and Iran would send an equal amount on to Turkey.



# Rich or Poor, Kurds in Turkey Are Torn by Age-Old Identity Struggle

By Stephen Kinzer  
*New York Times Service*

VAN, Turkey — More than 1,600 kilometers separate a defiant peasant named Baran, who lives in a refugee's hovel outside Van, in eastern Turkey, from a polished and successful Istanbul jeweler named Cemal.

The gap in perception and experience is even wider. All they have in common is that they are Kurds in Turkey.

"I am a Kurd but what difference does that make?" asked Cemal as he sat behind a glass case full of gold bracelets and earrings. "I'm Turkish. I love Turkey. Never once have I had a problem because I happen to have Kurdish blood. Everyone is equal in this country."

To Baran, who fled his ancestral village rather than be pressed into the pro-government village guards, things look very different.

"My identity as a Kurd is the most precious thing I have," he said as his son listened solemnly. "If I give up that identity, I can do anything in this country, even become president."

"But no matter what they do to me, I will never abandon a hundred generations of tradition in my family. I was born a Kurd, and nothing can ever make me a Turk."

These two men, both of whom asked to be identified only by their first names, represent the twin paradigms of Kurdish life in Turkey. Until their world views can somehow be reconciled, the government will find it all but impossible to resolve one of the world's most bitter and intractable ethnic conflicts.

It is a conflict that has produced more than a dozen rebellions over the last 80 years, cost untold amounts of blood and treasure and polarized opinion here and abroad. The current revolt, led for the last 13 years by the Kurdistan Workers Party, has taken more than 20,000 lives, mostly in eastern Turkey.

At a recent meeting in Van, about 80 kilometers (50 miles) west of Iran, senior Turkish military and intelligence

officers agreed that the conflict cannot be resolved militarily. Like countless others who have pondered the problem, they failed to find a formula under which Turks and Kurds could live together without fighting.

The Kurdish issue is so divisive that there is even debate about how many Kurds live in Turkey. A leading demographer, Cem Behar, recently estimated that as many as 10 million people speak Kurdish in a country with a total population of 63 million. Several million more Kurds live in Iran, Iraq, Syria and other nearby countries.

The decades of revolts since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 have made Turkish authorities suspicious of nearly all Kurdish political, social and cultural movements. In their view, the line separating guerrillas from peaceful intellectuals and politicians often blurs.

As recently as 1981, a member of Parliament was sentenced to three years for asserting: "There are Kurds in Turkey. I am a Kurd." Since then — and especially after the late President Turgut Ozal broke a long taboo by saying he was partly Kurdish — laws have been eased. It is no longer illegal to speak Kurdish in public or to play Kurdish music.

Turkish officials often assert that Kurds enjoy the same rights as other citizens. Thousands of Kurds are successful in many fields, and by some estimates more than a fourth of the members of Parliament are of Kurdish extraction. This makes it difficult to argue that Kurds suffer discrimination.

Kurdish leaders, however, say the path to success is open only to assimilated Kurds. The government has strongly resisted Kurdish demands for cultural and political concessions. President Suleyman Demirel spoke for many Turks when he warned that such concessions would lead to "compromise after compromise with no end."

The Turkish Republic was founded after a rebellion against the terms of the

1920 Treaty of Sevres, in France, under which most of what is now Turkey was to be divided among European powers. That trauma has bequeathed to Turks a "Sevres syndrome," which Kemal Kirisci, author of a study on the Kurdish problem, described as "the deep belief that the outside world is always trying to take the country away from you."

Many Turks fear that giving autonomy to Kurds would lead to demands for independence, and that their country would split apart like Yugoslavia.

Efforts to forge a political party to speak for the Kurds have failed several times. Opponents of Kurdish nationalism, fearing such a party would serve as a wedge for separatists, have used various tactics to assure that none survive for long.

The People's Democracy Party, which is now a principal civilian voice of Kurdish nationalism, was subjected to fierce criticism after someone tore down the Turkish flag at its 1996 convention and replaced it with a guerrilla banner.

Criminal charges were filed against party leaders, and 31 of them were convicted in June of subversion and sentenced to terms of up to six years.


The most famous Kurdish prisoner in Turkey is Leyla Zana, who was among eight members of Parliament convicted in 1994 on charges of "separatist speech" and supporting terrorism.

In 1991, a group of Kurds decided to set up a foundation to promote Kurdish culture, and last year it was finally given legal status as the Kurdish Cultural and Research Foundation.

In May, it began offering Kurdish language courses, but the courses were quickly shut down by the police. The chairman of the foundation, Yilmaz Camlibel, has been notified that criminal charges will be filed against him.

"If you speak Kurdish, you become Kurdish," he said. "Maybe that is what they are afraid of. They don't mind allowing courses in any other language, even Japanese but when we want to learn our language, they see it as a threat."

# Dark forces, confused issues, sanguine predictions



'The military apparently have never considered that one reason why politicians have become so irresponsible is because the army commanders, like overbearing parents, have refused to allow them ultimate responsibility for their actions'

**A**fter a brief and exhilarating gallop over the centuries of steppes and Seljuks, an enjoyable canter among the Ottomans and a swift trot through the Atatürk years, *Turkey Unveiled* reins in as it approaches the sixties and thereafter gives the impression of negotiating an obstacle course. Not that it negotiates it badly, but it's a tall order to give a coherent account of the confusion of issues and profusion of political groupings characteristic of modern Turkey. If the book were aimed at the specialist, it might have been less concerned to introduce all the parties and to outline all the major areas of debate, but the target is the general reader and no previous knowledge is therefore assumed. The result, it must be admitted, is somewhat tortuous, with the narrative continually disturbed by the need to insert discussions of womens' rights, the Alevi minority, the oil pipeline question, the rise of the Islamists, the complexities of the situation in northern Iraq, a short history of Cyprus and so on. To their credit, the authors have omitted little of importance, and in the opinion of this reviewer, *"Turkey Unveiled"* is the best available general account of the history and politics of postwar Turkey, strongly recommended as an informed and balanced account of what's been going on here in recent decades.

## Where have all the principles gone?

Nicole and Hugh Pope (the latter of whom appeared, engagingly, in the pages of the Turkish Daily News on the day of the book's launch as Huge Pope) have interviewed practically everyone of note — Turgut Özal, Kenan Evren, Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Alparslan Türkeş, Necmettin Erbakan, Tansu Çiller, Apo Öcalan, Massoud Barzani, Doğan Güreş, Yaşar Kemal and Orhan Pamuk, to name but a few — and clearly know their way around the tangled skeins of Turkish political life. It therefore comes as something of a surprise that none of these characters, with the partial exception of Özal, achieve much individual stature in the pages of the book. At first this seemed like a weakness, a lack of anecdote, an objectivity tending to grayness, but it may in fact be a true reflection of the nature of contemporary Turkish politics, with the dead weight of procedural complexity and parliamentary arithmetic, the jealousies and the backstabbing, confining and defining political debate. In a rare moment of candour, the Popes write in their conclusion: "By the late 1990s, all sense of principle and moral standards had left Turkish politics," and accuse recent Turkish leaders of "long-term political irresponsibility."

Interestingly, Kenan Evren receives sympathetic treatment from the authors. "His critics have cast him as an ogre," they write, but give it as their opinion that

"many of the successes, as well as the failures, of Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s are a memorial to the often underrated character of this typical Turkish army officer." Turgut Özal, who in a sense rode to power on the general's shoulders, was, by comparison, "a showy civilian."

"...Turgut Özal was to take most of the international credit for building the so-called Turkish economic miracle of the 1980s. But the fact remains that the ground was cleared and guarded by Evren, the 'peasant pasha', plodding president and anti-terrorism crusader who could boast in his diary that he had kept the same formica dining table for twenty years..."

The Popes are not alone among informed foreign observers, to evince a cautious admiration for the Turkish military, "the single institution most trusted by the Turk in the street." "Even the oppressed Turkish Kurds in the south-east distinguish clearly between the often scandalous behaviour of the police and disciplined units of soldiers," they point out. But they are also aware that the continuing power of the military-dominated National Security Council is a threat to democracy in indirect as well as direct ways. "The military apparently have never considered that one reason why politicians have become so irresponsible is because the army commanders, like overbearing parents, have refused to allow them ultimate responsibility for their actions."

## Which dark forces?

Nicole and Hugh Pope clearly feel a great deal of affection for Turkey. They like its "rich complexity," the "amazing adventure of change," the compassion, the humour, the "sense of the tragic" and, like other longtime foreign residents, they are impatient of the glib criticism fired at Turkey from points west. This puts them in the position, sometimes, of acting as apologists for things they would probably rather not countenance. They remind us, quite properly, that aspects of Turkish life

"overlap with the rougher practices of (Turkey's) Middle Eastern neighbors," and that there are still "dark, sometimes murderous elements at work who believe in imposing their ideologies on the country by force." Ho, hum. One wonders which elements exactly.


Not the military, obviously, and not apparently the Islamists, at least in their official manifestations. Erbakan is "wily and opportunistic" and "a despotic leader" within his party, but there is considerable sympathy for the achievements of the grassroots organizations which try to "give dignity to those left behind by Turkey's economic boom," and of the Welfare-controlled municipalities.

Particular attention is drawn to the "intellectually advanced" women activists within the Welfare Party who combine religious belief with a sincere compassion for the downtrodden and voiceless. The emergence of the Welfare Party (RP) as the first party of Turkey is seen by the authors of *Turkey Unveiled* not as an upsurge of fundamentalist extremism, but as resulting from the weakness and corruption of the other parties as well as from an inevitable reaction to the severity of the Kemalist secularist ideal. The Popes note, however, that the RP stopped short of condemning the Sivas massacre of July, 1993 and wonder whether the party under Erbakan will manage to control its less moderate elements.

#### One-sided attitudes

No doubt, the "dark forces" are to be sought among the extreme ultranationalists (the "sinister" Grey Wolves), among the many mafias and the "state gangs," among pro-Hezbollah activists, but "*Turkey Unveiled*" understandably avoids unveiling such matters. It is also judicious in its coverage of the Kurdish issue, but whatever else could it be? Öcalan collects a series of uncompromising judgements. Barzani compared him to Idi Amin, Barzani's nephew referred to him as "totally crazy" and Talabani called him "a madman." In an interview with *Hürriyet* newspaper, Öcalan for his part likened himself to Jesus Christ. Many Turkish Kurds of the Southeast began worshipping him as a hero, but the Popes point out that this was due to "respect for a national leader, admiration for an outlaw who had successfully challenged the Turkish oppressors and awe for a man who did not hesitate to eliminate subordinates or to order the killing of Turkish Kurd opponents and their wives and children."

It comes as something of a surprise that none of the main characters, with the partial



"Turkey Unveiled," by Nicole and Hugh Pope, published by John Murray (London, 1997).

Jacket photograph by Ara Güler.

exception of Özal, achieve much individual stature in the pages of the book. At first this seemed like a weakness, a lack of anecdote, an objectivity tending to grayness, but it may in fact be a true reflection of the nature of contemporary Turkish politics, with the dead weight of procedural

complexity and parliamentary arithmetic, the jealousies and the backstabbing, confining and defining political debate

Madame Mitterrand comes in for some implied criticism for unleashing expectations that neither she nor anyone else could satisfy, and for being content with a very one-sided attitude toward a complex issue. "If she wanted a fresh view, she

chose not to look for it," the authors tell us and, more tellingly, report the episode in which Mme. Mitterrand's own translator was so angered by her "exclusively nationalist perspective" that an argument blew up in which he was asked to leave. "Madame Mitterrand has lit a light for us," said one Kurdish writer, but although they do not directly say so, one suspects that the Popes think it might have been better if she had not. After all, Öcalan himself was saying a year later that "there is no question of separating from Turkey." The writer who spoke of Mme. Mitterrand's light, incidentally, was "shot dead in September 1992 at the age of 76, probably by a state-tolerated death squad."

As usual, the origins of the conflict in the Southeast are sought historically — in the international scheming of the first decades of this century, in the Kurdish rebellions during the first years of the republic and in the brutality with which they were suppressed, as well as in nervously shortsighted policies of successive Turkish governments almost ever since. The Popes emphasize that the great majority of Turkish Kurds neither live in the Southeast nor wish to see a separate Kurdish state. This is undeniably true, and should be properly appreciated by outsiders taking an interest in the Kurds' predicament, yet the reader of *Turkey Unveiled* cannot but be aware of the quandary faced by writers of a liberal disposition who live and work in Turkey when dealing with the Southeast. No intelligent observer can fail to be horrified at the crassness of certain official policies, yet only those making no pretence of impartiality or those ignorant of local conditions and regional history can see the matter in black and white. "Turkish Kurds have been oppressed by their own tribal society, by their tribal lords, by their poverty," the Popes rightly point out.

#### **Collective consciousness**

For this intractable issue, and for other almost equally knotty problems, the authors of *Turkey Unveiled* appear to believe, or at least to hope, that a broadly-based economy, an increasingly well-educated and politically active citizenry and the ever-strengthening ties between Turkey and the wider world will keep the country on the right track. "Whatever reactionary outrages the politicians, the police and the military may inflict on Turkey — including the ever-present possibility of further military interventions — there is little they can do to stop the people's convergence with the rest of the world," the Popes write in their concluding paragraph. They stress the economic enterprise showed by Turkish business

circles in Central Asia, in Russia and elsewhere, the mushrooming of Turkish non-governmental organizations concerned with such issues as education and the environment, and the increasing numbers of Turks receiving training and imbibing ideas in the West. "The Turkish population," they say, "... is learning to speak up."

Let's hope they're right. Yet one wonders whether the major division within the country will prove to be not that between the affluent west and the impoverished east but between the sectors of the population able and willing to jump on the various bandwagons headed for a Western-style prosperity and those who, for one reason or another, are unable to do so. The accumulation of conspicuous wealth seems to accelerate year by year and cases of extreme or relative poverty show few signs of declining.

"We used to have a collective consciousness," the Popes quote Korkut Özal as saying. "We lost it in the Kemalist revolution." And the writer Murat Belge claims that "since military discipline replaced personal standards, there is no morality left. Society lacks a social project for the future."

Individuals only have private projects." The first modern factory in the Kyrgyz Republic, the Popes tell us, was a Coca-Cola bottling plant financed and built by a Turkish businessman. This "symbolized all that the Turks had shown they could do best in the east." No doubt it does, but among those who will wish to applaud the enterprise, there will be others who will find a bitterish irony in the tale. If only it could have been something other than Coca-Cola!

**"Whatever reactionary outrages the politicians, the police and the military may inflict on Turkey — including the ever-present possibility of further military interventions — there is little they can do to stop the people's convergence with the rest of the world"**

#### **A big heart and a big stomach**

If there is a hero of *Turkey Unveiled* it is probably Turgut Özal. It's true that the authors readily admit Özal's failings and failures, and their summing-up is cautious. "The benefits have probably outweighed these failings," they write. If this

sounds like damning with faint praise, the chapter that precedes the conclusion suggests otherwise. The opening up and streamlining of the economy, the attempts at reforming (or bypassing) an impossibly cumbersome bureaucracy, the housing program, the "astonishing success in converting the Turks into a thoroughly business-minded people," tax reform, the freeing of foreign travel — all these are roundly applauded.

And there is evidence that the Popes, who interviewed Özal in 1989 and twice during the following year, found him a colorful and attractive personality. Certainly he comes alive in these pages much more vividly than Demirel or Ecevit. He liked driving fast in fast cars with arabesk music blaring from the stereo. "Come on Semra," he was once overheard saying to his wife as they climbed aboard their BMW, "stick on a cassette and let's have some fun." He enjoyed food and Courvoisier brandy and bold moves that surprised even his closest associates. When he applied for Turkish membership of the European Union in 1987, it was done, the Popes tell us, against the advice of almost every ambassador in Ankara. "In Turkey," Özal said, "a politician should have a big heart, and an even bigger stomach to absorb the punches."

Perhaps a few more years are needed before a fair assessment of the "Özal revolution" can be made. Those who remember the grim chaos of the late 1970s tend to be indulgent toward Özal, and those who see in the free market economy the panacea for all ills tend to forgive the man his excesses and his mistakes. *Turkey Unveiled* accuses him of "obstinacy, egotism and short-sightedness" as he "clung to office," and describes him as being "saved" by the Gulf Crisis — and by his typically rapid and robust reaction to it — yet you get a clear sense that the authors view Özal's contribution as the most invigorating since Atatürk, and something more than this as well. There are a number of references in the book to the "heavy burden" of Atatürk's "controversial legacy," to the idea that although Atatürk's policies may have been appropriate for the '20s and '30s, Kemalism itself has become somehow fossilized, too rigidly secularist.

The implication is that the Turkey of the '80s needed Özal, or someone like him, to blow away some cobwebs and unloose some shackles. But there were casualties of the Özal revolution too, and one wonders how far "principles and moral standards" in political life were among them.

## Die türkischen Medien unter staatlichem Druck

### Reformversprechen der neuen Regierung

In keinem Land der Welt sind mehr Journalisten in Haft als in der Türkei. Türkische Medienleute sind zudem häufig das Ziel von polizeilicher Gewalt. Die neue Regierung hat eine begrenzte Amnestie für inhaftierte Redaktoren beschlossen und den Schutz der Pressefreiheit versprochen. Solange die Machthaber aber nicht bereit sind, Tabuthemen diskutieren zu lassen, kann von Meinungsfreiheit keine Rede sein.

A. R. Ankara, im Juli

Die Situation der türkischen Presse ist voller Widersprüche. Auf der einen Seite besitzt das Land eine reichhaltige Medienlandschaft – das Angebot der Kioske an Zeitungen und bunten Magazinen ist üppig, auf der nationaler Ebene konkurrieren 16 Fernsehstationen und 35 Radiosender miteinander, und die türkischen Journalisten geniessen Freiräume in der Berichterstattung, von denen ihre Kollegen in den östlichen Nachbarländern nur träumen können. Auf der anderen Seite stellt die Türkei regelmässig traurige Rekorde auf, wenn es um die Zahl der eingekerkerten Journalisten oder um jene der behördlich geschlossenen Medienbetriebe geht. Laut dem in New York ansässigen Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) waren in der Türkei zu Jahresbeginn 78 Journalisten in Haft. Dies sind mehr als in Äthiopien, China, Kuwait, Nigeria und Burma zusammen, die in der CPJ-Rangliste die nächsten Plätze einnehmen. Die Organisation ist der Ansicht, dass die häufige Kriminalisierung von Medienleuten den Anspruch der Türkei verspotte, ein demokratischer Staat zu sein. Für ein Land, das die Aufnahme in die EU fordert, ist diese Bilanz in der Tat beschämend.

#### Zunehmende Repression

Betroffen sind in erster Linie Reporter, Redaktoren und Kolumnisten prokurdischer und extrem linker Zeitungen. Die zahlreichen Gesetzestexte, die ein Vorgehen gegen unbequeme Autoren ermöglichen, werden dazu missbraucht, um alle Einschätzungen über den Krieg in den südost-türkischen Kurdengebieten, die nicht der offiziellen Linie entsprechen, als Propaganda für die PKK-Rebellen, als Gefährdung der nationalen Einheit oder als Aufruf zum Rassenhass zu klassifizieren. Die Justiz verwendet dieses Arsenal – vor allem das Antiterrorgesetz von 1991 und Artikel 312 des Strafgesetzbuches – zunehmend auch gegen die etablierten, aufgestärkten Medien. Seit Anfang Juli stehen beispielsweise der Eigentümer, ein Redaktor und ein Korrespondent der liberalen Tageszeitung «Yeni Yüzyil» wegen Separatismuspropaganda und Unterstützung einer illegalen Gruppe unter Anklage, weil sie ein Interview mit einem angeblichen Mitglied einer bewaffneten islamistischen Organisation veröffentlicht hatten. Der Zeitung droht die Schliessung.

Fast gleichzeitig wurde ein Karikaturist wegen Beleidigung des Militärs zu einer Haftstrafe von elf Monaten verurteilt, weil er in einem Cartoon die – seit dem Susurluk-Skandal vom letzten Herbst bestens belegten – Verbindungen zwischen Sicherheitskräften, rechtsextremen Verbrechern und kurdischen Paramilitärs aufs Korn genommen hatte. Ende Mai waren mindestens 43 Prozesse gegen Medienleute im Gang, wie die Organisation Reporters sans Frontières in ihrem neuesten Bericht (Turquie: Illusions perdues) schreibt.

#### Straflosigkeit im Mordfall Göktepe?

A. R. Eine Vorstellung von der Einäugigkeit der türkischen Justiz gibt der Fall des im Januar 1996 getöteten Journalisten Metin Göktepe. Göktepe, Reporter einer linken Tageszeitung, war bei der Berichterstattung über eine Demonstration zusammen mit Hunderten von Personen festgenommen und dann in Polizeigewahrsam zu Tode geprügelt worden. Die Affäre sorgte für grosses Aufsehen und führte zur Anklage gegen 48 Polizisten. Von ihnen stehen 11 unter Mordanklage. Bis zum heutigen Tag hat sich keiner der Polizisten vor Gericht verantworten müssen. Dies, obwohl in dem Prozess bereits 6 Anhörungen stattgefunden haben und obwohl der Richter – mit grosser Verspätung – gegen 5 Personen Haftbefehl erlassen hat. Anderthalb Jahre nach dem Tod Göktepes laufen die der Tat dringend Verdächtigen noch immer frei herum. Zur Verzögerungstaktik der Justiz gehört, dass der Prozessort «aus Sicherheitsgründen» zweimal in andere Städte verlegt wurde. Auf den Fall angesprochen, stellte Ministerpräsident Yılmaz den Prozessverlauf als fragwürdig hin. Andere Politiker sind nicht so aufgeschlossen. Justizminister Sungurlu gab sich in dieser Frage unwissend, und der Parlamentspräsident, Kalemli, glaubt nicht, dass im Fall Göktepe Fehler begangen wurden.

Straflosigkeit für die inzwischen vom Dienst suspendierten Polizisten wäre ein verheerendes Signal. Die Regierung, die sich sonst gern mit dem Hinweis auf die Unabhängigkeit der Gerichte als unzuständig erklärt, kann sich diesmal nicht aus der Verantwortung stehlen, denn es obliegt der Polizei, die Täter dingfest zu machen und dem Richter zuzuführen. Yılmaz hat letzte Woche dem Innenminister einen entsprechenden Auftrag erteilt. Am Donnerstag, sinnigerweise dem Tag der Presse, fand die bisher letzte Verhandlung statt. Die Anklagebank blieb einmal mehr unbesetzt.

Die im Juni abgetretene Regierung des Islamisten Erbakan hat in ihrer einjährigen Amtszeit nichts getan, um die Pressefreiheit zu stärken, im Gegenteil. Laut dem Vorsitzenden des türkischen Presserats, Oktay Eksi, hat sich die Situation unter Erbakan eindeutig verschlechtert. Türkische Journalisten des laizistischen Lagers werfen der früheren Regierung neben der Duldung von Gewaltakten gegen Verlage und Medienleute vor allem vor, eine Einschüchterungskampagne betrieben zu haben. In der Tat wusste sich die Regierung der immer neuen skandalträchtigen Enthüllungen nur mit dem Vorschlag zu einem neuen Pressegesetz zu erwehren, das unbequemen Kritikern einen Maulkorb anzulegen drohte.

#### Internationale Kritik

Vertreter von Organisationen, die sich für den

Schutz der Pressefreiheit engagieren, haben Mitte Juli die Türkei besucht und die neue Regierung von Ministerpräsident Yilmaz sowie andere wichtige politische Exponenten mit ihren Bedenken konfrontiert. Sie forderten unter anderem die Neubeurteilung der Fälle von inhaftierten Journalisten und die Aufhebung von Gesetzesnormen, auf Grund deren Medienleute verfolgt werden. Der Fall des früheren Chefredaktors der prokurdischen Tageszeitung «Özgür Gündem», Ocak Isik Yurtcu, ist in den letzten Monaten zum Symbol geworden für die unhaltbare Gerichtspraxis in der Türkei. Yurtcu verbüsst derzeit eine fast 16jährige Haftstrafe, weil er die Publikation von Artikeln erlaubte, die Kritik am Vorgehen gegen die kurdischen Rebellen übten. Von den 32 Verfahren, die gegen Yurtcu angestrengt wurden, sind einige noch im Gang, so dass sich seine Freiheitsstrafe verlängern könnte. «Niemand in der Welt ist je zu so vielen Jahren Gefängnis verurteilt worden für Artikel, die andere geschrieben haben», wird Yurtcu vom CPJ zitiert. Sein Fall ist keine Ausnahme. Die Reporters sans Frontières nennen das Beispiel des Anfang Jahr verhafteten Bülent Balta, der die unterdessen geschlossene «Özgür Gündem» während knapp zweier Wochen geleitet hatte. Die kurze Zeit reichte aus, um eine Lawine von elf Prozessen vor dem Staatssicherheitsgericht gegen ihn auszulösen, die bisher Haftstrafen von 46 Monaten zur Folge hatten.


Die Regierung Yilmaz räumt ein, dass die Lage der Journalisten verbessert werden muss. Wohl auch unter dem gewachsenen internationalen Druck hat sie rasch gehandelt und vergangene Woche eine Vorlage zuhanden des Parlaments verabschiedet, welche die Freilassung einiger Gefangener – die Rede ist von etwa acht – ermöglichen würde. Es handelt sich um Journalisten wie Yurtcu, die wegen ihrer Tätigkeit als verantwortliche Redaktoren und nicht wegen eigener Artikel belangt worden waren. Dieser Schritt ist zum Teil

begrüsst, zum Teil aber auch als ungenügend kritisiert worden. Geplant sind in dieser ersten Phase keine Gesetzesänderungen, sondern lediglich die bedingte Aufhebung von Haftstrafen sowie die Suspendierung von laufenden Prozessen. Machen sich die Redaktoren innerhalb von drei Jahren wieder des gleichen «Verbrechens» schuldig, wandern sie erneut ins Gefängnis. Die geplante Amnestie ist daher höchstens eine humanitäre Geste, aber keine echte Liberalisierung.

### Ein Dschungel von Strafnormen

Ob Yilmaz sein Versprechen einlösen kann, nach der Sommerpause die Revision medienfeindlicher Gesetzesparagrafen an die Hand zu nehmen, ist ungewiss. Nicht nur der berühmte Artikel 8 des Antiterrorgesetzes, der Propaganda gegen die Einheit des Staates unter Strafe stellt, sondern das gesamte Dickicht von angeblich rund 150 Normen, die zur Einschränkung der Pressefreiheit eingesetzt werden können, müsste gelichtet werden. Der Ministerpräsident deutete zudem die Notwendigkeit von Verfassungsänderungen an, die das Parlament nur mit Dreifünftelmehrheit beschliessen kann. Im Vordergrund dürfte hier Artikel 14 stehen, der unter anderem die territoriale Integrität des Staates höher gewichtet als die verfassungsmässigen Freiheitsrechte und damit ebenfalls gegen die Berichterstattung über kurdische Autonomieforderungen verwendet werden kann. Die Machtposition von Yilmaz' Minderheitsregierung ist prekär, und die Gefahr ist gross, dass sie selbst bei gutem Willen an den parlamentarischen Hürden scheitern wird.

Voraussetzung für ein Ende der Verhaftungen sind ohnehin nicht Gesetzesänderungen, sondern primär die Bereitschaft der türkischen Machthaber – die Armee eingeschlossen –, Tabuthemen diskutieren zu lassen und unbequeme Meinungsäusserungen nicht gleich als staatsfeindliche Akti-



Die prokurdische Zeitung «Özgür Gündem» ist nur eines von vielen türkischen Presseerzeugnissen, die unter staatlicher Verfolgung zu leiden hatten und schliesslich verboten wurden. (Bild Holger Burkhard)

vitäten abzustempeln. Die 1995 unter dem Druck der EU erfolgte Revision des Antiterrorgesetzes brachte zwar einigen Journalisten die Freiheit, änderte insgesamt aber nichts an der Repressionsmentalität. Auch die neue Regierung rechtfertigt Einschränkungen der Meinungsfreiheit allzu gern mit dem Hinweis auf das «Terrorproblem» im Südosten. Selbst sogenannte «liberale» Kabinettsmitglieder verstecken sich hinter dem Argument, die Öffentlichkeit sei gegen eine Liberalisierung, weil dadurch Terroristen Auftrieb erhalten könnten. Dabei findet in dieser Frage gar keine richtige öffentliche Debatte statt.

Manche Regierungsvertreter bestreiten zudem, dass es sich bei den Verhafteten nur um Journalisten handle. Doch selbst wenn unter diesen auch Verfasser von üblen Hetzartikeln sein sollten, rechtfertigt dies das Ausmass der gegenwärtigen Restriktionen nicht. Der Direktor des International Press Institute, Johann P. Fritz, plädiert für eine grössere Gelassenheit des Staates gegenüber Blättern mit extremen Inhalten, die ja meist nur eine geringe Reichweite hätten. Andere mit gewalttätigen separatistischen Bewegungen konfrontierte Staaten wie Grossbritannien, Frankreich oder Spanien hätten mit weniger Repression bessere Erfahrungen gemacht. Fritz verspricht sich zudem von einer Diskussion mit den Staatsanwälten über die allzu enge Auslegung der Ge-

setze mehr als von Anläufen zu Gesetzesreformen, die nur allzu leicht scheitern können.

### Folter und Einschüchterung

Die Verurteilung von Journalisten ist nur eine Facette des pressefeindlichen Klimas in der Türkei. Kritische Medienleute werden in Ausübung ihres Berufes auch häufig Opfer von Polizeigewalt. Laut Angaben der Reporters sans Frontières sind 1996 31 Journalisten in Polizeigewahrsam gefoltert worden, in den ersten fünf Monaten dieses Jahres weitere 13. Dazu kommen zahllose gewalttätige Übergriffe der Ordnungskräfte. Während die Justiz wenig Mitleid mit Journalisten zeigt, werden kriminelle Polizisten mit Samthandschuhen angefasst (siehe Kasten). Auch ausländische Reporter werden in ihrer Arbeit, besonders in den Notstandsgebieten des Südostens, massiv behindert. Zum Repertoire staatlicher Einschüchterungsmassnahmen gehören ferner die Beschlagnehmung von Zeitungen und die Schliessung kritischer Medien. Wegen ihrer Meinung verfolgt werden zudem nicht nur Journalisten, sondern auch Schriftsteller und oppositionelle Politiker. Meint es die Regierung ernst mit ihrer angekündigten «Revolution», so müssen auf die publizitätsträchtige Freilassung einiger prominenter Redaktoren weitere Schritte folgen.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 1997

Turkish Daily News

## Göktepe murder suspects turn themselves in

The lawyer of the surrendered police officers, Omer Yeşilyurt, says his clients were not fugitives but 'honorable police officers'

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Six police officers who have been accused of beating journalist Metin Göktepe to death have given themselves up to the authorities, reported the Anatolia news agency. The announcement was made by Justice Minister Oltan Sungurlu.

The officers, Suayip Mutluer, Selcuk Bayraktaroğlu, Murat Polat, Fedai Korkmaz and Burhan Koç, and police chief Seyidi Battal Köse, have never appeared in court while the Göktepe trial has been underway and were unable to be found for the past few weeks. Sungurlu said they surrendered to the state prosecutor's office in Afyon.

Afyon State Prosecutor Ali Velioglu said the other police officers, Ilhan Sarioğlu, Saffet Hizarcı and Metin

Korkmaz would also turn themselves in soon. The six who surrendered yesterday have been placed in custody, the authorities confirmed.

### Lawyer: 'Honorable clients'

The lawyer of the surrendered police officers, Omer Yeşilyurt, said his clients were not fugitives.

He added that after being questioned, there was no need for them to appear in court.

Yeşilyurt said his clients had not attended the trial because they were afraid of being "lynched" by mobs. He also claimed governmental leaders had acted incorrectly and misjudged the suspects.

He said his clients were "honorable" Turkish police officers.

# US Defense University: Army-Refah clash far from over

*In April, the Turkish General Staff declared that the danger posed by Islamic fundamentalism had become the top threat for the republic, replacing even that posed by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Kurdish separatism. The INSS panel thought otherwise*





UĞUR AKINCI

Washington - Turkish Daily News

PART -I-

Two new think tank strategic assessment reports on the recent developments in Turkish politics warn that the clash between the secular Turkish military and the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah or RP) may not be totally over yet and may have some implications for the future of Turkish-American strategic relations.

The reports, one penned by Dr. Judith S. Yaphe and a second by Dr. Yaphe and Sean Kay, prepared by the Institute of National Strategic Studies (INSS) in Washington are based on a closed-to-the-press policy roundtable conference on Turkish-U.S. relations held in May 1997 at the National Defense University (NDU).

The NDU is a federally-funded think tank affiliated closely with the U.S. Department of Defense and physically located within the premises of Fort McNair in Washington. Turkish Daily News sources claim that a majority of the research done at NDU is provided for by Pentagon grants. The INSS is a part of the NDU.

Yet it should be noted that neither the NDU nor the INSS necessarily represent the official views of the Pentagon. As a matter of fact, many of the views expressed in these two papers, in the judgment of this reporter, are certainly contrary to what we have heard in the recent past from official representatives of the U.S. Department of Defense.

**'Outmoded secularism'**

In the "Conclusions" chapter of the first paper, entitled "Shaping the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership," Yaphe reports that "some outside experts at the INSS roundtable believe the General Staff may represent an outmoded or anachronistic ideal of secularism in a society that wants to return to more traditional values and customs."

The TDN learned that one of the "outside experts" who defended this idea at the said meeting was a former employee of the CIA who currently works at a Washington think tank.

The May meeting was attended by Turkish professors from three different U.S. universities, and representatives from the Pentagon and the State Department as well.

"Many observers and analysts regard the military's efforts to set the domestic and foreign policy agendas as heavy-handed and out of touch with Turkish reality," the report continued.

In April, the Turkish General Staff declared that the danger posed by Islamic fundamentalism had become the top threat for the republic, replacing even that posed by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Kurdish separatism.

The INSS panel thought otherwise: "The generals' April declaration on the internal

security threat was almost certainly more a public relations campaign than reality, according to many observers. It is contradicted by popular perception, by the generals' repeated condemnations of Tehran and Damascus for supporting PKK terrorism, and the large-scale, cross-border operation launched in May into northern Iraq."

**Two poles**

During the roundtable, the participants' views reportedly gravitated to two opposite poles. While some defended that Refah's Islamist politics represented a genuine bottom-up demand for change in Turkish society and needs to be considered by the Turkish establishment and the military, the other group portrayed Refah as a threat to Turkey's secular Western-oriented democracy.

Yaphe described these two camps as follows:

"Some scholars argue that the Refah-led government should have been allowed to run its natural course and fail, just as the secular parties had done. The "natural" demise of the Islamist party would have been a safer end than one forced by military intervention because it would leave few martyrs and fewer illusions."

"Other observers think military intervention helps resolve unresolvable political crises. They note that the military would not abrogate the Constitution by staging a coup."

However, there was one issue that both camps agreed on: "None seems to believe that adoption of the French two-stage election model (which was fatal to the Algerian electoral process in 1991) would provide a solution or ease the way to eliminating future similar crises."

**Refah support increased**

A majority of the INSS panelists, reflecting a view defended by quite a few American observers including the Congressional Research Service, argued that although the pressures the military put on the RP-True Path Party (DYP) coalition seemed like a solution in the short-run, it actually deepened the crisis.

This view was opposed vigorously by a minority of the roundtable, according to a TDN source.

"The generals' efforts to stop Islamist-proposed changes in education by closing religious schools ... and introducing eight

*A majority of the INSS panelists, reflecting a view defended by quite a few American observers including the Congressional Research Service.*

*argued that although the pressures the military put on the RP-DYP coalition seemed like a solution in the short-run, it actually deepened the crisis*

years of compulsory state education rallied support around the Islamist Refah Party rather than diminishing it," the report said.

"Islamists still sit in Parliament and their local organizations — the key to their electoral victories — are apparently intact," Yaphe reminded. Recently, Turkish prosecutors have initiated an investigation to look into various charges, with the aim of closing down the Islamist Welfare Party. The party, in return, claimed that work was well underway to establish another party if Refah is shut down by the court.

**Future options for army**

After pushing RP-DYP coalition out of power, the Turkish military has the following options, according to the INSS:

"1) They could suggest to President Demirel and the new civilian government that Islamists not be allowed to participate in any future government. 2) If Demirel proves unable to keep the new government on a controlled course, they could again seek the Cabinet's resignation. 3) They could stage a takeover, as they did in the 1960s, 1970s, and in 1980."

However, if there is another coup in Turkey's future, "unlike previous interventions in the 1960s, 70s, and in 1980, this one may have lacked as broad a consensus and may underscore how illusory Ataturk's reforms are for a growing number of Turks," the INSS report claimed.

"Some analysts believe that the General Staff is trying to replace coup rumors with a plan of action for President Demirel and the democratic, secular forces to 'do the right thing.' In this case, an alternative solution — an interim technocratic government — may be a possibility," Yaphe wrote.

**Implications for US**

Yaphe cautioned that the future is not straightforward for the Yılmaz government and that Washington needs to step carefully, since Turkey could go through the same sort of "confrontation" after the elections.

"The outcome of the current political struggle in Turkey is uncertain. Prime Minister Yılmaz has promised elections, possibly next spring, to return a new, four-year government to power... If [Islamists] were to receive 20 percent of the vote, as they have in the past two elections, and the

rightist, centrist parties remain divided by a weak leadership, allegations of corruption, and factionalism, then the stage could be set for a repeat of this year's confrontation."

**Unreliable ally?**

The INSS pointed out that there was a growing sense of unease among the Turkish generals as to the degree to which they could rely on Washington on the issues that mattered the most for Turkey.

"[There is] ... a growing sense in Turkey that the United States may be an unreliable ally — the General Staff has been unhappy over longstanding arms procurement problems and sees what it perceives to be an arms embargo as a major impediment to relations. It does not share the somewhat relaxed attitude the United States seems to have regarding Russia, the Caucasus or Syria. American and European criticisms of the lack of human rights, especially regarding the Kurds, are irritants and ignored," the INSS report said.

The Clinton administration has recently made a number of positive gestures towards the Yılmaz government by thawing the freeze on the military orders. It successfully argued that Congress should lift its objection to the transfer of three frigates and sent notifications to Congress about a \$75 million deal involving an ammunition and equipment package, as well as four Sea Hawk navy helicopters.

When the TDN asked Dr. Yaphe if these very recent developments were not the harbinger of a new positive phase in Turkish-U.S. military relations, she cautiously and correctly recalled that as positive as these developments were, Congress had still not given them final approval.

**Turkish generals**

The report continued with its generally negative assessment of the Turkish military's involvement in civilian politics.

"If the Turkish General Staff continues its pattern of intervening in the political process, it will expect U.S. support; the generals are unlikely to heed warnings that their actions place Turkey's fragile democracy at risk.

The generals interpret comments by senior U.S. administration spokesmen on Turkey as a secular state as supporting their course of action. The Turkish generals probably perceive the strategic relationship — already tense over Ankara's budding relations with Tehran and Baghdad — to be going through a temporary phase, one which is bound to improve because of Turkey's geostrategic importance."

**Must restore trust**

In the "recommendations" section, the INSS started with a bold recommendation:

"The United States needs to restore a sense of trust with the Turkish military

without sending misleading signals."

"U.S. officials in Washington should consult more regularly with senior Turkish military and civilian leaders on issues of common concern, especially if shifts in U.S. policy perspectives are involved. Participation in confidence building exercises and contacts between mid-level officers, officials, and academics in Turkey and the United States could also be expanded."

**Limits to military activism**

The INSS recommended frank exchange between the Pentagon and the Turkish General Staff concerning the degree to which military's political activism will be supported by Washington.

"The Turkish military needs to know that while the U.S. government supports a secular Turkey, the United States and Western Europe would not support a military coup, and that such a coup would undercut Turkish efforts at further European integration. Efforts by the military to ban the Refah Party entirely or to deny Islamist delegates seats in Parliament would weaken Turkey's democratic image," the report ended.

*Turkish Daily News*

WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 1997

# US Defense University: 'Divergent interests complicate US-Turkish relations'

UĞUR AKINCI

Washington - Turkish Daily News

**PART -II-**

**I**n a second paper prepared by the Institute of National Strategic Studies (INSS), which is a part of the Pentagon-affiliated National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, think tank experts suggested that there were a number of emergent issues between the United States and Turkey that created friction. "[P]erceptions of diverging interests complicate U.S.-Turkish strategic relations," concluded the paper written by Dr. Judith S. Yaphe and visiting fellow Dr. Sean Kay. "The June change in government, which saw the resignation of Erbakan, is unlikely to resolve these differences," the authors concluded.

The INSS paper is based on a closed-to-the-press policy-roundtable conference on

Turkish-US relations held in May 1997 at the National Defense University (NDU) with the participation of academicians, think tank experts and representatives from the U.S. Defense and State departments. It should be noted that neither NDU nor INSS necessarily represent the official views of the Pentagon.

**Shared interests**

INSS noted that "the United States and Turkey share a broad range of strategic interests, including promoting solid and stable governments in the Caucasus and Central Asia, enhancing shared economic and trade relations, cooperating on global issues such as terrorism and anti-narcotics efforts, and monitoring Iraqi and Kurdish activity in northern Iraq through Operation Northern Watch." But still, the focus of the report was on what the two allies did not share.

**Three areas**

The institute report focused on the following three areas of "divergence": Arms transfers, NATO expansion, and Turkey's application to become a full member of the European

Two allies portrayed as at odds over arms transfers, Russia, EU membership, NATO expansion

*'The June change in government is unlikely to resolve these differences'*

Turkey might fail to ratify NATO enlargement'

*'Turkish military may take a hard-line stance on Aegean and Cyprus if internal situation is stabilized'*



Turkey's defense cooperation agreement with Israel acquires a new significance, since both Israel and Turkey use the same U.S.-made weapon systems. The rapprochement may mobilize the Jewish-American lobby to support Turkish interests at the U.S. Congress as well.

Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU).

**Arms embargo**

"The greatest source of tension has been what many Turkish military officers and civilian officials view as an "undeclared U.S. arms embargo" on Turkey," the report said. "Failure to resolve weapons procurement issues could erode ties with the United States and send Turkey in search of more reliable security partners and weapons suppliers."

Most of the participants at the roundtable

apparently still think that the recent thaw in arms transfers to Turkey (e.g. Frigates; Sea Hawks) does not represent a dramatic change in the situation, especially since Congress has not yet voted on the various transfers waiting in the queue, despite the reluctant support from the House International and Senate Foreign Relations committees.

**Two events**

The report pointed at two events that changed the strategic importance of Turkey for the United States. The first was the end

of the Cold War, after which "Turkey perceived that its importance to the United States as a front-line state in the NATO-Warsaw Pact standoff was steadily diminishing."

The second event was the Gulf War, when "for the first and only time, NATO's Article V collective defense arrangement was formally invoked in response to Iraqi threats to Turkish territory." But the INSS concludes that, "subsequently, Turkey has remained a key strategic crossroads for the United States, bridging the geographic boundaries

between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia."

At this point, we think an analysis penned in January 1996 by Alan Makovsky of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy draws a more pertinent conclusion from the same premise. Makovsky pointed out that "NATO responded to the danger of an Iraqi attack on Turkey only with great reluctance and then in a meager and nearly worthless fashion" which "diminished [Turkey's] confidence in NATO security guarantees." (Reluctant Neighbor; Turkey's Role in the Middle East; Henri Barkey Ed., USIP press, 1996; pp.152-53). Thus, if anything, the chances are that the Gulf War threat also acted to undermine the Turkish military's trust in Western and U.S. readiness to defend Turkey's vital interests.

U.S. Congressional opposition to Super Cobra, frigate and Sea Hawk sales, on the one hand, and "diminishing U.S. force presence" in general, on the other, of course deepened the "divergence." It fueled the feeling among the Turks that "Ankara's strategic importance to the United States is declining. Since the height of the Cold War in the 1960s, the United States has reduced its force presence from more than 20,000 personnel and dependents at 20 installations to less than 8,000 personnel at six installations," the report said.

"This number will likely decline further with the planned closing of a U.S. radar site at Pirinçlik and the anticipated reduction of personnel at İncirlik.

U.S. security assistance to Turkey has declined from \$500 million in grants in 1991 to \$175 million in market rate loans in 1997," Yaphe and Kay wrote.

But, the Erbakan government's dealings with Iran were not greeted with joy in Washington either, the report notes. The disappointment seemed to be mutual to a certain extent.

### Israel card

In this context, Turkey's defense cooperation agreement with Israel acquires a new significance, since both Israel and Turkey use the same U.S.-made weapon systems. The rapprochement may mobilize the Jewish-American lobby to support Turkish interests at the U.S. Congress as well. "Turkish generals may believe that their pursuit of security and defense cooperation with Israel will gain them new and sophisticated weapons systems as well as a powerful voice in Washington," the INSS said.

### NATO expansion

Turkey has a different take on the issue of NATO expansion as well for two main reasons, the INSS report explained: 1) Turkey thinks too much emphasis is laid on Eastern Europe whereas Turkey thinks strategic security threats are much greater in southern areas; and 2) Turkey's EU membership is sidestepped while Turkey is asked to ratify the expansion of NATO, by siding with the same countries today which Turkey once stood against to guard the NATO borders.

"Ankara apparently views NATO enlargement plans as having too much of a Central European focus while ignoring areas to the south where Turkey believes security challenges are more likely to arise," the report said.

"There is an irony not lost on many Turks that, having stood at the gates of Europe as a front-line state against the Soviet Union, former Warsaw Pact countries are likely to join the EU before Turkey."

### Russia

On Russia, Turkey and the United States do not see eye to eye either.

"The United States places a high priority on partnership with Russia, but Turkey has lingering doubts about Moscow's intentions along their common borders. In particular, Turkey worries about adjustments to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty which would increase the Russian military presence on its southern flank. Additionally, Turkey views Russian involvement in the Caucasus with great suspicion."

### NATO card

An obvious proof of the tensions between the two allies was Turkey's intention to use the "NATO card," that is, threaten to veto NATO expansion unless Turkey is admitted into the EU. The INSS noted that Turkey bowed to a U.S. request to refrain from such a veto but the future may hold some surprises.

"Further complicating its relations within NATO, Turkey in early 1997 threatened to veto NATO enlargement if it was not granted full membership in the EU. In doing this, Ankara directly challenged the United States, which has NATO enlargement as a foreign policy priority, to gain support in its dispute with the EU; unfortunately for Turkey's calculations, the United States has no vote in the EU."

"Ankara initially bowed to U.S. requests that it withdraw its veto threat, but there is some uncertainty whether Turkey will abide by its promise or if the Turkish parliament will approve ratification protocols for new members joining NATO. Turkey will likely raise questions of costs, burden-sharing, and concerns over Russia. The issue of Turkish national pride could also muddle the ratification process. Turkey might fail to ratify NATO enlargement absent a popular consensus in support of the policy."

### NATO scholars at the RAND

Corporation, which did much work on NATO expansion, described such a distant possibility to TDN as "suicidal."

### EU's importance

"The United States may be regarded as Turkey's best investment partner, but the EU is Turkey's largest trading partner. Many Turkish officials, including senior General Staff members,

appear convinced that the solution to most, if not all, of Turkey's domestic economic instability lies in membership in the EU," the report continued.

The report pointed to some "complicating factors" concerning Turkey's EU membership: "Turkey

has a strong private sector economy which should make it attractive for international investment. Nonetheless, public sector institutions are generally unstable, overemployed and underproductive, and corruption is rampant... Despite relatively high and consistent growth rates in the Turkish economy, Turkey has an 80 percent inflation rate, and government reform has been slow, causing general hesitation among international investors."

The "increased role of the EU, coming at the same time as decreasing levels of U.S. economic engagement, reinforces the Turkish perception of U.S. unreliability; this in spite of the fact that senior U.S. officials have explicitly endorsed Turkey's aspiration to join the EU."

"Prospects for an invitation to Turkey to join the EU appear slim for now, despite Turkey's best efforts and U.S. support," the report noted correctly. Greece's opposition to Turkey within the EU and frequent criticism of Turkey in the EU on the Kurdish and human rights issues do not help Turkey either, the authors noted.

The future with the EU does not look bright, INSS concluded: "Many Turkish officials may perceive the EU's slow approach as evidence of a new "cultural and religious iron curtain," or even a new Christian crusade, that will not open to Ankara."

### Trouble with Greece and Cyprus

The report also mentioned the U.S. role in quelling the Turkish-Greek conflict over the Aegean and the continuing tensions in Cyprus on Russian missiles and other issues.

"U.S. observers are left with an impression that Turkey has no intention of attacking Greece but would do so if it perceived a military threat or believed Greece intended enosis (union) with Cyprus once again."

"This impression is seemingly reinforced by the Turkish military's adoption of a new defense concept that focuses primarily on internal threats and a growing willingness by senior Turkish military officials to open a dialogue with Greece. Nonetheless, the prospect remains that the Turkish military might return to its previous hard-line stance on the Aegean and Cyprus issues once the internal political situation has stabilized."

### More consultations

The INSS recommended that the United States consult the Turks more on a number of issues.

"The United States needs to broaden its consultations with Turkey on elements of changing U.S. strategic regional relation-

ships, particularly on issues reflecting political and economic trends in Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Similarly, the United States must accept the fact that Turkey's changing needs mean it will deal with the Islamic world."

#### More arms

If the United States needs more Turkish cooperation to monitor Iraq, then it needs to be more "flexible" on arms transfers, the INSS recommended.

"The United States may need to be more flexible in assigning priorities in its rela-

tions with Turkey. In order to retain Ankara's cooperation in monitoring Saddam Hussein and containing Iran, both likely to be U.S. priorities for some time to come, the United States may need to make concessions on arms exports."

#### Move more quickly

Thirdly, the INSS recommended the administration act with more resolve and greater speed to help ease Turkish-Greek tensions and help build more trust with the Turkish establishment.

"U.S. participation in negotiations and

consultations would help create a more stable environment. Washington should move quickly to support confidence building measures among Turks, Greeks, and Cypriots to ease tensions in the Aegean and consolidate any gains in Greek-Turkish relations. Similarly, high-level support for an open EU process will help keep Turkey grounded in the West and promote stability in Central and Eastern Europe."

## Turkish Daily News

WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 1997

# Critics of new education policy take to the streets

**Violence:** Eleven people were reportedly injured during the demonstrations. Among them were journalists who were severely beaten by the police and hospitalized for apparently no cause

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Thousands of right-wing demonstrators gathered in downtown Ankara starting early Tuesday morning to protest the new education policy which will increase the compulsory education period to eight years on a continuous basis. Many of them were criticizing the new minority coalition government that will allow the closure of the secondary segments of the religious high schools, as well as other middle schools.

The police, who blocked the streets of Bakanliklar as well as the downtown's main artery, arrested 55 people who tried to demonstrate in front of the General Staff headquarters. It was also reported that the police had sprayed water on the demonstrators to disperse them and allegedly beat three journalists. A number of ambulances were sent to the area to transport those who

were injured during clashes.

Several thousand people came to Ankara, some even a day before the demonstration, from Istanbul, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Bursa and Konya provinces and convened at Kızılay Square early in the morning, delaying tens of thousands of Ankara residents driving to work who were unable to use Ataturk Boulevard. As the number of demonstrators increased from 300 early in the day to several thousand, the police moved them to a location in front of the Ministry of Education. Many carried Turkish flags, or banners saying "Don't touch my school," and chanted religious slogans. Many also were cursing and throwing stones at members of the press who were trying to cover the event.

The demonstrators, most of whom are thought to have strong religious backgrounds,

were protesting the new education law, believing that it would cause the "closing down" of the religious schools if it is approved by the Parliament. The new law, in fact, will not only shut down the secondary segments of the religious high schools, but also the other middle schools, or combine them with existing elementary education institutions.

But many of the conservatives, including the supporters of the Islamist Welfare Party (RP), believe that the push for an "uninterrupted" compulsory education system was a military-led attempt to curb the number of religious school-goers.

The matter was first brought to the surface by the military-led institution, the National Security Council (MGK), which asked the former Islamist-led government to convert the compulsory education system to an uninterrupted one.

Although former Prime Minister and RP leader Necmettin Erbakan signed the MGK document, he later was reluctant to take steps on that issue. Erbakan's supporters do not object to an eight-year system, but favor a five-plus-three system in which a five year elementary education is followed by three years of middle school attendance.

Meanwhile, the Anatolia news agency said the draft law on the new education policy would be discussed on Thursday by the parliamentary commission dealing with the education issues. The bill, which proposes amendments to three different



Thousands of people who objected to the closure of the secondary segments of the religious schools took to the streets of Ankara on Tuesday. They chanted religious slogans, saying they would not allow the "closure" of religious schools. Some of the demonstrators were seen in religious outfit which actually breached the Dress Code. Security was tightened in Ankara and traffic was blocked in the center of the city, preventing hundreds of motorists from arriving to work on time.  
Photos: Ali Fat Ulay & Selahattin Sönmez

laws on education, will also be debated by the Planning and Budgetary Commission, since it requires massive financing.

Independent Islamist deputy Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, who was forced to resign from the RP because of his outspoken attitude, joined the crowd which welcomed him with pro-Islamic slogans. "It is normal for the supporters of religious schools to speak out about their demands on the streets since it was also done by many other civic organizations," Ceylan, also a religious school graduate, told the crowd. A number of other RP deputies also appeared in the rally, asking that the demonstrators not cause any trouble that would badly hurt their cause.

There were a number of isolated incidents during the protests in Ankara. A number of men with beards and religious garb tried to enter the Parliament, but the police kept them away.

The police, who argued with the demonstrators, said their request was not

legal. Another group wanted to walk to the Prime Ministry building, but were again stopped by police dogs.

The protests also took place in the province of Konya, RP's stronghold. Konya Governor Namık Gülen said vehicle convoys which were trying to gather for protests were dispersed by the police, and no one was arrested. Gülen said many of the protesters who were in the vehicles and traveling in small groups honked their horns. One of the convoys was stopped by the police and the drivers protested by clapping their hands. Konya's Security Chief, Turan Bulus, was reportedly observed talking with the demonstrators who later dispersed. In the area of Kayseri protesters in their cars who blew their horns were fined by the police.

# State Department supports Turkmen-Iran-Turkish gas line

Turkish military are claimed to be against Iran route

Washington - Turkish Daily News

■ The U.S. State Department reconfirmed on Monday what has been made explicit by the White House over the weekend: The U.S. supports the gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Turkey, even though it crosses through Iran.

Last week, Assistant Secretary of State Alan Larsen testified before a Congressional committee that the pipeline's Iranian itinerary did not violate the ILSA (Iran Libya Sanctions Law) which prohibited any third party from investing over \$40 million in Iran's and Libya's petrochemical industries. Turkish state pipeline company BOTAS, which is involved in the gas pipeline in question, will not come under ILSA scope, Larsen state.

Deputy spokesman for the State Department, Jim Foley, said on Monday that Turkey was going to receive Turkmen, not Iranian, gas in accordance with the Turkish-Turkmen agreement signed in May 1997.

## Iran policy remains the same

But that did not mean that the administration was mellowing towards Iran, Foley said. There has been no change in U.S. policy in any way nor any signal to that effect," he emphasized. "It is U.S. policy and law to seek to deny Iran the resources it needs to pursue terrorism and weapons of mass destruction by means of deterring investments in Iran's oil and gas sectors. We are applying that law diligently."

Last week, 222 members of the U.S. House of Representatives, including 10 committee chairmen, signed a statement reaffirming the need to continue to isolate the Iranian regime.

"The bottom line" is that Turkey is going to buy gas from Turkmenistan, not Iran, Foley said.

## Pipeline not ready yet

Currently, the natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Tehran is just about to be completed, an insider source told TDN. The

line from Tehran to Tabriz also exists. But the connection from Tabriz to the Iran-Turkish border does not exist yet, the source said. Iran, which reportedly also built the line inside Turkmenistan in exchange for gas, is expected to complete the Tabriz-Turkish Border line in late 1998.

## Keep fees low

Concerning the uneasy issue of the transit fees that Iran would be earning from the pipeline, Foley said "We believe that Turkey and Turkmenistan have an interest" in seeing that the fees are "low and in alignment with market circumstances."

He said the U.S. position also reflects the desire to encourage emerging countries to develop their natural resources and to help Turkey, "an old and loyal NATO ally."

## Not ideal route

Foley also noted that the United States believes that the route through Iran is "not the ideal route" to bring Turkmenistan's natural gas to the West. "We preferred a trans-Caspian route" that could also serve to develop Azerbaijan gas resources, he said.

## Turkish military agrees?

According to an insider TDN source who asked to remain anonymous, the Turkish military is also not comfortable at all with a pipeline that would be passing through Iran and, as an option, wants to see a trans-Caspian underwater line instead.

The main reason for military's opposition is said to be the support Iran gives to the PKK and Iran's determination to export the Islamic revolution to Turkey, the source said. In early 1997 the Iranian ambassador to Ankara created a storm by openly defending Shariat as a regime fit for Turks. As a result he had to be recalled to Iran.

A second alternative that the Turkish military favors is the use of an existing natural gas pipeline that detours from north of the Caspian Sea and extends all the way down to Georgia. With an extension from Georgia, Turkey could still get Turkmen gas even if it would be more expensive to do so that way, is how the TDN source summarized the Turkish General Staff's alleged preferences.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 1997

Turkish Daily News

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 1997

## Police in Ankara Break Up Protest

Reuters

ANKARA — Police using batons, dogs and water cannon broke up a protest Tuesday by thousands of Islamists marching through Turkey's capital to challenge the government's effort to curtail religious education.

Witnesses said the police repeatedly charged demonstrators outside the Education Ministry after hours of rowdy protests. Armored cars fired water cannon at the crowd.

At least two people received head wounds. It was not clear whether they were protesters, journalists or undercover members of the security forces.

Dozens of police officers in riot gear, some with dogs, charged a group of about 1,000 protesters marching toward Prime Minister Mesut

Yilmaz's office chanting, "Government, resign!"

About 6,000 people, many wearing Islamic-style skullcaps and waving Turkish flags, demonstrated in the center of the city.

"Break the hands of those who try to lay a finger on the Koran!" they shouted, referring to the holy book of Islam.

Witnesses said the chanting could be heard inside military headquarters, where top generals were briefing the cabinet on security threats. The Turkish media said Islamist activism was at the top of the meeting's agenda.

The police prevented the demonstrators from marching on Parliament to protest the government's attempts to pass a law that would extend compulsory secularist educa-

tion to eight years from five. The bill would also close many religious schools.

Mr. Yilmaz was quoted in the press Tuesday as saying that he would push the reform through Parliament by the end of next week.

### ■ Turkey to Get U.S. Ships

The United States is going ahead with the transfer of three former U.S. Navy frigates to Turkey after reaching agreement with members of Congress who had been blocking the move, Reuters reported from Washington. The State Department made the announcement Monday.

Members of Congress put the deal on hold after a naval confrontation last year between Greece and Turkey over an uninhabited island in the Aegean Sea.

LE MONDE / JEUDI 31 JUILLET 1997

## Turquie : reddition de six policiers impliqués dans la mort d'un journaliste

ANKARA. Six policiers parmi les quarante-huit impliqués dans la mort d'un journaliste se sont rendus, lundi 28 juillet, à Afyon (Ouest), a annoncé, mardi, le ministre de la Justice, Oltan Sungurlu. Il s'agit d'un directeur de la police et de cinq policiers contre lesquels la justice avait lancé des mandats d'arrêt. Le journaliste du quotidien de gauche *Evrensel*, Metin Goktepe, vingt-sept ans, avait été battu à mort après son arrestation le 8 janvier 1996, à Istanbul, alors qu'il couvrait les obsèques de deux détenus tués lors de la répression d'une mutinerie dans une prison de la ville. Aucun des policiers impliqués n'avait assisté aux audiences du procès ouvert le 18 octobre 1996.

Par ailleurs, la police a violemment dispersé, mardi, quelque cinq mille islamistes qui manifestaient à Ankara contre un projet de loi devant entraîner la fermeture des sections secondaires des écoles d'enseignement religieux d'Etat. - (AFP)



## GENERALS AND POLITICS

### The increasing loneliness of being Turkey

**A country that could be the meeting-place of democracy and Islam is in danger of becoming a no-man's-land between them. This can be prevented**

**T**URKEY, say the geopoliticians, is the most important member of the new, expanded Atlantic alliance; and they may well be right. This is a huge place, with the biggest land area and the second-biggest population of any NATO country east of the Atlantic. It has the biggest army of them all, including America's, and though its soldiers do not have the most modern weapons they are dogged and uncompaining fighters: there are gentlemen in England still abed who remember Gallipoli and Kut al-Amara. Above all, Turkey stands where Germany did in the previous period of NATO's existence: on the front line, face to face with the big problem. Now that the Soviet army no longer looms over Germany, NATO's eyes have turned southward, to the bubbling mixture of oil and Islamism and decrepit authoritarian regimes called the Middle East: a bubbling which will not be kept from boiling over by diplomacy alone.

The trouble is that the alliance of the democracies needs Turkey for two different reasons, and both have been put at risk by what is now happening in Turkish politics.

The military value of Turkey is that it sits next door to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, to the mullahs' Iran and to the unpredictable dictatorship of Syria's Hafez Assad. Its own armed forces, the bases it provides for allied aircraft and warships and—not least—its quiet ability to control the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers into Iraq and Syria are all weighty pieces in the regional balance of power. But Turkey has been of even greater value for a different, political reason. Until recently, it had looked like the one fairly solid example of a Muslim country that was also a working democracy. It looks less solid now.

On February 28th, Turkey's generals stuck their hand into politics again (they had three full-scale coups between 1960 and 1980) by issuing a list of instructions to the

mildly Islamist government. This has made it harder to argue that Turkey was at last settling down to be a real democracy, a place where the people take the decisions. And if the generals have miscalculated—if the Koran-toting Welfare Party, which they have now pushed out of power, comes back into office at the next election on a wave of Muslim resentment—they will either have to live with a new government that will among other things be much more suspicious of their pro-western foreign policy, or do an Algeria and squash the election.

A little time was bought when Mesut Yilmaz, the beneficiary of the generals' intervention, got a rather wobbly vote of confidence last Saturday (a majority of 25 in the 550-member parliament) for a three-party coalition he has stitched together out

of his own conservative Motherland Party, its old adversary the Democratic Left, and a small splinter group. The generals would have had an immediate crisis on their hands if Welfare and its ally in government since last July, the True Path Party, had beaten Mr Yilmaz. Only two weeks earlier a majority of parliament's members had signed a plea that Welfare and True Path should stay in office. The necessary votes were, in the end, cajoled or bought. But the crisis is far from over.

Even if Mr Yilmaz's majority survives the year, which is by no means certain, some hard questions have to be answered. All those involved—the generals, Mr Yilmaz and Welfare's leader, Necmettin Erbakan—have to try to work out what sort of country they want Turkey to be.

#### They went over the top

The generals' answer is that they want Turkey to remain the secular state created 70 years ago by their hero Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, "Father of the Turks". They went into action last February armed with Article 118 of the constitution, under which the National Security Council—five senior officers and four civilian ministers under the chairmanship of the country's president—can say what it wants done to preserve "the independence of the state" and "the peace and security of society". They gave the prime minister a list of 18 things they wanted done to reduce Islam's influence on the workings of government.

Mr Erbakan, relying on his parliamentary majority, fudged and dodged. The generals replied with a creeping barrage.

Further demands were made on the government, including its approval for the dismissal of military officers considered too pro-Welfare. A handful of big firms that had shown sympathy for Welfare got a dressing-down. The lady in charge of True Path, Tansu Ciller, who had used her coalition with Welfare as an umbrella against the charges of corruption raining down on her, came under renewed attack. Towards the end, the newspapers suddenly revealed that a government ministry had been tapping the soldiers' telephones. Most curiously of all, the country's chief prosecutor, shortly after saying he did not think such a thing could be successfully done, brought a suit before the Constitutional Court calling for the Wel-



The army says it knows what the people want

## GENERALS AND POLITICS

fare Party to be banned.

Not all of these things were organised from military headquarters, though many of them undoubtedly were. Nor have the generals had unanimous support among secular Turks who enjoy a western-style way of life: the main businessmen's association, in a list of proposals to improve Turkish democracy, suggested abolishing the National Security Council. But eventually the pressure worked. Mr Erbakan said he would go; a vain attempt was made to get the prime ministership transferred to Mrs Ciller; President Demirel said he preferred Mr Yılmaz; Mr Yılmaz won some more defectors; and on July 12th he got his majority, and the generals got their way.

The problem with all this is not just that their victory could be short-lived. A sizeable chunk of Mr Yılmaz's majority last weekend consisted of the Republican People's Party, but this party has refused to join the government and would like a new election in 1997, whereas Mr Yılmaz wants to wait until next year. Motherland and the Democratic Left, the two chief parts of the new coalition, will not find it easy to run a joint government programme (the Democratic Left is keen on bigger pensions for public-sector workers, Motherland wants to cut the budget deficit and do some more privatisation).

Turkish parties are anyway much given to fragmentation; pieces regularly drop off and join other parties, and it is only half-jokingly said that the average parliamentarian's price is between \$2m and \$5m. Mr Yılmaz is a clever enough politician, but not the only one with the technique of making converts. He is also rather a dull dog, with little taste for big ideas and no known ability to capture people's imagination. He could have trouble holding on to that 25 majority.

But there is a bigger reason for worrying about what has happened over the past five months. When you inspect the list of accusations that are said to justify the Welfare Party's removal from government, they turn out to be remarkably vague.

### Not proven

The chief prosecutor's reasons for saying that Welfare should be banned include only a couple of things actually done by Welfare during its past year in government—its attempt to insist that women should be allowed to wear head-scarves in public buildings, despite a ban dating from Ataturk's time, and Mr Erbakan's invitation to dinner at the prime minister's house of some controversial people who, good gracious, "attended in attires in violation of revolutionary laws". It is perfectly true that the Welfare-led government did en-

courage the wearing of scarves in schools and other buildings. But that is hardly reason enough to ban a party. It even seems a rather liberal idea, when you reflect that peasant mothers whose soldier sons have been wounded in the civil war against Kurdish rebels are made to remove their daily headgear if they want to visit their boys in a military hospital.

Probe a little deeper than the public prosecutor does, and you dig up two further charges. One is that Welfare has allowed money to be brought into the country, and has perhaps itself provided money, for Masonic-like secret societies dedicated to spreading the Islamist word. This may or may not be true. It is hard to tell, because apart from one or two clear-cut episodes—



Erbakan displeased the ghost of Ataturk

such as the arrest at Istanbul airport of a man trying to smuggle in money from Islamists in Germany—most of the evidence offered is distinctly murky. "Our control system is very good." "The information is to be found in Welfare's computer system." This is less than wholly convincing.

The other chief complaint of the defenders of secularism concerns religious education. Turkey has about 500 Imam Hatip ("Parson-Preacher") secondary and high schools—a small fraction of the total number of schools for children of that age—which offer a modest dose of Muslim education to 11-to-14-year olds on top of the regular state curriculum but a much larger dose, up to a third of the total week's work, to those above 14. The secularists' fear is that these schools will pour out a flood of fanatical young graduates like the Taliban students of Afghanistan.

Unfortunately for the secularists, however, the Imam Hatip schools are a product

of the secular regime. They were started, with the generals' blessing, back in the 1950s, and most of the existing ones were founded in the 1970s and 1980s; not one was added during Welfare's just-ended year in government. They are run, and inspected, by the state. They are also popular with parents, since they tend to be more orderly than other schools, and to get better results. The generals want to cut the ground from under them by building more non-religious secondary schools. But that would seem to clash with many parents' wishes, as well as adding to the government's overspending. If Imam Hatip graduates subsequently do illegal things, they should be arrested. But unless a disproportionate number of them do, the case against these schools does not seem to stand up.

After this, the charge-list grows even mistier. Mr Erbakan has supported the idea of building a mosque in Istanbul's Taksim Square, which is a bit like proposing a Christian revivalist centre in Piccadilly Circus. The Welfare mayor of a small town earlier this year invited the Iranian ambassador to a Muslim revivalist rally, which was provocative but no dafter than a communist mayor in cold-war Western Europe inviting the Soviet ambassador to his country to a joint denunciation of capitalism. Various Welfare people have said heated things at public meetings. A few of these are worrying (Istanbul's mayor is quoted as saying that democracy is like a tram: you take it where you want to go, and then you get off). But most were just politicians saying in the rough accent of Anatolian politics that, if they get elected, the other side had better not try keeping them out of office.

### The flavour of the 1930s

To be sure, all Islamic revivalists need to be examined through narrowed eyes. Some of them are ignorantly and brutally dictatorial: look at the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the wilder specimens in Algeria, Egypt and Pakistan. But not all are like this.

The mainline revivalist parties in Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan have said that they wish to operate within a democratic system—multi-party free elections, alternation of government and all. Malaysia's Islamists, in that country's admittedly creaky semi-democracy, are obeying the rules. The heartening discovery of the past few years is that the Muslim world's revivalist movement is not a uniform entity; it is a spectrum, ranging from incurable authoritarians to devout searchers after God's will who are nevertheless prepared to accept the people's judgment. With any luck, Turkey's plump if occasionally excitable Mr Erbakan, and most of his party, are at the moder-

GENERALS AND POLITICS

ate end of the spectrum.

The fact that the leaders of the anti-Welfare campaign will have none of this says much about the psychology of Ataturk's Turkey. No, they insist, you can never trust a politician with the Koran in his hand; these people are trained to say one thing and do another; we secular Turks know in our bones that they are plotting to force a fundamentalist dictatorship on us. There is a neurotic edge to the way many secularists talk about the awkward, rather earnest, just-up-from-the-country sort of people who make up most of Mr Erbakan's following.

This may be because, when you look at it, the Ataturk definition of secularism is not quite what most other westerners mean by the word. There is still a flavour of the 1930s about today's Turkey. It is not just the self-consciously heroic statuary, the assurances that "the army knows what the people want", the still far too big state sector of industry. The Turkey that Ataturk built two-thirds of a century ago was constructed out of a now rather old-fashioned mixture of nationalism and rationalism.


The nationalism was not too bad: the Turks treat their Kurdish minority very badly, and they are stubborn about their interests in Cyprus, but Ataturkian Turkey has never been a serious threat to its neighbours. The rationalism part, alas, now feels like something out of a dusty past.

For most Europeans and Americans, a secular state is a state in which the church cannot dictate to the government and, in America at least, the symbols and ceremonies of the two are kept firmly separate. But this does not mean that for most people in the West of the 1990s the business of government can be conducted without reference to some kind of moral order.

The rational pursuit of self-interest is the necessary basis of human activity but, if a country is to be worth living in, all those competing individual self-interests have to operate within an agreed set of rules. The rules may be derived from a belief in God, or they may be constructed by a consensus of non-believers; but in either case they will draw upon the instinctive part of the mind—the tug of compassion, the intuitive sense of right and wrong—as well as the purely rational part. Christian Democrats and Christian socialists in Europe, Christian revivalists in America and communarians on both sides of the Atlantic would all nowadays agree on that much.

For Ataturk, though, rationalism was king. To be useful, he said, religion "has to conform... to science and knowledge, to logic." The phrase "a moral order" would probably have struck Ataturk, with his belief in the absolute supremacy of reason, as something murky dug out of the medieval recesses of the Islamic mind.

This is why his sort of secularism has less in common with the secularism of



most of today's Europeans and Americans than it has with that of France's 19th-century rationalists. It is not merely an insistence that religious believers should keep the propagation of their ideas within the rules of the democratic system. It is a preference for excluding their ideas from the public arena altogether. It is not impartiality towards religion so much as a turning of the back upon it. And this is why in 1997 Turks who have inherited Ataturk's secularism and Turks in search of an Islamic revival find themselves gazing at each other across a gulf of incomprehension.

**If they don't try**

If the gulf is to be bridged, both Mr Erbakan and the generals have to stretch out a hand. Mr Erbakan can reasonably argue that in his year in the prime ministership he did not visibly break any of democracy's rules. He might add that his foreign policy, apart from a smirk towards Iran and a humiliating visit to Colonel Qaddafi's Libya, was just the sort of thing the generals wanted: his government stayed a loyal member of NATO, kept knocking on the European Union's door, and even let the Turkish army get on with its cosy new programme of military co-operation with Israel.

But Mr Erbakan could go further. He could formally commit himself to the democratic credo already voiced by open-minded Islamists in other countries.

What people believe or do not believe, says this credo, is their own private business; the state should keep its nose out. But both believers and non-believers should be free to put their ideas about the government of the country, wherever in heaven or earth those ideas are said to come from, to the country's voters. If they and their allies get the support of a majority of the voters, they can put their proposals into law, provided these laws do not clash with the country's constitution (which must itself have the voters' approval). If at the next election a different lot of people with different ideas win a majority of the votes, the first lot will stand down and accept the changes

the second lot make, subject to the same proviso. Full stop. That is democracy.

In reply, the generals could say that their only concern is to preserve the rules of democracy. They do not support or oppose any particular body of ideas; they merely want to make sure that the voters can make the choice, and change their choice next time if they wish. Given Mr Erbakan's commitment to the same principle, the generals will go back to their military business and watch the next election with impartial interest. They might add, *sotto voce*, that if anybody really does break the rules they will know what to do about it.

If something like this happens, the Turks can resume normal politics. If it does not, they face an increasingly isolated future. A continuation of the army's campaign against the Welfare Party—maybe even a court order disbanding the party—will give new ammunition to the people in the European Union who say that Turkey will never be democratic enough to be a full member of the EU (even though its economic qualifications for membership are in some ways better than those of most of the EU's other current applicants). It would also make it harder for the United States to insist on Turkey's military importance to the NATO alliance, since the countries now seeking to join NATO are being told that they first have to prove they are good democrats. And Iran's mullahs will be even more anti-Turkey than they are now.

If the generals have got it wrong, on the other hand, and their harassment of Welfare wins indignant Islamists more votes in Turkey's next election, the next Turkish government is likely to be colder to NATO, less interested in Europe, and on even pricklier terms than its predecessors with the hard-nosed and ungodly men who run Iraq and Syria. Either way, a country that could have been a demonstration of the compatibility of Islam and democracy would be drifting off into a lonely limbo between the two. That is not what the democracies need, and it is not what most Turks want.

# Did 2d Gas Plume Hit U.S. Troops?

## Iraqi Depot Hit in Gulf War

## May Have Exposed Thousands

By Philip Shenon  
New York Times Service

BUFFALO, New York — The United Nations has announced that clouds of chemical weapons may have been released from a second large Iraqi ammunition depot in the vicinity of American troops during the 1991 Gulf War, raising the possibility that the number of troops exposed to chemical weapons could be far larger than the Pentagon's latest estimate of as many as 100,000.

UN weapons inspectors said Tuesday that Iraq informed them only last year that hundreds of rockets filled with mustard gas and nerve gas had been stored during the war at the depot in Ukhaydir in southern Iraq, about 185 miles (295 kilometers) north of the Saudi city of Rafha, where thousands of American troops were deployed.

The United States received this evidence earlier this year. On Tuesday, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency confirmed that the Iraqi site had been bombed on Feb. 14, 1991, and that the United States now presumed that the bombing by the

American-led military alliance had released a plume of chemical weapons.

They said that preliminary computer models suggested it was unlikely that the cloud had reached American troops in Saudi Arabia, although more modeling was needed before it could be ruled out.

"Obviously you don't want to end up alarming people about a situation like this," said Robert Walpole, who is overseeing the CIA investigation of chemical exposures during the Gulf War.

He acknowledged that if all of the hundreds of rockets had been destroyed at the site, the plume of chemicals would have "come close" to American troops in Rafha, but he said that it was highly unlikely.

This is the second time in two years that the UN weapons inspectors have provided the Pentagon with unwelcome news about the possible exposure of American troops to chemical weapons. They are testifying in Buffalo at a regional meeting of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, a special investigative panel.

For more than five years after the war, the Defense Department had insisted that it had no evidence to suggest that American troops had been exposed to Iraqi chemical weapons — and no answers for the thousands of veterans who had complained of mysterious health problems.

Last year, however, the Pentagon reversed itself and announced that it had received evidence from the United Nations suggesting that American troops had been exposed to a cloud of the nerve gas sarin when they blew up a sprawling Iraqi depot in the southern Iraqi village of Kamisiyah, in March 1991, shortly after the war.

Initially, the Pentagon suggested that only a few hundred American soldiers might have been exposed to chemical weapons released from Kamisiyah. But the estimate has grown repeatedly over the last year, and last week the Pentagon announced that its latest computer models showed that the plume of nerve gas had passed over as many as 98,900 American troops, or about 1 out of every 7 American soldiers who served in the war. Saudi and

Iraqi civilians may have been contaminated as well.

James Turner, chief investigator for the White House panel, said that Tuesday's announcement on Ukhaydir was "obviously a significant development" given the possibility that many more troops were exposed to chemical weapons than previously thought.

"We need to do modeling to determine whether there was any U.S. downwind hazard from that bombing," he said.

The committee, which includes scientists and physicians, was created by President Bill Clinton in 1995 to investigate the ailments being reported by thousands of Gulf War veterans. More than 100,000 veterans have sought special medical checkups from the Defense Department and the Department of Veterans Affairs.

In a report in January, the committee said that chemical weapons were probably not responsible for the veterans' health problems, although it called for millions of dollars in new research on the health effects of exposure to low levels of chemical weapons.

# Clashes in northern Iraq claim nearly 300 lives

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) announced more than 200 members of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and 32 KDP members were killed during clashes in northern Iraq in the last three months, the Anatolia news agency reported.

The Turkish Armed Forces have staged a considerable withdrawal from northern Iraq, leaving few troops behind, following Turkey's cross-border operation into the area where two rival Kurdish groups clash.

KDP positions were attacked jointly by PKK and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) fighters, according to the Anatolia reporter who was briefed by KDP officials at check

points.

Ankara said it held the operation to support the KDP in restoring peace and to replace Baghdad's lack of authority in the area.

The clashes reportedly mostly took place close to the Iranian border with northern Iraq.

It has been reported that the PKK is forcing young people out of their camps and pushing them to fight due to low numbers in the organization left in northern Iraq.

Young people who protest an order to fight for the PKK are reportedly executed on the spot. Eight of these youngsters, including six unidentified bodies, were found executed after they refused to fight.

The leader of the PUK, Jelal Talabani, was

recently at a high-level meeting in Washington where he was strongly criticized and warned to withdraw support of the PKK.

The PUK is one of the two main Kurdish groups that have held power in northern Iraq since the area gained autonomy from Baghdad after the 1991 Gulf War.

A shaky cease fire has been held between the PUK and its main regional rival, Massoud Barzani's KDP, since the two sides ended months of fighting last summer.

Turkish Daily News

SATURDAY, AUGUST 2, 1997

# Iran: Washington playing dishonest Middle East role

Rafsanjani, in talks with Assad, calls for continued struggle against Israel

Tehran- Reuters

■ Iran on Friday called on Arab states to "correct" their policy toward Israel and accused the United States of playing a dishonest role in the Middle East.

Israel "is an illegitimate entity...and its nature is against peace," Iran's spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was quoted as saying by state television during a meeting with visiting Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

He said Arab states "must correct their stance toward (Israel) and the so-called Middle East peace process" which "proved to be fruitless and an illusion" as Iran had predicted long ago.

Iran and Israel have been bitter enemies since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution. Iran says Israel has no right to exist and has been vehemently opposed to the Middle East peace

process since its inception.

Washington, a key player in the peace process, has demanded that non-Arab Tehran end its objections to the peace moves and halt alleged support to groups such as Muslim militants who target Israelis.

Two Arab suicide bombers on Wednesday killed 13 people in Jerusalem's main Jewish market.

Khamenei, whose Islamic republic has repeatedly denied any links to terrorism, said Washington "is being dishonest with Arab states by fully backing Israel" and called for coordination among Muslim countries to "confront threats by their enemies". He praised Syria's "brave and explicit" policies of refusing to bow to Israeli pressure.

Iran's outgoing President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, in talks with Assad earlier, called for a continued struggle against Israel, Iran's official news agency IRNA said.

"The Iranian president said that the Islamic Republic...stressed the need for struggling against the Zionist regime," the agency said. Rafsanjani added that they had to discuss the increasing military links between Israel and Turkey — seen by Damascus as a threatening step to encircle it — and the Middle East economic summit scheduled for Qatar in November that is supposed to increase Israeli integration in the region.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 2, 1997

Turkish Daily News

# Washington gives N. Iraq \$4 m aid

PUK leader Talabani tries to stay away from the press

Washington- Turkish Daily news

■ The Clinton administration announced that \$4 million will be provided to "northern Iraq" for "humanitarian relief projects."

This sounded very much like the aid also mentioned by the visiting Iraqi Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Talabani held week-long meetings in Washington with various administration senior officials discussing "reconciliation" issues and implementation of UN Res. 688 and 986, according to PUK.

"The United States, as part of its continuing commitment to northern Iraq, has decided to

provide \$4 million for humanitarian relief projects in that area," State Department Deputy Spokesman James B. Foley announced on Friday. It is not clear yet which "projects" will count as a "humanitarian" one.

In the past the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) poured millions first to the opposition group Iraqi National Congress, and then to the Amman-based Iraqi National Accord. Both operations collapsed when Saddam Hussein helped KDP drove north of 36th parallel in September 1996, and capture the PUK-held regional administration center of Irbil. This time around, Mr. Talabani said he urged the administration to make its support overt and not covert.

"The funds are intended to ameliorate the exceptionally difficult humanitarian problems that exist in and around



PUK leader Jalal Talabani

the northern governorate of Sulaymaniyah," Foley continued. "This contribution will complement other relief efforts throughout the north by the

United States, U.N. agencies, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), the European Union, the Turkish Red Crescent, non-governmental organizations, and local institutions."

"The United States looks forward to continued cooperation with the U.N. to ensure effective implementation of Security Council Resolutions 986 and 1111 throughout Iraq, including U.N.-administered programs to address the exceptional humanitarian needs among vulnerable groups in northern Iraq," Foley continued.

"As with all its efforts concerning northern Iraq, the United States will continue to respect the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq."

It is not yet known through which agency or mechanisms this money will be administered in northern Iraq, without creating an imbalance between PUK, its arch-rival Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and the Turkmens.

Washington, for reasons unknown and despite what was announced by the State Department to the contrary, did not invite KDP's Masoud Barzani this time around for similar talks. Talabani said on Wednesday he will be going to Ankara soon to discuss money matters as well.

#### **Avoids press**

Talabani, despite the extent of his week-long contacts in Washington, tried to stay away from the press as much as possible. He, for example, gave a presentation at a well-known Washington think-tank which was closed to the press. The reception that was given in his honor at the Washington Kurdish Institute was also closed to the press. Again, the press was sent no invitation to the lecture he'll be delivering on Saturday at Georgetown Holiday Inn.

*Turkish Daily News*

SUNDAY, AUGUST 3, 1997

# Ünal of Justice Ministry presents 'Southeast report' to Parliament

In his study, which took nearly two years to complete, Ünal makes his comments mostly in the context of 'defending Turkish rights in the 13 years of military struggle against the separatists'

#### **SAADET ORUÇ**

*Ankara - Turkish Daily News*

■ Associate Professor Şeref Ünal, the head of the European Community Coordination Desk of the Ministry of Justice, presented his study entitled "The struggle against terrorism and the southeast question in the framework of international law" to Mustafa Kalemlı, the Parliament Speaker and Oltan Sungurlu, the minister of justice last week.

Ünal, who has been an experienced

bureaucrat for many years, discussed the Kurdish question in the framework of international legal proceedings, setting up similarities between the Southeast question in Turkey and international samples, such as the conflict in Britain. Şeref Ünal has reportedly done this study independently of any ministry.

This report is the third broad study on the Southeast. Professor Dogu Ergil, who wrote the first, discussed the Southeast from a sociological perspective for the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exports. Afterwards, Professor Bülent Tanör discussed the region in economic terms for the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association.

In the context of international law, Ünal compared the Turkish legislation with that of Western developed countries and international conventions.

The bureaucrat, originally a lawyer, who is

one of the leading figures involved in the trials in the European Court of Human Rights against Turkey, has suggested a series of proposals for the solution of the issue, which can be summarized as "steps to be taken in order to dispel international pressure."

In his report Ünal, discussing the issue in the light of the ongoing cases in the European Court of Human Rights, criticized the demand from some circles for a "political solution to the Kurdish issue," accusing these circles of having "malicious intentions" and being against the territorial integrity of Turkey.

In his report Ünal emphasized that Turkey must take some additional steps, such as appointing experienced people with clean records to security posts in the Southeast to wipe criticisms of Turkey's human rights abuses. According to him, the problem is the behaviour and attitudes of the people applying the laws, not a lack of legislation.

Regarding the Kurdish presence in the Southeast, Ünal wrote: "Most citizens of Kurdish origin living in the southeastern areas of our country, migrated to western regions of Turkey especially after the year 1950 and numbers decreased in the Southeast."

He ends his study referring to the remarks that former Turkish President İsmet İnönü addressed to Lord Curzon in the Lausanne negotiations: "The Turkish government also belongs to the Kurds for the reason that the real representatives of Kurds take their places in the Turkish Parliament and join the administration of the country equally."

### **Minority rights**

Ünal discussed the issue of minority rights in a broad sense in his 200-page study, also referring to a remark by Max Van der Stoep, the high commissioner for minorities for the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe.

"I can not define what a minority is, but I can recognize one when I see one," says Stoep, whose organization represents the situation of minorities in the world.

According to Ünal, there is a lack of legislation in the world regarding minorities. Even the definition of a minority has still not been decided.

"It is impossible for our Muslim citizens of Kurdish origin to be defined as a 'minority' because of the proceedings in the Lausanne Treaty which outlined the facts about Turkish Republic after the Turkish War of Independence. According to the Lausanne Treaty only non-Muslims are defined as minority. In fact, although those of Kurdish origin had been defined as minorities, it would have been impossible to make new arrangements for them. Belonging to a minority is an 'individual right', but not a collective right. The present state of international law does not recognize the collective right of minorities. This fact was repeatedly expressed in the relevant conventions with the warning 'the rights of people belonging to national minorities,'" he pointed out.

### **UN conventions**

Ünal also suggests in his report that Ankara should approve the United Nations (U.N.) Convention on Preventing all kinds of Racial Discrimination, the U.N. Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the U.N. Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Turkey is one of the few countries, which has not approved these yet. "It is difficult to explain why Turkey still has not approved these conventions which has been approved by all countries, even by Rwanda where Hutu and Tutsi clans kill each other," he says in the report.

### **OHAL, Village guards**

Regarding the Emergency Rule (OHAL) System currently being applied in the Southeast, Ünal suggests the system should be lifted gradually, as repeatedly promised in governmental platforms.

Ünal briefs that the OHAL system is a democratic institution which operates as a security plug and is present in all Western

constitutions, adding that Turkey has used the German Constitution as a guide for the OHAL. "There is no reason to criticize the village guard system applied in the Southeast, for the reason that most countries use special forces against terrorism, such as Delta Force in the United States, the Special Air Services (SAS) in Britain, GS-9 in Germany etcetera," he points out.

### **Administrative, political and judicial control**

Ünal suggests more central administrative, political and judicial control for the OHAL region, for the reason that authority given to officials in the region causes many problems.

### **Torture**

Commenting that torture is one of the issues putting Turkey in a troubled situation in the international arena, Ünal says that even though some criticism comes from subjective organizations such as Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch and Turkish Human Rights Association, Turkey has to take steps, such as to abolish the "Law for Prosecuting Civil Servants."

### **Rights**

"The main reason for the Southeast question is anti-propaganda made by some circles regarding the economic, social and cultural underdevelopment of the region. Since the economic and social life has nearly stopped in the region, the situation is getting worse and worse. There are such regions even in most developed countries," he says in his study.

Arguing that citizens of Kurdish origin have had all constitutional rights and have not been faced with any kind of discrimination, Ünal has proposed some economic improvements to be made, such as opening new working areas. He referred to the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) as having a "special importance."

Ünal also urged the of citizens Kurdish origin who have become rich, to make investments in the region.

### **Language**

In the section of his study entitled "Cultural Rights" he considers the possibility of using Kurdish names.

But while discussing relations with the state, he defends the current situation in which Kurdish is banned. "People who are not able to speak Turkish are provided with help by finding them a translator," he says.

Regarding broadcasting in Kurdish, Ünal suggests that the state TV, Turkish Radio and Television broadcast in Kurdish. Considering the formation of private Kurdish TV stations, Ünal repeats the current situation as the following: "Our citizens of Kurdish origins can have TV stations broadcasting in Turkish."

Regarding education in Kurdish, Ünal proposes institutions and associations open courses for Kurdish training, academic researches to be made on Kurds and Kurdish in universities.

"The state does not have to give instruction in a language other than the official language but private schools can be established to train in Kurdish," he said, adding that nobody would be interested in private Kurdish schools.

MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 1997

Turkish Daily News

# Ministries argue over how to solve human rights

**Foreign Ministry report: 'General Staff rejects the abolition of Article 8'**

Report suggests high-profile cases such as the Metin Goktepe and the DEP be speedily concluded

**SAADET ORUC**

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ The Foreign Ministry proposes a series of solutions for improving Turkey's human rights record in its report presented to the Prime Ministry, which reportedly includes many reactions from the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior.

The report has not yet been officially released to the press because of continuing discussions and disputes about its content among various ministries.

The human rights report prepared by the Foreign Ministry, which was made available to the Turkish Daily News, breaks down the issue of human rights into four categories:

- Allegations of torture
- Allegations of disappearances
- Institutional improvements
- Modernization of the police organization...

## **DEP case**

A senior Turkish diplomat told the TDN that because the trial of deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP), their arrest and the closing of the party was a significant step backwards in Turkey's human rights record, the report suggests that there be a quick conclusion to it and other high-profile cases that have marred Turkey's image abroad. The report also suggests quick action on the Metin Goktepe murder case, and the case involving the torture of teens in Manisa.

The DEP case, in particular, is one that is much discussed among western countries when looking at Turkey's human rights record. The DEP, which mainly consisted of politicians of Kurdish origin, was closed

down by the Constitutional Court and most of the deputies were arrested after the Parliament had lifted their immunity.

Currently, Leyla Zana, Orhan Doğan, Selim Sadak and Hatip Dicle are in Ankara Prison each serving 15 years sentences.

## **Army wants to maintain Article 8**

Significantly, the report noted that the Office of the General Staff rejected even discussion on whether or not Article 8 of the Turkish Penal Code, known as the Anti-terrorism law, should be reviewed or abolished. The report is proposing the following consideration on Article 8: "Further legislative changes must not affect the struggle against terrorism negatively, but enlarge the limits of freedom of expression."

The report also suggests abolishing imprisonment for members of the press.

"The releasing of journalists and writers imprisoned due to Article 8 and Article 312 of the Anti-terror law will only be a gesture, but the current legislation will remain as before," stated the report.

Additionally in order to prevent torture the report suggests that the highest level of the state make a declaration against it.

## **Turkey's importance**

In the first section of the report, Turkey is described as the only secular, democratic Muslim state and, with Israel, one of two democratic states in the region. The report notes that the democratic standards in Turkey were improving day by day. As an example, the report points to the flourishing of private television channels. The main obstacle to freedom of expression, notes the report, is how to measure it against the need for the unity of the state.

## **Ombudsman**

The report also suggests that a position for an ombudsman should be created. As in European countries, an ombudsman would be responsible for mediating on behalf of the public who are having difficulties sorting out various administrative, military, judicial or other problems.



## Rückzug der türkischen Armee aus der Politik?

### Weitgehende Umbesetzungen an der Spitze der Streitkräfte

Bei den diesjährigen Beförderungen in der türkischen Armee sind am Wochenende alle vier Kommandanten der Teilstreitkräfte ersetzt worden. Mit diesem Wechsel könnte die jüngste Periode, in der die Generäle massiv in die Politik eingriffen, zu Ende gehen.

it. Istanbul, 4. August

Vier Tage lang hat der Oberste Militärrat der Türkei über die diesjährigen Beförderungen in die höchsten Ränge der Armee getagt, bevor er seine Resultate am Montag Staatspräsident Demirel zur Billigung überreichte. Demnach wird – erwartungsgemäss – General Ismail Hakki Karadayi für ein weiteres Jahr Generalstabschef der türkischen Streitkräfte bleiben. Offensichtlich auf Karadayis Wunsch hin blieb General Cevik Bir stellvertretender Generalstabschef. Karadayi und Bir, der im Konflikt mit den Islamisten in den letzten Monaten immer wieder mit ausführlichen Presseerklärungen als «inoffizieller Pressesprecher» der beunruhigten Offiziere auftrat, sind die einzigen Repräsentanten der alten Garde. Die Kommandanten der vier Teilstreitkräfte – Landstreitkräfte, Marine, Luftwaffe und Gendarmerie – wurden überraschenderweise ersetzt. Der Wechsel in den Reihen der Generäle wurde in der Öffentlichkeit mit Erleichterung aufgenommen. Die türkischen Soldaten seien in die Kasernen zurückgekehrt, lautet das Fazit der türkischen Presse. Die Umbesetzungen sollen das Ende einer unruhigen Zeit signalisieren, in der die Generäle erneut massiv interveniert und sich zum regulierenden Faktor der türkischen Politik erhoben hatten.

#### Spannende Sitzung

Diese Periode hatte letzten Februar begonnen, als die Generäle ausserhalb der Hauptstadt Ankara in der Islamistenhochburg Sincan Panzerrollen liessen. In den folgenden Monaten steigerten sie ihren Druck, bis die von den Islamisten dominierte Regierung im Juni zurücktrat. Hinter den Kulissen war damals die Rede davon, dass die Februar-Intervention hauptsächlich von Offizieren der mittleren Ränge getragen und vom Chef der Marine, Admiral Güven Erkaya, gelenkt worden sei. Dass Erkaya sowie der Chef der Gendarmerie, Koman, pensioniert wurden, lässt die

Hoffnung auf eine Normalisierung in der Innenpolitik aufkommen. Im Konflikt zwischen Islamisten und Armee galten beide Generäle als Falken. Militärexperten gehen davon aus, dass Generalstabschef Karadayi die Umbesetzungen dazu benutzte, um die «politisch allzu aktiven Mitglieder» aus der Führung der Sicherheitskräfte zu entfernen. Die Auswechslung der vier Kommandanten garantiert zudem Ruhe in den Sicherheitskräften. Spekulationen, wonach Erkaya und Koman ihre Ämter für ein weiteres Jahr behalten würden, drohten zeitweilig unter den Offizieren, die ihre eigenen Beförderungen blockiert sahen, Unruhe auszulösen.

#### Beruhigung in Offizierskreisen

Die Frage, ob die neuen Kommandanten in politischen Fragen tatsächlich zurückhaltender als ihre Vorgänger sein werden, dürfte die Türkei noch lange beschäftigen. Unumstritten ist aber, dass der Rücktritt der Regierung Erbakan eine deutliche Beruhigung in den Kreisen der Offiziere und der mehrheitlich westlich orientierten Elite herbeigeführt hat. Die Tatsache, dass die Regierung von Mesut Yilmaz bemüht ist, den Wünschen der Generäle entgegenzukommen, wirkt auf die Armeeführung ebenfalls beruhigend. So hat die Regierung unmittelbar nach ihrem Amtsantritt für die Operation der türkischen Armee im Nordirak zusätzliche Gelder in der Höhe von 130 Billionen türkische Lira freigesetzt. Die Regierung des Islamistenchefs Erbakan hatte dies offensichtlich verweigert und damit den Zorn der Generäle auf sich gezogen. Die Generäle würden sich nicht mehr aktiv in die Politik einmischen, liess Karadayi durchblicken. Wie er kurz vor der Sitzung des Obersten Militärrates sagte, habe der Kampf gegen den radikalen Islam bisher zu den Pflichten der Armee gehört. Von nun an sei die islamistische Bewegung aber lediglich eine der Fragen, die die Armee aus Interesse verfolgen werde.

# Kurds don't want to go back

Istanbul - Turkish Daily News

■ Kurds who were living in Turkey's Southeast Anatolia region where they allegedly underwent pressure and torture before taking refuge in Germany have said that they do not want to be sent back to Turkey. Their current dilemma was explained in a press conference held Tuesday at the Istanbul Human

Rights Association office.

The Kurds who were identified individually by name have taken refuge in a church following a court decision in Germany's Saxony State that they should be returned to Turkey.

Among them were Abdullah Efe who was taken into custody in 1996 with his father Isa Efe at Derik and

who it was proclaimed had disappeared.

At the present time Efe is in Germany and the German court's decision would mean that he will be sent back to Turkey.

Along with Efe are Ramazan Aka, Hasan Sincar, Şevki Gök and Abdülbaki Özben.

According to the statement made by the

Human Rights Association, if these people are sent back to Turkey they may perhaps be tortured again and disappear while in custody.

The report further said that German offices should help those refugees who escape from Turkey and take refuge in Germany and that they ought not to be sent back in accordance

with international human rights laws.

Turkish Daily News

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1997

# Turkey's aggressive EU drive may 'backfire,' European officials claim



SEMİH D. İDİÇ  
Ankara-Turkish Daily News

Thursday, August 7, 1997

Turkish Daily News

■ Turkey's aggressive drive aimed at trying to join the "Europe train" at the European Union's Luxembourg summit in December may be backfiring.

Signs are emerging that this drive is considered "counterproductive" in Europe where it is said to be having the opposite effect to what Ankara wants; namely, to enhance Turkey's chances in terms of its EU bid.

Meanwhile, Ankara's attempts to show itself as being better placed economically than the countries the EU is due to start accession talks with in 1998, are being characterized as "alienating" by more than one senior EU diplomat based in Turkey.

"Turkey is not gaining any leverage with this line of argumentation in Europe, but instead is alienating itself from countries such as Poland which are its traditional friends and which do not like being shown in a bad light by Ankara's efforts to gloss its own image," one senior EU diplomat told the Turkish Daily News.

Ankara reacted angrily to the European Commission which in July recommended that accession talks start with five countries plus "Cyprus," meaning Greek Cyprus, but omitting Turkey. Turkish diplomats, while conceding Ankara's poor credentials on human rights and democracy, nevertheless have been insisting that the Turkish economy is much better than almost all the countries with which accession talks are to be held in 1998. In an angrily worded statement Ankara castigated the European Commission at the time

for its "big mistake" and said it hoped that EU leaders would correct this at their Luxembourg summit at the end of this year.

"It is precisely this attitude of trying to browbeat us into a certain mode of behavior that is rebounding on Turkey," another EU source told the Turkish Daily News. "The reality of the situation is that the Luxembourg summit will sustain the European Commission's recommendation," he added.

"What worries us is that Turkey — with its aggressive drive to get into this family photo, that meeting or that conference — is going to react doubly angrily if it finds out that the Luxembourg summit will not correct the Commission's 'big mistake,'" this source added.

"This in turn will cause fresh anger in Europe and leave Ankara facing outbursts that are totally counterproductive, but which are a direct result of its own attitude," the source said. European diplomatic sources in Ankara concede that the latest human rights report prepared by the Foreign Ministry and submitted to the prime minister "is a welcome recognition of where the real problem lies," vis-a-vis Turkey's EU bid even if it is "long overdue recognition."

But they have doubts firstly that this report will have the necessary effect on the Ministries of Interior and Justice, where it is expected to be resisted, and secondly whether the recommendations in the report can be implemented in time for them to make any significant impression in Europe and sway the EU at its Luxembourg summit.

"The essential problem here is that individual EU member states, the European Commission, and the European Parliament have all been given so many assurances in the past by Turkey on democratization and human rights — assurances which were subsequently contradicted by actual events — that, to be quite frank, Ankara has no real credibility on this score," the EU source told the TDN.

"The only yardstick left for Europe to go on after so many broken promises is actual developments. It is something of a 'we will believe it when we see it' attitude now," he added. EU diplomats also acknowledge the fact that "times have changed for Europe," and that political, social and economic factors are also working to Turkey's disadvantage at the present time.

Using Poland as an example, they admit that this country still has some way to go in terms of its economy and even to some extent its democracy, to fully meet European standards. But they say the Poles are "attune" to the favorable, and somewhat "emotional" attitude towards their country by Europeans, who by and large consider Poland as an "undeserving victim" of events outside its control this century, and therefore want it to be fully anchored in Europe.

By being "attune" in this way, they say Poland is "working day and night" to send "the right signals" to a politically receptive Europe "both in terms of its plans and in terms of its deeds."

They add that Turkey is not only far from sending any such convincing signals, but there is also the fact that while its economy may be "on the right track" it still continues to have serious deficiencies, one of the most serious being unemployment.

"With the problem of chronic unemployment in Turkey there is no politician in Germany, for example, who can appear to be giving the green light to Turkish membership. Given the prevalent fears in that country of being flooded by Anatolian peasants, especially when there is so

much economic and social turmoil following unification, the so-called 'German resistance' to Turkish EU membership is not something that is coming out of Helmut Kohl, as is widely believed in Turkey, but is an across-the-board phenomenon," is how one EU diplomat put it to the TDN.

The bottom line for most EU diplomats in Ankara is that they do sincerely believe in Turkey's place in Europe but see that there are no "overnight miracles" in the making in this regard. Turkey's pushiness on this score, they maintain, is not only working to its detriment, but also making the task of Europeans who believe in this country's vital importance and its eventual place in Europe more difficult.

It is noteworthy however, that they also laud the attitude of Turkey's new Foreign Minister Ismail Cem — although they have serious doubts if his government can survive or achieve anything concrete.

They are particularly pleased with Cem's argument that "it is not the end of our world" just because the European Commission has made an unfavorable recommendation, and with his suggestion that Ankara should continue with its "European vocation" regardless of the Commission, while also taking advantage of the other options open to it in its region and elsewhere.

## Military planes bomb PKK camps at Iraqi border

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Turkish security forces, supported by aircraft, bombarded five newly-built camps of the outlawed Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) at the border of northern Iraq on Wednesday, the Anatolia news agency reported.

F-4 planes and helicopters launched the operation in the early hours of Wednesday and utterly destroyed the five PKK camps — Kelmehmet, Besta, Yassıkaya, Karakovan and Meydankol — which were built by Kurdish separatists who managed to escape during the cross-border Operation Hammer last May, Anatolia said. Authorities said

the operation was continuing but they gave no details on the number of casualties. The bodies of five terrorists killed in previous clashes were found near the village of Akduman during a search of the area, Anatolia said.

## Talabani meets UN secretary-general

A KDP delegation will visit Ankara just after Talabani, Turkish officials say

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Jalal Talabani, the leader of the northern Iraqi opposition group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) met with U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in New York on Tuesday to discuss the Iraqi "campaign of ethnic cleansing," the PUK declared in a press release on Wednesday.

In the statement released by the PUK, it was also reported that Talabani and Annan discussed relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iraq, such as resolution 688.

"Talabani urged the U.N. to

enforce resolution 688 which demands that the government of Iraq cease repression of its citizens.

He called for continued vigilance by the international community with regard to the plight of the Kurdish people, and the need to provide guarantees for their future security and safety," said the statement.

Talabani is coming to Ankara after talks in London next week. In addition, a senior Foreign Ministry official told the Turkish Daily News that a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) delegation will be visiting Ankara after Talabani leaves Ankara.

It has not been clarified yet whether or not the delegation will be headed by Massoud Barzani, the KDP leader.

Turkish Daily News

THURSDAY, AUGUST 7, 1997

# Despite Talabani's 'forward position,' US aims a 'holding operation'

'Is something cooking in northern Iraq?' Most experts disagree

UĞUR AKINCI

Washington- Turkish Daily News

**W**here was the KDP's Massoud Barzani while Jalal Talabani was chauffeured around Washington in his wine-red Lincoln Continental?

Down in northern Iraq, reportedly fighting the PKK at this time of writing and "suffering big losses," according to a TDN source. That must be part of the reason why his two brothers in Washington abruptly left the city within the last few days, heading for northern Iraq.

## Barzani invited?

The State Department's press office assured journalists that a similar invitation had been sent to Massoud Barzani as well, but he did not respond. When TDN checked, the Barzani family said it absolutely was not true and Massoud Barzani received no invitation whatsoever. So we called the relevant bureau of the State Department, to find out if they would counter the KDP claim. But the bureau merely gave a suspicious "no comment."

So it looked as if Barzani did not get an invitation after all. A TDN source said that, when an informal probe through back-channels showed that Barzani would not accept an invitation, in order not to lose face, the State Department decided not to send an invitation at all.

Another State Department official, however, insisted that Barzani was definitely sent an invitation. We tend to believe that he was not.

But whether Barzani was also invited or not, the real question is, what does the Clinton administration hope to accomplish by pampering Talabani like a king when his arch-rival is not present for one reason or another?

## Aiming at Barzani

All the administration officials, former-officials, think-tank scholars and Kurdish sources we contacted in Washington for this analysis agree on the same thing: that the administration wanted to send a very stiff signal to Massoud Barzani "to mend his ways."

One close observer of Iraqi affairs put it this way: "There are two very critical issues in all of northern Iraq: Erbil and money. Massoud Barzani has got them both and is not sharing them with anybody. This is the administration's way of saying Barzani better change his monopolistic attitude."

How Barzani's monopoly came about is of course as important for Washington as the end result. The Barzani clan had always controlled the Turkish border and thus had full access to the proceeds from the Habur border gate.

But Erbil's capture back from PUK forces happened in September 1996 only with the support of Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard divisions. It was an alliance that shocked the Kurdish world, given the fact that thousands of Kurds as well as dozens from Barzani's own family had been killed in the past by Baghdad's forces.

## News Analysis

Since then, despite the "Ankara Process," there has been a discernible rapprochement between Ankara and the KDP, on the one hand, and between PUK and the PKK, on

the other. Talabani's welcome in Washington was America's way of saying that the Barzani-Saddam alliance was not acceptable — without saying anything about Barzani-Turkish relations — and the United States would do something about it, a source claimed.

## Talabani likes Baghdad too?

Yet, almost all sources again agreed that, despite Talabani's reputation as "Tehran's man," it was a dog-eat-dog world out there, and there was a real possibility that Talabani could also throw in the towel and cut a deal of his own with Saddam Hussein as well. So Washington may have decided to wean Talabani away from Tehran as well as not leaving him with any excuses to flip sides and run to Saddam's arms, the analysts argued.

## Debate within PUK

"There has been a debate within the PUK for some time," an insider source told TDN. "Some within the PUK said, 'we waited for the United States to do something for too long. The United States toyed around with the idea of an opposition but did not help us when Saddam attacked us. The KDP not only got Turkish support but captured Erbil too. And even then, Washington did not punish or condemn Barzani. So what's holding us back from getting our own deal with Saddam?'"

"On the other hand, the Iranians, which are seen in the PUK's corner, also could not do much when Saddam and the KDP invaded the north last fall," the source said. "So overall, there exists some good arguments within the PUK why they could get closer to Baghdad. And the Americans are aware of that too."

## PR leaks

To compound the squeeze on Barzani, both

Talabani and Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) have also escalated a very-targeted public relations war against the KDP.

There are many reports of Talabani and Chalabi harping to the administration about the \$1 million per day that the KDP allegedly earns from truck traffic at the Turkish-Iraq border. There have been unsigned anonymous documents appearing lately on journalists' fax machines giving very detailed expositions of how the Barzani family is making millions from trucking oil, black-market cigarettes, and even drugs.

Nechirvan Barzani, for example, a brother of Massoud, supposedly personally makes \$20,000 a month from each gas station that he owns in northern Iraq, and he owns 300 of them. And his business partner is supposedly none other than Uday Hussein, Saddam's son. Anti-KDP sources in Washington claim that is how Nechirvan paid \$1.5 million dollars for a villa in Great Falls, a plush suburb near Washington. The allegation could not be confirmed independently by TDN.

And all this is happening while the parties are allegedly getting ready to meet again in Ankara in September for yet another round of "Ankara talks," with Turkey as the host, and the United States and Britain as participants. The previous meeting on July 17-18 was canceled, reportedly at Turkey's request. Chalabi is expected to pay a visit to Ankara at the end of this month.

Wherever Talabani went in Washington, he introduced himself as the natural leader of the "united Iraqi opposition" against Baghdad.

At one think tank, he even produced letters of support from nine Iraqi opposition groups, all, of course, endorsing his leadership. But since even the KDP and the Amman-based "Iraqi National Accord" are still technically a part of the defunct INC, such letters probably do not carry much weight anyway.

### Something cooking?

Some sources said, although they did not have any proof of it, that all this attention lavished on Talabani could be the sign of yet another American attempt — following the collapse of the whole CIA-infrastructure in northern Iraq in the fall of 1996 — to "organize" a new "opposition effort" against Saddam. Talabani himself insisted that all U.S. support this time around should be overt, and not covert.

After all, the conspiracy-minded observers argue, there is an activist Secretary of State in office who, in her March 1997 speech at Georgetown University, openly said that Saddam Hussein has to go. Shortly after that, Bruce Reidel of the National Security Council, made it clear at another conference that the United States would continue to "contain" Baghdad to the bitter end. So perhaps this new American team is willing to take the risks that another Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, did not want to take.



Jalal Talabani

The majority of TDN sources, however, discounted the possibility that Talabani might be anointed as the leader of the new-and-improved Iraqi (Kurdish) opposition, to replace Barzani.

Given the deep personal animosity between the two Kurdish leaders, Barzani would never defer to Talabani, sources said. If there was anyone who deferred it was Talabani, they said, who agreed to have Barzani be part of the INC Troika, with an ex-Iraqi-general and a cleric.

### Holding operation

To sum it all up, despite the "forward position" taken by Talabani by promptly accepting (nay, perhaps engineering) Washington's invitation and aggressively pushing himself as the man on a white horse, Washington is mostly interested in a "holding operation," most experts think.

"We have to get Saddam Hussein and we are the only ones who can do it," Talabani reportedly told the U.S. officials behind closed doors. "But we want help and material aid since the KDP is hogging it all."

### Three messages

The United States, in an effort to balance the out-of-U.S.-orbit KDP, reportedly said the following to Talabani:

"One: We care about the Kurds. We will continue to protect them from Saddam's wrath. We'll make sure they get food and medicine."

"But, two: you should not leave the Ankara process. You have nothing to gain by doing so. Stick with the Ankara process, and we'll help you materially, if modestly, to balance the situation."

"And thirdly," the administration officials reportedly told Talabani, "cut all your ties with the PKK, once and for all. Quit playing the PKK-card against Ankara. Honor the October '96 declaration that you signed with the KDP, in which you guaranteed the security of the Turkish border by keeping the PKK away. You have not done that and it's time you do so. That way you will also not create a reason for the Turkish troops to enter northern Iraq in hot pursuit of the PKK."

### September test

September will be a test of Washington's efforts (or, perhaps, gamble) to strengthen the Ankara process by rolling out the red-carpet for Talabani, and thus, by the same token, hopefully providing an incentive for Barzani to keep Baghdad at arm's length and return to the fold.

But the trouble is there are many in Turkey who don't hate Saddam the way Americans do and believe in doing something to compensate for the \$30 billion loss Turkey suffered by honoring UN-sanctions against Iraq.

If cancellation of the July 17-18 meetings is an indication, progress between the Iraqi Kurdish parties and revamping of the "Iraqi opposition" (including the Turkomans, Assyrians, and Arabs as well) will take a lot more than dramatic moves to promote — for tactical reasons — one local leader over the other.

*Turkish Daily News*

SATURDAY, AUGUST 9, 1997

## Einseitige Reform des türkischen Bildungswesens

### Eindämmung der religiösen Mittelschulen als Hauptziel

Die Debatte über die angekündigte Verlängerung der obligatorischen Grundausbildung von fünf auf acht Jahre überschattet seit Wochen das politische Leben in der Türkei und heizt den Konflikt zwischen den Islamisten und ihren Gegnern an. Bei ihrer Reform wagt sich die Regierung Yılmaz nicht daran, den Inhalt des Schulstoffs zu verändern, der laut Experten «längst überholt und rassistisch» ist.

it. Istanbul, 9. August

«Die Herrscher in Ankara wollen die Imam-Hatip-Schulen schliessen.» Diesen Satz sagt Ibrahim Solman, Direktor des Vereins der Absolventen der Imam-Hatip-Schulen (Predigerschulen), immer wieder und wird bei jedem Mal zorniger. Gegenüber breiten sich die grosszügigen Anlagen der Fatih-Moschee aus. Das zentral gelegene Istanbuler Viertel Fatih macht seit Mitte der achtziger Jahre Schlagzeilen. Hier kann man die Re-Islamisierung der türkischen Gesellschaft deutlich erkennen. Die Frauen gehen verhüllt, die Männer tragen den Bart der Gläubigen, und die meisten Kinder besuchen die religiösen Koran-Kurse und Imam-Hatip-Schulen. Fatih ist eine Hochburg des politischen Islams in der Türkei. Bis im Juni, als die islamistische Regierung Erbakan zurücktreten musste, floss das Gebiet den westlich orientierten Bürgern Furcht ein und den Islamisten Zuversicht, dass der Tag, an dem sie die Macht ganz übernehmen würden, nicht weit sein könnte.

#### Entschlossene Gegner

Dieses Selbstvertrauen scheint Anfang August gebrochen zu sein. Das angekündigte Gesetz über die Erweiterung der obligatorischen Grundausbildung von fünf auf acht Jahre hat die Islamisten verunsichert. Es sei ein «mörderisches» Gesetz, erläutert Solman. Sein Hauptziel sei nämlich nicht, die jungen Generationen besser auszubilden, sondern die religiöse Ausbildung zu eliminieren. Solman stellt eine Rechnung auf: In der Türkei gebe es 1 300 000 Absolventen von Imam-Hatip-Schulen. Weitere 650 000 Jugendliche würden gegenwärtig in solchen Institutionen studieren, und 250 000 Kinder besuchten Koran-Kurse. Rechne man die Familie der Absolventen dazu, so ergebe dies eine Zahl von mehreren Millionen Bürgern, die bereit seien, für ihr Recht auf religiöse Ausbildung zu kämpfen.

Solman lässt die Drohung mit einer Konfrontation bewusst mitschwingen, offenbar weil er weiss, dass das andere Lager genauso entschlossen ist. Sechs Jahre nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion hat das türkische Establishment den politischen Islam erstmals als Gefahr Nummer eins deklariert. Auch die Generäle hatten ihre Zahlenspiele gemacht. Sie behaupten, die islamistische Wohlfahrtspartei würde im Jahr 2000 bis zu 36 Prozent der Stimmen auf sich vereinigen, sollte die religiöse Ausbildung wie bisher fortgesetzt werden. So wurde die achtjährige Grundausbildung zum Grundpfeiler einer Strategie zur Bekämpfung der «islamistischen Gefahr» erklärt.

Die obligatorische Grundausbildung dauert in der Türkei fünf Jahre. Die Sekundarstufe besteht aus einer dreijährigen Mittelschule sowie aus dem ebenfalls dreijährigen allgemeinbildenden Gymnasium (Lise). 24 Prozent der türkischen Kinder verlassen gemäss einem Anfang August veröffentlichten Bericht der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation im Alter von 10 bis 14 Jahren die Schule

und gehen zur Arbeit. Rund 11 Prozent der Jugendlichen zwischen 11 und 19 Jahren besuchen die religiösen Imam-Hatip-Schulen, die die ganze Sekundarstufe abdecken. Dieser Bildungsweg wurde nach der Mitte der siebziger Jahre für Familien der ärmeren Schichten zu einer populären Alternative. Die religiösen Schulen waren nämlich oft mit besseren Lehrkräften als die staatlichen Mittelschulen besetzt und versprachen vor allem der Jugend aus den anatolischen Provinzstädten oder den Slumvierteln der Metropolen sozialen Aufstieg. Als Paradebeispiel für den Erfolg der Imam-Hatip-Schulen gilt etwa der Bürgermeister Istanbuls, Erdogan, Kind einer Familie aus dem Armenviertel Kasimpasa. Mit der Einführung der achtjährigen Grundausbildung wird den Imam-Hatip-Schulen der Nachwuchs entzogen, der für Indoktrination empfänglich ist.

Noch hegen die Islamisten die trügerische Hoffnung, wonach der konservative Flügel der mitregierenden Mutterlandspartei (Anap) gegen das Bildungsgesetz stimmen werde. Die neue Regierung verfügt aber kaum über Freiraum. Die Generäle sind erst in ihre Kasernen zurückgekehrt, nachdem der Regierungschef Yılmaz ihnen versprochen hatte, die Bildungsreform zu realisieren. Dass das Bildungs- wie das Kulturministerium Kadern von Bülent Ecevit's Partei der Demokratischen Linken (DSP) übergeben wurden, gilt den Militärs als Garantie dafür.

#### Mutter aller Rassen

Im Gebäude des Verbands «Union im Bildungswesen» (Egitim Sen) ist die Stimmung gedämpft. Die anwesenden Mitglieder betrachten die Debatte zwischen Armee und Islamisten mit Distanz. Es herrscht hier die Überzeugung, dass die Re-Islamisierung jahrelang vom Staat gefördert wurde als Mittel gegen die linke Bewegung, die im letzten halben Jahrhundert als die grösste Gefahr galt. Die Fakten sprechen dafür: 375 der 600 Imam-Hatip-Schulen wurden von Regierungen des heutigen Staatspräsidenten Demirel eröffnet. Demirel will heute aber den Kampf gegen die Islamisten führen. General Kenan Evren, Anführer des Staatsstreichs von 1980, hatte ferner den obligatorischen Religionsunterricht eingeführt und den Zufluss saudiarabischer Gelder in Institutionen des Bildungswesens ermöglicht. Beim neuen Gesetz kann laut den Experten von Egitim Sen von einer Bildungsreform nicht die Rede sein. Dabei wäre eine Reform dringend nötig. So gibt es zu wenig Schulräume, und die Lehrer sind mit einem monatlichen Durchschnittslohn von 450 Franken unterbezahlt. Klassen mit durchschnittlich 70 Schülern haben zur Folge, dass die Bildung auf reines Auswendiglernen reduziert wird. Das grösste Problem dürfte allerdings inhaltlicher Natur sein. Wie Egitim Sen in einem Bericht festhält, ist der Schulstoff «rassistisch, chauvinistisch und sexistisch».

Jeder Schultag beginnt in der Türkei mit einer Zeremonie. Wie Soldaten stramm in Reihen aufgestellt, schreien die Kinder: «Ich bin ein Türke. Ich bin aufrichtig und fleissig. Meine Existenz soll der Existenz der türkischen Nation dienen.» Was die Schüler im Unterricht über ihren nationalen Ursprung erfahren, unterscheidet sich stark von dem, was im Ausland als geschichtliche Fakten gilt. Die türkische Rasse sei die Mutterrasse der gesamten Menschheit, haben die Lehrer zu unterrichten, und dass aus der türkischen Sprache, der «ältesten und besten», alle übrigen Sprachen geboren worden seien.

### Wirre Debatte

Die sogenannte «Sonnentheorie», vom Republikgründer Kemal Atatürk entwickelt, darf dem Dogma der kemalistischen Armee entsprechend nicht angetastet werden. Offenbar gemäss einer Anordnung des vom Militär dominierten Sicherheitsrates erfahren die Kinder ferner, dass die Türken in ihrer Kriegskunst und militärischen Be-

gabung unschlagbar seien, dass die Türkei aber von Feinden umgeben sei, die nur darauf warteten, das Land zu zerstückeln.

Ob dieser Schulstoff, der sich auf Bücher des Erziehungsministeriums aus dem Jahr 1932 stützt, der jungen Generation helfen kann, sich etwa auf einen Beitritt in die EU vorzubereiten oder die grossen Probleme der Türkei zu überwinden, ist fraglich. Die «Reform» der Regierung Yılmaz geht jedenfalls auf diesen Aspekt nicht ein. Die Debatte beschränkt sich lediglich auf die Frage, ob die Grundausbildung fünf oder acht Jahre lang dauern soll. Das neue Gesetz soll nächste Woche dem Parlament vorgelegt werden. Wieviel seine Realisierung kosten wird, bleibt auch für die Regierung noch ein Rätsel. Die zuständigen Minister haben sich nämlich bisher nicht einigen können und nennen Zahlen, die zwischen 300 Billionen und 1,5 Billionen türkische Lira (3 beziehungsweise 15 Milliarden Franken) variieren.

# Turkey dismisses S. Africa's helicopter embargo

**METEHAN DEMİR**

*Ankara - Turkish Daily News*

■ Turkey has played down the South African government's decision to veto the so-called sale of 12 Rooivalk attack helicopters to the country.

High-level military and diplomatic sources told the Turkish Daily News on Monday that there is no need to take such a decision into consideration because Turkey did not request and will never request any helicopters from South Africa. They pointed out that Turkey has already opened a bid for helicopters.

Ankara also blasted Pretoria's official protest issued by the Undersecretariat Defense Industries (SSM), the key decision making body in the defense industry. It said that such reports that Turkey has requested helicopters from S. Africa are baseless and also Denel Aviation firm's demand to sell helicopters to Turkey was rejected by Turkish officials.

### Reasons for S. Africa's negative attitude toward Turkey

South Africa's one-sided initiative to veto the so-called, but apparently, non-existent request for attack helicopters was probably the result of their removal last May from Turkey's \$3.5 billion tender to produce at least 145 assault helicopters with a foreign helicopter manufacturer, said defense sources. South Africa probably planned to take revenge for this exclusion by creating stories that they vetoed a helicopter sale to Turkey, said sources.

Despite its willingness to have a piece of Turkey's \$3.5 billion pie to produce assault helicopters, a firm from the Republic of South Africa was excluded by

Turkish Defense Industries Undersecretariat (SSM) from the tender last May. Just weeks before Turkey's \$3.5 billion bidding for the attack helicopters, South Africa lifted its previous embargo against Turkey which had been implemented two years earlier. A senior defense official said that they had asked the Foreign Ministry whether to include South Africa in the bidding. The result was negative because the country's maneuver to lift the embargo on the eve of bidding was considered to be solely in order to have a piece of the "cake."

News agencies, including Anatolia and Reuters, over the weekend quoted "The Sunday Independent" which said that the decision to block the 1.2 billion rand (\$257 million) sale of helicopter gunships to Turkey was made at the last meeting of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee on July 17. "Turkey is guilty of committing human rights violations against Kurdish refugees, which include the bombardment of Kurdish refugee camps," Laurie Nathan of the Centre for Conflict Resolution told the paper. "The Rooivalk could have been used for this purpose." Members of the committee were not available for comment on the report.

The reported decision followed an application by the arms industry seeking guidance on whether to proceed with negotiations for the sale of the helicopters to Turkey. Confirming the reimposition of the embargo this week, committee chairman Kader Asmal was quoted by the Sunday Independent as saying that the decision had been taken following consideration of Turkey's dominant position in the region, its continuing human rights violations and its illegal occupation of part of Cyprus.

Meanwhile, officials of Denel Aviation, the representative firm in Turkey for the Rooivalk helicopters said that there was not any negotiation with Turkish officials

TUESDAY, AUGUST 12, 1997

Turkish Daily News

for the helicopters, but if any sale happens from South Africa to any country, Pretoria must approve the sale. South African Embassy officials in Ankara said that their country has a consistent policy in the sale of any weapons abroad adding that probably, the Denel company demanded permission from the government's committee to sell such helicopters to Turkey.

#### **What is Turkey's actual helicopter plan?**

According to the current plan, Turkey will produce either an "assault" helicopter or a "third generation" helicopter to meet its needs in the 21st century, utilizing a foreign helicopter manufacturer with maximum local input.

Turkey began the "Request for Proposals" (RFP) process on May 30 with seven foreign helicopter firms who are to submit bids for the \$3.5 billion, 145 attack helicopters project. Helicopters produced by the compa-

nies that were asked to submit bids are as follows; the A-129 International (Mangusta), built by the Italian company Augusta; the French-German designed Tiger, built by the joint venture Eurocopter; Russia's Mi-28 Havoc and Mi-24 Hind helicopters. Also in contention are American products such as Bell-Textron's King Cobra, an advanced version of the Super Cobra, McDonnell Douglas's Apache Long Bow, and Sikorsky and Boeing's joint design Comanche Reconnaissance and attack helicopter (RAH-66) model, which is also a stealth helicopter.

In the long term, Turkey also plans to increase the number of its fleet of both assault and general purpose helicopters to 750 by producing them in its own facilities with maximum local input. Turkey also plans to sell helicopters to third countries including Turkic states in the future.

# *Dori Gold: Netanyahu knows that Syria supports PKK*

*Turkish Daily News*

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 13, 1997

'For the peace process to succeed, all terror must be eradicated in the region'

**UĞUR AKINCI**

*Washington — Turkish Daily News*

■ Dori Gold, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's one-man think-tank, said the new Likud government was aware of the anti-Turkish terrorism supported by Damascus.

Talking to the Turkish Daily News after a presentation at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on the future of the Middle East Peace Process, Ambassador Gold said: "Prime Minister Netanyahu is very much aware of the support Syria has provided for the PKK against Turkey. He is very much aware that in order for the peace process to work and be comprehensive, terrorism must be eradicated throughout the region."

#### **Peace without victims**

"I was once in a meeting of [now] Prime Minister Netanyahu and [Turkish] President Demirel — and this was during when we were in opposition," Gold continued.

"One of the statements made was that 'peace should not be made at anybody's expense.' And I think everybody knows what that means," he said.

#### **Turkish concerns**

Some Turkish leaders are concerned that Israel would sign a peace agreement with Syria without, however, exerting any pressure on Syria to cut its support for the PKK.

Some Turks are also concerned about the degree to which Israel is motivated to support the Turkish theses on the allocation of precious water resources between Turkey and some of her southern neighbors.

Israel herself is being challenged by some of her Arab neighbors for allegedly over-utilizing the limited underground water reserves of the region.

#### **Contrast to Peres**

Ambassador Gold's response to the TDN was in stark contrast to that of former Prime Minister Shimon Peres, of the Labor Party.

When TDN asked the former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, during a National Press Club appearance in Dec. 1995, if Israel was planning to keep the Turkish concern for PKK terrorism on the table in its negotiations with Syria, Peres acted as though he were baffled.

To this reporter's question whether Israel would insist that Syria expel the PKK as part of an overall peace agreement between Israel and Syria, Peres responded: "I am sorry, where did Turkey come in the story?... I wouldn't like to speak about a situation which I am not sure that I am fully aware of..."

Prime Minister Netanyahu seems to be fully aware of what Mr. Peres admitted he wasn't back in 1995.



Turkish Daily News

Thursday, August 14, 1997

## Talabani in Turkey for support against 'Arabization' of N. Iraq

Local Turkmen are reportedly also concerned about Baghdad's efforts to 'ethnically cleanse' the region

**SAADET ORUÇ**

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Jalal Talabani, the leader of the northern Iraqi Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), arrived in Ankara on Wednesday after completing a long visit to Washington, where he had extensive talks with U.S. officials.

Talabani was due to hold talks with Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and other senior Turkish officials today on the situation in northern Iraq.

While in the U.S. capital, Talabani expressed his concern about the "Arabization" of northern Iraq.

He was expected to repeat the same complaint in his talks in Ankara.

The Turkish side, on the other hand, will reportedly pressure him to be more clear concerning his attitude towards the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has bases in northern Iraq. Ankara will also warn him against his "flirting with Iran," sources told the Turkish Daily News.

The other key Kurdish faction in the region, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Massoud Barzani, has established ties with Baghdad, which both the PUK and the Turkmen are said to be concerned about. A Western diplomat, who wished to remain anonymous and who

recently visited the region, confirmed the so-called "Arabization" campaign by the Iraqi government in northern Iraq. A northern Iraqi source talking to the TDN claimed that Baghdad, appeared determined this time to "ethnically cleanse" northern Iraq and that it was implementing this campaign under resolutions it adopted on July 6 and July 28.

Northern Iraqi opposition sources are also claiming that Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein has plans to bring a million Palestinians from Lebanon and settle them in their region. The say this will adversely affect the Kurdish-dominated demography of the region.

The two resolutions adopted by Baghdad in July enable all Arabs to settle in Iraq, to have Iraqi identity papers and to acquire land on Iraqi territory.

The July 6 resolution is said to enable all Palestinian supporters of the Iraqi Baath Party led by Saddam Hussein to enjoy extensive advantages in Iraq. These resolutions are said to be "messages to the West" relating to the exclusion of Iraq from the Middle East peace process.

### **PUK and Baghdad?**

Meanwhile, Davud Baghistani a Kurdish human rights activist who is close to Kurdish political leaders in northern Iraq, told the TDN by phone from Erbil on Wednesday that both the Iraqi Kurdish factions were in contact with Baghdad.

"The PUK and Baghdad have been

discussing a joint administration for the cities of Kirkuk and Sinjar. The Kurdish parties are playing all of their cards."

He added that Sheikh Jafer and Feridun Abdulkadir, both from the PUK, met with Tariq Aziz and one of Saddam's sons in Baghdad only a few days ago. He maintained that the KDP was also in contact with Baghdad at the level of the party's politburo.

Another source told the TDN that PUK leader Jalal Talabani was working for the expansion of the United Nations imposed no-fly zone in northern Iraq, which currently extends to the 36th parallel.

Such an extension will reportedly bring the Kurdish Sorani tribe, currently falling outside the no-fly zone, under the protection of this arrangement. The Sorani Kurds are said to be supporters of Jalal Talabani and his PUK. Local Turkmen are also said to be supporting the PUK on this with the condition that a Turkish military force be replaced in that region or if this is not possible for the whole region to be demilitarized.

A senior Kurdish source maintained that former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller had discussed this issue with the leader of the Turkmen Front, Sinan Çelebi and Talabani during the PUK's previous visit to Ankara in January.

August 14, 1997

Turkish Daily News

## Washington repeats offer to start conditional dialogue with Tehran

**UĞUR AKINCI**

Washington - Turkish Daily News

■ As a possible harbinger of a future shift in Washington's containment of Tehran, the U.S. State Department repeated on Tuesday its previous offer to start a dialogue with Iran, if two main conditions are met:

1. Iran should offer authorized representatives for a dialogue but not third parties working through back-channels, and

2. Iran should satisfy the "three conditions" by giving up its support for international terrorism; opposition to the Middle East peace process; and quitting its program for "weapons of mass

destruction."

Iran's newly elected president Mohammad Khatami announced the new cabinet. Iran's former UN representative, Kamal Kharrazi, is named Iran's new foreign minister, replacing Ali Akbar Velayati. In answering a question concerning the reading of the State Department on Khatami's new foreign minister, department spokesman Jamie Rubin said, "As far as a specific reaction, we don't have one at this time."

### **Watching carefully**

But Rubin repeated that "Unfortunately, so far, we haven't seen any indications when it comes to the three areas that we're concerned about, that

there has been fundamental change. But as the president has said, we regard the election as an interesting development.

We're watching it very carefully, and we're watching very carefully to see whether there are modifications in any of those three areas that would make a difference."

"Are you saying that modification in any one of those three areas might provide the pretext or context with Iran, or an opening?" a journalist followed up during the regular press briefing.

"If there is a willingness on the part of the Iranian side to have an authorized dialogue in which those three issues — all three issues — are on the table, we have long said we'd be prepared to have such a dialogue. Those are the issues that put Iran in a category that has led us to engage in rather dramatic economic sanctions and rather determined efforts to get support for those sanctions around the world," Rubin said.

### **Iraq shoots its foot**

On the issue of the reason why the United States is blocking the acquisition of a number of ambulances by Iraq, Rubin said the difficulties Iraq was experiencing under the food-for-oil deal, as spelled out by U.N. Res. 986, was due to "constant attempts of the Iraqi government to find reasons why they are being discriminated against, even as the international community tries its best to give them every opportunity not to shoot itself in the foot and to help their people." But on ambulances, Rubin said he did not have the details.

### **Russian tanks to Syria**

On the issue of the Russian offer to upgrade Syrian military hardware by giving Damascus T-55 tanks, Rubin said, "Syria is on the terrorist list, and we don't particularly see any reason why it should get more weapons."

Friday, August 15, 1997

*Turkish Daily News*

**Süddeutsche Zeitung**

# Kurdish wound continues to bleed, but Turkey's leaders ignore it...

Masses pay the price of elite's continuation of civil war

**WOLFGANG KOYDL**

*Istanbul - Sueddeutsche Zeitung*

■ At times you would almost think "Kurdistan" was in Germany, not Turkey. In German towns the war against Kurds trying to establish their own separate state excites strong emotions among the large Kurdish refugee population and others, but here the conflict is rarely mentioned.

It might get some coverage in Turkey when the army sends another several thousand troops to hunt down Kurds across the border in northern Iraq. Otherwise, there are only the terse military communiques claiming that 30, 40 or 50 "terrorists were found dead," as the officials put it.

Three reasons are given for the general lack of public interest. Most important, the Turkish state is currently preoccupied with the struggle against the so-called "reactionaries" - the Islamists, in

other words, who are held by the all-powerful military to be a greater threat than the Kurdish "separatists."

That is an astonishing judgement when one remembers that NATO's second-largest army has failed over 13 years to defeat the "handful of terrorists" the military says are fighting to create Kurdistan, a separate country for the Kurds who now live primarily in southeastern Turkey, but also in northern Iraq and Iran.

The second reason is that the east of the country is about as familiar to Turkey's so-called secular elite as the jungles of Borneo. If you are prosperous enough, there is no need ever to visit towns like Şırnak, Siirt, Bingöl or Batman.

Even military conscripts from affluent families manage to avoid the area, serving their tours of duty as translators at NATO headquarters or perhaps at bases along the sunny Aegean: it is the sons of peasants and workers who are dying in the civil war. But while rich Turks may know nothing of "Kurdistan," they are determined it shall never be independent.

And then there is the third reason - a general ban on discussing the Kurdish problem, imposed under article eight of the criminal code. Anyone brave enough to disagree even marginally with official policy is accused of separatism, and can count on years in prison.

Rescinding article eight is out of the question, following the general staff's complaint that even the recent faint-hearted attempt to relax the law slightly went too far. "Further legislative changes should not interfere with the struggle against terrorism, but they

should expand the borders of freedom of opinion," it said.

The ban even blocks discussion of the cost of the hugely expensive war. Yet a public debate would quickly make it clear that everyone - including the military and its fellow travellers - pushing for the continuation of the conflict is working against Turkey's ultimate interests.

A few facts are sufficient to illustrate this: according to official figures, the war costs eight billion dollars annually, which is twice the country's total tourism earnings. Every second, the war costs more than a Turkish schoolteacher earns in a month.

The war is also damaging Turkish business, forcing firms to transfer production which should have been done in Turkey to neighboring countries. Moreover, it is forcing thousands of peasants out of their villages; with nowhere else to go, they head for the cities of western Turkey, where there is no work for them, creating political and social dynamite whose explosive power can hardly be estimated.

Worst of all, the war is driving Kurds into the arms of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), an organization which many people hate almost as much as the army.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, for PKK

chief Abdullah Ocalan considers himself in a league with the prophets, a kind of Messiah of the Kurdish people. Consider his Stalinist henchmen's method of continually finding new women to carry out their suicide bombings - it is as simple as it is perfidious. A PKK fighter will induce a peasant girl into a sexual adventure; but now, in the Kurdish culture, she has lost her honour, and suicide is often the only way out. But if she dies by strapping a bomb to her stomach and approaching a military installation, she is told she will at least die with her honour intact - and serve the party.

Caught between the state and the separatists are ordinary Turks and Kurds. The former recognize that some formal recognition must be given the country's Kurdish minority, and the latter accept that there can be no Kurdish state completely outside of Turkey.

There is a solution which could free the country from this nightmare: dialogue. Yet it seems farther away than ever, the PKK having moved on from teachers to postal officials as its latest target group. The Turkish state, the militants reason, must be eliminated from the region in all its manifestations. Officials of the state, meanwhile, dis-

parage the very suggestion of a political solution as "malicious," muzzling any peaceful organization which comes to be seen as a potential dialogue partner with the Kurds.

So, what can be done? Experience has shown that foreign pressure - be it arms embargoes, demonstrations or idealist appeals - brings nothing. The pressure must come from within Turkey.

The Kurdish wound must start to hurt - even in Istanbul, Ankara and the other Turkish cities and towns far away from the front lines. Otherwise, "Kurdistan" will continue to feel more a part of Germany than of Turkey. (DPA-GNNS)

**Editor's note:** This article was published in yesterday's edition of Germany's influential daily *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*. The TDN decided to publish it to show to our readers as well as the Turkish intelligentsia what the Western press thinks about the problem in Southeast Turkey and the wide discrepancies on how we see the problem and how they view it.

## Security tightened against PKK attacks to coincide with Aug. 15

*Turkish Daily News*

FRIDAY, AUGUST 15, 1997

Ankara - *Turkish Daily News*

■ Abdulkadir Sari, governor of the Emergency Rule Region (OHAL), said that security has been tightened in the southeast region of Turkey to coincide with Aug. 15, the date on which the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) launched its first terrorist actions in 1984.

"All the officers in the region are on duty," said the governor, the Anatolia news agency reported on Thursday.


Emphasizing that the separatists are unable to

take action because of the successful measures taken by security forces, Sari said, "The most common activity of the separatists nowadays is robbing villages."

Investigations against terrorist activities have been increased in Hakkari, Mardin and Şırnak, which are near northern Iraq and Syria, the regional governor said.

On Aug. 15, 1984, with a raid on the towns of Eruh and Şemdinli near Hakkari, the PKK announced the establishment of its military wing, the National Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK).

# Talabani assures Ankara on PKK



Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, who came to Ankara in response to an invitation by the new Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem had broad talks on Thursday related to the future of northern Iraq. TDN Ali Fuat Ulay

*Turkish Daily News*

FRIDAY, AUGUST 15, 1997

Consensus reached on stopping N. Iraq from becoming a 'terror base,' says Undersecretary Öymen

*Ankara - Turkish Daily News*

■ During wide-ranging talks in Ankara, Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), assured Turkey of his group's cooperation in the fight against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

Talabani was received by Foreign Minister Ismail Cem before having lunch with Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry Onur Öymen.

Before and after the meeting in the Foreign Ministry, Öymen met with senior

U.S. diplomats.

Briefing reporters about the foreign ministerial meeting with Talabani, Öymen commented that it had been fruitful, and cited Talabani's remarks about his commitment to Turkey's struggle against the PKK.

The implementation of the Ankara Process (efforts sponsored by Turkey, Britain and the United States, including the Turkmen Front and the Massoud Barzani-led Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to bring peace to northern Iraq) and the dispute with the KDP over the sharing of the revenues of northern Iraq were reportedly the main points of discussion.

There is a consensus between Turkey and the PUK against allowing northern Iraq to turn into a "terror base," Öymen told reporters.

"Talabani told us that they are sensitive

to that issue and will not permit any terrorist activities in the area. We discussed the steps to be taken within the territorial integrity of Iraq," said Öymen.

After the working lunch between senior Turkish foreign ministry and military officials with the PUK delegation, including Muhammed Tofiq and Shazad Saib of the PUK, Talabani told reporters that they had discussed the so-called Arabization in northern Iraq, Turkey's security interests and the Ankara Process. When asked about his talks in the United States, Talabani said that he and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan had discussed the expansion of the no-fly zone in northern Iraq to the 34th parallel.

Öymen, however, said the issue was not on Turkey's agenda. Turkey has suffered because of the use by separatists of northern Iraq as a base for their attacks against Turkey.

Since Nov. 1996, Turkey has been hosting the Ankara Process to help achieve a settled peace in the region and solve the related problems, such as sharing of the revenues from the Habur border gate, which is still controlled by the KDP.

Talabani has been expressing concerns for some time over a cross-border operation by the Turkish army against the PKK bases in northern Iraq, claiming that its rival Kurdish faction, the KDP, was given priority. The operation was carried out in KDP-controlled territory.

# Reformation or deformation of education

The parliamentary commission that investigated the Susurluk affair discovered enough hard evidence to implicate (and possibly to indict) important bureaucrats and politicians. But the commission immediately closed up like an oyster to hide its pearl

The corruption and criminalization of the political-administrative system became clearly evident in the aftermath of the Susurluk accident. The association of a fugitive criminal who was later alleged to have drug connections, a police chief and a Parliament deputy elected because of his status as a tribal chieftan, who is also the leader of an anti-terrorist mercenary tribal outfit in a luxury car loaded with assassination weapons has not been accounted for yet. Without clarifying this odd and controversial association, the ramifications of corruption and criminalization breeding in the system cannot be unearthed and stopped. If not the radical/fundamentalist protests against this what we call "Western and secular" system will go on brewing. Then we do what we always do and turn to the army to save us. Democracy, rule of law and social justice, all those modern values which we have forsaken so far will once again be sacrificed to uphold "our way of life." We will probably go on ignoring the stark reality that it is the absence of these qualities which corrupt and incapacitate the system.

The parliamentary commission that investigated the Susurluk affair discovered enough hard evidence to implicate (and possibly to indict) important bureaucrats and politicians. But the commission immediately closed up like an oyster to hide its pearl. Fortunately public and media pressure put on Parliament for further



## Opinion

Doğu Ergil

investigation still continues. Due to that pressure, the Parliamentary Commission on Constitutional Matters and Justice met once again on Friday Aug. 15 1997 to debate over the necessity of lifting the parliamentary immunities of Mr. Mehmet Agar and Sedat Bucak. Both DYP deputies are accused of being a party to questionable deeds. Six deputies from ANAP and the DSP (the coalition partners) did not show up to take the vital vote. Thus the parliamentary initiative to take an x-ray of corruption and possibly pave the way to the cleansing of the system was killed by the members of the very government which took office on moral grounds. I wonder what excuses these party leaders will make up if Refah emerges triumphantly from the next general elections?

Another disappointment of parliamentary performance has surfaced during the vote for eight-year continuous primary education. The difference between the "yes" and "no" votes way only 35. If this education reform was the sine qua non of towing away from the trap of traditionalism and bringing it closer to Western civilization, one would expect that the law makers of Turkey would have more enthusiasm.

How can one explain the lack of sufficient zest in the Parliament? First of all, every party in the Parliament has been in power at some time. None of them took the eight-year proposal from the rusty shelves of the Ministry of Education (for it has been there for the past thirty years) and tried to put it into effect. They did not even try. But the most pathetic example of political expediency that borders on misanthropy (not to use a harsher adjective) is the case of Mr. Mehmet Sağlam, the Former Minister of Education (DYP) who led his party's preparation of the proposal for eight-year uninterrupted primary education bill, and now voted against it.

It seems that the inspiration for Educational reform comes mainly from extra-parliamentary forces. These forces have not changed their minds to regulate and interpret religion as the state ruling secularist (not secular) elite sees fit. The old republican tradition of "if it is absolutely necessary, it must be under our control" does not make a secular regime but it buttresses the political-cultural dominance of the ruling elite (the secularists) over all spheres of societal life.

However, today's society is much better organized and much more varied than in the 1920s and 1930s. That is why the CHP (Republican People's Party) has voted against the clause that put the control of religious education under the administration of religious affairs. Indeed article 4 of the "eight-year continuous primary education bill" has been rejected by a vote of 300 as opposed to 214 "yes" votes. This article was proposing that a government agency take on the responsibility of all religious education for all creeds of all Turkish citizens.

Haven't we learnt anything from recent history? It is the state's control over culture, economy, and social life and the state's increasing incapacity and deterioration that has led to political fragmentation. In turn fragmentation has led to conflict among social-cultural groups. This contentious climate has also pulled the state into political conflict as a contending side. This mistake must not, never, ever be repeated again.

But alas! It happens over and over again.

## Turkish gangs are major drug traffickers in Britain

London - Turkish Daily News

■ The British Customs and Excise's National Investigation Service has recently released a report stating that Turkish gangs are dominating the heroin trade in Britain. According to the report, Turks are central to drug smuggling operations in Britain.

The report claimed that gangs were aggressively targeting Britain to increase their market and to satisfy a trend towards the recreational use of heroin. The Turkish gangs were believed to be benefiting from an increased recreational use of the drug by non-addicts.

The report said that agents operating overseas had infiltrated smuggling operations, enabling the National Investigation Service to remove many of the gangs and seize drugs worth billions of pounds. The report said that this 'penetration strategy' was also applied to Turkish operations, based in north or east London. It said that this strategy had paid off well and many of the gangs had been broken up.

This is not the first time Turkish gangs have been accused of such crimes. The issue was first raised by the British media some time ago with an emphasis on allegations of the involvement of Turkish state officials in the drug trade. Tom Sackwell, a Home Office minister under the previous Conservative government has accused Turkish state authorities of not taking the necessary measures to prevent drug trafficking into Europe, and Scotland Yard authorities have made claims that 80 percent of heroin arriving in Britain came from or passed through Turkey.

It is not only Turkish gangs that stand accused, but The Turkish Bank, which has three branches in Britain, is under investigation by the Bank of England after allegations that the bank was used by Turkish drug dealers for money laundering.

## Five inmates on hunger strike taken to hospital

Ankara-Deutch Press Agency

■ Five inmates from a high-security prison in the eastern Anatolian town of Elazığ, who have been on hunger strike for a month, were taken to hospital Monday due to their ailing health, the semi-official news agency Anadolu reported.

A total of 21 prisoners went on a hunger strike a month ago, demanding an improvement in prison conditions, the report said.

The inmates' demands include an end to solitary confinement in single cells, a solution to their health problems, the purchase of newspapers and magazines for convicts and detainees, an extension of visiting times and better treatment to their visiting relatives.

An official from the Turkish Human Rights Association (IHD) told the German Press Agency dpa that only four prisoners had been taken to hospital and that 19 prisoners were on hunger strike, with 40 other inmates giving them support through a rotating hunger strike.

All of them were political prisoners and members of the outlawed Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which has been fighting for independence in southeast Turkey for the last 13 years, she added.

The IHD official explained that the the inmates' aim on going on a hunger strike was to achieve their humanitarian rights. Their problems ranged from beatings when upon their admission to prison or during transfer to another one to their personal belongings being kept away from them.

"These are problems are seen not only in the Elazığ prison, but in every prison in Turkey. The Justice Ministry's recent move to keep inmates in single cells makes the solution of problems, which can be remedied through solidarity, impossible," she said.

In Turkey, prisoners are traditionally kept in wards, holding some 20 people.

The IHD official noted that a human rights delegation under the chsirmanship of IHD deputy chairman Eren keskin will go to the Elazığ prison today to neogotiate with the prison officials and the prisoners to end the strike.

# US weapons in Turkey: 'Need more action and conviction'

Stresses Turkey's strategic importance, and PKK terrorism

'Security situation improved in Southeast'

Washington - Turkish Daily News

■ A report on the use of U.S.-made weapons in human rights violations in Turkey noted that the Turkish military took the right precautions and adopted the right human rights measures.

However, what is lacking is the implementation, said the report entitled "U.S. Military Equipment and Human Rights Violations" prepared by the U.S. State Department and sent to the Appropriations Committee of the U.S. Congress in June 1997.

"The key to further progress will be firm implementation of these standards [adopted by the Turkish Armed Forces], monitoring of behavior in field operations, transparency and cooperation with investigations of abuses, and aggressive prosecution and stiff sentences for violators. Plans, intentions and principles must be accompanied by action and conviction," the report concluded.

Recent changes in Turkish law allow better representation for detainees as well as shorter detention periods. The Turkish military also adopted a "principles of behavior" doctrine, and human rights training programs for its officers and enlisted men.

The report, which is prepared as a follow-up to a similar report again submitted by the State Department to Congress in June 1995, claims only about 3 percent of the human rights violation cases filed end up in convictions.

## Turkey's importance

Before laying out its main conclusions, the report stressed Turkey's "great strategic importance" as a "pivotal country affecting U.S. interests in Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia."

Underlining the fact that most of the alleged human rights violations occur during the operations carried out against the PKK, the report stressed that PKK is "a terrorist organization" and "represents a threat to Turkey's security."

## Self-defense

Within such a context, Turkey is justified in using U.S.-made weapons, the report said. "According to U.S. security assistance pro-

visions, Turkey has the right to use U.S.-supplied weapons for self-defense and internal security. This includes combating criminal acts directed against the state and terrorism."

## Credible

Researching allegations filed by human rights organizations, the State Department said, "we believe some allegations of serious human rights abuses by security forces during operations against the PKK are credible." Equipment of U.S.-origin "has likely been used in operations against the PKK during which human rights abuses have occurred," the report said.

## Evacuations

"It is likely that U.S. equipment was used in support of the evacuation of villages," the report added. That was "a conscious strategy of limiting local logistical support to the PKK," the report explained.

## And compensations

It was also noted that the Turkish government has a program to compensate such villagers for their losses. But the report added that the compensation is not large enough and more funds must be budgeted in the future.

Most of the U.S. weapons and helicopters (including M-16s, AR-15S, M-203 grenade launchers) are used by police "special teams," the report said.

## Unsubstantiated

But the report could not prove every allegation. For example: "Eyewitness accounts alleging use of U.S. equipment in extrajudicial killings or torture are difficult to substantiate."

## Improbable

"Given the nature of the abuses, we believe the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment in torture cases is improbable," the report added.

## Improving security

The U.S. mission personnel were given full access to Turkish civilian and military officials, and they were helped in traveling to southeastern cities to conduct interviews.

In January 1997, for example, the U.S. officials traveled to Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, Şırnak and Diyarbakır. Four months later, in April 1997, they again traveled to Malatya, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Elazığ and Kahramanmaraş.

"[U.S.] Mission personnel, traveling throughout the southeast region have witnessed an improvement in the security situ-

ation there since January 1995," the report said.

## Three factors

Three factors helped improve the security situation and reduced "collateral damage" to civilians, the report said.

1) Turkish forces introduced a "principle of 'appropriate force' to ensure that only that force necessary to defeat the identified enemy would be employed ... U.S. officials' conversations with civilians in the region and press reports suggest that 'collateral damage' to civilians and private property has been reduced."

2) Shifting the fighting to the mountains also reduced the 'collateral damage,' the report said. "Security forces now conduct large-scale anti-PKK operations primarily in remote locations, minimizing the possibility of civilian casualties."

3) "Turkish units developed the capability to fight at night and put more emphasis on infantry and commando operations, thereby better targeting the PKK, and interdicting terrorists before they enter populated areas. This initiative appeared to have further reduced the incidence of unintended harm to civilians," the report said.

*Turkish Daily News*

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 20, 1997



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## Kurd rebels say Iran kills three members in Iraq

21 August 1997  
Web posted at: 02:31 GST, Dubai time (22:31 GMT)

DUBAI, Aug 20 (Reuter) - Iran's main Kurdish opposition group said on Wednesday Iranian agents killed three of its members in northern Iraq.

The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), in a statement faxed to Reuters from its Paris office, said "terrorists of the Islamic republic" on Tuesday attacked a van carrying a number of its members, killing three men and wounding nine.

The statement named the three as Saeid Moradi, Esmail Namaki, and Ali Zakaleh. It said the attack occurred outside the Kurdish-held town of Dukan, 40 km (25 miles) from the Iranian border.

There was no independent confirmation of the report. The KDPI said last week two of its members and a local man were killed and four other Iraqi Kurds were injured in an armed attack in the Kurdish-held city of Sulaimaniya in northern Iraq. It blamed Iranian agents.

Iranian Kurdish rebels have waged a low-intensity guerrilla struggle against against Tehran since state forces drove most of them into Iraq after major offensives in the early 1980s.

In July 1996 Iranian troops crossed into northern Iraq to hit KDPI bases.

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## Barzani says

## they did not call Turkish troops into northern Iraq

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Massoud Barzani, leader of the one of the leading Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), stated that they did not invite the Turkish troops into northern Iraq for the cross border operation of the Turkish Army whose objective was to clear the area of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

Talking to an Iranian daily, Barzani added that his party had not been opposed to the Turkish military's operation because they believed that the PKK had left them with no alternative.

"If the PKK leaves our area, we will not have to struggle with the PKK", said the Kurdish leader.

Answering a question about the current situation with regard to the presence of Turkish troops in northern Iraq, Barzani said that only small armored groups remained near the borders of Iraq, Syria and Turkey in the area of the operation.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 21, 1997

Turkish Daily News



# Turkey attempts to derail 'Peace Train'

Interior Minister Murat Başeskioglu said, "We have been following the so-called effort called the "Peace Train." Our observation is that it is linked with terror. This is an effort that involves us and our neighbors. Our foreign Ministry has been contacting the countries in question and we are helping them in this regard."

## ELİF SEMİHA KÜFLÜ

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ A group of European deputies, union representatives, human rights activists, intellectuals, clergymen, Turkish intellectuals and deputies, political party representatives and unionists are planning to travel from Brussels to Diyarbakir Aug. 26-Sept. 1 on the "Peace Train," in a project aimed at promoting democracy and a political solution to the Kurdish conflict in southeastern Turkey.

The train is scheduled to depart from Brussels on Aug. 26 after a rally and will be met with a welcoming ceremony at every stop: Koln, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia and Istanbul, where it will stay one day and leave after taking Turkish participants on board. The train will then proceed to the southeast in order to arrive in Diyarbakir on Sept. 1, World Peace Day.

However, Turkish authorities are attempting to derail the train.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Sermet Atacanli said Wednesday that Ankara considers the Peace Train campaign, organized under the auspices of the Der Appell Von Hannover organization, as "an initiative linked to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)."

"We believe that this initiative is a propaganda effort linked to the terrorist organization and we have contacted the necessary authorities," he said.

As to what precautions would be taken about the train, the official responded; "Whatever is necessary."

Ankara has been doing everything "necessary." The Foreign Ministry made demarches in all the capitals on the train's itinerary and requested they not let the train pass through their countries.

Interior Minister Murat Başeskioglu said, "We have been following the so-called effort called

the "Peace Train." Our observation is that it is linked with terror. This is an effort that involves us and our neighbors. Our foreign Ministry has been contacting the countries in question and we are helping them in this regard."

He added that the people organizing the campaign are people who have close contacts with the PKK.

Ankara first contacted Belgian authorities through the Turkish Embassy in Brussels, explained its view on the subject and requested that the train not be allowed to leave from Brussels.

"There was no legal foundation for us to execute such a request and we think banning the Peace Train is a mistaken attitude and would send of a negative image. It would also generate negative publicity for Ankara. We really had trouble understanding their attitude," a reliable source close to Brussels said.

The same source said, "Ankara asked Brussels not to give assistance to the train. We think this means preventing the train from leaving."

Turkish officials in Sofia asked the Bulgarian authorities not to permit the train enter Bulgaria, "because it is a PKK, terrorist provocation and both countries have a confirmed stance against terrorism," another reliable source told TDN.

The Peace Train appears to be attracting more Turkish intellectuals who want a peaceful solution to current conflict than international participants.

The campaign still has a wide list of both international and national participants and supporters.

Some of the European deputies planning to take the trip are: Alan Brooks (British Labour Party), Ronald Fink (German Greens Party), Andrea Dornbush (German

PDS), Ulla Jelpke (German deputy), Angelika Frankhausen (Swiss deputy), Atilla Balogh (British Labour Party).

Yves Juoan (French author), Guyot Madeline (head of the Peace and Freedom Movement), and Uve Steinberg (German PDS) are among the European intellectual and activists participating.

Among the Turkish intellectuals supporting the campaign are singers Ahmet and Leman Sam, famous actress Mujde Ar, acclaimed poet and playwright Murathan Mungan, journalists Ertugrul Kurkcil, Erdal Oz, Yilmaz Odabasi, Cezmi Ersoz, political parties People's Democracy Party (HADEP), Freedom and Solidarity Party (ODP) and the Istanbul constituency chairman of the Republican Peoples' Party (CHP) and unions.

Turkish officials created a bigger fuss over the Peace Train than would have occurred if they had allowed it to make its way through Europe and Turkey peacefully and unhindered.

*Turkish Daily News*

FRIDAY, AUGUST 22, 1997

# Turkey looks for new options beyond EU


New relationship with Europe mooted after setbacks in bid to join the fold

WOLFGANG KOYDL / *Istanbul- Sueddeutsche Zeitung*

■ In his more than five years as Germany's foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel has had his share of lows, but his last trip to Turkey had to be one of the lowest.

In his entire time in Ankara, the beleaguered Kinkel was the target of diplomatic putdowns, combined with an endless stream of abuse and snide remarks. Though put more aggressively than ever before, the reason for his hosts' anger — Turkey's frustrating and unsuccessful quest to become a member of the European Union (EU) — was a longstanding one.

The Europeans curse the Turks' pushiness, and the Turks complain of European hypocrisy. And both are right. Since Kinkel's unhappy visit in late March there has been a change of power in Ankara and a definitive change in the political tone out of the Turkish capital, if not in actual policies.



A first indication came with Turkey's surprisingly mild reaction to the recent release of the EU Commission's Agenda 2000, which foresaw membership for Greek Cyprus but not for Turkey. An apparently unflustered Foreign Minister İsmail Cem responded that while EU membership remained a goal for Turkey, it was far from an obsession. Indeed, Cem and the other members of Turkey's new foreign policy team, Deputy Premier Bülent Ecevit and the state minister responsible for relations with Europe, Şükrü Sina Gürel, have struck European officials as far more self-confident than most of their predecessors. All three come from the Democratic Left Party, which has always subscribed to a fairly energetic brand of Turkish nationalism.

For the first time, Turkey announced that it would look for alternative orientations in its foreign policy if the EU failed, as Gürel put it, to come up with a "concrete pre-accession strategy" for his country. He warned that Turkey would have to "newly evaluate" its relations with Europe if there were no progress toward EU membership.

Gürel did not say, however, if he would make his own concrete proposals for the "concrete strategy," and acknowledged that the "EU has the right to set objective criteria" for potential members, not only on economic questions but also on human rights.

"We owe it to ourselves to attain these high standards," he said. "That is regardless of the EU, and is only a question of time."

The Turks have flatly rejected other pre-conditions to their membership, including demands that they improve relations with Greece and agree to a resolution of the Cyprus problem. "We will never submit to such a deal," Gürel vowed.

At the same time, Turkish leaders have been careful not to commit themselves to an alternative policy if EU membership cannot be obtained: Cem at one point cited a possible free-trade arrangement with the United States, but recently denied any such policy was in the works.

Still, closer links to the United States and Israel are being pondered. "With both states we are linked through security interests," the foreign minister said, "but our relations must not be limited to this field."

Behind all this speculation is a dream of many Turks who look forward to the day when they can tell the arrogant Europeans they are no longer needed. A western diplomat here summed it up thus: "There may come a time when the EU will be interested in Turkey but Turkey will no longer be interested in the EU, because it will have so successfully developed other orientations."

That day, however, is certainly a long way off, and the EU remains by far Turkey's most important trading partner. Germany alone takes 22 percent of all Turkish exports; only eight percent go to the United States.

There is also a large Turkish population in Germany, which makes the bilateral relationship deeper and more complex than a simple trading one.

Turkish officials, for example, have often spoken of the "positive role our German friends have played in the EU" on issues pertaining to Turkey. And yet, Gürel pointed out, "Among the Turkish public, the impression may not go away that Germany is the biggest obstacle to our European goals."

Chancellor Helmut Kohl will get a firsthand look at Turkey's evolving policies when Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz visits Bonn late next month. An official in Ankara said Yılmaz and other Turkish leaders want Kohl to provide a "clearer" perspective on Turkey's chances of entering the EU.

It is highly questionable, however, whether Kohl will risk such a commitment so soon before next year's parliamentary elections. (GMNS)

SUNDAY, AUGUST 24, 1997

*Turkish Daily News*

## Turkey Islamic Party Seeks Support

By Suzan Fraser

Associated Press Writer

Sunday, August 24, 1997; 4:18 p.m. EDT

ANKARA, Turkey (AP) -- Turkey's former prime minister quietly has turned to a French right-wing leader and European nations he spurned while in power, seeking help fending off attempts to ban his pro-Islamic party.

Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan met with France's far-right politician Jean Marie Le Pen in an Aegean resort town last week to discuss Erbakan's view that banning the party is incompatible with democracy. Party officials confirmed the meeting after reporters found out about it.

"I shall start a campaign within the European Parliament against Turkey on the issue," the Turkish daily Hurriyet quoted Le Pen as saying in its Sunday edition.

Erbakan resigned as prime minister in June under military pressure after he advocated stronger ties with Muslim countries, including Libya and Iran, and opposed Turkey's bid for membership in the European Union. In May, Turkey's chief prosecutor demanded the party be shut down for pro-Islamic policies he said violated the constitution's secular tenets.

The prosecutor's indictment cited speeches by Erbakan and other party members as evidence Welfare was trying to establish an Islamic regime.

The party maintains the charges are based on media stories blown out of proportion.

To rally more foreign support, Welfare is translating into English and German a 215-page preliminary defense brief it already has submitted to the court, Hurriyet reported. The brief would be sent to the European Human Rights Commission and members of the European Parliament, according to the newspaper.

A decision is expected in a few months.

A second party, the pro-Kurdish Hadep, also could be banned because of its alleged links to an outlawed Kurdish rebel group.

Some political analysts oppose Welfare's closure on the grounds that it could increase sympathy for Islamic movements at a time when the party's popularity appears to be declining.

A predecessor to Welfare was closed by the supreme court in 1971 and the party appears to be prepared. It reportedly has transferred assets to trusted individuals to evade possible seizure by the treasury.

If the court outlaws Welfare, Erbakan could be banned from politics. He reportedly already has handpicked a leader for a new pro-Islamic party in the offing.

# Spielball der Parteien

Die Kurden im Norden des Irak leiden unter der Feindschaft ihrer Führer /

Von Namo Aziz

Die Abendsonne in der Ebene von Arbil glänzt wie eine riesige Apfelsine. Die Latten des kilometerlangen Zaunes lassen die roten Sonnenstrahlen auf- und abblincken. „So also haben sie sich um die Lage der Kurden gekümmert“, meint unser Fahrer, verbittert über die Patriotische Union Kurdistan (PUK). „Deswegen haben sie es zu nichts gebracht. Das große Grundstück dahinter“ – er zeigt auf den Zaun – „gehört dem ehemaligen Premierminister Kosrat Rasul von der PUK. So haben sie gelebt, aber nach uns, den Hundenden Kurdistans, haben sie nicht ein einziges Mal gefragt.“

Die Millionenstadt Arbil macht nicht den Eindruck einer Stadt, die vor etlichen Monaten noch Kriegsschauplatz war. Ende August 1996 rief Massud Barzani, Vorsitzender der Demokratischen Partei Kurdistans (KDP), die irakischen Truppen zu Hilfe, um gegen den kurdischen Rivalen PUK unter dem Vorsitz von Dschalal Talabani vorzugehen. Dabei wurde die von der PUK zuvor eroberte Stadt Arbil wieder von der KDP eingenommen. Im klaren Blau des Morgens sind weder Waffen, Peschmerga oder gar irakische Soldaten zu sehen. Statt dessen pulsiert das Leben auf dem Bazar. Der Staub der letzten Monate und Jahre auf den Regalen ist bunten Waren gewichen.

„Das Kurdistan von heute im Vergleich zu dem vor Monaten ist ein Paradies“, sagt der Lehrer Sherzad. Grundnahrungsmittel wie Reis, Mehl, Fleisch und Gemüse sind erschwinglich, und besonders Energiestoffe wie Petroleum und Kerosin sind wieder auf dem Markt. „Früher kostete ein Barrel Kerosin 1600 Dinar, heute ganze drei Dinar“, meint Sherzad und zeigt mir die Zahl mit seinen Fingern. „Warum soll ich nicht glücklich sein, daß ich es in diesem Winter warm habe, daß ich genug zu essen habe, daß ich nicht sterben muß?“

Für diese wirtschaftliche Sicherheit ist Sherzad gern bereit, die Grenzen zum Süden zu öffnen. Denn mit dem Hilferuf Barzanis an Bagdad ist Kurdistan wieder ein Teil des Irak geworden. Weder die Amerikaner noch die Europäer hätten den Kurden wirklich geholfen. Und die islamischen Gruppen hätten auch nur ihre Moscheen gebaut. „Was sollen wir mit Moscheen, wenn wir Hunger haben?“, so Sherzad.

Zum Dank für die Heimkehr des verlorenen Sohnes hat Saddam Hussein das irakische Embargo gegen Kurdistan aufgehoben. Jetzt strömen täglich Iraker in die kurdischen Städte, um dort günstig fremde Waren aus Iran und der Türkei zu erwerben. „Die Araber hier stören mich kaum“, meint Sherzad. „Sie haben zwar andere Kleidung an, sind aber doch Menschen wie du und ich.“

Treffpunkt der intellektuellen Elite Arbils ist das unscheinbare Teehaus Mitsch-

ko. Jeder, der etwas über Kurdistan wissen will oder etwas darüber zu schreiben weiß, trifft sich dort. Mitschko, die inoffizielle Presseagentur Kurdistans, Sammelpunkt für Journalisten, Künstler und Sänger.

„Diesem schwarzen Gift haben wir es zu verdanken“, meint der Journalist Abdullah, während er seinen Tee umrührt. „daß wir nach all den Ungerechtigkeiten in unserem Land noch existieren. Mein Freund, ihr Europäer kennt nur das Giftgas von Halabdscha 1988. Das haben wir schon lange vergessen. Damals zählten die Toten 5000, in den letzten drei Jahren bei den Kämpfen zwischen Barzani- und Talabani-Anhängern sind 15 000 Menschen getötet worden.“

Arbil war immer auch Sitz der größten irakischen Opposition, INC. Seit der Eroberung durch die KDP sind ihre Mitglieder unter dem Vorsitz von Ahmed Tschelbi verschwunden. „Das waren doch überhaupt keine Oppositionellen. In Wirklichkeit waren sie der echte Feind des kurdischen Volkes“, meint Abdullah. „Zur einen Hälfte waren sie Baathisten und sind dann mit der irakischen Armee nach Kirkuk zurückgegangen. Die andere Hälfte arbeitete für den Itlaat, den iranischen Geheimdienst.“

Abdullah führt mich zu Bahia, einer schwarz gekleideten 54 Jahre alten Frau. Die Oppositionellen hätten immer wieder junge arme Kurden gesucht und ihnen einige Dinar geboten, wenn sie eine TNT-Bombe in Bagdad zu einer bestimmten Uhrzeit hochgingen ließen. Die armen Teufel seien dann auch nach Bagdad gegangen, aber wiedergekommen sei keiner. Der Sohn Bahias ist einer von ihnen. Die Mutter sagt nur: „Ich möchte doch wenigstens seine Leiche haben.“

Arbil ist auch die Stadt des Parlaments-sitzes der kurdischen Republik, die seit 1991 existiert und durch Wahlen im Frühjahr 1991 ihre Vertreter Talabani und Barzani ernannte. Inzwischen wurde ein drittes Parlament gegründet, das aus 65 Parlamentariern aller kurdischen Parteien – inklusive zweier islamistischer Parteien, Minderheiten wie Assyrer und Turkmenen sowie 19 PUK-Mitgliedern – besteht. „Wir sind Demokraten und lieben den Frieden. Die PUK-Mitglieder haben wir vor der Gründung separat zur Teilnahme aufgefordert und sie wie eine kurdische Partei behandelt“, meint der neue Premierminister Rowsch Shawwa (KDP). Die Parlamentsarbeit laufe ohne Schwierigkeiten. Das liege aber nur daran, daß Talabani hier keinen Einfluß habe.

Im Parlamentsgebäude sitzt hinter einem Berg von Unterlagen Hussein Taha Sinjari, der Minister für Kommunales und Tourismus, mit bedrückter Miene. Mit einem Fingerzeig auf die Unterlagen meint er: „Das hier, die Hinterlassenschaften der

PUK, sind unsere eigentlichen Sorgen.“ Unter der PUK-Herrschaft über Arbil haben PUK-Mitglieder riesige Grundstücke untereinander verteilt. Die spätere Möglichkeit einer Elektrizitätsversorgung, Wasserleitung und des Straßenbaus hätten sie nicht bedacht. Manche der PUK-Leute hätten ihre Grundstücke verkauft, an Leute, die oft ihr letztes Geld dafür hergaben. Diese Kaufverhältnisse wurden durch die KDP für rechtlich unwirksam erklärt. Die Käufer verlangten natürlich Schadenersatz, aber die meisten PUK-Leute seien einfach verschwunden. „Könnten Sie sich vorstellen, daß hier wegen solcher Verhältnisse gemordet wird?“, fragt mich der Minister. Doch dann fährt er tonlos fort. Natürlich habe sich hier vieles verbessert, besonders was die allgemeine Sicherheit betreffe. Diebstähle und Verbrechen seien selten geworden.

KDP-Peschmerga in roten und schwarzen Turbanen, bis zum Hals mit Waffen und Munition beladen, gehen auf den Straßen Salaheddins, dem Sitz von Massud Barzani, auf und ab. Ecken und Winkel der Stadt sind bestückt mit Bildern des legendären Vaters von Massud Barzani, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, auch der rote Mullah genannt. „Wir lassen nicht zu, daß Iran Kurdistan zum Schauplatz seines Terrors gegen die Welt macht. In jeder Stadt gab es mehrere Mykonos-Morde. Das wenigstens verstehen die Europäer“, meint Massud Barzani selbstbewußt. „Wir waren und sind der Meinung, daß nur von Kurdistan die Demokratie im Nahen Osten ausgehen kann. Deswegen verteidigen wir unser Land um jeden Preis.“

Der KDP-Vorsitzende ist aufgeregt. Immer wieder greift er in Unterlagen auf seinem Schreibtisch. „Sehen Sie, wieder ein Beispiel für die Zusammenarbeit von Itlaat und PUK. Ich brauche nicht lange zu suchen.“

In einem Brief von Talabani an den Verantwortlichen des iranischen Geheimdienstes im Bereich Pasdaran, Sardar Ga'afari, heißt es: „Die guten Beziehungen zwischen PUK und dem obersten Revolutionsrat der Islamisten im Irak sowie der Islamischen Republik Iran haben zur stärkeren Sympathie der Vereinigten Staaten mit Barzani geführt. Deswegen brauchen wir Ihre militärische, finanzielle und wirtschaftliche Unterstützung. Geben Sie unseren Peschmerga Waffen, Munition, Kleidung und Schuhe.“ In einem späteren Brief Talabanis vom 12. August 1996 aus Iran an führende PUK-Mitglieder heißt es dann: „Morgen bekommen wir einige Sachen. Die Verwandten (er meint die Iraner) haben sich in Bewegung gesetzt. Sardar Ga'afari versicherte mir, die Sachen werden noch in dieser Woche ankommen.“

Diese Dokumente konnte die KDP nach der Flucht Talabanis erbeuten. Talabani



Krieger der Demokratischen Partei Kurdistans vor einem Bild Mustafa Barzanis

Foto ROPI

mußte so schnell fliehen, so Barzani, daß er nicht einmal seinen Aktenkoffer mitnehmen konnte. Und diese Dokumente bestätigten, was er schon zuvor vermutete: PUK arbeite mit dem iranischen Regime zusammen – und überreicht mir eine Liste mit den Namen von 360 KDP-Mitgliedern, die in den letzten beiden Jahren verschwunden sind. „Auch Opfer der Meuchelmorde von PUK“, so sagt Barzani wütend.

Während des Gesprächs flackert mehrfach das schwache Licht der Glühbirne und erlischt. Als wir ein weiteres Mal im Dunkeln sitzen, meint Barzani: „Ist das nicht eine mörderische Tat der PUK? Sie haben einige Teile der Generatoren von Dukan nach Iran mitgenommen und damit die Elektrizität in Kurdistan fast lahmgelegt.“

Die Stromerzeugung in Kurdistan erfolgt an zwei Staudämmen, Derbendichan und Dukan. Nach dem Golfkrieg waren iranische Pasdaran nach Derbendichan einmarschiert und hatten alle vier Generatoren explodieren lassen. In mühevoller Kleinarbeit wurde wenigstens eine Turbine mit einfachen Materialien von Architekten wieder zusammengeflickt. Bagdad in diesen frühen Tagen der Unabhängigkeit um Unterstützung zu bitten, war ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit. Der Großteil der Stromerzeugung lastete seither auf dem zweiten Staudamm in Dukan. Doch bis zur Vertreibung der PUK-Leute stellte dennoch die elektrische Versorgung in Kurdistan kein Problem dar.

Mit dem Verschwinden der PUK allerdings verschwanden auch 145 Speedgouverneur-control-Platten – von den Kurden „Karten“ genannt –, ohne die die Generatoren nicht betrieben werden können. So lastet zur Zeit die gesamte Elektrizitätsversorgung auf der einen zusammengeflickten Turbine von Derbendichan, die zudem

noch Elektrizität für den Staudamm von Dukan stellen muß, da sonst die dortigen Generatoren im Stauwasser versinken würden.

Die Flucht der PUK hat vielerorts Spuren hinterlassen. In dem von Saddam Hussein gegründeten Betonghetto mit dem Namen Saddam-Halabdscha leben Flüchtlinge, deren Dörfer von der irakischen Armee in den Jahren 1988 bis 1990 zerstört wurden. Aus einem der einförmigen Häuser klingen Klagelieder, aus der Tür kommen wie Ameisen schwarzgekleidete Frauen. Es ist das Haus der 55 Jahre alten, hageren Mahbuba. Ihr Sohn Bahdschad sei erst 15 Jahre alt gewesen. Plötzlich seien seine Freunde gekommen. Sie riefen ihn, er solle schnell kommen, die PUK sei geflohen und jetzt sei die Zeit zum Plündern. Dann seien alle zum Hauptgebäude der PUK gegangen. Es sei ein Jeep mit drei PUK-Peschmergas gekommen, einer habe mit seinem Gewehrkolben auf den Freund Bahdschads geschlagen, der andere habe auf Bahdschad geschossen. „Mein Sohn hat doch noch die Hände hochgehalten, damit sie nicht schießen. Und dann traf die Kugel, zuerst seinen Finger und dann das Herz.“ Nach einer Pause fügt sie hinzu: „Ich bin Witwe. Als Bahdschad sechs Jahre alt war, ging sein Vater eines Morgens vor die Tür und wurde erschossen. Ich weiß nicht von wem. Jetzt hat Bahdschad das gleiche Schicksal wie sein Vater. Wenn es eine kurdische Regierung gibt, soll sie den Mörder finden, und dann werde ich ihn genauso erbarmungslos erschießen. Auch im Islam gilt: Auge um Auge, Zahn um Zahn.“

Plündern ist fast schon wie eine neue Kultur unter den Kurden geworden. Es wurde ihnen oft genug vorgemacht: Zuerst plünderten irakische Soldaten die Häuser

der Parteien; dann plünderten Peschmerga die Zentren des irakischen Geheimdienstes; schließlich plünderten PUK-Peschmerga die Häuser der KDP-Peschmerga und umgekehrt. Auch vor medizinischen Gerätschaften machte man nicht halt, in der festen Überzeugung, dadurch die irakische Regierung empfindlich zu treffen. Der Gouverneur von Arbil zeigt mir eines der vielen leergeräumten Krankenhäuser. Selbst ein großes Gerät für die Zentrifugierung von Nierensteinen sei von den PUK-Leuten beschlagnahmt, in seine Einzelteile zerlegt und nach Iran transportiert worden. Dort sei es mit dem Wissen des früheren PUK-Premierministers Kosrat für zwei Millionen Dinar verkauft worden, wie ein Schreiben belege.

Entsprechend gesunken ist allgemein die Achtung vor fremdem Eigentum. Auf dem Bazar von Slemani (Sulaimanah) wird mir stolz ein Fernseher gezeigt. Auch ein Beutestück. – Eine europäische Hilfsorganisation ließ einige Häuser in der Nähe von Slemani bauen. Am Tag der Fertigstellung stürmten die Anwohner mit Sack und Pack in die Häuser; ihre Wohnungen seien schlecht. Daß die Häuser nicht für sie, sondern für Flüchtlinge bestimmt waren, stört sie wenig. Und manche, so heißt es, hätten gar die besetzten Häuser verkauft.

PUK-Mitglieder hatten vor ihrer Flucht deshalb wohlweislich ihr gesamtes Hab und Gut in Brand gesteckt. Das Grundstück und Büro von Talabani in Kalacholan, dreißig Kilometer von Slemani entfernt, war vormals ein blühender Park. Jede Pflanze, so versicherte mir Talabani einmal in einem früheren Gespräch, sei von ihm selbst gesetzt worden. Heute weiden auf der verbrannten Erde knochige Kühe. In der Fluchtnacht gingen riesige Lager an Lebensmitteln in Flammen auf.

Neben Fensterrahmen, Türgriffen und anderen verkohlten Resten gelang es der KDP, große Mengen von Unterlagen der PUK sicherzustellen. Für wenige Dinar wurden sie feilgeboten und gingen danach unter den Familien rund. Ein Journalist in Slemani überreicht mir einen Brief von einem gewissen User Fakiani an den früheren Premierminister Kosrat: „Wir finden es besser, wenn Mahmud Haleni nicht getötet wird, weil wir ihn in Zukunft brauchen werden.“ In einem anderen Brief des PUK-Peschmerga Siruan Derascha an den Verantwortlichen der Kulturangelegenheiten von PUK, Kadir Hadschi Ali, vom 20. Februar 1994 heißt es: „Wie von Ihnen entschieden wurde, soll ich der Verantwortliche für die Sonderabteilung von Tschamschamal werden. Aber Sie haben sich selbst dagegengestellt. Ich war ein Vertrauter der PUK. Zwischen dem 23. März 1991 und dem 24. Januar 1994 habe ich 15 Personen für PUK beseitigt. Und jetzt sind Sie nicht bereit, mir diese Position zu geben?“ Dann werden im einzelnen die Namen der Ermordeten – darunter auch drei Frauen –, Todesdatum und die Namen der Auftraggeber genannt.

Seit Oktober 1996 ist Slemani wieder unter der Vorherrschaft Talabanis. Das Symbol der Freiheit Kurdistans, der übermenschlich große, aus Stein gehauene

Schmied Kawe mit dem Kopf des Tyrannen Zohak in Händen, trägt seitdem wieder ein grünes Halstuch, in der Symbolfarbe der PUK. Die Bewohner Slemans sind gespalten. Ein Teil jubelt der Rückkehr Talabanis zu. Der andere – wenn er auch nicht Barzani liebt – ist bedrückt über die Existenz des iranischen Geheimdienstes, der offenkundig unter der Maske des Roten Halbmondes tätig ist.

Rizgar, ein Student, führt mich zur Schastiyaka, einer 60 Meter breiten Straße um Slemani. „Viele Kurden aus Iran sind hierher nach Slemani gekommen, weil sie Schutz vor dem iranischen Regime suchen. Seitdem die iranischen Sicherheitskräfte hier sind, gibt es kaum einen Tag, an dem nicht einige dieser Kurden aus Iran getötet werden. Hier auf der Schastiyaka liegen dann ihre Leichen.“

PUK unternehme nichts dagegen. Das einzige, was Talabani tue, meint Rizgar leise zu mir, sei der Bau einer fünfzehn Millionen Dinar teuren Moschee für Schiiten. Ein Symbol der Bruderschaft mit den Mullahs. Und das in Zeiten, in denen es kein Brot zu kaufen gibt. Und vor allem, wo es in Slemani keine Schiiten gibt, fügt Rizgar hinzu.

Wir gehen auf den Straßen Slemans. Junge Männer sind rar geworden. Viele von ihnen sind verletzt. „In den Krankenhäusern gibt es nichts. Nicht einmal Pfla-

ster, Aspirin-Tabletten oder Jod. Selbst ein Gesunder wird krank, wenn er in eines der Krankenhäuser kommt.“ Rizgar schweigt. Dann fährt er fort: „Die meisten meiner Freunde sind entweder in den Bergen im Kampf gegen die KDP, oder sie sind weg aus Kurdistan. Geflohen nach Europa.“ Auch er, so versichert er mir, halte es hier nicht mehr lange aus. Er verstehe zwar nichts von Europa. Aber als Asylbewerber in Frieden zu leben, könne nur besser sein als hier zu sterben. „Unser schönes Land ist schon lange von den Parteien verkauft worden.“

Bei der Rückkehr in Richtung Türkei sehe ich bis zur Stadt Koja immer wieder iranische Militärfahrzeuge mit Katjuscha-Raketen. Die etwa einen Kilometer lange Front zwischen PUK und KDP hat sich etwa im Bereich Degala gebildet. Beide Gruppen haben einander über das Fernglas im Visier. Ab und zu rast eine Kugel in Richtung des Feindes. Nach der Rückkehr nach Arbil zeigt sich der Bazar voller Menschen. Bettelnde Kinder, Frauen, Arbeitslose, Flüchtlinge. Es ist ein Teil der 70 000 Menschen, die aus dem Süden als vermeintliche KDP-Anhänger von PUK-Leuten vertrieben wurden.

\*  
Der Verfasser ist Orientalist und lebt als freier Journalist in Deutschland.

## Ecevit lashes out at meeting between Erbakan and Le Pen

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Deputy Prime Minister and State Minister Bülent Ecevit on Sunday denounced the secret meeting between former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, and French far-right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen, which was held midweek at a Turkish seaside town where Erbakan usually spends his holidays. Speaking at a press conference in Ankara, Ecevit said that Le Pen, currently visiting Turkey, aims to undermine relations between French and Turkish people living in France by alienating the Turks in France from the mainstream. If this were to happen, Turks would face great reaction from French people. Veteran politician Ecevit noted that such initiatives could be well achieved by the Welfare Party and the Islamist National View Organization (AMGT) — known as the RP's European arm — adding that the anti-Turk and anti-Muslim Le Pen is trying to make contact with Erbakan's RP in order to encourage them to organize the AMGT to pull the Turks in France out of the cultural mainstream and thus causing an uproar against Turks in France.

Le Pen heads the far-right National Front which campaigns fiercely against immigration to France, mostly from Muslim North Africa. Reports said Le Pen expressed sympathy for the Turkish Islamists in their fight against closure by the constitutional

court. In his response to CHP chairman Deniz Baykal's earlier criticism that the government had become tired quickly, Ecevit said the government has been working in the fastest way ever seen and that his government would be ready for an early election either next spring or fall. He added that the more they stay in power the more they are able to serve the country. He also thanked to Baykal for his support of the government.

### Baykal on Le Pen and government

Meanwhile, Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal said the meeting between Erbakan and Le Pen was normal but to have kept it secret from the public was very strange. He added that in democracies people can meet whoever they wish but if somebody does not want publicize it, it is very interesting.

Baykal said that if Erbakan is trying to seek support from outside Turkey, especially from Europe, his efforts to attract support from Le Pen are counterproductive.

Left wing CHP leader Baykal also criticized the government over the latest price increases, saying that the increases were not related to the eight-year compulsory education system because when the current government made plans for this new education system, there were no plans to increase prices. Baykal urged the government to fight tax evasion instead of increasing prices that hurt the public.

Monday, August 25 1997

Turkish Daily News

# KDP sources say alleged PKK, PUK cooperation hurts peace



SAADET ORUÇ  
Ankara- Turkish Daily News

'Seven hundred PKK militants are stationed along the cease-fire line with the PUK and they are sharing the same barracks and logistic support'

**The United States is trying to convince the KDP to allow Talabani to transit KDP territories, instead of Iran, when travelling abroad**

■ Northern Iraqi sources close to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) claimed on Sunday that cooperation between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has reached an alarming level, even endangering the activities of the Peace Monitoring Force (PMF), established in the framework of the Ankara peace process.

The peace process was started after the United States, Britain and Turkey convinced the KDP and PUK to end a bloody dispute between them and start dialogue for a peace settlement in northern Iraq.

In spite of the fact that Jalal Talabani, the head of the PUK, in his recent visit to Ankara, said that the PUK was not supporting the PKK, the sources briefing the Turkish Daily News said that evidence of cooperation between the PUK and the PKK was in a PMF report. In the report, signed by Hasan Kaplan, commander of the force and KDP representative during meeting on Aug. 17, it is said that PKK militants, after an attack on the KDP-PUK cease-fire line, escaped into the PUK-controlled area.

"The PUK has not only refused to attend PMF meetings since beginning of July, but is also acting together with the PKK. We have captured six PKK militants and six PUK members, who together launched an attack against the PMF last week," said the source, who also gave the number of PKK militants along the cease-fire line between the KDP and the PUK as 700.

"Seven hundred PKK militants are stationed along the cease fire line with the PUK. They are sharing the same barracks and logistics support. Recently there have been PKK bombings in the

area. Contrary to promises given, violations have increased during the last eight weeks," he pointed out.

"The PMF has turned into a target. During an investigation in the Rewanduz area, the commander of the PMF was the target of a combined attack from the PUK and the PKK," the source said. Shazad Saib, the PUK's Ankara representative, however, strongly denied these reports, telling the TDN that the region was difficult to protect against PKK infiltrations.

## Parties disappointed

Both Kurdish rival parties, the PUK and the KDP, are reportedly disappointed in the "lack of enthusiasm from the parties involved in the Ankara process." "While the KDP is doing its best for peace, paying salaries and releasing prisoners, the PUK refuses to even attend the PMF meetings," a northern Iraqi source said, who defined the Ankara talks as just a continuation of previous Paris and Dublin talks.

"The process has come to a dead end and it needs to be pushed. There are efforts being made for key meetings to be held, such as the ones in Washington and Ankara, but it is too early for a Barzani-Talabani meeting at the moment," said a source who is close to the KDP.

He also added that they do not see any serious stance being taken by the West with regard to the future of Iraq.

In addition, Jalal Talabani himself during his recent visit to Ankara, defined the process as a "game."

Similarly, KDP circles are also urging the parties involved in the Ankara process to take a clear position with regards to its continuation.

Parties targeted in the peace process include the Turkmens, the Massoud Barzani-led KDP and the Talabani-led PUK. There have been four meetings in Ankara which were co-chaired by senior Turkish and U.S. officials.

## Iranian involvement

Claiming that the reason for Talabani's last visit to Tehran was simply "to inform Iranian officials about the contacts of the PUK in London, Washington and Ankara," a northern Iraqi source commented that the PUK is totally controlled by Iran.

"In early July, a high-level delegation from Pasdaran met with Talabani in the PUK-controlled area of northern Iraq, to

express their concern about Baghdad-PUK contacts. They asked the PUK to play the game according to their rules," he said.

The TDN was also told that the United States and the other sponsoring parties are trying to prepare the necessary conditions for the PUK to use KDP territories instead of Iran, when they are forced to leave their area.

Iran and Syria, for a long time, have been very concerned about the continuation of the Ankara process. When the Turkish army executed a cross-border operation against PKK bases in north Iraq, Iran was reportedly upset because it felt that the Iranian regime was under threat from Turkey.

A senior KDP member, when asked by the TDN about the issue, said that they were ready to make sacrifices for peace in the region. "But we are still working on the issue," he said.

Referring to the withdrawal of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) from the PUK government, the source said that Iran had created a provocation between the PUK and the IMK in order to mediate between them later.

"The fighting between the IMK and the PUK was staged by Iran. The IMK was forced to join the PUK government in Suleymaniye. When they decided join, we asked the two ministers from the IMK to resign and thanked them for their contribution," he said.

Turkish Daily News

Tuesday, August 26, 1997

# The mystery of Susurluk weapons

Security Directorate searched worldwide for months for the missing police force guns and for the records of the arms seized at Susurluk

*The fact that the assassination gun and rifles equipped with silencers belonged to the Security Directorate's Special Operations Section has been concealed for a long time*

Two months after determining that the assassination gun had belonged to Special Operations, the Security Directorate was still looking to Interpol, as if it were looking into the matter

**KEMAL BALCI**

Ankara - TDN Parliament Bureau

■ Ten months after a traffic accident at Susurluk revealed the existence of "gangs within the state," the incident has yet to be brought fully into daylight. The arms found in the Mercedes (license plate number 06.AC.600) belonging to Sedat Bucak, a member of Parliament, which crashed at Susurluk on Nov. 3, 1996, remain shrouded in mystery to a certain extent.

According to the findings of the gendarmerie unit which arrived at the scene of the accident, there were a number of pistols and automatic rifles in the car, some of them licensed, along with hundreds of bullets of various sizes. A special .22 caliber Baretta and special rifles which use 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm bullets, drew a lot of curiosity.

After examining the Baretta, experts said that the pistol had been modified to fit one of the silencers found in the car and that the serial number on the pistol itself was different

than the serial number on the barrel. Some of the bullets found in the car were .56 mm and 7.12 mm of the type called Bixie. The guns capable of firing these specific kinds of bullets, on the other hand, were missing from the scene.

## **Security Directorate concealed it?**

In an official letter it sent on Nov. 3 to the Susurluk prosecutor's office which was conducting the initial investigation of the incident, the Security Directorate listed the owners of the licensed guns while saying that the "other weapons" were being tracked via Interpol. The "other weapons" in question were the "assassination pistol" and the special bullets. A week later the Security Directorate sent similar letters to both the Istanbul State Security Court and to the Gendarmerie Criminology Department.

After these letters, a "secret hand" intervened in the case, starting a series of misleading communications which would delay the investigation. The fact that there were

two different serial numbers of the Baretta made this possible.

Though it was common knowledge for arms experts that Baretta pistols' serial numbers consisted of one consonant or vowel plus five figures plus another consonant or vowel — for example A 56789 Z — Security Directorate officials sent to Interpol, not the standard number found on the pistol itself, but the different number found on the barrel, that is, A 06421, to be tracked. This caused a serious delay and a deviation from the right direction. The Italian company which produces the Baretta pistols warned the authorities about this and what followed was a lengthy exchange of letters. It took months to track down the history of the specific Baretta found in the Mercedes.

Yet, the Security Directorate could have easily found out about the gun by going through its own records. An effort in this direction was indeed made but when relevant information was sought from the Special Operations Section, the latter stalled the investigation — deliberately or not — by officially replying that they had no records of such a weapon.

The Security Directorate also had trouble when it tried to track down the kind of weapons which would use 5.56 mm bullets through its own records. Though it was no secret that only the Special Operations Section used that kind of bullet and the five boxes in which 100 bullets were found in the Mercedes carried the inscription Security Directorate issue, it took a very long time to determine how the bullets were put in the car and where were the weapons which used



those bullets. As noted above, these weapons had "vanished" in the aftermath of the accident.

To identify the guns which used 5.56 mm bullets a list of these specific type of guns was prepared at a police laboratory.

Curiously, as the list was being prepared, the Security Department refrained from providing clear identification as to the 100 Galli rifles of Israeli make which belong to the Special Operations Section and which use the kind of bullets in question. Instead of giving the trademark of these rifles it simply said "minimachineguns" firing 5.56 mm bullets were being used by Special Operations teams.

#### Records finally found

Forty-five days after the Susurluk crash the Security Department said in an official report that the Baretta assassination pistol belonged in fact to the Special Operations

Section. That pistol had been imported to Turkey from Israel by a company named HOSPRO and had been among a party of weapons given to the Turkish police force as a gift. The 10 weapons imported on Dec. 8, 1993 had been delivered to the Special Operations Section.

This detail could be documented only after 80 days had passed since the accident, that is, on Jan. 24, 1997. Along with the Baretta, the 5.56 mm bullets and the Galli rifles which fire the 7.12 mm bullets had been imported by HOSPRO from Israel and handed over to the Security Directorate as a gift. And the Security Directorate had handed over to the Special Operations Section all 100 of the 5.56 mm Galli rifles and the 20 6.12 mm Galli rifles received as a gift.

So it took nearly three months to determine that the weapons had belonged to the

Security Directorate. During that time the parliamentary Susurluk research commission completed its mandate. The commission could have access to the above-mentioned information only when the Istanbul State Security Court completed its investigation report and sent a brief to Parliament formally asking for the lifting of the legislative immunity of the two parliamentarians implicated in the Susurluk case, Mehmet Agar and Bucak.

Despite all this information the Special Operations Section is still saying that it has no records of the Baretta in question.

And there is the possibility that the rifles firing special bullets had not been "lost" following the accident but were placed in the storage depots where they originally belonged.

## Bahçeli: Peace train aims to boost separatist activities

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chairman Devlet Bahçeli criticized the Western sponsors of the Peace Train, who had planned to travel to Turkey to stop the 13-year-old conflict between Turkish security forces and the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). "The PKK, along with countries and organiza-

tions which protect it, are trying to give new momentum to the separatist movement in Turkey," he said.

Bahçeli held a press conference on Monday at the MHP's headquarters in Ankara, to address the Peace Train issue. He said that some countries have been using indirect methods to create disturbances among political, ethnic and religious communities in rival states. Bahçeli

labelled these indirect methods as "low intensity conflict," adding that the Peace Train was an example of this. The MHP chairman said that the groups protecting the PKK were using professional propaganda methods, which are aimed at accelerating the growth of separatist movements in Turkey.

When asked what would happen if the people, who would have attended the Peace Train campaign, tried to come Turkey by other means, such as by airplane, Bahçeli responded that all such initiatives should be prevented.

When questioned about not permitting his supporters from the youth branches to wear blue jeans, Bahçeli voiced his opposition to blue jeans, saying that they should wear suits, befitting of their political views.

## French nationalist leader expresses admiration for M. Kemal Atatürk

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Jean-Marie Le Pen, the French far-right leader, who has already created so much controversy in Turkey by secretly meeting with Islamist Welfare Party (RP) Leader Necmettin Erbakan last week at his summer mansion in Western Turkey, said he would vote for the Turkish Republic's Founder Kemal Atatürk in Time Magazine's public opinion survey to choose the best leader of the 20th Century. Le Pen, who is currently spending his vacation on Turkey's southern coastline, spoke to an Anatolia news agency reporter.

Neither Le Pen, a "denounced nationalist and anti-semitic leader" in France, whose rise to power

is described "unstoppable" at the moment, nor Erbakan, who has also frequently made anti-semitic remarks, have enlightened the public about their private tete-a-tete.

"If I were to take part in Time Magazine's survey, I'd vote for Atatürk. The number of his pictures and statues in Turkey is even much more than those of Hitler in Germany and of Roosevelt in the United States," Le Pen said. He said he was very saddened by the statements about him that he hated the Turks, saying that his wife, Jany was a member of a French family who lived in the western Turkish port city of Izmir, and that she had been born there.

Le Pen also said he admired Turkey's late nationalist leader, Alparslan Türkeş, who died few months ago. However, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chairman Devlet Bahçeli, Turkey's successor, called Le Pen a "racist leader," and condemned Erbakan's meeting with him.

Meanwhile the criticism against both Le Pen and Erbakan concerning their private meeting also continued this week. The governing Motherland Party (ANAP) deputy, Yaşar Okuyan, asked the RP leader to reveal the details of their conversation, saying both leaders were coming from completely different cultural backgrounds. Okuyan himself, was a former MHP member before he joined ANAP.

## Bilican: We will prevent PKK bases in Black Sea

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ General Director of Police Forces, Necati Bilican, said on Tuesday that they have taken the necessary measures to prevent the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) establishing bases in the Black Sea region of Turkey.

Meeting with the Republic of Moldavia's chief of police for the Gagauz region, Bilican said that they would instigate a cooperation with Gagauz Turks in Moldavia, in the field of security.

Emphasizing that Turkey has been struggling against terrorism since 1984, Bilican said that they have increased their

efforts by setting up bilateral contacts with related states, in order to prevent the PKK from receiving outside support.

When asked about the PKK's actions in the Black Sea region, Bilican responded that the organization has started to develop new strategies throughout the country.

"The separatists are locked within the eastern and south-eastern regions and they are trying to show off by creating propaganda. They are killing people for their own interests, and they have been receiving external support. Some states have foreign policies which are not in Turkey's interests, so the PKK is trying to cause chaos in Turkey,

with money paid by these states. The PKK has no supporters in Turkey, there are only a few groups of brainwashed people," said Bilican.

### Measures

Bilican said that Turkey has contacts with Iran, Armenia, Moldavia, the Russian Federation and Georgia, in order to prevent the activities of the PKK, and that they have taken the necessary measures against the PKK's efforts to establish bases in the Black Sea region.

"We have organized groups in the Black Sea region who have had special training in combatting terrorism," said Bilican.

Turkish Daily News

August 27, 1997

## PUK denies any cooperation with PKK

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Releasing a statement on Tuesday, the Ankara office of the Jalal Talabani-led Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) denied news reports about any cooperation between themselves and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

It was pointed out in the statement that the PUK was honoring the cease-fire in the region. "PKK-KDP clashes continue deep inside Dehouk province, far away from the PUK-KDP front lines. Therefore, the KDP's allegations of PUK support for the PKK are groundless, and are clearly meant to justify its failure to keep promises made to Turkey to eliminate the PKK," said the statement.

The PUK also called upon the sponsors of the peace process "to restrain Mr. Barzani from further adventures, and to intensify efforts to bring about a speedy and comprehensive implementation of the provisions of the Ankara accord of October 1996, including those pertaining to ending Barzani's piracy of the revenues of the region as well as normalizing the status of Arbil."

### Ethnic cleansing

In another statement released by the PUK, it was declared that "ethnic cleansing to 'Arabize' the Kurdistan region" has been carried out by Baghdad.

"The Kurdistan regional government's administrator of the Kirkuk province, Jalal Jawher, reports that during the last week, Iraqi authorities notified 440 Kurdish households in the district towns of Jalula and Qara-Tepa to leave their homes for southern Iraq or areas administered by the Kurdistan regional government," the statement announced.

Turkish Daily News

August 27, 1997

# Yerevan assures Ankara: 'We do not assist the PKK'

**Kaan Soyak of Turkish-Armenian Business Development Committee:  
'Baku-Ceyhan via Armenian territories has greater possibility'**

**Soyak: 'A positive result before next spring'**

## SAADET ORUÇ

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

■ Kaan Soyak, the head of the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Committee, pointed out on Wednesday that Yerevan had assured Turkey that they did not support the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

Briefing the Turkish Daily News about the increasing efforts to normalize ties between Turkey and Armenia, Soyak said that during their contact with high level Armenian officials, Aug. 1-5 in Yerevan, the Turkish businessmen told high ranking officials in Yerevan that their precondition to trading with Armenia was "a clear attitude against PKK separatism."

"General Staff has found no evidence that Armenia supports the PKK," claimed Soyak.

"We stated in Yerevan that no ties could be established between Armenia and Turkey, nor is there any indication that the PKK has received assistance from Armenia," Soyak said.

The main discussion regarding the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations is continuing over whether or not to open the border crossings between Turkey and Armenia.

Semsettin Uzun, governor of Igdir, appeared optimistic about the opening of the Alican and Doğukapı border gates, which is one of the most important elements of Turco-Armenian relations.

"Although the gate is closed we have a trade volume of \$100 million with Armenia conducted via Iran and Georgia. The estimated direct trade volume with Armenia would be \$500 million," said one source.

Commenting that the opening of the border crossing between Turkey and Armenia will permit Turkey to be more influential in Central Asian states, "Armenia has good ties with the Central Asian states," Soyak said.

He also pointed out that the American Armenian businessmen told them in Washington that the Turkish-Armenian hostility ended 10 years ago when Turkey sent aid of wheat and opened the air corridor.

## Baku-Ceyhan via Armenia

Soyak also stated that a pipeline, to be built between Baku and Ceyhan for the transportation of Caspian oil via Armenian territories, will have more chance than a pipeline via Georgia.

"Turkey has to consider its interests in the long term," said Soyak, referring to the uncertainty of the Azerbaijani government's choice for the route to carry Caspian oil to Western markets.

Armenian businessmen living in the United States are quite willing to make investments in Turkey, added Soyak. Both the United States and the Russian Federation are very much in favour of Armenia and Azerbaijan having good relations, said Soyak who also pointed out that it was really very important for regional peace. "There are already trade ties even between Armenians and Azerbaijanis along the Georgian border," said Soyak.

The committee, which was established on May 3, 1997, held its first meeting between August 1-5 in Yerevan after which a protocol was signed. The protocol is the first documentary step towards starting relations between the two countries after 80 years, said Soyak, adding that "we are being accepted as an interlocutor by the Foreign Ministry."

The group of Turkish business representatives were welcomed at the highest protocol level in Armenia and received by the minister of trade and leading Foreign Ministry officials, Soyak said.

"Georgia and Iran have gained much revenue because of the indirect trade between Armenia and Turkey. But we cannot only continue direct trade between the two countries, but also make Trabzon and Hopa [Turkish ports on Black Sea] some the biggest trade centers of the region, instead of Novorossiysk or Poti ports," said Berna Serdaroglu, the coordinator of the committee in an earlier interview with the TDN.

She also added that although there is no direct trade between Turkey and Armenia there is frequent use of Turkish-made goods in Armenia, making Georgia and Iran rich from that trade. Businessmen from Istanbul will tour Ardahan, Igdir and Kars in order to establish a common position for Turkish business circles to present to the government.

# 'Peace Train' participants arrive in Turkey by plane



The late Musa Anter (seated center) with Serhat Bucak (standing second from left), Eşber Yağmurdereli (standing fourth from left) and Ismail Beşikçi (standing far right).

August 29, 1997

Turkish Daily News

Some 120 foreign activists, seeking to end the 13-year separatist insurgency in southeast Turkey, arrive in Istanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakır

Most of the activists include European, American, African parliamentarians, writers, intellectuals and clergy, labor leaders

## REMZİ ÇAKIN

*Istanbul - Turkish Daily News*

■ Some 120 foreign activists, including European, American and African parliamentarians, writers, intellectuals and clergy have arrived in Turkey, calling for the end to the 13-year conflict between Turks and separatist Kurds, a spokesman for the group said Thursday.

The activists are members of the so-called "Musa Anter Peace Train," an initiative that began in 1995 and is named after a famed Kurdish writer killed in southeast Turkey in 1992 by unidentified gunmen.

They were supposed to arrive by train, but began arriving in Istanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakır by airplane instead after Turkey's Foreign Ministry said on Tuesday it would not

permit the Hamburg-Diyarbakır train to enter Turkish territory. Turkish officials accused the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is carrying out a bloody guerrilla war in the country's southeast corner, of organizing the trip. More than 20,000 civilians, soldiers and guerrillas have been killed in the conflict since the PKK launched its insurgency in 1984 to establish a Kurdish state in southeast Turkey.

The conflict has also left more than 3 million people as refugees, who have been forced to flee from their villages to cities in the region and the west. An estimated 2,759 villages in eastern and southeastern Turkey have been destroyed in the fighting.

The visitors demanded that Turkey find a peaceful solution to the conflict, which is undermining the country's political and economic stability.

"This war is not only affecting the Kurds, but the entire people (of Turkey). It is destroying the educational, health, welfare, cultural and humanitarian needs of 60 million people," the organizing committee of the trip said in a written statement.

It said that war was costing Turkey \$10 billion a year. "The future of Turkey is being turned over to the traders of war, darkening the hopes of the people," the statement said. The visitors included Italian Communist Party Deputy Luka Caceli; French academician Philippe Daumas; and Cenog Dafia, a member

of the British House of Commons.

A member of the French delegation Michael Kostigaff was hospitalized after he fell at Istanbul Atatürk International Airport and was injured.

The activists in Istanbul are expected to leave for Diyarbakir by bus from Kadıköy on Saturday.

Turkish officials said the travelers would not be met by any difficulty and those who are

not forbidden by to enter the country would be met by tolerance.

Musa Anter, the Kurdish intellectual and writer who the peace train initiative is named after, sought most of his life to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey. An idol among Kurds, he contributed to the recreation of an ethnic and cultural Kurdish identity in the Republican era through his writings and speeches.

*Turkish Daily News*

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## Baghdad urges Kurds to end western protection

Al-Iraq: The sound and practical solution (to the Kurdish issue) is...to resort to national dialogue under the hero and planner of (Kurdish) autonomy, the beloved leader Saddam Hussein

*Baghdad - Reuters*

■ Iraq's official press urged rebel Kurds on Saturday to end U.S.-led Western protection and open dialogue with Baghdad, a day before the anniversary of an Iraqi attack on a Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq.

"It is quite confirmed... that America will not bring any advantage (to the Kurds) and they will not gain any advantage from outside the (Iraqi) borders," the official al-Iraq daily said in a commentary.

Iraq's Kurdish north, outside the control of the central government since shortly after the 1991 Gulf War over Kuwait, has been protected by a U.S.-British air force

against possible attack from Baghdad.

But Iraqi forces intervened on the side of the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Massoud Barzani in August 1996 and helped them oust rebels of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani from Arbil, Iraqi Kurdistan's administrative center.

Washington, which opposes military involvement in the area by Baghdad, then launched punitive missile strikes against Iraqi air defence targets in southern Iraq.

"The lightning Iraqi strike against the snake's head in Arbil has contributed to the

destruction of the center of conspiracy and aggression in Arbil under the umbrella of 'protecting Kurds'," al-Qadissiya said in a commentary.

"Whether it takes longer or shorter, Iraq's Kurdistan will not remain under these extraordinary conditions," the paper predicted.

Al-Iraq said: "The sound and practical solution (to the Kurdish issue) is... to resort to national dialogue under the hero and planner of (Kurdish) autonomy, the beloved leader Saddam Hussein."